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*The Czar, Nicholas II, Emperor of All the Russias, congratulating  
his officers. At the extreme left is the tall figure of the Grand  
Duke Nicholas*

Deus Virentes

Deus Virentes, at the present time is the  
most beautiful and most interesting of the world.

*The*  
STORY OF THE  
GREAT WAR

CRACOW · WARSAW  
POLISH CAMPAIGN  
THE DARDANELLES



V O L U M E I V

P. F. COLLIER & SON, NEW YORK



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# PART I—THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAMPAIGN

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## CHAPTER I

### RESULTS OF FIRST BATTLES

THOUGH described as a punitive expedition in the Vienna press, this campaign cost the Austrians very dear, not only in material and in lives, but in prestige. Just what the Austrian casualties were cannot be definitely stated at this time, but at least 6,000 were killed outright on the field of battle, while at least 35,000 were wounded. And another 4,000 fell into the hands of the Serbians as prisoners. In material the Serbians report that they captured 46 cannon, 30 machine guns, 140 ammunition wagons, and a great mass of rifles, hospital paraphernalia, ammunition, stores, and other incidentals.

The Serbian losses were heavy: 3,000 dead and 15,000 wounded. That they were so much less is not extraordinary, for not only were they on the defensive, but an army in flight, as were the Austrian, always loses heavily.

The first onslaught of the Austrians in August, 1914, had been driven back. A disorganized mob, the soldiers of Franz Josef had fled back across the Drina and the Save, leaving thousands of dead and prisoners behind. And for over a week the little Serbian army lay panting.

Military science says that a victory should always be followed up closely, for a beaten army is almost as helpless as a herd of cattle. But military science must also take into account the limitations of human muscles and nerves. The Serbian reserve forces had been moving back and forth along the fighting front,

strengthening a defense here, supporting an attack there, and some of them had covered from fifty to sixty miles a day. There were no fresh troops to pursue the Austrians. The Serbians needed rest. And so the Austro-Hungarian soldiers were allowed to continue their northward flight unmolested.

Thus for twelve days after the Battle of Shabatz, or from August 23, 1914, there was quiet along the Austrian and Serbian frontier. The remnants of the Austrians had definitely retired northward. And at about that time the Russians were driving hard at the Galician front. The Austrians were being beaten there, too. Altogether the situation looked extremely serious for Austria at that time. But, finally, encouraged by the Allies, the Serbian General Staff decided to send an expedition over into Austrian territory.

Not much over twenty miles north of Shabatz is a range of mountains, called the Frushkagora. A fairly strong force holding these rocky ridges would be in a position to prevent the Austrian general from reenforcing his armies in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the east. It would also afford a better protection to the northern frontier of Serbia than would a force of the same size stationed within Serbian territory along the Save River. The chief thought of the Serbian general was, however, to gain control of this natural position and hold it while another Serbian force was invading Bosnia, in conjunction with the Montenegrin troops. What made this first objective the more tempting was the known fact that between the frontier and the Frushkagora range the Austrian forces amounted only to about a dozen regiments.

To the First Army, General Putnik assigned the execution of this expedition. That was now composed of two divisions, and the cavalry division, which had rendered such excellent service on the Matchva Plain during the first invasion. The left wing of this expeditionary force was to be supported by a division in Matchva, while the "Detachment of Belgrade" was to operate on the right. A second reserve division was to hold Obrenovatz.

Another glance at the map will show that, almost halfway between Shabatz and Belgrade, the Save takes a peculiar little



loop into Serbian territory, forming a narrow strip of Austrian territory projecting into Serbia. Naturally, this little tongue could be commanded by the Serbian guns without first crossing the river, since the Austrians could only operate here by marching down in a narrow column between the two sides of the loop formed by the river. Such a force, however, could be immediately flanked by the Serbians from their side of the river. This peculiar peninsula, known as the Kupinski Kut, was chosen as the point at which the first crossing should be made.

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## CHAPTER II

### SERBIAN ATTEMPT TO INVADE AUSTRIAN TERRITORY

IT was the night of September 5, 1914. So secretly was this movement planned and begun that the Serbian field officers did not themselves know what was to be undertaken when their forces arrived on the banks of the river at the Kut on the nights of September 5 and 6. The marches were made at night, to hide the movement as long as possible from the Austrian aeroplanes, which occasionally whirled their flight over Serbian territory.

At one o'clock in the morning of September 6, 1914, the first troops of the invading expedition embarked on the barges lined up along the river bank. A screening force having been ferried across, to protect the ford against possible attack, the construction of a pontoon bridge was begun at Novoselo, while farther up some flour mill floats were utilized for a second bridge.

It was an ideal place for a crossing. Farther up, at the neck of the isthmus, was an old river bed, where the Save had once cut a straight channel. This was now full of stagnant water, while between it and the ford the ground was covered with thick timber. The stagnant water, while not very deep, afforded somewhat the same protection that a wire entanglement would, and the woods served as a screen to the advance guard of the Serbians

stationed there to guard the crossing. Not far distant, farther up in Austrian territory, was a small town, Obrez.

After the Serbian army had crossed safely, it set to work clearing the timber away, it being no longer necessary to screen themselves from view, and a strong line of trenches was thrown across the neck of the isthmus, thus effectually protecting the ford for retreat, should that be necessary.

At this moment two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery of the enemy appeared and attempted to oppose the further advance of the Serbians, but when the Serbian guns began shelling the forest opposite, this force fled in the direction of Obrez. Then the left of the Serbian force worked its way around toward the town itself and, after firing some dozens of shells, entered it and drove the Austrians still farther on.

The cavalry division now came up to secure possession of the town. The two divisions then set to work to intrench themselves. Meanwhile the Serbian right, advancing toward the northeast, encountered another force of the enemy, consisting of one regiment and two batteries, and, after a short skirmish, drove it back and occupied the two villages, Kupinovo and Progar. Thus the Serbian operations in this section fared well.

But at another point, on the extreme left, at Mitrovitza, they did not encounter such good fortune. The division operating here was to occupy and fortify Mitrovitza and with it a bridge, after which it was to advance and worry the enemy's flank. The actual point chosen for the construction of the bridge was a customs station at Jasenova Grada, between Mitrovitza and Jarak.

The column here had arrived at the river bank at midnight of September 5, 1914, and at early dawn had begun building the pontoon bridge. Meanwhile a steady artillery and rifle fire was kept up, sweeping the opposite bank, to keep back the enemy. The Serbian commander of this force had received instructions to the effect that as soon as he had moved his troops across safely, he was to send two regiments forward: one to the right, the other to the left, and the whole line was to advance and cover the territory between Mangjeloskabara and Shashinshi, the object being to push back any movement of the Austrians from Jarak.

As at Novoselo, an advance guard crossed in barges before the bridge had been thrown across. Immediately a heavy fire began from the enemy, hidden in the opposite forest. Many of the Serbians threw themselves into the river, and either swam or waded the rest of their way across.

Finally three barge loads had effected a crossing. While waiting for the rest to follow, sixty of the Serbians threw themselves over against the Austrians and, by their very boldness, drove them out of their trenches and took twenty prisoners.

Some delay in the building of the bridge followed, but more barge loads of soldiers were sent across, and the fighting with the Austrians was pushed vigorously. But meanwhile the enemy was also being reenforced, more rapidly for not having a river behind him. By evening the Serbians, who had crossed, found themselves tremendously outnumbered and fighting on the defensive. At that time, one of the Serbian regiments, which had advanced as far as Shashinshi, found itself isolated, with both flanks exposed.

After two hours of stubborn fighting the regiment managed to draw back to the river bank, carrying with them a mass of wounded comrades, hoping there to find the support of the main body of their army. But the pontoon bridge had not yet been completed. Of the 400 yards across the river, only twenty remained unbridged. Seeing their advantage, the pursuing Austrians redoubled their attack furiously. The Serbian regiment, with half its men down, and only 60 feet of water between itself and the main corps, turned, with its back to the river, and fought back with equal fury.

With frantic haste, the Serbian engineers attempted to finish the building of their bridge, so that the main body of the troops might rush across and relieve the situation of the regiment defending itself against overwhelming numbers on the opposite bank. But before this could be accomplished, the wounded began throwing themselves into the pontoon nearest their side of the river. The mooring lines parted and the barge drifted away from the end of the bridge, down the river, loaded with wounded soldiers. The same happened to the next barge. To add to the



disaster, the barges were old and leaky, and soon one of them filled with water and began sinking. Presently it sank, throwing the wounded into the river, where most of them were speedily drowned.

The Serbians on the Austrian shore, now seeing their last hope of support or escape cut off, continued fighting desperately until all their ammunition was gone. Then the handful of survivors surrendered. By this time it was already dark. The only one to escape across the river was the regimental surgeon who, carrying the regimental flag between his teeth, swam across the river and reached the main body of his countrymen safely.

Fortunately, the recklessness which led this attempted crossing to disaster did not characterize the movements of the main body which had crossed at Novoselo. The advance continued under carefully thrown out screens of cavalry, and was kept up until the trenches at the landing could be abandoned and a wider circle of defensive works could be thrown up, including within their line the villages already mentioned. Thus the three Serbian bases were strongly protected by a semicircle of field works, radiating from Kupinovo. Having secured this position, General Boyovitch, the Serbian field commander, advanced his cavalry in fanlike formation to the north and west. One division followed the cavalry on the right; another took a northeasterly direction.

By the evening of September 7, 1914, the enemy had been driven back to a line reaching from Detch to Nikintzi. No serious encounters occurred for some days, the Austrians evidently not desiring to make any serious opposition until they should have sufficient backing. But on the morning of September 9, 1914, the Serbian right came in contact with strongly entrenched Austrians at Detch and Surchin. During the first invasion the fighting had been under a tropical sun. Now the weather was cooler, almost cold at nights, which rendered the enthusiasm and the fighting of the men on both sides correspondingly more spirited. It was, therefore, with some vim that the Serbians threw themselves into an attack against Detch.

After a determined resistance, the Austrians were forced out. Next Surchin became the center of battle, but here the Austrians held out stoutly, driving back the Serbian charges again and again.

All that day of September 9, 1914, the Serbian advance was checked, but the following morning, being reenforced, they charged into Surchin again and finally drove the Austrians out at the point of the bayonet. The Serbians then turned north and captured Dobranovtsi. And at this junction the Serbians stationed at Belgrade crossed the river there and advanced on Semlin.

On September 11, 1914, General Boyovitch moved his whole front forward, with the object of driving all of the enemy westward into the Frushkagora Mountains and gaining full possession of the plain. This would have left the two divisions and the cavalry free to advance against the mountain range itself. Having once gained that stronghold, the Serbians would then have under their control the whole district of Syrmia with its friendly population of Serbs.

The Serbians were now extended along a front from Hrtkovtsi to Pazova Nova while the Austrians were intrenched along a line from Jarak to Pazova Stara. The following morning the Serbian left occupied Pechintsi and advanced north to the Romer Canal, where they met a heavy fire and were compelled to intrench themselves. Farther west, however, the Serbians rushed the town of Jarak and took it by means of bayonets and hand bombs.

Such was the situation on September 12, 1914, when a bright, clear morning had dawned and a cool breeze swept over the plain. Off in the distance rose the blue ridges of the Frushkagora Mountains, streaked with the green of vegetation along their lower spurs. With tingling blood and renewed vitality the Serbians looked forward to the word of command which should send them onward, driving the Austrians before them.

But that word of command seemed long delayed. Finally, indeed, it came, but only to the cavalry. The horsemen were sent ahead, up and down the line, screening the men in the



trenches. And then suddenly came the word to the men in the trenches.

"March!"

They did fall in and begin to march. But not forward. The heads of the columns turned toward the rear, back toward Serbia. Presently the whole Serbian army, just as further victories seemed all but won, was on the retreat. Behind them they heard the fire of their own cavalry, protecting their rear. The retreat was orderly and the river was recrossed without loss or confusion. Even more concerned and disappointed were the Serb peasants of the villages through which they passed, for these simple folk had thought the Magyars permanently beaten and that King Peter's men were now moving onward to take Vienna. They had, therefore, shown unmeasured enthusiasm and had showered gifts of chicken, milk, eggs and other rural dainties on their brother Serbs from Serbia, to the full extent of their slender resources. A few days later they had to pay dearly for this manifestation of their sympathies. When again the Magyars came down into their territory they became so oppressive toward these poor villagers that a Croatian regiment, whose members were racially akin to the Serbs, broke into open revolt and attacked the Magyars, the result being a pitched battle in which not only rifles, but machine guns and cannon were employed. Presently word was passed back and forth among the rank and file of the Serbian army explaining the disappointing retreat.

"The Austrians are swarming across the Drina again," their officers whispered. "There will be plenty of fighting yet, but it will be the same old battle ground."

Thus ended Serbia's brief invasion of Austrian soil.

## CHAPTER III

## AUSTRIA'S SECOND INVASION

THE second Austrian invasion of Serbia began September 7, 1914. Had the Serbian General Staff known what mighty efforts the Austrians were to put forth at this second attempt to invade the country, it would never have undertaken the expedition into Syrmia. After the failure of the first invasion the Austrian staff placed at General Potiorek's disposition a force of 300,000 men, with a reserve of another 150,000 to draw upon, should the necessity become strong enough. Fortunately for the Serbians the Russian pressure in Galicia became so strong, later on, that this reserve force was sent through the Carpathians, and when the critical moment did arrive, General Potiorek was unable to avail himself of its assistance.

It may be well to know how the Austrian forces were disposed just before the second invasion. There were five whole army corps; one was stretched out from Klenak to Bosut; another from Bosut to Bijeljina; another from Janja to Kosluk and another from Kosluk to Zvornik. Aside from this force there was part of another corps lined up from Zvornik to Liubovia and one and a half divisions held the front from Semlin to Weisskirchen. Four battalions were kept busy by the Montenegrins.

It will be remembered that when the expedition into Syrmia began the bulk of the Serbian army was sent to the western frontier along the Drina, to be ready to invade Bosnia when the success of the Syrmia expedition should be assured. But so well is Bosnia wooded in this section that the Serbians had not been able to observe the concentration of troops that was going on before them across the Drina.

Suddenly, on the morning of September 7, 1914, the whole frontier along the Drina, from Jarak south, became alive with Austrian soldiers. North of Loznitza the fighting took on a very bloody and deadly character. All day the battle line swayed back and forth with a succession of attacks and counterattacks.

Several times the Austrians almost broke through, but in the end their whole line was driven back across the river. In the Matchva district, however, they succeeded in holding a triangular patch of swamp land, bounded by Ravjne, Tolich and Jarak. But even here they were checked along a line from Ravjne to Tolich, where both sides intrenched and came to a deadlock for the time being. Here the two opposing lines continued their trench warfare without much spectacular demonstration, but with a tremendous loss of life to both sides and an expenditure of ammunition which the Serbians could little afford.

Along the line south of Loznitza the fighting was not so favorable to the Serbians. The forces stationed here had been weakened in the Syrmia expedition. And then, too, the country being extremely mountainous, they had overestimated the strength of their positions.

Here, on the morning of September 8, 1914, the Austrians began a general advance, beginning at Liubovia. At first they were successfully held back, but when they came on again with greatly augmented numbers, the Serbians were finally compelled to retire to a line of hills running from Guchevo, through Jagodina and Proslop to Rozani, where they intrenched themselves and prepared to resist any further advance.

The Austrians, however, continued to attack. Around Kruapani below Loznitza, the Serbians made a stubborn defense and succeeded in holding the heights of Kostainik. But their southern, or left, wing continued to be driven back.

By September 11, 1914, the Austrians had advanced as far as a line drawn from Shanatz to Petska. At this critical moment, however, one of the divisions of the force that had been recalled from Syrmia arrived and the combined forces were ordered to advance against the Sokolska Mountains, whose ridges were occupied by the Austrians.

The Serbians rushed the heights with their customary élan. The Austrians resisted stubbornly. They, in their turn, had been tasting the first draughts of victory, and were not so prepared to give in as on previous occasions. For a long time the fighting was hand to hand. The men even hurled big rocks at



each other, grappled together in each other's arms and fought with knives and teeth. But finally some of the Austrians broke and scattered and presently all of them fled. Their trenches and ground on both sides of them, however, were covered with dead, Serbians and Austrians promiscuously mingling together.

So complete was the Serbian victory that their troops were now able to advance and form a new line from Shanatz to Brodjanska Glavitz, with the cavalry patrolling clear down to the Drina at Liubovia.

Further north, however, the Austrians were still in possession of Matchko Kamen (Cat Rock). Here the fighting had been most terrific, the heights having been taken and retaken no less than eight times. This position dominated all the country around within artillery range. By taking this strategic point the Serbians would have had complete possession of a chain of heights which begin with Guchevo on the north, and would have constituted a natural frontier which could have been held with a minimum force of troops and expenditure of ammunition. But this move was not carried out. Both sides were literally tired out. The Serbians were unable to advance any farther, while the Austrians were content with not being driven back any farther. They were, also, no doubt worried by the fact that down in the southern section the Serbians had succeeded in not only driving the Austrians across the river, but had even advanced some distance into the Bosnian hills.

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## CHAPTER IV

### END OF SECOND INVASION—BEGINNING OF THIRD

THUS the second Austrian invasion was checked. The strategy was, perhaps, not so spectacular as in the first invasion, but the losses to both sides had been much heavier. In killed, wounded and prisoners the Austrians lost fully 30,000 of their men. There

now followed a situation somewhat similar to that up in northern France; both sides were deeply intrenched and in some parts faced each other over only a few yards of neutral ground. Again and again the Austrians delivered attacks, attempting to break through the Serbian positions. All the arts of trench warfare were employed by the Austrians to overcome the Serbian resistance, but the Serbian engineers showed themselves at least their equals in such maneuvers. At one time they successfully mined over a hundred yards of Austrian trenches and blew 250 of its defenders into the air.

As for the Serbians, their attempts to break through the Austrian positions were fatally hampered by a shortage of ammunition. At one point they did, in fact, succeed in breaking through and then suddenly the ammunition supply came to an end and the Serbians had to retire again, leaving the Austrians to return to the trenches from which they had just been ejected.

Up in the northwest the Austrians also held a narrow strip of Serbian territory, along the Drina from Kuriachista up, but with this small exception they were confined to their side of the river until the triangular tract in the northeast of the Matchva Plain was reached, previously mentioned.

Along the Save from Parashnitsa to Shabatz they had also attempted a southward movement, where they were supported by five river monitors. During the period of comparatively little activity which now followed the Serbians were much worried by these monitors, which patrolled up and down the river at night, throwing their searchlights on and exposing the Serbian trenches. Then, too, they could hurl bombs into the Serbian positions with almost absolute impunity, for whenever the Serbian shells struck the heavy armor of these river fortresses they rolled off harmlessly.

On the night of October 22, 1914, the Serbians sent some mines floating down the river, one of which struck a monitor and sank it in deep water.

For nearly six weeks through November, 1914, this deadlock continued. But during all this time, the Austrian General Staff was quietly preparing for another grand drive through Serbia.



It was then that the 150,000 reserve, previously mentioned, was assigned to General Potiorek's disposal, while his first line was also materially strengthened.

Nor did the third invasion begin with any dramatic effort. The pressure was applied gradually, little by little, until the Serbs were finally face to face with the necessity of shortening their lines, if they were not to be broken through. Other causes besides the increasing pressure from the Austrians contributed to the general causes.

Winter was coming on in earnest now. The low bottom lands in the Matchva Plain were becoming waterlogged; it was impossible to keep the trenches from filling. The Serbians had, in the first place, made a mistake in attempting to hold these Matchva levels. On such battle grounds, the Magyars, from their own level plains, were too nearly their equals. On level ground, too, the defenders have less the advantage, unless they are in equal number, and the Serbians were everywhere in smaller number. This inferiority, too, made it less possible for the Serbian soldiers to obtain periods of rest away from the constant vigilance necessary in the first line trenches. The result was that they were under a more severe strain. They were subjected to all the drawbacks of trench warfare at its worst, without the respite that is usually accorded to men under these conditions on other fronts. The nerve-racking strain thus imposed became finally more than ordinary human beings could endure. Small wonder that the correspondents with the Serbian army reported many cases of insanity among the men in the trenches.

Finally the order came to withdraw from the Matchva Plain, to the foothills of the Tzer Mountains and the heights along the right bank of the Dobrava River. This retreat, made in the face of no specially strong attack, did not a little to depress the Serbian rank and file. It was beginning to feel that its strength was sapping away.

It was soon obvious that a more general retirement would now become necessary. Complete command of the Tzer Mountains could not be attained without the expenditure of more energy and ammunition than the Serbians could afford at this

time. So a general withdrawal was ordered, along the whole line. The Austrians, many of them fresh troops, unused to defeat, followed up in the footsteps of the retreating Serbians with enthusiastic vigor, from Shabatz to Liubovia. And presently Valievo, the railroad terminus and the first objective of the Austrians, became untenable.

On November 11, 1914, the Serbians were compelled to evacuate this city. Its capture was the first step in the progress of the Austrians toward Kragujevatz, Nish and a junction with the Turks near Constantinople. Still, as later events will show, the Serbians were by no means the beaten rabble described by the Vienna press. The score or more of cannon which the Serbians were compelled to abandon on account of the bad condition of the mountain roads were hailed as evidence of a hardly won campaign, and the stragglers captured were accepted as signs of a demoralization which had as yet not set in.

On the other hand, whether this first success was real or not, it did serve to inspire the Austrian troops with an enthusiasm which they had hitherto not possessed.

The Serbians had not yet been driven back on the line along which they had originally intended to make their first stand against the invaders. During the period between the first mobilization and the beginning of the first invasion on August 12, 1914, what are referred to as the Kolubara and Lyg positions had been strongly intrenched. But it had not proven necessary to fall back on these positions; the Austrians had been driven back at once. But now, after the fall of Valievo, the Serbians decided to make no further resistance to the Austrian advance until this line was reached.

The Kolubara River itself is not of sufficient width to hold back an advancing army long, but in places its banks rise so high and steep that it serves very much the same purpose as a moat before a castle. In such places comparatively few men could hold back a large number of the enemy. A little south of Lazarevatz the line of intrenchments left the Kolubara and followed the Lyg River, where the country was even more rugged. From the source of the Lyg the Serbians had fortified the Jeljak

and Maljen ridges, which control practically all the roads leading to Kragujevatz and, proceeding in a southwesterly direction, they threw up earthworks on the Bukovi, Varda, Jelova, Bukovic, Miloshevatz and Leska Gora ranges, which defended an advance toward the Western Morava Valley.

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## CHAPTER V

### PRELIMINARY AUSTRIAN SUCCESSES

IT was along this line that in November, 1914, the Serbians determined the decisive battle of the campaign should be fought. At Obrenovatz was stationed a strong brigade, known as the "Detachment of Obrenovatz." Further south, at Konatich, on the Kolubara River, the cavalry division cooperated with the Second Army, which held the line from Volujak to Cooka and the ridges farther to the left. The Third Army occupied the right bank of the Lyg River from Barzilovitzza to Ivanovchi. The First Army stretched itself out from Gukoshi to Ruda and along the Jeljak ridges to Maljen. And finally the "Army of Uzitsa," which had fought so brilliantly before in the southern section and penetrated into Bosnia, was assigned the protection of the base at Uzitsa and the Western Morava; it intrenched itself from a point southwest of Yassenovatz, through Prishedo, along the Jelova crests, after which it crossed over to the heights of the Leska Gora to Shanatz.

This new line, much shorter than that previously held, enabled the Serbians to contract. Moreover, all the country was favorable to defense. Nowhere was it so screened that an approaching enemy could surprise them. Here, certainly, one defender was equal to two invaders.

Apparently the Austrian commanders realized that they had genuine obstacles to overcome, for they did not proceed with any impetuous haste. It was six weeks before they had advanced so far as to come into real contact with the new Serbian line.



During that interval they had been preparing for this kind of mountain warfare, by bringing up special mountain artillery and men who had had experience in just such a country on the Italian front.

It was mid-November, 1914, before the Austrians were ready to deliver their first assaults. Almost every garrison in the town of Bosnia had been drawn on to swell their numbers and the troops brought up from the Italian front amounted to a whole army corps. All in all, there were about 250 battalions of infantry, in addition to cavalry, artillery and engineer corps.

One feature of this third invasion, which had not attended the first and second, was the vast number of refugees who now came fleeing through the Serbian lines. Their ox carts and their flocks blocked the roads, old men and women and children thronged the trails in their mad haste to get away from the advancing Austrians. Their reports of the vast numbers of the enemy that they had seen may not have helped to encourage the Serbian soldiers, but, on the other hand, they gave reports, somewhat exaggerated, perhaps, of such hideous atrocities committed by the Magyars that henceforth the Serbians were to fight with an added bitterness and hatred.

Allowing for a certain amount of exaggeration, there still seems to be solid foundation for the reports of atrocities committed by the Austrians in Serbia. But this seems to be a circumstance inseparable from any war. And, naturally, the invaders are necessarily always the guilty ones. The Serbians did not commit atrocities for the very simple reason that they never had the opportunity to come in among the enemy's villages. Had they invaded the Hungarian plains there would undoubtedly have been atrocities committed on both sides. An army like the Austrian, composed of so many different nationalities and races, would naturally be more susceptible to such excesses.

Whatever their reasons for waiting so long before their next general attack, the Austrians had, at any rate, played into the hands of their enemy to the extent that they had allowed him

to accumulate a plentiful supply of ammunition. Moreover, more was coming, sent by the Allies and this had a cheering effect on the men.

On the morning of November 15, 1914, the Austrians began their first attack. It developed principally against the Second Army, south of Lazarevat, and against the Užitsha detachment in the direction of Kosjerich. For five days the Austrians sent successive waves dashing against the Serbian walls, but each was repelled, hurled back, with comparatively little effort. How determined the Austrians were may be judged from the fact that the Serbians now took more prisoners than they had during all the previous operations.

Meanwhile the Austrians were also making a determined effort to take Belgrade; an effort, as will be described later, which was also to have an initial success. But, considering the unfamiliarity of even the best informed with the Serbian country, it will, perhaps, be wiser to take each theatre by itself. The operations before Belgrade, anyhow, were not closely connected with those in the interior of the country.

It seemed as though during those first five days of fighting the Austrians were merely testing the relative strength of the various sections of the Serbian line. On November 20, 1914, a powerful force of Austrians advanced and took possession of Milovatz, in close contact with the right flank of the First Army. Another column drove at its center at Ruda and successfully stormed the heights of Strazhara. The next day these movements developed into a mighty assault on the Serbian positions in this section. All day the Serbians held their ground, but toward evening the center weakened, then caved in, collapsed. The result was that the whole First Army was beaten back with heavy loss, until it was finally able to make another stand along the line from Babina Glava to Rajac.

The fire of the renewed attack flared up and down the front. The Third Army of the Serbians succeeded in holding its ground. Between the Užitsha detachment and the Austrians the fighting was especially bloody, but neither side gained any distinct advantage.



But the retirement of the First Army from its strong position from Ruda to Gukoshi was disastrous, not only from a purely military aspect, but also in that it sent a wave of depression up and down the whole line of Serbians. This loss might be retrieved by an effective artillery support, but again the Serbians were feeling a shortage of ammunition. Armed Bulgarian bands entering Serbia from Bulgaria had finally succeeded in interrupting railroad traffic, and the supply of ammunition had been abruptly broken off.

Fortunately for the Serbians, the Austrians showed their usual disinclination of following up their success immediately. Their center rested while their mountain brigades delivered a rather feeble attack on the Serbian extreme left, on the line from Varda to Gruda.

It was November 24, 1914, before the Austrians came on in force again. This time the Second Serbian Army was forced back; to a line running from Galvitza to Smyrdlykovatz and the heights of Cooka were taken. The Uzitsha army was also forced to retire, on to the Goinjagora Mountains, at the head of the Western Morava Valley. The Austrians now also attempted to outflank the extreme left of the Serbian line. With this object in view they shot their mountain brigades down along their right, until the threatened Serbian flank was compelled to swing back to protect itself from an enveloping movement.

Finally, on November 28, 1914, the Uzitsha Army was able to make a determined stand along the heights from Kita to Markovitza.

In the south the Serbians had suffered a serious setback. Counterattacks were of little avail. How desperately the Serbians resisted may be judged from the fact during one of their counterattacks, made at Salinatz, they took prisoner seven officers and 1,580 men. In general, however, they were forced back, step by step. One by one, each succeeding ridge fell into the hands of the invaders. And finally the dominating ridges of the Suvobor Mountains were in complete possession of the Austrians.

In the north the Serbians had made a better showing. Along the Kolubara River the fighting had been especially heavy. One Aus-

trian division had even succeeded in penetrating as far as Progon, on November 24, 1914, but it was finally driven back by the cavalry division with heavy loss.

The result of this stage of the fighting was that the Serbians had again been compelled to lengthen their lines; their front now extended from Tchatchak to Belgrade, almost seventy miles.

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## CHAPTER VI

### CRISIS OF THE CAMPAIGN—AUSTRIAN DEFEAT

WE have now arrived at the critical point, not only of the third Austrian invasion, but of all the military operations in the Serbian theatre. If the Austrians should now again be driven back, it would be practically impossible for them to make another invasion unaided, at least so long as they were engaged with Russia. And, on the other hand, if the Serbians lost now, the whole country was lost. The climax was at hand. For this reason it may be well to define again the position and the strength of the two opposing lines.

On November 28, 1914, the Serbian units were disposed as follows: The Second Army, from Vechani to Vagan; the Third Army, from Kalanjevchi to Kelja; the First Army, from Silopaj to Galich; the Uzitsha Army, from Kita to Markovitz.

The Austrians had four mountain brigades in the direction of the Western Morava Valley; about one and a half army corps on the road along Valievo to Milanovatz; an entire corps against Lazarevatz and two corps moving eastward against the Serbian line from Belgrade to Mladenovatz.

On the night of November 29, 1914, to shorten this long line the Serbians decided to withdraw from Belgrade. A redistribution of the Serbian forces was then made as follows: the troops from the Kolubara retired to the heights about Sibnitz and the Belgrade detachment was thrown astride the Belgrade-Nish Rail-

road along the summits of Varoonitza in the east and Kosmai in the west. Elsewhere the positions remained practically the same as before. Apparently General Putnik felt that the retreat of the First Army, which had caused the general retirement of the Serbian front, had not been absolutely necessary, for the commander of that force was now relieved and in his place was appointed General Mishitch, a member of the General Staff. How wise this change was may be judged from the later behavior of the First Army, which was destined yet to retrieve itself.

To the trained military observer, the strategic plan of the Austrians would by this time have become apparent. With the Suvobor Mountains as a central pivot, they had strengthened their wings and attempted to swing around in the north by Mladenovatz and south down the Western Morava Valley. Had this movement been safely accomplished the mass of the Serbian army, together with their arsenal at Kragujevatz, would have been rounded up, after which the new Serbian capital, Nish, would have followed easily and Serbia would have been completely in Austrian hands.

On December 2, 1914, this was the plan which the Austrians were putting into execution, in rather a leisurely way, when the Serbians, having drawn in their breath for a final effort, began their great counterattack. Nor can there be any doubt that the Austrians were completely surprised by this sudden renewal of the Serbian strength. It is only necessary to read the press dispatches from Vienna, issued during the few days previous, to be convinced that General Potiorek had reported the Serbians as completely defeated. Not only the Austrians, but the whole world was surprised by the startling change that now took place in the Serbian theatre.

Under the command of General Mishitch, the First Army hurled itself against Suvobor and, after a bloody three days' struggle, took the heights and pushed in the Austrian center, driving its forces in this section in a disorganized flight toward Valievo. The days that ended the first invasion were renewed. Nor was this flight a mere sudden panic; it had, in fact, risen in a crescendo, from a small beginning, until it developed into a veritable débâcle.



At first the Austrians had attempted an orderly withdrawal, as testified by their effort to take with them all their heavy artillery. The scene that occurred near Gorni Toplitza will serve to illustrate the whole retreat. Here, where the road winds around a commanding bluff, which overlooks a valley, the Austrians had planted a battery of field guns, right on the edge of the cliff. In the road leading up to this height were placed a score of ammunition wagons from which little two-wheeled carts were employed to carry the ammunition up to the guns. Deployed on the flank of this position, the Serbian gunners had suddenly covered it with a terrible enfilading fire and men, horses, carts, and wagons lay in a mangled heap. There were dead horses in the shafts of the carts, whose bridles were still clutched by the hands of dead men. Some few had tried to escape the avalanche of flying steel and as they ran they hurled from them caps, ammunition, haversacks and rifles only to be raked down before they could reach the shelter of a neighboring ravine. And this was merely one little corner of the general scene. All along the road to Valievo the ground was strewn with material, even to the rations of the soldiers, jolted out of the knapsacks as they were cast down by their fleeing owners.

During that first day of fighting the First Army captured twelve officers, 1,500 men, five mountain howitzers and four machine guns, then advanced, until by nightfall it was able to take up a position along a line from Kostuniche to Vranovicha. During this time the Uzitsha Army was fiercely attacked in its position on both sides of the Western Morava Valley, but it succeeded in driving back the assaults. The Third Army had also advanced slowly toward Lipet, taking over 500 prisoners and two machine guns. The Second Army met desperate opposition, but finally began surging ahead and soon sent in its share of captured war material and prisoners.

In the north an important force of the Austrians was making toward Belgrade, to lead a triumphal entry. Reconnoitering parties, sent out from the flank of this body, were seen in the direction of Slatina and Popovitch.

The decided successes of this first day's fighting acted

as a powerful stimulant on the previously depressed Serbian rank and file, though they still realized that there was many a hard fought attack to be driven into the vitals of the ponderous body of the enemy before he could be finally hurled back across the frontier. The Austrians still remained in possession of mountain positions of great natural strength, which could only be taken at the point of the bayonet. But the Serbians had recovered their *morale*; again they were fighting with that energy and vigor which had characterized their assaults during the first and second invasions. And they were amply rewarded.

By December 5, 1914, the First Army had retaken the dominating heights of the Suvobor Mountains and the summit of Rajatz. The Third Army, after buckling back a stubborn resistance, advanced as far as Vrlaja during the day. During that same night the Austrians were driven from Lipet, leaving 2,000 of their own number behind as prisoners. The Second Army, on its part, had pushed steadily on and by night it reached Kremenitza and Barosnevat. The Uzitsha Army, opposed by greater numbers, was unable to participate in the general forward movement, but, on the other hand, it held its own during the day's fighting. During that night it hurled itself at the enemy, and by morning he was retreating toward Zelenibreg.

There was now no longer any doubt that the chances of success for this third invasion of Serbia were beginning to assume very slender proportions. The three army corps in the Austrian center and right had been completely broken and were now retreating in mad, disorganized flight toward Valievo and Rogatitza. Even should the Serbians fail to follow up this section of the enemy's forces with full vigor; even should it have a few days for reforming, the loss of so much war material made such a possibility very difficult. There would hardly be time, under any circumstance, to draw fresh supplies from over the frontier before the Serbians could come up with them.

On December 7, 1914, the Uzitsha Army reached Pozega. The First Army, after storming and taking the heights of Maljen, advanced and formed a line between Maljen and Toplitza. The



Third Army made a strong push forward and reached the line from Milovatz to Dubovitzza, making a great haul of guns and prisoners. Only the Second Army failed to make any headway. Obviously, the Austrian field commander realized that the situation in the center was lost; this would account for his attempted diversion in the north. Here two Austrian corps held their ground successfully and they not only were able to check the advance of the Second Army, but they advanced to an attack against the detachment of Belgrade at Kosmai and Varoonitzza.

On the whole, however, the fortunes of war had, during that day, rested decidedly with the Serbians. They had captured 29 officers, 6,472 men, 27 field guns, 1 mountain gun, 15 gun carriages, 56 wagons loaded with artillery ammunition and between 500 and 600 ordinary transport wagons. Above all, the situation in the south, where it had at first seemed most hopeless, was now retrieved beyond question and the Austrians in that section were fleeing helter-skelter before a lively Serbian advance, led by the Serbian Generals Yourishich and Mishitch.

The next day, December 8, 1914, began with hard fighting around Uzitsha, but the division here (the Uzitsha detachment), was not to be pressed back on its very own home soil; the Austrian lines wavered, broke, then scattered, the soldiers fleeing for the frontier. The First Army continued triumphantly, as it had done the day before, advancing and sweeping all in its way before it. It ended the day by storming and entering Valievo.

The Austrians holding Valievo had carefully prepared for its defense, for this town they were reluctant to give up. The approach by the main road had been heavily intrenched and the guns were in position. But the main force of the Serbians circled around in the hills and flanked the position of the Austrians, taking them completely by surprise. They broke and ran, and while the fugitives hurried off toward Loznitzza and Shabatz, a rear guard of Hungarians on the hills to the northwest put up a rather indifferent fight before they, too, fled in mad disorder. The last of them were caught by the Serbian artillery and, while running over a stretch of rising ground, over a hundred were shot to pieces by shrapnel. When the Serbians arrived the ground was

literally covered with mangled forms; here and there sat a few wounded.

The Third Army likewise shared in the general triumph. It reached the Kolubara, at its junction with the Lyg. Throwing out one of its divisions eastward, it threatened the right flank of the enemy on Cooka, then permitted the Second Army to carry that position. By this movement the Serbians succeeded in driving in a wedge and completely cut off the three beaten and fleeing corps in the south from the two in the north, which were still showing some disposition to hold their ground.

The operations in the west and northwest now resolved themselves into a wild, scrambling foot race for the frontier. The worst of the fighting was now over; indeed, the Austrians now fought only when cornered. Most of them were by this time unarmed, thinking of nothing but how to reach the frontier before the first of the pursuing Serbians.

Only a powerful literary pen could paint such a picture as was now spread over the land of Serbia. Wounded warriors, now resolving themselves into helpless, suffering farmers, simple tillers of the soil, save for the tatters of their blue and gray uniforms which alone indicated what they had been, lay by the roadsides and along mountain trails, abandoned by their comrades. Others lay mangled, their forms beaten out of all recognition. Scattered over all, wherever road or trail passed, lay guns and cartridges, sometimes in heaps, where they had been dumped out of the fleeing wagons. And further on lay the wagons themselves, some thrown over on their sides, where the drivers had cut the traces and continued their flight on the backs of their horses.

Later in the day, December 8, 1914, the scenes along the highways took on a different character. The main columns of the pursuing Serbians had passed on, but straggling files of those too tired or too weak to be in the fore of the chase still continued onward. More slowly followed a steady stream of returning refugees, their oxen, in various stages of life and death, yoked up to every conceivable manner of springless vehicle, piled high with odds and ends of furniture and bedding which had been snatched

up in the mad hurry of flight. On top of the bundles lay sick and starving children, wan with want and exposure. Beside the wagon walked weary women or old men, urging their animals on with weird cries and curses, returning to the devastated remains of what had once been their homes.

Later still, from opposite directions, came processions of Austrian prisoners, sometimes thousands of them, guarded by a handful of Third Ban Serbian soldiers, still wearing their peasant costumes. Among the prisoners were smooth-faced youths and old men, some in the uniforms of soldiers, or of Landwehr, or Landsturm. All types of that hodge-podge of nationalities and races which the flag of Austria-Hungary represents were there; Germans, Magyars, Croats, Czechs, Moravians, Slovaks, Rumanians, Lithuanians, and Bosnian Musselmans.

In between the convoys straggled men of the Serbian army who had fallen out of the chase by the way, most of them Third Ban men, too advanced in years to keep up the pace set by the younger men. Nowhere moved anything but suffering, bleeding humanity.

On this scene the sun, a glowing disc of copper, finally set, and the struggling figures merged into the deepening dusk, and presently only black, halting shadows were creeping along the dark trails and roads.

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## CHAPTER VII

### — THE FATE OF BELGRADE —

**D**URING all this time a separate drama was being enacted in and around Belgrade, the Serbian capital. Unfortified and not especially adapted for defense, except for the breadth of the Danube flowing along its low front, it was the cause of a general, world-wide wonder that it should not have fallen almost immediately into Austrian hands. Quite aside from military values, the capture of an enemy's capital always makes a strong, moral impression, on both sides.



Beginning with the early morning of July 29, 1914, when a detachment of Serbian irregulars beat off a river steamer and two troop laden barges which were attempting to approach the shore just below Belgrade, there followed a period during which the citizens of the city had their full share in experiencing the horrors of warfare. The booming of heavy siege artillery and the screaming of shells at first startled them, then became so commonplace as barely to attract their attention. The attacks and counterattacks on mid-river islands became incidents of daily occurrence. Ruined buildings, wrecked houses and dead bodies in the streets became an unmarked portion of their everyday life.

For the greater part of this period Austrian cannon, planted across the river, poured shell, shrapnel, and incendiary bombs into the city, with intent to batter down its modern buildings and to terrorize the inhabitants. Over 700 buildings were struck by bombs, shells, or shrapnel, and of these sixty were the property of the state, including the university, the museum, foreign legations, hospitals, and factories. The foundries, bakeries and all the factories along the Serbian shore of the river were razed to the ground. Austrian howitzer shells dropped through the roof of the king's palace and wrecked all of the gorgeous interior. The university was riddled until the building, with its classrooms, laboratories, library, and workshops, was entirely demolished. Even the cellars were destroyed by great shells, which broke down the walls, pierced their way into the very bowels of the earth and there exploded. As the result of a steady fire to destroy the state bank, one street, running up from the water's edge, was ripped up from curb to curb. Missiles pierced the wood paving and its concrete foundations by small holes, passed along underground for some distance, then exploded, throwing particles of the roadway to all sides.

Many of these shells were fired from the Austrian batteries stationed over near Semlin, but presently there also appeared a fleet of river monitors, so heavily armored that no Serbian shell could pierce their sides. These would parade up and down the



river channel with impunity, adding their share to the general destruction.

Finally, in the beginning of November, 1914, there arrived in Belgrade two big 14-centimeter cannon, sent by the French Government by way of the Adriatic, together with French gunners and 20,000 rounds of ammunition. These were put into position above the city and on November 8, 1914, the French gunners sent their first message over into Hungary. The damage inflicted so impressed the monitors that they did not again venture into range. Moreover, spies, of whom there were probably a number in Belgrade, had doubtless notified the Austrians that measures were now being taken to mine the river effectively. In fact, many measures for a more effective offensive were being undertaken when the trend of operations in the interior forced the Serbian General Staff to order the evacuation of the capital.

It will be remembered that the Serbians had been beaten back from their main line of defense and that a rearrangement of the Serbian forces had thereby become necessary, in order that the line might be shortened.

This included the abandonment of Belgrade on November 29, 1914. The order was carried out during the night. But before retiring, the French gunners, who saw that they were going to lose their two big guns, determined to bid the enemy across the river a hearty good-by. In the early morning they fired off their stock of 240 rounds of ammunition and in a little more than half an hour deposited some twelve tons of melinite on the enemy's forts at Bezania, with such terrifying effect that the garrison abandoned it. Thus it came to pass that the two strongholds, having snarled and barked at each other across the dividing waters for nearly five months, were both evacuated at the same time.

As will be remembered, the right wing of the Serbian lines, now joined by the garrison of Belgrade, swung back and stretched across the Belgrade-Nish railroad, along the ridges of Varoonitza in the east and Kosmai in the west. The Austrian left, composed of two army corps, immediately covered the ceded territory and, of course, entered Belgrade. Then followed the strong

Serbian counterattack against the Austrian center along the Suvobor ridges and the complete demoralization of the Austrian forces from the center south.

The northern wing of the Austrians, however, which held the country around Belgrade succeeded in holding its own, though it was presently cut off from the rest of the Austrian forces. But this was all according to the plans of General Putnik. Being much outnumbered he could not spare the forces necessary to rout the enemy's strong northern force. Having broken the center of Potiorek's front, the Serbian commander gave his chief attention to capturing the Austrian southern wing, operating in the Western Morava Valley.

On December 8 and 9, 1914, the Serbian right wing had been hard pressed along the line from Kosmai to Varoonitza, but the completeness of the Austrian defeat in the other theatres enabled General Putnik to rearrange his troops. He therefore dispatched the left wing of the Third Army against Obrenovatz, attached the rest of the Third Army and the cavalry division to the Second Army and placed this new combination of forces, together with the garrison of Belgrade, under the command of Voivode Stepanovitch, he who had made so brilliant a record at the first battle on the Tzer ridges.

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## CHAPTER VIII

### ATTEMPTS TO RETAKE BELGRADE

ON December 10, 1914, General Stepanovitch immediately began a movement against Belgrade which had now been in the hands of the Austrians since the first of the month. At this time the Third Army was pressing on toward Obrenovatz, the cavalry division held the left bank of the Beljanitza River, the Second Army was holding a line from Volujak to Neminikuchir, the Belgrade detachment still maintained the ridges along Kosmai and Varoonitza and a detachment, which had come up from Semendria, occupied Pudarchi. The troops thus formed a crescent, with

one horn touching the Save and the other the Danube, Belgrade being the star in the middle.

The Austrian main positions stretched from Obrenovatz up the right bank of the Kolubara to Konatitche and then across to Grooka through Boran, Vlashko and Krajкова Bara.

There now followed what was probably the most stubborn fighting of the third invasion: either the Austrian soldiers composing this northern army were better material, or the Austrian commanders were especially animated with the necessity of holding Belgrade.

On the morning of December 11, 1914, the Serbian advance began. As possession of the railroad was of first importance, the center pushed rapidly ahead until it reached Vlashko heights. Again and again the Serbians charged up the slopes of this eminence, only to be beaten back. But finally, toward evening, the Austrians fell back and the summit was taken, thereby giving the Serbians control of the railroad at Ralia; the terminus of the line, in fact, for a tunnel several miles farther north had been blown up by the Serbians on the day they had evacuated Belgrade.

Early the next day, December 12, 1914, the advance was continued and the left wing of the Third Army reached Obrenovatz and its right occupied a line from Konatitche to Boshdarevatz. The Second Army occupied the summits designated as Hills 418 and 287 and the Belgrade detachment advanced to a front from Koviona to Krajкова Bara.

Thus, with astonishing swiftness, and in spite of the stubborn resistance, the crescent was contracting and the Austrians were being squeezed back into Belgrade. But they continued their desperate resistance, fighting over every foot of ground before surrendering it. By December 13, 1914, the enemy had been routed from all the territory lying between the Save and the Drina, but with such desperation did the Austrians cling to Belgrade that they delivered repeated counterattacks upon the Serbian positions at Koviona and Krajково Bara before they finally retired north.

The triumphant Serbians, though they had suffered severely, followed up the retreat vigorously, pressing along the banks of



the Topchiderska River on the left and up the main road on the right. The left wing had advanced up the Kolubara River toward its junction with the Save, which was eight miles behind the Austrian front. The enemy had to draw back for fear of being suddenly taken in the rear. Two monitors were sent up the river to check the Serbian cavalry division, which was trying to work its way around the marshes and thus cut off the Austrian force entirely. But this movement of the left wing was merely a feint; it was intended simply to make the Austrian line waver. While the Austrians were maneuvering in answer to this feint, the Serbian center was pushing its advance.

The Austrians had attempted to check the Serbian advance by intrenching heavy rear-guard forces in several strong positions, the nature of the country being especially suited to such tactics. The hills along the road north of Ralia are, indeed, strategic points of immense military value. But the Serbians, their capital now almost in view, pressed on with frantic vigor.

The Austrians fought manfully, giving them one of the best fights they had yet been through. Instead of merely clinging to their hill intrenchments, they made fierce and determined efforts to pierce the Serbian line. It was in one of these counterattacks, near the central height, where the railroad entered a tunnel, that the resistance of the Austrians was broken. After the Serbian riflemen, with their machine guns, had thrown back the enemy, the Serbian artillery caught the retiring masses of blue and gray clad soldiers of the Dual Empire.

This produced a panic in the densely packed retreating column, whereupon the Serbian infantrymen leaped out of their trenches and dashed forward in pursuit, forming two pursuing columns, one on either flank of the fleeing Austrians, like wolves worrying a wounded buffalo. And, as these streams of Serbians ran uphill more rapidly than the blue-gray flood moved, the Austrian rear guards, composed of heavy forces, turned to check the pursuit.

On the morning of December 14, 1914, the Serbians approached the southern defenses of Belgrade, where the Austrians must make their last stand; along a line from Ekmekluk to Bano-



vobrodo. Here General Potiorek had constructed a system of earthworks, consisting of deep trenches with shrapnel cover and well-concealed gun positions, with numerous heavy howitzers and fieldpieces. Evidently he hoped to withstand an indefinite siege on this fragment of Serbian territory, holding Belgrade as a bridgehead for another advance toward the main Morava Valley, when the next effort to invade Serbia should be made. He would, at the same time, preserve at least a semblance of his prestige from all the calamities that had befallen his armies, enabling him to represent the campaign as a reconnaissance in force, similar to Hindenburg's first advance against Warsaw.

But his troops had been so terribly punished that they could not garrison the siege defenses. The Serbians, now drunk with their many victories, and absolutely reckless of death, as they drove on toward their capital, with their old king, grandson of Black George, moving through their foremost ranks, charged up into the ring of hills.

The last fight, on December 14, 1914, which definitely broke the back of the last effort of the Austrians to maintain a footing on Serbian soil, took place on the central height, Torlak. Two battalions of Magyars were defending this point. And just as the sun was setting over in the Matchva swamps in a glow of fiery clouds, the foremost Serbians leaped up to the attack.

Long before the fight was over darkness set in. The Serbians, driven back again and again, came back like bounding rubber balls. Finally they gained the trenches, and one general, horrible mêlée of struggling, shouting, furious combatants set in. The shooting had died down; they were fighting with bayonets and knives now. Finally the tumult died down. But nearly every Austrian on that height died. Few escaped and not very many were taken prisoners. Then, under cover of the night, the Serbians spread over the other heights and captured the whole line of defense works.

No Serbian slept that night. They tugged and dragged at their heavy guns through all the dark hours, up toward the city, and placed them on heights commanding the pontoon bridges that had been thrown over the Save from Semlin.

When dawn broke on December 15, 1914, a heavy mist hung over the river, but the Serbians knew with accuracy the location of the pontoon bridge. All during the previous day and during the night the retreating Austrians had been crowding over this bridge to escape into Austrian territory. At first the retirement had been orderly, but later in the day, as the news from the front became more serious, as the low, distant roar of rifle and machine gun rolled nearer, the movement increased in intensity, and, during the night, developed into a hurried scamper. Cannon were unlimbered and thrown into the river, and troops fought among themselves over the right of way along the narrow plank walk. In the midst of this confusion, while yet thousands of the invaders were still on the Serbian side of the river, just as dawn was breaking, there came a deep report, the hissing of a flying steel missile, and a shell dropped in the middle of one of the pontoon supports, hurling timber and human beings up into the air. The confusion now became a wild panic. Some tried to return to the Serbian shore, others fought on. Dozens of the struggling figures rolled over the side of the bridge into the eddying currents of the waters.

Again came the dull, heavy report, then another and another, followed by the screeching overhead. Shells dropped into the water on all sides. And then another bomb burst on the pontoon where the first shell had landed.

Even the roar of the shouting soldiers could not be heard above the crashing of timbers, the snapping of mooring chains. The bridge swayed, then caved in, where the pontoon had been struck and was sinking. Between the two broken-off ends, still crowded with struggling humanity, rushed the turbid current of the river. The last road to safety had been cut.

Presently the fog lifted and revealed a long line of retreating Austrians, reaching down the road toward Obrenovatz, still heading desperately for the bridge, as unconscious of its destruction as a line of ants whose hill has been trampled in by a cow's hoof. But they were not long to remain unconscious of the fact that they were now prisoners of war.

## CHAPTER IX

SERBIANS RETAKE THE CITY—END OF  
THIRD INVASION

AS the sun rose on December 15, 1914, the Serbian cavalry, accompanied by King Peter, swept down from the heights of Torlak and entered the streets of the capital. A volley from the remnant of a Hungarian regiment met them. The cavalymen dismounted and began driving the Magyars down the streets, from one square to another. And while this fight, an armed riot rather than a military action, was going on, finally to end in the practical slaughter of all the Hungarians who would not surrender, the king entered the cathedral of his capital to celebrate a Mass of thanksgiving for the deliverance of his kingdom from the hands of the enemy. And even as the Mass ended, stray shots echoed through the streets of the city still.

Two hours later the Crown Prince Alexander, accompanied by his brother, Prince George, a strong cavalry escort, and the British military attaché, approached Belgrade. They were met on the outskirts by a crowd of women and children who, with a few exceptions, were all of the inhabitants that remained, the Austrians having carried the others off with them the day before. They had collected masses of flowers, and with these they bombarded and decorated the incoming soldiers. The girls brought the embroidered scarfs and sashes, which they had worked in preparation for marriage, and these they hung about the cavalrymen's necks until they looked as though they were celebrating at a village wedding. Huge tricolor streamers now hung from the houses and buildings, while bits of dirty bunting fluttered from the cottages.

In the streets of Belgrade the Austrians left 5 cannon, 8 ammunition wagons, 440 transport wagons, and 1,000 horses. Some 150 junior officers and 10,000 men also found their retreat suddenly cut off; among them were few officers of high rank. In one of the officers' headquarters the evening meal



was still spread on the table, the soup half consumed, the wine half drunk.

So ended the third Austrian invasion of Serbia. Of the army of 300,000 men who had crossed the Drina and Save rivers, not over 200,000 returned. During the last thirteen days of the operations the Serbians had captured 41,538 prisoners, including 323 officers, and enormous quantities of war material; 133 cannon, 71 machine guns, 29 gun carriages, 386 ammunition wagons, 45 portable ovens, 3,350 transport wagons, 2,243 horses, and 1,078 oxen. The Austrian killed and wounded numbered not far from 60,000.

The Austrian occupation of Belgrade had lasted just fourteen days. The invaders had evidently not counted on the disaster that was so soon to come to them. Under the guidance of their late military attaché in Serbia they had established themselves in the best available buildings, began to repair the streets, which they themselves had ripped open by shell fire, and set up the semblance of a city administration. But it was still evident that no central authority from above had as yet been able to assert itself. The personality of each commander was represented by the marks left behind in his district. The buildings occupied by one military authority remained cleanly and intact, even the king's photograph being left undamaged. In others, furniture was destroyed and the royal image shot and slashed to pieces. Entire sections of the town escaped pillage. Other quarters were plundered from end to end. While the cathedral and other churches were not seriously damaged, the General Post Office was completely wrecked. The furniture in the Sobranje, the house of the national assembly, was destroyed and broken, and the Royal Palace was stripped from floor to ceiling, the contents being carted off to Hungary in furniture vans, brought especially from Semlin for that purpose.

With the army of occupation came 800 wounded soldiers from the other theatres of operations. Most of them were immediately turned over to the American Red Cross unit established in Belgrade, already caring for 1,200 wounded Serbians. As the fighting continued in the interior these numbers were constantly



augmented, until the American hospital sheltered nearly 3,000 wounded men.

When the evacuation began the Austrians left their own wounded, but took with them the Serbian patients, to swell the number of their prisoners of war. Several hundred of the non-combatant citizens were also taken into captivity.

In the importance of its influence on the war as a whole, the achievement of the Serbians in repelling the three Austrian invasions will probably be found, when the complete history of the war is finally written, to take very high rank. For had Serbia fallen, the Teutonic Empires would have been united with little delay to their Turkish allies. Austria might then have been able to hold off the Russians by herself, while the Germans would thereby have been so much stronger for pressing their campaigns in Belgium and East Prussia; with what results can only be guessed. The Austrians themselves were astounded by the extraordinary power of little Serbia. Their last disaster, indeed, so roused their anger that they began preparing again for another attempt to conquer this stubborn little nation.

Calling the Germans to their aid, they began in January, 1915, to collect a new army, 400,000 strong, which was ranged along the Serbian frontier. But the pressure from the Russians on the Carpathian front presently became so heavy that this body of troops was needed there, and so Serbia was left in peace for the time being.

Thenceforward only insignificant fighting took place between the belligerents on each side of the river, such fighting being mostly in the nature of artillery actions. Belgrade was not again, during that period at least, subjected to bombardment. An arrangement was made between the Serbian and Austrian commanders whereby the Serbians refrained from firing on Semlin, and the Austrians spared Belgrade.

There was, however, some activity on the river itself. Belgrade was now garrisoned by a mixed force of Serbians, British, and French, the British being mostly gunners, who had been detached, together with some big naval guns, from the British navy. For some time before they arrived the Austrian monitors and picket

boats had again been patrolling the Danube and annoying the Serbians, but the Belgrade garrison put an end to the activities of these vessels with their big guns. The British sailors especially rendered good service by means of a small picket boat, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Kerr. Though armed with only a single machine gun, this small boat was so persistently troublesome to the enemy that it earned for itself the name "Terror of the Danube." Of dark nights it would poke its way into creeks and passages, alarming the Austrians constantly and causing them no little loss. Once it even succeeded in persuading one of the monitors to pursue it into a carefully prepared mine field, over against the Serbian shore, with the result that the monitor was permanently put out of action. But these operations were of minor importance just then. For now Serbia was called on to face a new enemy, in some of its aspects much more terrible than the Austrians, for it demanded a sort of fighting in which the Serbians were not so well trained. The Austrians had, indeed, left behind them an ally that was to accomplish as much mischief almost as they themselves had caused the Serbians.

Not long after the final defeat of the third invasion an epidemic of typhus appeared among the Serbian soldiers. Run down physically, as they must have been, their vitality sapped by the hardships of the campaigns they had just passed through, they fell victims to this scourge by the thousands. Not knowing how to attack or to defend itself against such an enemy, the little kingdom sent forth a cry for help, which was heard and responded to by the United States, Great Britain, France, and even Russia. Organizations were formed with the purpose of assisting Serbia in this extremity, and private persons also came forward with offers of money and service. The Red Cross also did what it could under the emergency, but its resources were already being taxed to their full extent by demands in all the battle fields of Europe. Sir Thomas Lipton sailed his yacht, the *Erin*, to Saloniki, loaded with supplies of medical stores, and carrying a full passenger list of doctors and nurses. Lady Paget, Lady Wimborne, and other women of rank in Great Britain also devoted their whole energies to the cause. A society of women physicians,

an offspring of the Scottish Federation of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies, did noble work in Serbia. After sending two hospital units to France, this women's organization dispatched a third to the Balkans, where it was received with the deepest gratitude, Serbia agreeing with enthusiasm to pay the salaries of its members and the cost of its maintenance. It was stationed at Kragujevatz, where it was given a hospital of 250 beds.

But meanwhile the epidemic had spread over the country. There were thousands of serious cases; men, women, and children were dying everywhere, unattended and under the most distressing circumstances. Hardly had the first of the foreign aid arrived when the immensity of the task required was recognized, and telegrams and cables were sent all over the world calling for further assistance. To this second appeal no country responded more nobly than the United States.

Owing to the virulent character of the disease that raged in every district the mortality was frightful. In many localities the death rate was over 50 per cent. All during the spring and summer of 1915 the need of Serbia was extreme. In July there were in the country 420 British doctors alone, aside from the French, Russian and American medical men, all working at the highest pressure and doing with very little sleep, yet unable to cover the ground. Many were the stricken patients who must be satisfied with floors instead of beds; many more who could not even be admitted into the hospitals. Nor were the Serbians the only sufferers; from among the foreigners who had so nobly come to help the Serbians in their distress there were not a few who succumbed to the fatal disease.



## CHAPTER X

## MONTENEGRO IN THE WAR

THE military operations on the Montenegrin front should really be considered as a part, though a detached part, of the Serbian campaigns. Up to the first Balkan War Serbia and Montenegro, or Tzernagora, as it is called by its own people, were separated by the sanjak of Novibazar, a territory which Turkey was allowed to retain after the Treaty of Berlin at the instigation of Austria, so that the two countries should have no opportunity to unite. By blood the two peoples are closely akin, though the isolation of the Montenegrins has been the cause of their not adopting so many of the outward tokens of civilization as the Serbians.

Already on July 25, 1913, before Austria had officially declared war against Serbia, the Montenegrin Government, at the capital, Cetinje, announced that it would support Serbia should there be an outbreak of hostilities with their common hereditary enemy, Austria. Montenegro had, indeed, even more reason than Serbia for hating the great empire to the northward, for its territory stretched down the coast from Dalmatia, and literally fenced her in from the Adriatic, whose blue waters are visible from the Montenegrin towns and villages perched up on the mountains above the shore. In the Balkan war the army of Montenegro had captured, at a terrible sacrifice of blood, the town of Scutari from the Turks, which dominates the only fertile section among the crags of the little mountain kingdom. It was Austria, at the London Conference, who had forced her to relinquish this dearly paid for prize, though so reluctantly was it given up that the Powers were on the point of intervening.

The value of the Montenegrin army in such a great war as was now begun was slight, however, for in numbers it did not amount even to a full army corps. Nor would it be very efficient outside of its own territory, for the Montenegrins, whose manner of life is quite as primitive as that of the Albanians, are



essentially guerrilla fighters, who cannot well adapt themselves to army discipline.

On a war footing the army is composed of four divisions, the first three of three brigades each, while one is composed only of two brigades. Altogether there are fifty-five battalions, or about 40,000 men. Each brigade also includes one detachment of mounted scouts, one mountain battery, one group of rapid-fire guns, one section of telegraphists and one section of engineers. Each division has, in addition, attached to it a detachment of mounted scouts, a section of engineers, a field battery and a heavy battery. Then there is a reserve of eleven battalions, usually assigned to garrison or guard duty. Altogether the total armament amounts to 40,000 rifles, 104 guns and forty-four mitrailleuses.

Of the actual operations along the Montenegrin front not so much detailed information is available as there is of the other sections of the theatre of war. War correspondents were not allowed to accompany either army in this field and the only reports so far given out, covering this period, are from the few official bulletins issued by the two respective governments and from other more indirect sources.

On August 3, when the Austrians had already begun bombarding Belgrade, King Nicholas signed an order for the mobilization of his forces, and four days later, on August 7, he declared war against Austria. But already the Austrians had detached an army corps under General Ermoly to prevent any possible juncture between the Serbian and Montenegrin forces. For the time being, therefore, until the Serbians had driven back the first Austrian invasion, the Montenegrins facing this division of the Austrian army acted on the defensive.

This, however, with the advantageous nature of the country, did not require the full strength of the Montenegrin army; part of it, therefore, was employed in an attack on the Austrian towns situated on the narrow strip of Austrian territory running along the sea coast. The chief of these, Cattaro, was subjected to a hot bombardment from the heavy guns on Mt. Lovcen, commanding that section of the coast. A few days later, on August

10, the Montenegrin infantry descended from the surrounding heights and delivered a strong assault on Spizza and Budua. The activity of Austrian warships, which bombarded Antivari, where Montenegro touched the coast, made it impossible for the Montenegrins to hold what they had taken. Another force, however, turned toward Scutari and occupied that town. Mt. Lovcen continued, not only then, but at intervals for the next year, to pour a heavy artillery fire on Cattaro, and its environs.

In Bosnia, over toward the Serbian operations, fighting had already begun and continued until the Serbians drove the main Austrian army back. On August 20, just as the Serbians were delivering their last attack on Shabatz and the Austrians were stampeding across the Drina, the Montenegrins delivered a heavy attack along their whole front, causing the Austrians to retire in that section as well. The following day the Austrians, in trying to recover their lost ground, brought up more mountain artillery, then advanced their infantry up against the Montenegrin entrenchments. Here occurred the first hand-to-hand fighting, the Austrians charging with their bayonets again and again, but they were finally repulsed again with heavy loss.

From now on the Montenegrins, under the command of General Vukotitch, who had so distinguished himself in the Balkan War, gradually assumed an offensive and advanced into Bosnia. On September 2 he again encountered the Austrians at Bilek, and succeeded in defeating them after a heavy fight, in which a comparatively large number of prisoners were taken.

The Montenegrins, comprising practically all of their army, continued advancing in three columns. On September 9 there was another hot fight at Foca, south of Sarajevo.

At this juncture the Serbians sent a column into Bosnia, from Visegrad, whose purpose was to effect a connection with General Vukotitch, that the two combined forces might advance on and take Sarajevo, a movement which was to be carried on simultaneously with the Serbian advance into Austrian territory from the Save.

But, although the two allied armies almost reached the vicinity of the Bosnian capital, the Austrians were now, toward the latter

part of September, returning to this region in great force, to begin the second invasion of Serbia. The Montenegrin army was, in consequence, obliged to retire before vastly superior forces and, during the rest of the year, as did the Serbians, the Montenegrins were satisfied merely with keeping the enemy out of their home territory. What fighting occurred after that moment was of more or less a desultory nature and entirely defensive.



## PART II—AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

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### CHAPTER XI

#### STRENGTH AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ANTAGONISTS

THE first campaign between the Austrian army and the Russian legions began on August 6, 1914, when Austria declared war on Russia. We have witnessed in the preceding chapters the German invasion of Belgium and France, and the Austrian invasion of Serbia; we will now view the fighting of the Russians and the Austrians on to the frontier, as it progressed simultaneously with the Russian and German campaigns to be described in subsequent chapters.

For some days before war was declared, as noted in Volume I of this work, Austria-Hungary and Russia understood each other thoroughly. Russia was satisfied that Austria intended to force war on Serbia, and Russia was pledged to protect and uphold the little nation, which was really her ward and over which she had announced a protectorate.

A review of the situation at this time shows that while mobilization was being hastened, Russia had joined the Slav kingdom in asking for a delay on the ultimatum that Serbia had received from Austria on July 24, 1914. On July 27 Russia notified Austria that she could not permit Serbia to be invaded. On July 29 an imperial ukase issued by the czar called all reservists to the colors.

On July 31, 1914, M. Goremykin, President of the Council of the Russian Empire, issued a manifesto which read: "Russia is determined not to allow Serbia to be crushed, and will fulfill its

duty in regard to that small kingdom, which has already suffered so much at Austria's hands."

Germany on July 30, 1914, had asked Russia to stop its mobilization, and had demanded a reply within twenty-four hours. Russia had ignored the ultimatum, and on August 1 the German Ambassador had handed a declaration of war to the Russian Foreign Minister. On August 6, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia, and the Austrian Ambassador left St. Petersburg. In such wise was the eastern arena cleared for action.

Before describing in detail the Austro-Russian campaign, it is necessary to bear in mind the conditions in the opposing armies. The strength of the Austrian army is discussed in the chapter on the Austro-Serbian campaigns, while the fighting forces of Russia are discussed in the chapter on the Russian and German campaigns.

Much has been said, and justly, in criticism of Russia's army at the outbreak of the war and afterward, but there is no disputing the fact that it had been improved wonderfully as the direct result of the war with Japan. In the strenuous years that followed that war, with revolution an ever-present menace, the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, and the granting of religious toleration to the many creeds and sects which helped to make up the population, awakened its diverse people to a new unity, inspired the people with hopefulness and activity, and the *morale* of the Russian army improved accordingly.

The army, at the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, on a peace basis included about 50,000 officers and more than 1,200,000 men, which included about 1,000,000 actual combatants. In recent years preceding, the annual contingent had been about 430,000. At the end of July, 1914, the ukase, which proclaimed a general mobilization, summoned to the colors five classes, or about two million men. The total number was increased by other reservists and volunteers to 4,100,000.

There had been a wave of reform in every branch of the military service. The men who were conscripted to form the main strength of the army were young and possessed more initiative





than had the recruits of years before. Every effort was made to encourage this initiative under the new field service regulations.

In creating a new army with real fighting spirit, cohesion, and ability, Grand Duke Nicholas, who was made Generalissimo, was conspicuous. Each year the progress made under his direction has been displayed at the autumn maneuvers. Another member of the imperial family, Grand Duke Sergius, was largely responsible for the excellent showing made by the Russian guns and gunners after war began.

For purposes of administration all of European Russia was divided into eight military districts—the Caucasus, Kazan, Kiev, Moscow, Odessa, Petrograd, Warsaw, and Vilna. There were also four Siberian districts, making twelve in all. To each district were assigned two or more army corps. In war, these were grouped in varying numbers from three to five to constitute an army or army group.

The equipment of the Russian infantry soldier comprised at the outbreak of the Great War a rifle, a 299-mm. weapon with a quadrangular bayonet—which also was carried by noncommissioned officers—a waistbelt supporting a pouch for thirty rounds on each side of the clasp, an intrenching tool, a bandolier holding another thirty rounds carried over the left shoulder under the rolled greatcoat, and a reserve pouch also holding thirty rounds, which completed the full load of 120 rounds for each man, suspended by a strap over the right shoulder.

As the Russian soldiers moved to the Austrian frontier, there was slung over the right shoulder kits containing food and clothing and cooking utensils, and over the left shoulder one-sixth part of a shelter tent. The total weight borne by the regular Russian infantryman was nearly 58 $\frac{1}{4}$  pounds.

When the war started, the Russian army, in its invasion of Austria, had its full complement of officers, and because of the great capacity of its military schools, it was as well able as other nations engaged to make up for losses in battle. One sweeping and beneficial change that had been made was that promotion no longer went by seniority but entirely by merit: the higher the position the more rigid the tests. Incidentally, it was Russia's

good fortune that the war came at a time when the noncommissioned ranks were full and it was possible to promote many of these men to fill vacancies in the commissioned service.


The use of Russian infantry on the battle fields, as we shall soon see, differed in no essential way from that common to other nations of Europe. An advance under fire was almost identical with that of other nations. A single company in attack would dispatch two platoons as a firing line, retaining two in reserve, each of the platoons in front providing its own protection for skirmishing, according to the nature of the ground.

If the cover was adequate, a few rifles were enough to locate the enemy, and either they could be reenforced or the front could be extended. If the ground were quite open, the two leading platoons were extended at once, so as to oppose the enemy with an equal extent of fire, and then advanced by rushes, each section covering the rush of the other by alternate firing. The two reserve platoons could be used either to outflank the enemy, if the nature of the ground permitted, or for direct reenforcement in any formation required.

As has been said, all the nations engaged in the great conflict pursued similar tactics in this respect, and the only advantage possessed by Russia in their use was that both her infantry and artillery possessed a much larger number of officers, who had been trained to understand how, against a powerful opponent, to carry out efficiently in practice and in times of great stress the theory which all nations held in common.

The observer of the battles in the Russo-Austrian campaigns will see that the Russian cavalry was inadequate, because its horses were too small, of inferior strain, and lacking the stamina needed in modern warfare. They were valuable, however, because of their large numbers, and the fact that during the winter months, being acclimated and to the country born, they were able to pick up a living in the snow when other horses would starve.

As regards field batteries, near the western Russian frontier and in Asia, nearly all of them had, when war was declared, eight guns. In most of the batteries in Asia the number of men maintained in peace was the same as in war.



# RUSSIAN INVASION OF GALICIA



The Russian army moved forward with adequate aerial corps. The keenest interest in military aviation had been taken in Russia during two years before the war. Grand Duke Alexander was one of the founders of the aviation school at Sebastopol, where two-thirds of the Russian aviation officers obtained their training. In the spring of 1914 the air fleet consisted of 16 dirigibles and 360 aeroplanes, while orders for 1,000 aircraft of different descriptions had been placed with various firms in Russia.

The army of Austria-Hungary which faced the Russians was composed of men from a country where universal military service prevailed. In theory only the physically unfit were exempt from service, and the liability extended from the beginning of the nineteenth year to the close of the forty-second. Actual service in the ranks and with the reserve was twelve years. After the men had served ten years with the army and in its reserve they were included in the Landwehr for another two years. It is likely that Austria had at the outbreak of war from 1,200,000 to 1,300,000 men at her disposal. During the three years preceding she had greatly strengthened her equipment.

The infantry of the joint Austrian army, which had to fight the campaigns against the Russians on the east, and against the Serbians on the south, comprised 102 regiments of infantry, 27 battalions of Jaegers, 4 regiments of Tyrolese Jaegers, and 4 regiments of Bosnia-Herzegovina infantry. Every infantry regiment had four field battalions and a depot battalion. The duty of the latter was to fill up the ranks of the others. Each infantry regiment had at least two machine-gun detachments of two guns each, and in many there were two guns per battalion. In Bosnia and Herzegovina every battalion had four, and this also was true of every Jaeger battalion.

The Austrian infantrymen, as they met their Russian antagonists, carried a small-bore magazine rifle, in use in the army since 1895, and known after its inventor as the Männlicher. It had a caliber of .315 inch and fired a pointed bullet. It was loaded by means of a charger which contained five cartridges, and it was equipped with a bayonet. The cavalry carbine was shorter but took the same bullet. One hundred and twenty rounds were car-

ried by the infantry soldier, and there were forty rounds in the company ammunition wagon, and 160 in the infantry ammunition columns, in addition. The machine gun in use was of the same caliber and took the same ammunition as the infantry rifle. It was composed of few parts, and was a simple and highly effective instrument.

On these first days of August, 1914, the cavalry of Austria—the hussars, uhlans, and dragoons, but really all of one type—light cavalry—was equipped uniformly with saber and carbine. The noncommissioned officers and others who did not carry a carbine rode forth equipped with an automatic pistol. There were forty-two cavalry regiments in the entire Austrian army, consisting of six squadrons, each of which had a fighting strength of 150 sabers, not counting the pioneer troops. Every cavalry regiment had four machine guns with 40,000 rounds of ammunition. The pioneer troops of the cavalry, which first were introduced in Austria, were composed of an officer and twenty-five men, equipped with tools and explosives needed by an advance force to clear obstacles, destroy railways, etc. Besides the pioneer troops, eight men in each squadron were equipped with similar tools. The telegraph section, consisting of eight men, carried about seven miles of light wire.

The artillery of Austria-Hungary had been greatly modified in recent years. The gun used for horse and field batteries was known as M5—that is, the pattern of 1905. It was of 3-inch caliber, a quick firer, throwing a shrapnel shell which weighed 14.7 pounds. High-explosive shells also were carried in the proportion of two to five of shrapnel. The gun had a long recoil on its carriage, which absorbed the shock and the gun returned to its place. This made rapid fire possible.

Like the other powers, Austria-Hungary had adopted a howitzer for its heavy batteries. It fired a shell of 38.132 pounds. There was also a heavy gun in use, a 10.5 centimeter, corresponding to a 4.1-inch gun. The ammunition was like that of a howitzer—a shell weighing 38.132 pounds, which contained a high-explosive bursting charge and shrapnel with 700 bullets,

fifty to the pound. On the march the carriage was separated from the gun, and each was drawn by six horses.

The mountain regions on all the frontiers of the Dual Monarchy resounded on these August days of 1914 with the mountain artillery. The 10.5-centimeter guns and 4.1-inch howitzer quick firers threw a shell of thirty-two pounds. This howitzer had a range of more than 6,000 yards, and was a powerful weapon. The 30.5-centimeter mortars fired a shell of 858 pounds with a bursting charge of 56 pounds of ecrasite. The extreme range of this mortar was about six miles. Ten rounds could be fired each hour. Two guns and their ammunition lorries were drawn by three large tractors. An hour was required to get one of these guns ready for action.

Let us enter the headquarters of the Austrian army at the beginning of the Russian campaign. There we meet the engineer staff, which built and besieged fortresses, and a military works department, which built and maintained buildings that were not immediately connected with fortifications. Austria-Hungary had only a few fortresses of modern construction. The intrenched camps in Galicia, Cracow, and Przemysl were soon to be besieged, and between them was a fortress known as Jaroslav, of insignificant value, like that of Huy between Liege and Namur in Belgium.

The Austrian army had not made as much progress in aeronautics as those of other nations. There was a depot for dirigibles at Fischamend, about eleven miles southeast of Vienna, but only a few dirigibles were ready for service. These were of the Parsefal type. There were a number of captive balloons. The number of aeroplanes available was very small. A school for teaching aviation had been established at Vienna-Neustadt.

The faces of the soldiers of the Austria-Hungarian army on the Russian frontier denoted many races, but it possessed considerable solidarity. Officers and soldiers recognized alike that they were all under a single head—the emperor. The officers were drawn from all classes of society, and this was also a unifying influence. They were on more intimate relations with their men



than the Prussian leaders, and "led" instead of "drove" them. Commands for the whole army were given in German, but otherwise the language varied according to the composition of the various regiments as regarded races. The use of the German language for commands undoubtedly aided in unifying the army.

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## CHAPTER XII

### GENERAL STRATEGY OF THE CAMPAIGN

THE Austrian army faced the Russians on August 11, 1914, with a well-organized strategical plan. Austria, realizing the importance of unity, cohesion, and harmony in her own forces, proposed at the outset of the war to dissipate the strength of her enemy, Russia, by causing an uprising in Poland. The vanguard of Austria's advance along the Vistula consisted of the Galician army corps, made up of Polish soldiers. Along the border, arms and ammunition had been collected for the anticipated insurrection. A proclamation was sent by the Polish associations of Galicia and Posen to their "brethren of Russian Poland." In this, the Poles of Russia were urged to prepare for a rising, but not to attempt it until the Austrian vanguard had arrived and won a first battle. Then arms would be provided for them.

Russian strategy checkmated this plan. The czar issued a proclamation promising home rule to Poland as soon as Germany and Austria had been repulsed. With this home rule he also offered self-government and freedom of law and religion, and the reconstitution of the old Polish territory by means of the annexation of Posen and Galicia. This move divided the Polish leaders and stifled the incipient revolution.

The spy system won and lost the first strategical battles before a shot was fired. There is no doubt that the Austrians before the war knew almost as much about Russia's preparations as did the Russians themselves. The Austrian system of espionage was elaborate and accurate, and the Austrians profited by that of

Germany also. Nevertheless, Russia surprised her foes and allies alike by the rapidity with which she got her troops into action on the offensive once war was on.

The Russian army was handicapped by lack of railroad facilities, but she made the most of them. Her total mileage was about 25,000, her system being inferior to that of Germany or Austria. Germany's was by far the best of the three. Many of the Russian roads had but one line of track, their construction was inferior, stations were farther apart, and the speed of trains was comparatively slow. They could not carry as much traffic as those of either of her two adversaries. The gauge of the Russian roads was 5 feet, so that the rolling stock could not be used on German and Austrian roads, which had a uniform gauge of 4 feet 8½ inches. The management of Russian railroads was too complicated for army purposes. But Sukhomlinoff simplified it and instituted schools in which army officers were instructed in putting soldiers on cars rapidly and routing trains to the best possible advantage. This and other activities of Sukhomlinoff, along the line of reform and improvement, were in no small measure responsible for the rapidity with which Galicia was invaded.

Austria's military problem was a difficult one from the start. Her ally, Germany, could not extend much military assistance until a decisive blow had been struck in the western theatre of war, but Austria, having a million men in readiness and being strong in artillery, was expected to assume the offensive from the start and attack the imperfectly mobilized Russian forces in western Poland. An immediate offensive was required, because she must hold Galicia at all cost.

There were three places where Russia might cross the frontier of Galicia—west of the point where the waters of the San empty into the Vistula, between the Upper Bug and the San, or along the line of the River Sereth on the east. There was great danger in a combined movement by Russia against the first and third sections of the frontier which would cut off and surround the forces of Austria which were based on Przemyśl and Lemberg. In order to avoid this peril, apparently the safest as well as boldest plan was to proceed northward against the fortresses of Warsaw.

Such an advance would in all probability prevent the armies of Russia from crossing the Vistula and postpone any attack against the Sereth from the east.

Austria was staking the success of such tactics on the incompleteness of mobilization by the Russians, and therein she proved to be in error. Indeed, the quickness of Russia's military movements amazed the entire world, with the exception of her Generalissimo, Grand Duke Nicholas, and his aides and advisors.

At the outbreak of the Great War, Nicholas was in command of the St. Petersburg military district. Under him was a Corps of Guards, and the First and Eighteenth Army Corps from 120,000 to 150,000 men. He was a soldier of the first rank and an able strategist. He had familiarized himself with the armies of other European nations. He long had planned for the emergency that now confronted him.

In the rapid movement of the Russian forces, he was aided chiefly by General Vladimir Sukhomlinoff. The latter saw that one of the chief defects in the Russian army, as disclosed by the Japanese War, was the slowness of her railroad operations, and some time before war was declared he had set himself to improving conditions. He established a school of railroading for officers where the rapid loading of troops on cars and the general speeding up of transportation were studied scientifically. The good results of such work were apparent at the very outset of hostilities.

As we have seen, France was saved in the first campaign in the west by the sturdy resistance of little Belgium to the advance of the Germans through her territory, so Russia now helped to save France a second time by the rapidity of her campaign. While German troops still were investing Liege in Belgium, the Russian troops were registering their first triumph at Eydtkuhen, and upon the very day that Ghent fell into the hands of the Germans, Russia began her strong offensive in East Prussia. By such means were a large part of the German forces, intent on taking Paris, diverted from attack on the western war arena to protect the eastern frontier from Russian menace. The relief which Russia thus gave her Allies was invaluable. The battle of



Mons was over in Belgium and the retreat to the Marne in France had begun, and the Germans were almost in sight of the French capital, when, save for Russia's timely blow on the Polish frontier, the Germans, many war critics believe, would have reached Paris.

When the Germans in the west were striving toward Calais on the English Channel as their goal, it was the Russian offensive in Galicia that forced Germany to transfer more army corps to the eastern front in order to stop the tide that threatened to overflow Austria. Thus the French and British were able to stop the advance that threatened to engulf them on the western front and given time to organize themselves for a strenuous contest.

The strategic problem which confronted Russia was much more complicated than that which had to be solved either by Germany or Austria. It was quite evident to her General Staff that at least during the first few months of hostilities Germany would devote her whole time and attention to attack in the western arena, the French being at the time her most dangerous enemy. Except for a small part of the Austrian forces left to oppose the Serbians and Montenegrins, the whole army of Austria was depended upon to oppose the Russian advance.

The important strategic condition that confronted Russia was this: Her most dangerous enemy was Germany, but in order to attack Germany it was necessary that Austria's army should first be destroyed.

The eastern theatre of the war has been described in a preceding chapter and it will be recalled that for about two hundred miles from east to west Russian Poland is inclosed on the north by East Prussia and on the south by Austria. Moreover, the Sudetic Mountains on the Austrian frontier and the huge forests of Poland protect the position of German Silesia southeast of Breslau. Passing through it are the chief lines of railway connecting eastern and western Europe, including the routes between Poland, Galicia, Moravia, and Bohemia. At varying distances from her Russian frontier Austria has a line of mountains of great defensive strength. This is the Carpathian, which, extending inside the Austrian-Russian border line, is joined by the

Transylvanian Alps and continues to form the south frontier of Austria.

It would not be possible for the Russian invaders to menace Austria seriously until these mountains had been crossed. Russia, however, was menaced by the configuration of the German-Austrian frontier, with Poland open to invasion from three sides. Also, Austria and Germany had many strongly intrenched positions at strategical points covering all the chief lines of approach on their frontiers where the latter faced Russian territory. Besides being defended by artificial works, the frontier had natural defenses, such as lakes, swamps, and forests. All along the Russian-Austrian frontier, in fact, there exist such natural defenses against invasion. On the southern boundary of Poland the Russian army was held off by great bogs which cover from east to west a distance of about 250 miles. The only crossing was a single line of railroad, the one extending from Kiev to Brest-Litovsk. From a military viewpoint, these marshes divided the line in two parts, imperiling the situation of any fighting in front of them in case of defeat. They would offer no kind of sustenance to troops driven within them.

Russia was not prepared to put into the field an army large enough to hold the entire line from the Baltic to the Rumanian frontier, approximately 1,000 miles, and there was no time, if part of the German forces were to be diverted from the western front, to raise such forces and equip them.

At the beginning of hostilities on August 11, 1914, the chief offensive against Russia was intrusted to the First Austrian Army under General Dankl. This was composed of about seven army corps, having various additional units, or amounting in all to about 350,000 men. This army had its base on Przemyśl and Jaroslav, and the work which had been assigned to it was to advance upward between the Vistula on the left side and the Bug on the right, on to Lublin and Kholm. There it was to sever and hold the Warsaw-Kiev railroad so the line would be exposed in the direction of Brest-Litovsk and the chief communications in the rear of Warsaw. The First Austrian Army, while it advanced to this position, would have as protection from attack on its

right and rear from the east and south the Second Army under General von Auffenberg. This army, advancing northeast from Lemberg, would control eastern Galicia from the Bug to the Sereth and the Dniester.

The numerical strength of Von Auffenberg's army at the start probably was about 300,000, and consisted of five army corps with five divisions of cavalry. This, however, was only its initial strength. As hostilities developed Von Auffenberg added to his strength until he is reported to have had no less than six corps and additional cavalry. At first this increase came from the Third or Reserve Army, over which Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had command. While General Dankl was advancing toward Lublin on August 28, 1914, being protected on his right flank by Von Auffenberg, the army of the Archduke appears to have been pushed out in a similar manner on the left.

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## CHAPTER XIII

### AUSTRIA TAKES THE OFFENSIVE

THE Austrians crossed the Polish border on August 29, 1914, and moved on as far as Kielce and toward Radom without encountering serious opposition. That may have been as far as it was intended to proceed. In all three of the armies of Austria there were about 1,000,000 men, and against these forces were arrayed three Russian armies—a small force on the Bug, which may be called the First Russian Army; a Second Russian Army under General Russky, which was moving on Sokal from the Lutsk and Dubno fortresses; and a Third Army under General Brussilov, which was proceeding against the Sereth. There were about 300,000 men in each of the two latter armies.

Now the Russian strategy on September 1, 1914, was this: It was intended that their First Army should retire before Dankl, the Second Army to menace Lemberg from the northeast and put its right wing between Dankl and Von Auffenberg, and the



Third Army to advance from the Sereth to the town of Halicz on the Dniester, and so finish the investment of Lemberg on the south and east.

It may have been, though this is not certain, that the General Staff of the Austrians did not see the close connection between the movements of Russky and Brussilov. It may be that they believed they had only Brussilov to face at Lemberg, since Russky would be obliged to proceed to the aid of the First Russian Army on the Bug.

Russky was famed as a highly scientific soldier, being a professor in the Russian War Academy. In the war with Japan, he had been chief of staff to General Kaulbars, the commander of the Second Manchurian Army. Afterward, he had been closely associated with General Sukhomlinoff in the reorganization of the Russian forces. Brussilov, whose army consisted of men of southern Russia, was a cavalry general and had seen service under Skobelev in the Turkish War of 1877. General Ewarts, in charge of the Third Army, the smallest of the three, whose duty was to fight a holding battle, was a corps commander.

No serious resistance was made by the Russians against the main Austrian advance under General Dankl, and it proceeded almost to Lublin. At one time it was within eleven miles of that place.

On August 10, 1914, the Austrians who had crossed the frontier had a front of about eleven miles wide to the west of Tarnograd. The Russian frontier posts had a brush with the advance cavalry of the Austrians and then fell back. There was a second skirmish at Goraj and a more serious meeting at Krasnik, and the Russians still retreated. The Austrians were jubilant over their victory at Krasnik and at the few delays they encountered at the hands of the enemy. The Russians in their retreat proceeded toward the fortified position of Zamosc or toward Lublin and Kholm.

In the meantime Russia had been gathering an army on the line from Lublin to Kholm. There the Russians had the railroad behind them, in one direction to Warsaw, and in the other to Kiev and Odessa. Each day as the Austrians advanced the

strength of the Russian army was improving. In the early days of September, 1914, it probably amounted to 400,000 men.

When the Austrians were within fifteen miles of Lublin they first encountered heavy resistance. They were checked and then delayed, but the Russians were not ready to do more than hold their antagonists. They were waiting for developments farther to the southeast.

On August 17, 1914, the Russian offensive had its definite start. General Dankl was finding himself with the First Austrian Army; when he stopped in his advance toward Lublin, General Russky began a powerful attack against Von Auffenberg. Co-operating with Russky, as we have noted, and on his left was Brussilov, the total forces of these two commanders being at first double those with which Von Auffenberg was equipped to oppose them. As soon, however, as Von Auffenberg became aware of the numerical superiority of his opponents, he drew for reinforcements on the Third, or Reserve Army, which had advanced into Poland as far as Kielce.

The latter troops hurried to join Von Auffenberg, crossing the Vistula by means of bridge boats at Josefow. When the issue really was joined, the troops of the Third Austrian Army, under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, were ready to act in close cooperation with those of Von Auffenberg. Thus, in the armies on both sides there were, in all, about 1,200,000 men, with the advantage in favor of the Russians. Having this superiority in numbers, Russky felt that he was safe in attempting to envelop the Austrian forces on both flanks. With the larger army—the Second—he hurled his troops at the Austrian left and center, advancing along the railway.

On August 22, 1914, the Russians crossed the frontier and on the following day, Russky occupied Brody, with small opposition. On the same day, Brussilov, on his left, also crossed the frontier at Woloczysk, which is the frontier station on the Lemberg-Odessa railway. At this point the rolling stock used by the Russians on their own railway in their advance was no longer available, as the gauge of the Russian and Austrian lines differs. The Austrians had retired with their own rolling stock in the di-

# WAR FRONTS

IN

## SERBIA AND AUSTRIA


DEAD IN TRENCHES AND ENTANGLEMENTS • ARTILLERY AND  
CAPTURED GUNS • FORTRESS OF LEMBERG • SERBIAN SOLDIERS



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A shallow, hastily made Russian trench, left filled with the bodies of the men who fell there. Often there is no opportunity for burying the dead





Copyright, Paul Thompson

A powerful German siege gun transported by the use of caterpillar wheels. It was her advantage in heavy guns that gave Germany easy victory over Belgian forts



Copyright, Paul Thompson

A Russian priest is conducting a service in a rude field hospital filled with wounded Russian prisoners at Suwalki



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A Russian soldier killed at the very moment of attempting to force a passage through barbed wire entanglements. The wire still holds him and his gun from falling





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These Krupp guns were sold to the Japanese, who used them against the Russians. They were among the munitions furnished to Russia by Japan and came at last into German hands again



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An Austrian battery not far from Przemyśl, the Galician fortress which the Russians captured after a six months' siege



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Lemberg, Capital of Galicia, is an important railway center 468 miles by rail from Vienna and 50 miles from the border of Russia. It fell to the Russians September 3, 1914, only to be recaptured on June 22, 1915





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Serbian infantrymen on their way to the front. They wear in their coats and hats flowers fastened there by their wives

rection of Lemberg, destroying what they did not take away, and so the Russian advance from that point was continued wholly, perforce, on foot. There was a good wagon road which ran parallel to the railroad toward Lemberg, and along this Brussilov's cavalry hurried.

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## CHAPTER XIV

### A CAUTIOUS RUSSIAN ADVANCE—RUSSIAN SUCCESSES—CAPTURE OF LEMBERG

ON AUGUST 23, 1914, the Russians were almost on the heels of the retreating Austrians. After three hours' fighting, they drove them out of Tarnopol. Thereupon they retreated along the line of the Zlota Lipa, which is an affluent of the Dniester and runs almost directly southward.

On August 25 and 26, 1914, there was some heavy fighting along this river, especially at Brzezany. Heretofore, the army under Brussilov had not met with any important resistance, having encountered chiefly frontier posts, skirmishers, and small detachments of Austrians. It seems that no great body of Austrians had penetrated much beyond the Zlota Lipa. On the eastern side of this river was a line of low hills, offering a fine defensive position; the Austrians hastily began to make use of them. They were still constructing trenches when the Cossack cavalry appeared, driving the skirmishers of the Austrians before them.

A fight began on August 24, 1914, which lasted ten days. The Russian cavalry was not strong enough to attempt to take the Austrians' intrenched position, and therefore waited for the main body of the Russian forces to come up. The fight extended over twenty miles of front, stubbornly contested by the Austrians. Finally, by direct assault, the Russians took the position and the Austrians fell back, in good order, toward Halicz, where the Gnita Lipa joins the Dniester.

In the meantime, while Russky was thus pounding at Von Auffenberg's right, Brussilov was attacking his right and center.

Having crossed the frontier between Brody and Sokal, Russky extended his forces on a wide front. While the center advanced straight for Busk and Krasne in a direct line toward Lemberg, the right, proceeding almost due west, was attempting to penetrate between the army of Von Auffenberg and that of Dankl on the north, and was pushing powerfully on Von Auffenberg's left. Gallantly resisting, the Austrians were forced back in all directions, slowly but firmly. The fighting on Russky's right and center was especially fierce and severe and resulted in great losses on both sides.

By the time Brussilov had taken the position on the Zlota Lipa, his right was in touch with Russky's left, and the first stage of the campaign was over. That Russia had been able to proceed so far with her plans would seem to indicate that the Austrians had underestimated the rapidity with which she could complete her preparations. It was the fall of Tarnopol that made possible a junction of the Russian armies and enabled them to advance in a united line upon Lemberg.

General Brussilov had to move to the attack without attracting attention. This was accomplished by both Russky and himself throwing out a screen of Cossacks all along the frontier of Eastern Galicia. For an extent of one hundred and fifty miles, the Cossacks skirmished at every border road or bridge between the Bug and the Dniester rivers. They started this immediately after war was declared and soon, so inconsequential did such activity appear, that the Austrians, it seems, came to regard it as lacking any real purpose. After the third week in August, however, the commander at Lemberg sent a force of 2,000 men to make a reconnaissance in Podolia.

These troops arrived at Gorodok, a small town across the border. Their presence there was most inconvenient for the Russians, for General Brussilov was at that time advancing with a big army through Gorodok on toward Galicia. It was imperative that the Austrian reconnoitering troops should be stopped and the only force available for this purpose was nine hundred Cossacks stationed at Gorodok to screen the main army. It was necessary for these Cossacks to repulse the Austrian reconnoiter-



ing force, without calling for large reenforcements. If the latter were done, it would excite the suspicions of fugitives from the fight.

Therefore, the Cossacks lined out in the woods far beyond the village and then thirty of them went forward from cover to cover until they came upon the Austrians. Simulating surprise, they fled in apparent panic. The Austrians entered upon a swift pursuit and were led into ambush. Thousands of them were cut down by a cross-fire of rifles and machine guns. The rest were pursued by Cossacks over the border and the invasion of Galicia was begun by the Russian main force.

Then began the perilous part of the enterprise. The army of Russky was advancing on Lemberg from the north and the army of Brussilov was converging on the Galician capital from the east. After they had been united, they would assuredly outnumber the Austrian force which was guarding Lemberg, but in the meantime either Russky or Brussilov was too weak to escape defeat. Each might be met singly and overwhelmed. The skill with which their combined operations were carried out was such, however, that General Brussilov was able to steal into Galicia and occupy a large part of the country before battle actually was joined.

The secrecy with which his great movement was executed was extraordinary. It was executed in daylight, covering a period of thirteen days, from August 19 to August 31, 1915. It was performed in spite of the fact that the Austrians had many spies, a large force of trained cavalry, and scouts in aeroplanes darting over the frontier. Yet not until it was too late did the Austrians discover the real nature of the Russian turning movement in Eastern Galicia.

In part, this was attributable to the fact that the territory in which Brussilov was operating was an ancient Russian duchy which had been wrested from the ancestors of the czar. Eastern Galicia might be compared to Alsace-Lorraine, which had been torn from France. Peopled by a Slav race, Eastern Galicia had the same language, religion, and customs as the soldiers in Brussilov's army.

When at the beginning of operations, Russia first assumed a general offensive on August 17, the Grand Duke Nicholas issued the following proclamation addressed to Russian inhabitants of Galicia:

"Brothers—A judgment of God is being wrought. With Christian patience and self-annihilation, the Russian people of Galicia languished for centuries under a foreign yoke, but neither flattery nor persecution could break in it the hope of liberty. As the tempestuous torrent breaks the rocks to join the sea, so there exists no force which can arrest the Russian people in its onrush toward unification.

"Let there no longer be a subjugated Russia. Let the country which forms the heritage of Saint Vladimir throw off the foreign yoke and raise the banner of united Russia, an indivisible land. May the providence of God, who has blessed the work of the great uniters of the Russian lands, be made manifest. May God aid his anointed, the Emperor Nicholas of All the Russias, to complete the work begun by the Grand Duke Ivan Kalita.

"Rise, fraternal Galician Russia, who have suffered so much, to meet the Russian army for you and your brethren, who will be delivered. Room will be found for you in the bosom of our mother Russia without offending peaceable people of whatever nationality. Raise your sword against the enemy and your hearts toward God with a prayer for Russia and the Russian Czar!"

This proclamation was received in Galicia with acclaim. When the Russian soldiers came, priests and people came out from the villages with flowers and banners to meet their "little brothers." Flowers were thrown on their heads from the upper balconies of houses, as they marched through the streets. Whatever could be done by pretended ignorance or silence to mislead the Austrians regarding the Russian advance was done by peasants.

Meanwhile, General Brussilov was making the most of his opportunities. He passed over the tributaries of the Dniester and without revealing his strength pushed back the Austrian cavalry screen. For this work he used large bodies of Cossacks, with all necessary infantry and artillery support.

While appearing to be merely a border raider, the Cossack had to veil his main army and clear its path through bridge-heads, forts, and blockhouses, and he was well suited to this kind of work. Moving at the rate of eight miles a day in advance of the infantry and the big guns, he maintained a continual skirmish with cavalry scouts, infantrymen, and gunners in places that had been fortified, and even armored trains.

In all, the Cossack in the Galician campaign, proved himself not only a most efficient soldier but well behaved. Previously, his reputation had been an evil one. Naturally, there were reports of brutality and savagery, but none were proved. In fact, neither on the part of the Russians nor the Austrians was there manifest any of the "frightfulness" attributed, rightly or wrongly, to combatants in the western theatre of war.

It was, of course, not to the interest of the Russians to mistreat the people of Galicia. They came, in their own estimation at least, as deliverers, not as despoilers. As for the Austrians, they were in their own country when in Galicia. When they penetrated north into Russia, it appears that they did little wanton damage. On their return, it is true, they laid waste a large part of the province of Volhynia, burning villages and farmsteads as they proceeded. But this was dictated by military exigencies, in order to delay and inconvenience their pursuers.

There was an occasion when it might have been supposed there would have been excesses. This was when after an Austrian defeat, the Russian van, composed of three divisions of Cossack cavalry, pushed through Halicz in pursuit of the enemy. The victorious troops swept through a country, full of Jews, and utterly undefended. It was a garden of plenty, a rich and fertile country. Instead of presenting a picture of desolation and ruin after the Russian army had passed, its cattle still grazed in the fields, the fields were full of shocks of grain, and chickens, ducks, and swine wandered about the streets of the town.

There was not a single wrecked house in the town itself, only a few buildings, such as warehouses near the railway station, having been demolished by the Russians in order to hasten the departure of the enemy.



There was another significant incident at the neighboring town of Botzonce. Here the retiring Austrians attempted to make a stand, but were shelled out by the Russians with their heavy guns. There were only three buildings in the city which were not reduced to ruins. These were two churches and the Town Hall, which, having a church-like spire, the Russians evidently took for a church of worship, also. In this connection, we may quote here a second proclamation which the Grand Duke Nicholas, as Commander in Chief of the Russian forces, distributed in the districts of Austria captured by the Russians. It was designed to prevent ill feeling between the people and the invaders. It was dated September 17, and read:

"To the inhabitants of Austria-Hungary:

"The Government of Austria declared war against Russia because the great empire, ever faithful to its historical traditions, could not forsake inoffensive Serbia, nor acknowledge its enslavement.

"On entering the Austro-Hungarian territory, I declare to you in the name of the great Emperor, that Russia, which has spent its blood many times for the emancipation of nations from the yoke of foreigners, only seeks the rehabilitation of right and justice.

"Russia also brings liberty and the realization of your national views. For many centuries the Austro-Hungarian Government planted among you discord and enmity, for it knew that as a result of this strife its dominion over you would continue.

"On the contrary, my sole aim is that each and every one of you may grow and prosper and keep at the same time the precious inheritance of language and faith of your fathers.

"Let every one of you, united to his brothers, live in peace and harmony with his neighbors, respecting their national rights. Being convinced that you will cooperate with all your strength to realize this, I call upon you to welcome the Russian troops as faithful friends who are fighting for the realization of your greatest ambitions."

Now, to return to the campaign which had been waged by Von Auffenberg:

While he may be said to have lost this preliminary campaign, his army was unbeaten. Immediately it fell back into the powerful and carefully built line of defenses in front of Lemberg, extending over a front of seventy or eighty miles, from the vicinity of Busk on the north to Halicz on the Dniester, on the south. An irregular extent of volcanic hills, some containing extinct craters, extended along the greater part of its length, and ended on the south in a ridge parallel to the Gnitá Lipa as far as the Dniester. The northern end of this territory was skirted by the railway running due east of Lemberg. The Austrian left rested north of the railroad on the River Bug and the lake district around Krasne. Artificial fortifications improved these natural defenses. There were many miles of trenches with barbed-wire entanglements, and at different points massive fortifications of concrete and steel. The position was difficult to take at any point.

On August 26 and 27, 1914, after the forces of Russky and Brussilov had been joined, the Russians immediately began their attack along the entire front. The days that followed were replete with furious charges. Positions were taken only to be surrendered. Bayonet fighting figured largely in the clashes. After two days, though the Austrian lines were still intact, the Russians claimed a victory. Events came about in this way: After he had forced the crossing of the Zlota Lipa on August 26, and his right wing had connected with Russky on the north, Brussilov had extended his left, by forced march through a country almost devoid of roads, as far to the south as the valley of the Dniester. On August 31, 1914, the main body of this flanking body arrived in front of Halicz. On the day following, September 1, 1914, a furious attack began. More guns were brought up and a fierce attack was concentrated near the little village of Botszonce, where the enemy had taken a position. Afterward, the condition of the field, which had been literally plowed up with shell fire and strewn with the débris of cannonading and accouterments, showed how terrific the conflict had been. The final assault was made by the Russian Ninth and Fifty-ninth Infantry under cover of a heavy shell fire. Enormous losses were sustained, but

the Russians were enabled to make a breach some kilometers wide in the Austrian line.

Then the entire Austrian line began to give way. A desperate stand was made as a last resort in the village of Botszonce itself, but this was turned into a useless sacrifice when the Russians, pushing forward heavy guns, unlimbered them on the same hills where the Austrians had fought so determinedly and quickly reduced the town to ruins.

On September 3, 1914, the Austrian retreat began in earnest. Where the fighting had been hottest around Botszonce and Halicz, the Russians claim they buried 4,800 Austrian dead and captured thirty-two guns, some of which had been mounted by the Austrians but taken before they could be brought into use. The Austrian reports deny such figures, while claiming heavy losses by the Russians.

There was a fine steel bridge across the river Dniester at Halicz, and the extreme right of the retiring Austrian army crossed this, with the Russian cavalry pursuing. The bridge was destroyed and also the only other bridge in that region of the Dniester at Chodorow. In such wise was the pursuit southward delayed until pontoons could be thrown across the stream by Russian engineers.

This was done on the following day, whereupon Cossack cavalry to the strength, it was reported, of three divisions, crossed the river and came up with the retiring enemy. Behind the cavalry at a short distance came several divisions of Brussilov's infantry, which rapidly pushed across the south of Lemberg toward Stryj.

After the extreme right of the Austrian line had been shattered and Russky had been victorious in his attack on the other extreme, the whole line fell apart quickly and while the entire front was exposed to attack, the Austrian left was being enveloped from the direction of Kamionka by a flanking movement. One end of the Austrian line was being broken and the other bent back. The Russians increased the fury of their attack and it was not long before the entire Austrian army was in retreat.

On September 2, 1914, Lemberg was in the hands of



the Russians. This city, otherwise known as Lwow or Löwenberg, was first known as Leopoldis, being founded in 1259 by the Ruthenian Prince Daniel for his son Leo. His history had been a checkered and stormy one. In 1340 it had been captured by Casimir the Great; it had been besieged by the Cossacks in 1648 and 1655, and by the Turks in 1672; it had been captured by Charles XII of Sweden in 1704, and bombarded in 1848. As capital of the crownland of Galicia, it had come to be a handsome city, of many parks, wide boulevards, three cathedrals, many churches, and a great number of important public monuments. It was the seat of a university which contained a highly valuable library of books and manuscripts and a great many treasures of historic and antiquarian interest. Its population was about 200,000.

The Austrians declared that Lemberg had been evacuated in order to save all these treasures from destruction. It is certain that the civil population of the town was strongly opposed to its being defended. It was cosmopolitan and contained elements, doubtless in the minority, who sympathized with Russia and who welcomed the Russian troops with great enthusiasm. Whatever other reasons may be given for its abandonment, however, the fact remains that any attempt to hold it would have been futile.

After the Russians had taken possession of Lemberg, tranquillity again prevailed. Although it was crowded for a considerable time thereafter with Russian soldiery, there was no violence, disorder, or confusion. On every hand were seen Russian soldiers of all branches of the service fraternizing with the people of the place. If a soldier even jostled a civilian accidentally he saluted and apologized. No drunkenness was permitted. A considerable number of Austrian policemen continued to patrol the streets, with a Russian badge on their arms, however.

Austrian surgeons and nurses, left in the town when the Austrian troops retreated, continued to help care for Austrian wounded, also left there, and received the same pay for their services as their Russian associates of the same rank. Austrian

Red Cross attendants were allowed to walk about the streets at will, unmolested.

After its occupation by the Russians, Lemberg at once became a huge hospital base. For the care of wounded that daily came in from the front, there were forty-two immense institutions.

The inhabitants of Lemberg welcomed the Russians as deliverers. A deputation came to General Russky and requested him to make known to the czar the readiness of the whole Slav population of the city to be loyal "sons of Russia." In surrendering the government to Count Bobrinsky, whom the czar appointed Governor General of Galicia, M. Rutovsky, Mayor of Lemberg, said:

"Not without our cooperation have the Austro-Hungarian troops left Lemberg, without firing a shot. There was no struggle here, thanks to our efforts. We believe your excellency has been informed that your troops found here cooperation and a cordial reception.

"In proffering the government of this capital, allow me to express my gratitude to the former military governor, who lessened our hardships.

In his reply, Bobrinsky outlined the principles of his policy:

"I consider Lemberg and East Galicia the real origin of Great Russia," he said, "since the original population was Russian. The reorganization will be based on Russian ideals. We will immediately introduce the Russian language and Russian customs. These steps will be taken with the necessary care.

"We shall at first limit this to the appointment of Russian governors and other officials. Many of the present officials will not be replaced. We shall forbid the convocation of your Legislature during the war. All social and political organizations must be discontinued, and may resume their activities only by permission. These precepts obtain only in East Galicia; West Galicia will be treated differently."

The Russians considered Lemberg to be of great strategical importance. Railroad lines radiated from it in all directions giving its captors direct communication with Kiev and Odessa, with their fortified positions at Dubno and Rovno and thence

to Petrograd, with Brest-Litovsk and Warsaw—save only for the inconvenience of changing the gauge at the frontier. Soon after crossing the frontier, the Russians had changed the gauge of many of their engines and cars to fit the Austrian gauge. They found at Lemberg thirty locomotives and a large number of railway cars left there by the Austrians.

When on September 3, 1914, the Russians entered Lemberg, the official Russian announcement of its taking was as follows:

“Seven days of the most stubborn fighting in Eastern Galicia have resulted in a complete victory for the Russians. Five Austrian Corps were completely routed, and in retreating in disorder westward, abandoned their arms and baggage.

“Besides an enormous number of killed, the Austrians lost not less than 40,000 prisoners, including many generals. The roads of retreat of the Austrians are so encumbered with carts, guns, and impedimenta that the pursuing troops are unable to use the roads. Panic is spreading among the Austrian troops. During the seven days the Russians have taken over 200 guns, several colors, and about 70,000 prisoners. Lwow (Lemberg) is in our hands.”

Russia received this report with great joy. The news of the occupation of the town was conveyed by Grand Duke Nicholas to the czar. The Fourth Class of the Order of St. George was bestowed on General Russky for “his services in the preceding battles.” The Third Class was given him for the capture of Lemberg. The Fourth Class of the same Order was bestowed on General Brussilov. Throughout the empire, Thanksgiving Services were held to celebrate “the reunion with Galicia.” General Count Bobrinsky was appointed Governor General of the province.



## CHAPTER XV

## DANKL'S OFFENSIVE AND RETREAT

LET us now turn our attention to the scene of operations further north. There, it will be recalled, was taking place the principal Austrian offensive by the First Army commanded by General Dankl. In the middle of August, he was being held up by the armies of Generals Ewerts and Plehve, who barred his way toward Lublin and Kholm. A strong offensive was not attempted then by the Russians against him, as they were gathering strength and waiting until Dankl's army should be cut off from reenforcements. It was desired that their advance take place at the same time as the completion of the advance on Lemberg of Russky and Brussilov. Finally, on September 4, 1914, the brief official announcement was made by Russia:

"Our armies on September 4 assumed the offensive along a front between the Vistula and the Bug."

Coming as it did, when the Russian people were rejoicing over the taking of Lemberg, this news was greeted with great enthusiasm.

It will be recalled that when Russky's army advanced, a portion of the Austrian Reserve Army, commanded by Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, was hurriedly withdrawn from the position it held in Poland on the left of the Vistula, across the rear of Dankl's army, to assist General von Auffenberg.

This was referred to as an "advance," in a "communiqué" published by the Austrian General Staff on September 3, 1914. It is probable that at that very early date some German troops also were being brought up for the same purpose. Some of the Austrian reenforcements had been joined with Von Auffenberg's army and had shared in its reverses. Some had remained to screen Dankl on the right.

After Von Auffenberg's army began to encounter difficulties and its progress was stopped, the gap between its left and Dankl's right and rear grew too large for safety, so that there

was a hurrying of forces from the left bank of the Vistula to fill the gap. Later, as the Russian strength grew, an entirely new Austrian army was assembled, consisting, it seems, of portions of the Third or Reserve Army under Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, which was augmented by two corps withdrawn from the Serbian frontier, and also some German troops.

The "Fourth" Army, under the command of the Archduke, was referred to thereafter in official announcements by Russia as the "Tomaszow Army." To strengthen Dankl's left, which lay upon the Vistula at Opolie, German troops from Breslau also were brought up.

In the last part of August and the first part of September, 1914, there was considerable confused fighting between detached forces on both sides in the frontier country between Zamosc and Sokal. Both sides claimed successes. The Russians claimed that their wedge was driven through successfully to Tomaszow and that there a severe defeat was administered to the Austrians.

From there the latter retired to the swampy land about Bilgoraj and upon Tarnograd. The tactics of the Russians had put a last barrier between the two principal sections of the Austrians. Interest thereafter centered in Dankl's First Army.

Fighting on the Lublin-Kholm front, having been purely defensive on the part of the Russians, at first, had grown fiercer as days passed, until there was continuous battle along the entire line. When Von Auffenberg had been defeated and his right and rear threatened, the condition of the northern army seemed so critical that General Dankl decided to force the issue. He might fall back or break through the Russian defense. He decided to attempt to pierce the line between Lublin and Kholm. On September 2, 1914, the Tenth Austrian Army Corps led the assault against the weaker part of the Russian line and reached within eleven miles of Lublin. There it was halted, and so the Austrian offensive seems to have spent itself.

As we have seen, the Russian offensive began definitely on September 4, 1914. According to the Russian official announcement, two days later, "the enemy's center, lying in the region west of Krasnostaw (this being almost due north of Zamosc,

about halfway to the center of a line drawn from Lublin to Kholm) was particularly disorganized. The Forty-fifth Austrian Regiment including the colonel, forty-four officers, and 1,600 men were surrounded, and surrendered." The same announcement stated that "a German division, coming to the aid of the Austrians, was attacked on the left bank of the Vistula." Presumably, the Russian troops there had come from Ivangorod.

After the Austrian First Army began to retire, it was followed by the Russian forces along its line. And this line, at first, was approximately eighty miles. As it retired, the left wing being hemmed in by the River Vistula, and the right feeling steady pressure from Russian forces on the right, where direct retreat was prevented by the swampy nature of the country, the front was contracted until it was less than forty miles.

This had been accomplished by the time the army reached the San, where it was necessary to effect a crossing by four or five bridges at different points. Dankl was highly praised for the manner in which he handled his army during this retreat, and saved it from destruction. In Russia, it had been assumed that the retreat would degenerate into a panic and the fate of the First Army was regarded there as practically sealed. Russian strategists themselves speak in high terms of the way Dankl handled his army in this crisis.

The Austrian advance on this front had its high mark on a line drawn from Opolie on the Vistula, through Krasnostaw to Grabiowiec, whence the line curved southward toward Tyszowce. And it was in the region of the latter place that the Austrians claimed a big success, though this was denied by Petrograd.

After the Russian advance on this front from Lublin and Kholm, as we have seen, had begun with the "disorganization" of the Austrian center at Krasnostaw, the next attempt was to strike at the Austrian left, starting at Opolie and developing thence along the entire line as far as Turobin.

It was on this wing of the Russian army that the chief strength had been assembled, the other parts of the line being left comparatively weak. Reasoning that even if the Austrians were able to break through the front, where it was weaker, it would



only make more certain their being surrounded finally, all new troops that arrived were shifted over to the right wing.

On September 5 and 6, 1914, the Russians attacked the Austrian army at Tomaszow, situated northeast of Krubessiw and southeast of Rawa-Russka. The Austrian army retired.

Near Frempol, the Russian cavalry rushed big convoys of the enemy in the direction of Lublin. Troops and convoys which were moving in the direction of the road leading from Josefow to Annopol were dispersed by Russian artillery on the left bank of the Vistula.

Detachments of the Fourteenth Austrian Army Corps attempted an attack near Rawa-Russka, during the night of September 7, but were repulsed. Near Tomaszow the Russians took an enemy aeroplane.

Aerial battles were not infrequent. Captain Nesteroff, one of the most daring of Russian aviators, sacrificed his life in a successful attempt to destroy an Austrian aeroplane. He was returning from the front after an aerial reconnaissance when he saw an Austrian aeroplane hovering over the Russian forces with the intention of dropping bombs.

The Russian aviator immediately headed straight for the Austrian machine at full speed and dashed into it. The force of the impact caused the collapse of both machines, which plunged to earth, both aviators meeting instant death.

The fortress of Nikolaieff, twenty miles south of Lemberg, was taken by the Russians after severe fighting. The fortress was one of the most modern military strongholds in Austria, being supplied with all the newest forms of defense and offensive weapons. It had steel cupolas, masked ranges of earthworks, and guns of modern type and heavy caliber.

The Nikolaieff fortress commanded the passage of the River Dniester. At the fortress forty guns of the heaviest type and stores of all kinds were captured. Like Lemberg, the fortresses had been well stocked with provisions, which fell into the Russians' hands.

After occupying Nikolaieff the Russians undertook, after allowing their soldiers only two hours of rest, a night march for

the purpose of attacking new positions occupied by the enemy. A Russian battery, placed on the Vistula River, engaged with success an Austrian steamboat armed with rapid-fire guns.

About the same time troops were sent by train from the east of Lemberg to near Chelm, and put in action against Austrian infantry intrenched on a long line, which included the village of Michailowka. The Russians entered the village the same night, the Austrians having fallen back to a half circle of small, steep hills which overlooked the town. Some houses had been set afire, but the flames had been extinguished by the villagers themselves.

At three o'clock the following morning the attack on the hills began. The Austrians occupying them numbered 15,000, of which a large number were in a deeply wooded gorge. The Russian artillery swept the crest of the hill and shelled the gorge with shrapnel. The Austrians replied strongly.

At noon the position was stormed. The Russians, at the word of command, rose with cheers and rushed the hill. Austrian guns to the left cut them down badly. Later, after a desperate, brave fight, the position was taken. The gorge was full of dead men lying in heaps. Officers said they had never seen so many dead lying in a single place. The troops gave the place the name of "The Valley of Death."

It was reported that the Austrian general commanding the defense watched some of his men being disarmed after the battle. Presently the Austrian standards were brought up from the gorge. At this sight, it was said, the Austrian general drew his revolver and shot himself dead.

On September 5, 1914, Austrian troops which had been stationed behind the Grodek Lake district passed the railway lines of Rawa-Russka and Horynier, and on the next day advanced to Kurniki. On the following day a heavy battle began between these forces and a strong Russian force advancing northward. Two days later the Austrians opened their offensive on a forty-mile front, having the better of the conflict until September 11, especially on the southern wing near Lemberg.

The Austrians then retired because of the necessity which had arisen for a new grouping of their forces, the north wing of their

army near Rawa-Russka being threatened by superior Russian forces near Krasnik and between Krasnik and the battle fields of Lemberg.

The attack by the Russians on the Opolie-Turobin section of the line seems to have been a powerful one and the Austrians retired southward, paralleling the course of the Vistula. For nineteen miles the Russian cavalry was engaged with the rear guard of the retreating forces. There was particularly fierce fighting at Suchodola and also at Krasnik. At Frampol, there was a strong Russian cavalry charge. From this point, the Austrians were forced back on the left into the morasses about Bilgoraj and the right and the center were crowded together as they drew near the San. By that time, Russia claimed to have sent 10,000 prisoners back to Lublin. These movements were all the first days of September, 1914.

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## CHAPTER XVI

### BATTLE OF RAWA-RUSSKA

**D**URING the time that Auffenberg's army had been retaining the position before Lemberg, a new line of defense had been instituted in his rear. This line ran from Grodek to Rawa-Russka, and thence along the railroad line toward Narol. As the Russian forces between the armies at Tomaszow had not as yet gotten as far as Tarnograd, the far left of Von Auffenberg's troops, or those of the Archduke, which were a continuation of Von Auffenberg's army at this point, were for a brief time almost in touch with the fringe of Dankl's army on its way to the San. But there was no combined and determined stand at any time. The entire army fell back, set upon getting across the river.

It is probable that on the line from Grodek to Rawa-Russka there were more than 1,250,000 men in the armies on both sides. The line was more than sixty miles long, but the struggle was



concentrated on certain points and fighting elsewhere was not important. The most critical points were at Grodek on the far south, where a position of considerable strength was occupied by the Austrians, and at Rawa-Russka.

One advantage which accrued to the Austrians was that they occupied positions which had been well fortified before the battle of Lemberg, probably in anticipation of a retreat. Nature, itself, protected their right at Grodek against a turning movement. They had excellent railway facilities in their rear. The advantages possessed by the Russians were those of numbers and the fact that they were encouraged by victory.

The battle had its beginning about September 8, 1914, round the position at Grodek, where the Austrians had retreated after the capture of Lemberg. It was on the extreme north of the line, however, that they first began to give ground. There they were not able to make any extended stand because the enemy, besides attacking them fiercely from in front, began to envelop their left.

The fighting went on over a large extent of ground. At several places large numbers of Austrian prisoners were taken. The upper part of the Austrian line was forced steadily back, not without desperate fighting, and finally the entire line became doubled back on itself at a sharp angle from Rawa-Russka. Here the fighting was terrific.

Rawa-Russka was a small Galician city, inhabited chiefly by Jews. The greater part of the town was old, but there was a modern settlement near the railway station, the town being one of the chief railway centers in that part of Galicia. There, two lines cross, one a branch of the main line to Cracow, from a point near Jaroslav to the frontier at Sokal, and the other extending northwesterly from Lemberg to the Polish frontier at Narol. There were at Rawa-Russka large railroad works, round-houses, sidings, and storage yards.

As the big battle began to develop on September 8, 1914, it was seen that Rawa-Russka was the place where it probably would be decided and the best efforts of both sides were exerted there. The defenses on the point of the angle of the Austrian line, just

behind which was the town, were in extent no longer than six, or at most eight, miles. Nevertheless, during eight days, there were as many as 250,000 or 300,000 men engaged here in night and day fighting.

After the first two days, the Russians concentrated their attack on the very apex of the Austrian angle, atop the bluffs at the edge of the ten-acre battle field. During eight days, the Russians stormed this point repeatedly. In a single mile the Austrians made no less than eight distinct stands.

Some points before being evacuated were taken and surrendered several times, and then retreat was only for a short distance, followed by just as determined resistance. The courage and determination of both armies was equally admirable.

One position held by Austrians for hours was in a stubble field. It was necessary to hold this point while a better position was being dug a few hundred yards behind in a slight dip in the ground. The rain of shrapnel was so heavy about this place that later it was not possible to pick up a handful of dirt from it without finding therein pieces of lead. For a mile across the field where the Austrians had lain, bloody bandages and pieces of equipment were strewn thickly.

Behind this line, two or three hundred yards, was another line just beyond a small ground swell, where the Austrians placed themselves in fairly deep trenches. The Russians took this trench, but being unable to advance farther, dug themselves in on their side. The next day they were driven out by the Austrians. Afterward the trench presented the strange appearance of a ridge of earth with a trench on each side—with Austrian relics on one side and Russian relics on the other.

Day by day the Russians drove the Austrians back farther, until at last, the Austrians were holding a deep trench on the slope of the crest of the last ridge of hills defending the town itself. Immediately over the ridge the Austrian batteries were concentrated. The last trench was not more than four hundred yards in front of the Russian guns.

Nevertheless, the Russians were unable to make any advance against this position until they brought up and put into position

a considerable number of heavy howitzers. Then slowly they began to crumble the Austrian defenses. Notwithstanding this bombardment, the Austrians held on for more than a day. Then the Russians stormed the entire top of the hill and seized the few guns which they had not already put out of commission. The hill was taken at the point of the bayonet. This was the decisive moment in the whole conflict.

From the center of the field where this action was taking place the Russian wedge extended to the north and south. The Austrian center was broken when night fell and the Russians were dropping shells into the outskirts of Rawa-Russka. Attacks by the Russians followed, making it impossible for the Austrians to hold the town and it was abandoned by the Austrian forces. In any event it soon would have been enveloped in the rear, considering the way events were shaping themselves on the southern end of the line, and the defense would have been costly.

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## CHAPTER XVII

### RUSSIAN VICTORIES—BATTLES OF THE SAN

EARLY in September, 1914, the Russians attacked strongly fortified positions at Grodek. This was during the time when the Russian northern army was busy driving back the enemy from Frampol to Biloraj. The defenses of Grodek, which included the position at Sadowa-Wisznia, were protected by a chain of six lakes and considerable ground cut up by dikes.

The Russians were commanded by General Brussilov, who duplicated here the tactics of continuous and heavy attack with which he had overcome the resistance of the Austrians at Halicz.

The Austrians had taken stand on a group of heavily wooded hills. In order to reach this, the Russians were obliged to cross a plain about three miles wide, in a series of parallels, while subjected to fire from machine guns and rifles.



It was not until three days later that they were able to gain a position where their guns could reach effectively the trenches of the Russians. When the assault was made with bayonets, the trenches were found heaped with bodies. According to the Russians, the prisoners they took said they had been without regular food for many days and had subsisted on raw potatoes and wild pears. Continually harassed by the Russians, they had not time to bury their dead and so the living had fought on while the remains of their fallen comrades decayed beside them.

A brief account of the affair from the Russian viewpoint is contained in the announcement from the Russian Headquarters Staff, made September 14, 1914:

"The army of General Brussilov, against whom the Austrians made their last desperate onslaught has, on taking the offensive, captured many guns, prisoners, and artillery parks, the numbers of which are now being reckoned. General Brussilov testifies that his troops displayed the highest energy, stanchness, and gallantry. The corps commanders calmly and resolutely directed their troops and frequently wrested the victory at critical moments. General Brussilov specially mentions the distinguished services of General Radko Dmitrieff."

There is no doubt that the engagement here referred to was one of the most bitterly and desperately contested of the war. But the conflict on many fields was being conducted on a scale so huge that it loses much of its importance in a general survey. On the day following the announcement just quoted, the Grand Duke Nicholas briefly announced that "the Russians, after occupying Grodek, reached Mocziska, and are now within one day's march of Przemysl."

While Brussilov's center was moving on to Mocziska, which is about forty miles west of Lemberg, his left was advancing southwesterly along the railroad line to Sambor, and on to Chyrow. The latter place, however, was not taken until September 24, 1914. The fortress of Przemysl was thus cut off from the south.

When Grodek fell, Brussilov's soldiers had been marching and fighting without pause for longer than three weeks. The feats

of endurance they had performed were extraordinary but without delay they pursued the Austrians from Grodek with the same alertness that they had shown in following them from Halicz.

In the meantime, as we have noted, Rawa-Russka had been taken. Like Brussilov, Russky was not inclined to give an enemy he had bested any chance to recuperate, and while Brussilov was pursuing the Austrian right from Grodek to Chyrow on the south of Przemyśl, Russky was following up his success with equal vigor, driving toward Sieniawa the shattered forces which had opposed him.

Sieniawa was occupied on September 18, 1914, the same day that Brussilov took Sambor. Jaroslav was captured by assault on September 21. There was hard fighting on the way there, around Javorow, fifteen miles east of Przemyśl, where the Russians claimed to have taken 5,000 prisoners and thirty guns. In such wise was Przemyśl cut off on the north, east, and south. Behind its defenses, what was left of Von Auffenberg's army took refuge.

The Austrians also had met with reverses where Dankl's army had been falling back before the troops of Generals Ewarts and Plehve. It has been shown that the continuity of the Austrian defenses had not been effective in the region northwest of Rawa-Russka, though it extended beyond the frontier between Tomaszow and Tarnograd. After the conflict at Tomaszow, the line of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand above Rawa-Russka to that place had been bent back on the Rawa-Russka-Jaroslav railroad, while the main body of Dankl's troops fell back on the line of the San.

Never was the Russian pressure on its rear relaxed. The pressure was especially strong from the Russian right which had fought the battle of Krasnik, after clearing the Opolie-Trubin district. The larger portion of the Austrian troops crossed the San near its junction with the Vistula. Probably they hoped that while they might place themselves, on the other side, in touch with the Austrian railroads, the river would be a barrier behind them against the Russians.

It appears that General Dankl, anticipating the necessity of falling back across the San, had been sending his transports back in advance of his retreat, almost from the time the retreat began. In fact, some of the transport trains had been sighted and subjected to shell fire as early as September 9, 1914, from the left bank of the Vistula. Not until September 12 did the army itself reach the banks of the San.

Two heavy rear guards, to north and east, were left to hold back the oncoming Russians, while the main body and the baggage were crossing the river on September 12. The Vistula protected the left of one of these rear guards, the San protected the right of the other. Thus the two formed an arch between the two streams.

Marshy ground made difficult the attack on their front, but, nevertheless, they seem to have been unable to prevent the Russians from piercing the screen before the crossing of the river had been completed. There was great slaughter. The Russians claimed that they took 30,000 prisoners. The artillery of the Russians was highly effective in shelling the bridges while the Austrians were passing over them in solid masses. Beside the large number of those killed by shell fire many were reported to have been forced into the water and to have drowned.

Neither was there respite for the Austrians on the other side of the river, although, in theory, the forcing of the passage of the San by an invading army was considered an impossible task. Enormous sums had been spent by the Austrians in an attempt to make it impregnable.

Along the upper or southern part of its extent it was protected by the powerful position of Przemyśl and by Jaroslav. From there a light railroad, which had been built solely for strategic purposes, ran parallel and close to its left bank almost to the point where it joined with the Vistula.

As they retired, the Austrians destroyed bridges behind them. But they were not able to destroy all, otherwise a few days' rest might have been vouchsafed the First Army. By quick work the Russians seized and maintained a hold on the bridge at Kreszov, on the frontier a few miles west of Tarnograd. As



an official communiqué from Petrograd put it: "The Russians leaped across the river on the very shoulders of the retreating enemy."

The victory on the San, September 12-19, 1914, may well be considered one of the most important of the campaign. There is no way of estimating the Austrian losses, over and above the 30,000 prisoners the Russians say they took, but they probably were heavy. Still more important was the fact that the Russians had broken down the barrier which the Austrians had sought to put between themselves and the invaders. Save for the fact that the Austrians were now in touch with their railroads, and for the moment within reach of security, being under the shelter of Cracow, their position within the triangle formed by the Vistula was no more safe than it had been when they were above it.

The Russians reported that within that triangle they seized an enormous amount of supplies of every kind. Moreover, with the advance on Krzeszow, the last of the invading Austrians had been forced from Russian soil. No longer was an enemy left in the provinces of Podolia or Volhynia.

It must be recalled also that Russian troops which were based on Ivangorod also had intercepted German reinforcements on the left of the Vistula as they hastened across Poland to the aid of Austria. The guns of the Russians also had shelled the transports of the Austrians as they retired along the right bank. The Russian right, pressed on the retiring Austrians, had been able to spare a large number of troops, and these it had thrown across the Vistula at Josefow. These, acting as reinforcements of the Russian troops already on that side of the river, had hurried southward, paralleling the advance of the main army on the right bank and brushing aside whatever forces of the enemy they met.

In this way they were able to prevent any help from that quarter coming to the Austrians. Also, when their comrades were delivering a final blow to the Austrians at the crossing of the San, they were busy on the opposite side of the Vistula driving back a large Austrian force and occupying the important place of Sandomierz. They encountered and overcame near Sandomierz

the Second German Landwehr Corps under General Woyrsch. In the neighborhood of and at the town they reported that they had taken 3,000 prisoners and 10 guns.

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## CHAPTER XVIII

### SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS OF SEPTEMBER, 1914

LET us now briefly summarize the Russian strategy during this month of portentous development, September, 1914, which concluded with the advance down the left bank of the Vistula and the occupation of Sandomierz.

It will be recalled that, being more or less prepared, Russia had found herself invaded by armies operating in three different directions over an extended front. These armies contained in all about a million men. The weakness of this advance, the Russians saw, consisted in this: that the farther two armies of invaders, advancing in divergent lines, proceed, the farther they become separated. Thus it is more difficult for them to act in harmony or for either to protect the flanks of the other.

For this reason the Russians were satisfied to allow the First or northern Army of the Austrians to advance almost without resistance until it came within artillery range of its first main objective—that is Lublin and the railway line to Ivangorod and Warsaw.

Then the Russians delivered a blow with force at the weak point between the two invading armies in the vicinity of Tomaszow. The Austrians, to meet this attack, were obliged to withdraw their reserve forces from the far left across the rear of the First Army. When these forces proved inadequate, the organization of a new army began, and this was thrown into the gap.

If it had been advanced immediately and simultaneously with the other two armies, the new army might have served its pur-

pose, but the campaign, it seems, was already too far advanced. The strength of the Russians had been augmented, and after they had driven the wedge in at Tomaszow they retained it in place, and were able to widen the break by means of the operations which followed in the vicinity of Bilgoraj, and by driving back the Austrian forces above Rawa-Russka. In this way the First Austrian Army was left dangling at the extreme of its advance.

In the meantime Brussilov had made his well-planned turning movement along the Dniester on the far south, and had delivered his blow on Halicz. Russky at the same time was hammering at the Austrian front and left, penning in Von Auffenberg's army on an ever-contracting front, and throwing it back on its successive lines of defense on the Zlota Lipa before Lemberg, and from Grodek to Rawa-Russka.

The Austrians, pushed back from each of these, and with Cossack cavalry on their right, ranging over a considerable extent in southern Galicia, were forced to fall back, guarding as best they might their rear, westward toward Cracow.

When Von Auffenberg's army had been put in a tight place, busy taking care of its own safety, the Russians were able to devote their attention to the army Dankl had in the north. There was no chance of aid reaching it now, and it was weakened from efforts to force the barriers that had been put across its path.

The chief strength of the Russians was massed against the left of this army, for if that wing was broken the entire army would find itself hemmed in and must retreat in order to avoid being surrounded. And so, forced from Opolie along the Vistula, attacked constantly on its entire front and right flank from Tomaszow and Tarnograd, Dankl's army was forced down to and across the San and beyond it.

The movements of the Russians had been executed with great harmony. By September 23, 1914, Dankl's army had been driven by Ewarts and Plehve to the line of the Wisloka. Jaroslav was taken by Russky on September 21. Chyrow was possessed by Brussilov on September 24. Brussilov had entered Galicia at Woloczysk on the same day—August 22—that Russky had crossed the frontier and occupied Brody.



The Austrian losses, since the taking of Lemberg, according to an official statement made by the Russians on September 17, 1914, were 250,000 killed and wounded, and 100,000 prisoners with 400 guns, many colors, and a vast quantity of stores. We are not obliged to accept these figures. They are given here for what significance and merit they may have, but as coming from Russia. It was also reported by Russia that the rifles taken numbered almost half a million. The enemy's total losses were put by Russia at from 35 to 50 per cent. Even the small estimate is said by Austria to be an exaggeration.

The Russians now held all eastern Galicia, and were masters of Lemberg, Jaroslav, Brody, Busk, Tarnopol, Grodek, Brzezany, Sambor, and other towns of no little importance, and also of the railroads between these towns. They also were in control of the oil fields of Galicia, of considerable importance to them at this time, and of the valuable agricultural resources of Galicia, or of such part of it as they occupied. Przemyśl alone held out. Russian cavalry was already trying the approach to the Carpathians from the Dukla Pass to the Bukowina.

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## CHAPTER XIX

### INVESTITURE OF PRZEMYSL ..

MANY fortresses lost a reputation of long standing for strength during the Austro-Russian campaign. Grodek and Rawa-Russka, with fine natural defenses and excellent works, were carried by assault after gallant resistance. Lemberg's defenses were reputed to be powerful, but no attempt was made to utilize them. The fall of Jaroslav has never been explained. It was considered generally to be stronger than Namur or Liege, and a prolonged resistance was anticipated there. It withstood attack for only two days. When heavy guns were brought to bear on it by the Russians the garrison withdrew. Przemyśl seems, alone of all the Austrian defenses, to have justified its reputation.

Przemysl was not only a strongly fortified place but a beautiful city as well, surrounded with flower gardens and orchards. Its history, like that of Lemberg, had been a stormy one. Its population in 1914, including residents of its suburbs, was about 50,000, principally Poles and Ruthenes, who lived together in amity and great religious toleration. In September of that year, when the Russians made their whirlwind advance, there was, according to official reports from Vienna, an army of 80,000 based on the city, under the leadership of General Boroyevich.

With a large part of this army, Boroyevich was reported to have moved to the line of the Wisloka to give aid to Dankl's hard-pushed troops as they made their stand on that river. It was understood that many of Von Auffenberg's soldiers, as they fell back, were employed as a garrison for the fortress. At the time of its investment it was said to contain about 100,000 men, with its defense in charge of General Kusmanek. Afterward the strength of the garrison was increased.

It has been indicated previously how the railway communications had been broken on the east and south by the advance of the Russians after the fall of Grodek and the taking of Mocsiska. The isolation of the fortress of Przemysl was completed by the fall of Jaroslav and the occupation of Radymno, a town on the main Cracow railway on the left bank of the San, about eight miles east of Jaroslav and fifteen miles north of the fortress. And so it remained isolated, save for a short period when the tide of invasion was driven back. During this time it was again in communication with Cracow.

The Russians took it as a matter of course that the fortress would soon fall to them. Its fate was predicted in the newspapers of the Allies; but, in preparation for defense, stores of all kinds had been hurried into it, and plans had been laid for stout resistance. It had a determined commander in General Kusmanek.

The first shots were fired on September 18, 1914. The city was surrounded on September 20, and an unbroken bombardment with many desperate sorties ensued until October 2, when the Russians sent out a white flag to the city and demanded its

surrender. General Kusmanek's reply was that he would not discuss surrender until he had exhausted all powers of resistance. The attack reached its height on October 5, 1914. The Russians stormed again and again, hills of corpses outside the works testifying to furious attacks they made. They succeeded in carrying temporarily one of the outer works, eleven battalions having succeeded in approaching these defenses undetected, because of damage to an Austrian searchlight.

Suddenly they stormed the walls. The garrison retreated to the casemates, from which they defended themselves with rifles and machine guns. The Russians forced their way to the casemates and a hand-to-hand struggle with bayonets, gun butts, and hand grenades followed. When Austrian reinforcements, hastily telephoned for, arrived, the attacking party was already retiring, leaving their dead and wounded in the casemates and on the wall. Rockets and light shells illuminated their retreat. There was desultory fighting during several days thereafter, and then the Russian army settled down to a routine investment, biding the time when their heavy siege guns could be brought up and the way made ready for an effective assault. On October 18, 1914, there was a battle to the east of Chyrow and Przemyśl, which was successful for the Austrians. The fighting near Mizynico was especially severe. The Magiera Heights, which had been in the possession of the Russians, were occupied by the Austrians after a formidable bombardment by their artillery. At the same time Russian attacks on the east of Przemyśl to Medyka Heights, on the southern wing of the battle field, which were especially directed against the heights to the southeast of Stryj and Sambor, were repulsed. A fresh attack of the Russians on the east bank of the river near Jaroslav also was repulsed.

The addition of reserves and the opportunity to reorganize their army, gave new fighting force to the Austrians about this time. Wherever the Russians retired they followed them closely and by reconnaissances were able to develop weak points in the Russian positions. On October 20, 1914, the Austrians had gained ground in several spots in a heavy, stubborn attack on the fortified positions of the Russians from Plotzyn to the highroad east



of Medyka, while a Russian counterattack was unable to make headway.

On the heights north of Nizankowice, Austrian troops scored another victory and took also the villages situated against the heights. In the southern wing the battle was carried on mainly by artillery. The modern field fortification system being liberally used by the Austrians, the battles had largely the nature of fortress warfare. On the same day the Austrians captured in the Carpathians the last point, Jablonki Pass, held by the Russians.

Thus we now see the Austrian army, which had been described as routed and destroyed in battles in Galicia, seemingly taking on a new lease of life, although appearing to have found an impenetrable barrier at the River San north of Jaroslav. On October 22, 1914, the Austrians retook Czernowitz, capital of the crownland of Bukowina, which had been in the possession of the Russians since early in the war. They also captured two field fortifications, situated one behind the other, to the southeast of Sambor.

For eight days a terrific fight was waged between the Russians and the Austrians on the line from Sambor, along the River San to Przemyśl and Jaroslav, and then to the southward. The battle extended over a front of about sixty-five miles. The cannonading was uninterrupted. The Austrians had started the attack at Sambor, but were thrown back by vigorous Russian counterattacks. A concentration of Austrian corps then attempted an advance against Lemberg, with the intention of bisecting the Russian line. This attack was defeated with losses.

On October 31, 1914, the Austrians defeated a mixed Russian column near the Galician-Bukowinian frontier, north of Kutý. In middle Galicia by that date they had occupied Russian positions northeast of Turka, near Stryj, Sambor, east of Przemyśl, and on the lower San. Several Russian attacks around Lisko were repulsed. At Lisko, Stryj, Sambor, and other points the Austrians took many prisoners. Near Stryj and Sambor the Austrians blew up a Russian ammunition depot.

On November 1, 1914, the Austrians claimed that they then had interned in Austria-Hungary, 649 Russian officers and 73,179

Russian soldiers, not including the prisoners they had taken in the fighting in the district northeast of Turka and south of the Stryj-Sambor line. The fighting in this locality was renewed with greater intensity by both sides early in the month, fortune favoring first one and then the other. On November 2, 1914, two infantry divisions and a rifle brigade of Russians were dislodged from a strongly intrenched position.

About this time the czar's forces began concentrating their main attack northeast of Kielce in an effort to repeat the tactics by which they won important victories over the Austrians in the first days of the war. It was their plan, provided they were able to break through at this point, to turn southward against the rear of the Austrian army in Galicia, just as they did two months before, after the battle of Rawa-Russka.

The line of battle in the southeast now became more definitely outlined, extending from Turka through Nadworna and Kolomea to the Russian border just east of Czernowitz in Bukowina. The renewal of Russian attacks followed the bringing up of a new levy of reserves.

The Russians now advanced with fair success along the whole Vistula front. They secured Piotrkow and other places in such positions as to suggest that the Austrians were running the risk of being cut off from Cracow, their ultimate goal of retreat. A rear-guard defense was attempted by the Austrians at Opatow but without success, and the Russians took several hundred prisoners and six Maxims with a supply train.

On the San River, where the fighting had been severe for a fortnight, the Russians adopted the method of deliberately sapping their opponents' trenches, precisely as a besieging force saps its way toward a fortress. This proved a success. When the Russian sap burst in the trenches the Austrians retreated, and the Russians, taking advantage of the confusion, stormed the fortifications in the neighborhood and took them, capturing 5 officers, 500 men, and all the Maxims.

An Austrian column which had descended the north slope of the Carpathians in the direction of Narvoda, where it had intrenched itself, was attacked and driven back. This operation,

being removed by more than one hundred miles from the nearest point to the great struggle, indicated that the Austrians, confident of victory, sent forces across the Carpathians to catch the Russians in the rear when the proper moment came.

This moment, it seems, failed to arrive, and the Russians, having the support of the native inhabitants, had little difficulty in dealing successfully with successive isolated attempts of the considerable Hungarian reserve bodies sent across the Carpathians at various points.

There was some activity about this time before Przemysl, which several times had been reported, incorrectly, as having been taken by the Russians. An attempt was made by the garrison at a sortie. The Russians allowed it to proceed until they could cut in behind, when the force was surrounded. When it found it was impossible to cut a way through either forward or backward, it surrendered. The Russians took about 2,000 prisoners.

On the Austrian retiring line from Kielce to Sandomierz the Russians succeeded on November 5, 1914, in breaking down the defenses of the enemy, and in stimulating a more or less orderly retreat into a hasty flight. Sandomierz, itself, an exceedingly important strategic point, which had played a vital part since the early days of the war, fell into the hands of the Russians. In fighting with the Austrian rear guard southward of Kielce the Russians took within a week 200 officers and 15,000 men prisoners, with scores of guns and Maxims.

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## CHAPTER XX

### AUSTRIAN RETREAT BEGINS

AT this time the Russians were strongly established on the six-mile front of the left bank of the San River, between Nizko and Rudnik. The Austrian opposition there had been long and determined, but was finally broken early in November, 1914. The Austrians began a retreat along this front.



This retreat was such as to indicate less a general defeat than a general obedience to orders to withdraw. It is true that the Russians had been pressing with great energy upon the upper Vistula and San fronts, especially since the settlement of the main fight farther north against the Germans and mixed forces, but the Austrians were in possession of strong fortified positions which still were giving trouble to the Russians, in spite of their constantly increasing numbers.

It was now plain that the Russians had left the Galician front until the Vistula front had been cleared, when a proportion of the troops released there could proceed to add to the fighting force in Galicia, thereby causing the retreat of the Austrians along the whole front.

On November 5, 1914, the Russians achieved what the General Staff characterized as "the greatest victory since the beginning of the war." This was the recapture of Jaroslav. It was announced to the Allies by Grand Duke Nicholas in a formal message, which also stated:

"Following our successes upon the Vistula, a complete victory has just been gained by our troops along the whole of the front in Galicia. Our strategical maneuver has thus been crowned by what is incontestably the greatest success gained on our side since the beginning of the war. I am most confident of the speedy and entire accomplishment of our common task, persuaded as I am that decisive success will be gained by the allied armies." In the capture of Jaroslav the Russians took 5,000 Austrian prisoners.

During several days before the general Austrian retreat along the Vistula front began, they were engaged in furious attack, their artillery fire being especially severe. It was evidently a supreme effort. The last engagement was over an extended front, enormous forces striving to prevent the Russians crossing the San at a point near Monastryzek. It was reported that reinforcements pushing over the Carpathians in an attempt to aid them were delayed in the snow-filled mountain passes.

We will have a better understanding of Russian tactics as worked out in the activities just referred to, if we consider here

an official statement issued by the General Staff about this time concerning them. It read:

"Fierce combats on the River San and south of Przemyśl, which have been going on for more than three weeks, resulted on September 5 in the general retreat of the Austrians.

"On the preceding night the Austrians made a last effort to repulse our troops who were crossing the San. Until a late hour the enemy attacked on an extended front, taking the offensive in dense, successive lines, but everywhere they suffered enormous losses and were repulsed.

"On November 5, 1914, the enemy's columns commenced to move from the San in the direction of Dukla Pass across the Carpathians and south of Przemyśl, seeking everywhere to leave the battle front. We pursued them energetically all along the line.

"The abandonment by the main Austrian forces of the line of the San is the result of the victorious battle fought at the end of September, the original purpose of which was to block the offensive of the Austro-German armies against Warsaw and Ivan-gorod.

"At the beginning of October our troops were engaged along a front extending for 330 miles and passing through Warsaw, Koziénica, Przemyśl, and Czernowitz. Toward October 20 we succeeded in gaining a decisive victory on the left bank of the Vistula in the region of Warsaw.

"Following up our successes during the last eighteen days, on a front of 330 miles, we broke the resistance of the enemy who is now in full retreat. This victory enables our troops to proceed to a realization of further tasks to inaugurate a new period of the war."

This announcement is embodied here, not only for such information as it contains which coincide with established facts, but that the Russian viewpoint toward such events and the purpose behind Russian activities may be manifest.

To the south of Przemyśl on November 7, 1914, the Russians, having increased their activities in the region considerably, took 1,000 prisoners. Warfare about the fortress now seemed to be entering a new phase, which the Russians initiated with great

artillery activity and an advance against Medyka. The Austrians responded with a closer concentration, with the fortress as their center. After the first attack on Przemyśl, all damage to the fortress had been repaired and the outer forts strengthened by field fortifications, of a very strong character, and covered by battery positions.

A new railroad bridge was built at Nizankowice and communications with Chyrow, about twenty-five miles to the south, restored. Numerous trains had been used to transport wounded soldiers and useless Przemyśl civilians southward and to bring back flour, Zwieback, and other supplies to the fortress. The arrival of many carloads of beer caused particular rejoicing.

On November 11, 1914, the Russians, advancing on Cracow from the direction of Jaroslav, occupied Miechow and Dynow. The forces operating farther south seized Lisko. It now seemed to the Russians that the enemy would not be able to make an effective stand east of Tarnow and the Dunajec River and so the Russians would find themselves once more on the lines they had been forced to abandon hastily six weeks previously, when the Germans first made their rapid advance to the Vistula. It was as a result of this campaign and the course of the Russians in conceding smaller successes in order to concentrate their forces at the most important point that the Austrians found themselves driven back now at every point, while the Russians advanced for the possession of the western part of Galicia. It was the hope of the Russians that their advance in Galicia would soon set free their Cossack divisions for a new invasion of Hungary.

On November 12, 1914, the Russians sustained a defeat near Czernowitz, capital of the Austrian province of Bukowina. The Austrians made an unexpected movement, crossing the Pruth, a few kilometers north of Czernowitz and suddenly attacking the Russian right wing. The Russians were completely surprised and after a short resistance decided to fall back upon their base, which seemed free. However, they were then taken under fire by Austrian artillery, which caused great losses among the Russian detachments. The battle field was strewn with corpses. Russian



forces in the Stryj valley also were forced to retire with heavy losses by a surprise attack from an Austrian armored train and Austrian cavalry.

The Russian offensive in Galicia toward Dounaietz nowhere encountered resistance. The Russians occupied Krosno and inflicted heavy losses on the Austrian rear guard.

It should be noted that during the middle of November, 1914, the campaign on which the Russians were concentrating their attention was against the Austrians. The Russian campaigns had consistently adhered to the principle that in military operations important results are obtained by bringing every force to bear upon a single point until the desired end is accomplished. The Russians still followed this policy.

The operations in East Prussia and in western Poland were for the time being made secondary while all energy was devoted to pushing forward the campaign against Cracow. When they were now within fifteen miles of it, an appeal was sent by the city to the Germans for reenforcements. The civilians of the place removed themselves from the fortified area and the inhabitants generally fled the locality. The German colony left for Berlin and Bavaria.

Cracow was surrounded by a triple line of fortifications of which the outer line contained fifteen forts, eleven on the north, and four on the south bank of the Vistula. The defenses on the north were much stronger than those on the East, where the San River and the fortresses of Jaroslav and Przemysl were once regarded as a secure barrier against Russian advance. The Russians already had broken down that barrier and only two small streams lay between their eastern army and the last stronghold of Galicia.

On November 15, 1914, the Austrians defending Przemysl again attempted a sortie, this time with greater success than before. It forced back the Russians on the north side of the fortress to the heights of Rokietnica, with small Austrian losses. A second sortie was repulsed by Russian artillery and cavalry and heavy losses inflicted on the Austrians.

In Galicia we now find the Austrians west of the Donajec

River, along the front from Tarnow to the Vistula. The Austrian line then followed the Biala River for a few miles until it cut across to take advantage of the Wisloka, north and south of Jaslo. From there east the Austrians were retreating into the passes of the Carpathians.

These latter troops were relatively small bodies, whose main object was to prevent the Russian cavalry from making raids into Hungary. Opposite Tarnow the Austrians were prepared to put up a most stubborn resistance, for they regarded the holding of this part of their line as essential. Unless they could hold back the Russians there, they reasoned, the latter would have a chance to break through and cut off the Austrian army that was retreating from Sanok and Jaslo. A Russian advance north of Cracow, they figured, would tend to cut off the entire Austrian army from its German ally. This was an object for which the Russians were striving.

Abandonment by the Austrians of Central Galicia and the gathering of their armies toward Cracow soon began to show results in the stiffening of their resistance to Russian advance. As the Austrians retreated westward their front decreased in length with consequent strengthening of their line. It was their desire that this strengthening should enable them to extend northward along the Warthe River, thus freeing some of the German troops for service in the army that was advancing from Thorn.

By the Russians a German advance in considerable force along the narrow battle front on the west bank of the river Vistula was regarded as a feint at the city of Warsaw, the intention of which was to draw Russian troops from their advance upon Cracow and distract attention from efforts to establish a strongly fortified defensive line from Kalisz to Cracow.

## CHAPTER XXI

## FIGHTING AT CRACOW

ON November 20, 1914, the Russians were before the outer line of defenses of Cracow, with strong opposition to their further advancement. Meanwhile they were pushing forward minor columns of Cossacks into the passes of the Carpathian Mountains, intending that these should emerge, if possible, upon the Hungarian plains in raids similar to those which were made in the first Russian advance in September.

During the next few days following November 20, 1914, there was constant and hard fighting in the vicinity of Cracow, the Austrians reporting that they had taken three battalions of Russians prisoners. All reports showed a stiffening of the Austrian line, while the energy of Russian attacks was reduced by the diversion of troops to stem the Russian invasion by way of the Vistula.

The Austrians were obliged, however, a few days later, to evacuate Neu Sandec, fifty miles southeast of Cracow, and an important railroad junction of the River Dunajec and the main line to Cracow. The Russians reported they took 3,000 prisoners and some machine guns. The capture of Neu Sandec revealed a new Russian advance, threatening the right flank of the Austrian army along the Carpathian Mountains. By this capture the Austrians were deprived of an important railway into Hungary. In order to stop this turning move it was necessary for them to weaken their campaign north of Cracow.

In the Cracow region the Austrians advanced on the north to Pilica, Wolbrom, and Miechow, about twenty miles from the Galician border. To the east the Russians advanced to within twelve miles of the fortress. In the fighting at Pilica and Wolbrom the Austrians claimed the capture of 29,000 Russians.

In the latter part of November, 1914, the Russians were successful in attack in Galicia along a line from thirty to sixty miles



southeast of Cracow, taking more than 7,000 prisoners, thirty cannon, and twenty machine guns in one engagement. On November 29, 1914, the Austrians also scored a victory on the front extending from Proszowicz to Onszreniawa, fourteen miles northeast of Cracow, southward through Brzesko on the Vistula to Bochnia and Adsniez.

General Radko Dmitrieff's cavalry kept in close touch with the retreating Austrians, who were attempting to shake off contact with the Russians and gain time to reform their ranks back of Cracow. Part of the Austrian troops defeated on the San had retired beyond the Carpathians to recuperate while the Russians attacked the Austrian force southeast of Cracow.

At this stage of hostilities, the Russians estimated that the Austro-Hungarian casualties had amounted to 19,000 officers and 900,000 men. At the same time, it was estimated by the Austrians that the total Russian losses had been 760,000 in dead, wounded, deserters, and prisoners. Of these, 420,000 were attributed to the various battles against the Austro-Hungarian forces, and 340,000 to battles against the Germans.

The losses of the Russians in the campaigns against Austria-Hungary, as estimated for the various engagements, were as follows: Early raids, skirmishes, and frontier fighting, 15,000; Krasnik, Niedzfica Duza, Lublin, 45,000; Zamosz, Komarow, Tyszowce, 40,000; first battle of Lemberg, 45,000; second battle of Lemberg, 30,000; Rawa-Ruska, Magierow, 30,000; offensive against middle Galicia, 15,000; offensive around Przemyśl, 40,000; raising siege of Przemyśl, 15,000; Carpathian invasions, 30,000; battles on the San beyond Przemyśl, to date, 25,000; Medyka-Stari, Sambor, 40,000; outposts in the Carpathians, 15,000; last battles of the Vistula from Sandomierz to Ivangorod, 35,000.

On December 1, 1914, the Austrians had been driven from all their positions over a front about thirty-three miles long, which defended the Carpathian passes from Konecha Village, twelve miles north of Bartfield eastward—that is, on all roads leading through the Dukla Pass over the Carpathians. This was the lowest pass anywhere available across the mountain range and

being also the widest, is in all respects best suited for military purposes. All armies that previously had invaded the present area of Hungary from time immemorial, via the Carpathian Mountains, had used the Dukla Pass.

A number of points along the line mentioned, where the Austrians had established defensive positions, were taken by the Russians, the most easterly being south of Mezolaborez. All were taken by assault. Many guns, Maxims, and prisoners were captured. An energetic Russian advance continued to push the Austrians back toward Cracow. The Austrians evacuated one position after another with large losses.

The Russian advance toward Bartfeld and Hammona, on the south slope of the Carpathians in Hungary, indicated an attempt to push forward a turning force around the south flank of the Austrian position, as it stood at that time. The damage caused by this raiding expedition was calculated to force the Austrians to meet it and so divert them from the main fighting line at Cracow. Evidence of this shift was shown in a reverse which the Austrians administered to the Russians at Hammona.

Early in December, 1914, Russia replied to reports that she was suffering from a shortage of recruits by declaring she could put two corps against every one that Germany brought into Poland and still have enough to carry on the campaign against Cracow as originally planned. Her two armies operating against that important objective point had linked flanks. Investment of the city was daily feared.

The southern army, which moved directly west on the Tarnow-Cracow line, had fought its way over every inch of the ground, making a record of forty-five battles in forty-five days. At least, according to old measures, these fights would be classed as battles. Under the stupendous conditions which surrounded this modern cataclysm, they probably range as little more than reconnaissances in force.

Back to the banks of the River Raba, the advancing Russians pushed the Austrian foe. Here in a position of considerable defensive value, the enemy made a determined resistance. But the Russians swept on. The Austrians made a stand soon afterward,

outside the protecting radius of the fortress guns, in the angle made by the Raba and Schreniawa.

Przemysl about this time was reported to be in dire straits. Monsignor Joseph Sebastian Felczar, Archbishop of Przemysl, said, December 3, 1914, after he had left the city for the Vatican:

"Would to God my cathedral city might be spared the horrors of invasion but I feel I can hope no longer. Our garrison has resisted with stubborn heroism but the Russians outnumber them two to one. I got away only after long hours of wearisome wanderings across the Russian lines; the Muscovites had then already captured several of the outer ring of forts, besides other important vantage ground, and had hemmed round the whole fortress in a circle of steel.

"When I left Przemysl, indescribable desolation reigned there. The houses, palaces, and public buildings were reduced to dust heaps. Despite severe measures taken by the authorities brigand bands prowled among the ruins and pillaged such of the civil population as still remained. A never-ending procession of caravans traversed the streets, which were chock full of wounded and dying. The hospitals were overcrowded and the injured laid out in rows in the churches."

On December 4, 1914, the Russians, by the capture of Wieliczka, gained another step in their campaign for the possession of the broad passes to the south and west of Cracow. Wieliczka is a small town, about nine miles southwest of Cracow and three miles from the line of forts. It is built over salt mines, a short railway bearing the product thereof to the larger city.

On the northwestern side, the Russians were only a few miles from the city. It was only the Austro-German army, sitting in trenches and making occasional attacks on the Czenstochowa-Oilusz-Cracow line that prevented the complete encirclement of the place. The contest between these forces was mostly a slow artillery duel from day to day.

It was now the turn of the Germans to relieve the Austrians, if they could, from a critical position. For months before, the Austrians had been sacrificed in the interest of the German plan



of winning a crushing victory in France, and during the retreat from Warsaw it was the Austrians who bore the brunt of the fighting as a rear guard. Again, when the Germans found themselves hard pressed between the Warthe and the Vistula, they flung the Austrian reenforcements to fresh defeat at Wienun.

It was the contention of Austrian military writer that in order to maintain an effective resistance to the Russians at this time and afterward, the Germans should continue to withdraw troops from the western front.

The Russians seemed to feel secure at this time in holding back the German forces in Poland and so were passing forward their campaign in Galicia, in an effort to interpose a wedge between the forces of the opposing nations.

Russia, also had a special motive for exerting every effort to inflict some signal disaster upon the Austrians. It was only by such means that she could relieve the pressure on Serbia and thus save the smaller Slav state from being overrun by the victorious Austrians.

The Russian campaign against Cracow had been little effected by the fighting going on at Lodz. The Russian forces in the region of Cracow had a clear line of retreat, if retreat should be necessary, and were not needed for strengthening the resistance being made by the Russians at Warsaw, as troops from Central Russia could be moved to that threatened district by the available railroads, much more rapidly than armies could be sent overland from Cracow. The Russian forces in the vicinity of Cracow could best help in the defense of Warsaw, the Russian General Staff believed, by pressing their attack energetically and so keeping busy in that field a large force of Austrians and Germans.

On December 6, 1914, the defense of Cracow was stiffened by the arrival of a large body of German troops. All the magnificent trees which surrounded the place were cut down to afford space for the artillery and various new lines of fortifications and barbed-wire entanglements were constructed.

The Russians perceived a turning movement on the part of the enemy, south of Cracow, directed against the Russian left

wing. Russian reenforcements which arrived found that the bridge over the Dunajec, near Kourove, had been destroyed, and that the heights on the left bank of the river were occupied by the enemy. Under a sustained fire by Germans, one of the Russian regiments crossed the Dunajec at a ford. They made their way through ice water up to their necks, and coming out on the other side, captured the heights by a vigorous assault. This assured and made safe the passage of the river by the other Russian troops.

On the following day, December 7, 1914, the Austro-Germans made an effort to counteract the advance of the Russians to Wieliczka, southeast of Cracow. By a dash toward Neu Sandek, on the headwaters of the Dunajec River, the Austrians attempted to outflank the Russians and thus force them to retreat from their advance position.

The Austro-German forces occupied the valley of the stream Lososzyna, and the fighting front extended from near Wieliczka southeastward to the Dunajec, about fifty miles in length. The Russian attack was successful, the losses inflicted upon the enemy, especially the German Twenty-fourth Corps, being very heavy. Several German heavy guns were knocked out, five field batteries were reduced to silence, guns and prisoners taken, and the Russians continued their attack.

In the next few days in December, 1914, events favored the Austrians. In West Galicia the south wing of the Russian army was defeated at Limanovo and compelled to retreat. The Austrians engaged in hot pursuit and took many prisoners. Austrian forces took Neu Sandec and again entered Grybow, Gorlice, and Zmigrod. The Austrians reported that the Russians had completely evacuated the Zemplin country.

A third incursion of Germans into Galicia was arrested by Russians on the very border of the province. Some maneuvering on the part of General Dmitrieff's corps sufficed to check the invading columns, although they crossed the Carpathians on a wide front extending between Wieliczka and the headwaters of the San River.

During the same week, the garrison of Przemyśl made a series

of attempts at sorties, but each time were driven back with heavy loss. The Russians captured several hundred prisoners and ten Maxims. It was learned later that increasing scarcity of provisions complicated by sickness was responsible for these tentative efforts to lift the siege. An unsuccessful attempt also was made by a force from the garrison to open the railway in the direction of Biercza, on the southwest.

It was asserted at Austrian headquarters that the total number of Russians captured by the Austro-Hungarians in Galicia within three days in the middle of December, 1914, was 33,000. After a battle at Limanowa, it was said, 26,000 were captured. The number of Russians killed was very large, according to report, 1,200 dead being found at Limanowa alone.

The problem of caring for prisoners had by this time become acute both for Austria and for Russia. According to the Russian Department of the Interior, which had charge of the maintenance of prisoners, there were then in Russia, exclusive of the Germans reported captured in operations under way in North Poland, 350,000 Austrian and German prisoners of war. Of this number only 100,000 were Germans, the rest being Austrians captured during the campaign in Galicia.

At Semipalatinsk, on the Irtysh River, near the borders of Western Mongolia, one small escort of Russian soldiers was serving as guard for 100,000 Austrian and German prisoners, whose prison walls consisted of four thousand miles of frozen steppes, separating them from the borders of their own countries.

The prisoners were brought by rail to Omsk, where they were embarked on steamboats for the thousand mile trip down the Irtysh River to Semipalatinsk. Here quarters were found for them in the big barracks erected for the mobilization of the Russian army and unoccupied since its departure for the front.

Every morning at eight o'clock the prisoners were released from the barracks and permitted to wander about at will. When they departed in the morning, they were told that unless they reported at the barracks by nightfall they would be locked out. At that time of the year, in such a bleak country, this would mean death, as there was practically no place where they could



obtain shelter. The freedom of the prisoners during the day was absolute, even to the extent of accepting employment from local mining companies.

In the thick of its fighting in Galicia, Russia had another problem to deal with, which was the Russianization of the country. In the middle of December, 1914, arrangements were made under the auspices of a member of the Duma charged with national education in Galicia, for a large number of elementary school teachers in the native schools of Galicia, to attend at certain centers a series of lectures on Russian language and literature. Lember, Sambor, Tarnopol, Stanislavoff, and Chernovtsi were the first towns chosen for the opening of these courses. Besides this measure, Russia, in the following month, opened ten model elementary schools where all teaching was given in the Russian language. These were in small towns and villages.

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## CHAPTER XXII

### AUSTRIANS AGAIN ASSUME THE OFFENSIVE

ON December 14, 1914, the Russian General Staff announced that it had "discovered the enemy trying again to assume the offensive in Galicia." Two days later, Austro-German columns were pouring over the Dukla. It was understood that three new German army corps had been sent to the eastern front, making nine new corps since the beginning of hostilities, and that three Austrian corps were withdrawn from Serbia. The number of troops entering Galicia through the mountain passes was estimated at 175,000 men.

This movement compelled the Russians to withdraw the raiding parties which had invaded Hungary. It is unlikely, however, that Russia had planned to invade Hungary in force, so long as Przemyśl and Cracow stood firm. As the situation then was, it would have been a perilous feat to send an army any distance across the mountains. Before such an invasion could be at-

tempted, it was first necessary that the positions of the Russians in western Galicia and Poland should be greatly strengthened.

When the new Austro-German reinforcements arrived in Galicia over the Dukla, the extreme southern end of the Russian line below Cracow was pushed back from advanced positions west of the Raba to and over the Dunajec. But the Russians did not regard the menace from this quarter as a grave one. Announcement was made by General Sukhomlinoff, the Russian Minister of War, on December 23, 1914, that it had been stopped "absolutely." We have said before that it was at the Austrians, rather than the Germans, that the Russians wished at this time to strike a telling blow.

On December 28, 1914, General Dankl's army sought to help the main German forces by passing over the Nida near its junction with the upper Vistula above Tarnow. The Russians suddenly were reenforced at this point by troops who swam the ice-filled stream, attacked the Austrians on their flank, drove them back, and took 10,000 prisoners.

It was about this time, when Radko Dmitrieff was operating so successfully in the neighborhood of Tarnow, that General Brussilov resumed the offensive in Galicia. He was able to feed and munition his army from Kiev. Practically all the railroad system of Galicia could be utilized by him for maneuvering troops and distributing supplies. His troops numbered only about 250,000, but their strength was increased by railway facilities. General Brussilov could afford to send a large force under General Selivanoff to help invest Przemyśl.

To the Russians, however, Przemyśl was not of immediate importance. The fortress commanded the railroad leading past Tarnow to Cracow, and would have been badly needed, it is true, if the army of Dmitrieff at Tarnow had been attacking Cracow. But the army of General Ivanoff had been forced by this time to retire about fifty miles north of Cracow. Therefore, the smaller force commanded by Dmitrieff was unable to do anything against Cracow from the east; and so it withdrew from the upper course of the Dunajec River and became intrenched along the more westerly tributary of the Dunajec, the Biala.

The Russian line extended from the Biala to the Dukla Pass in the Carpathians. Still farther eastward, all along the lower valleys of the Carpathians, the army of General Brussilov was holding out against a large Austro-Hungarian force. This was under the command of General Ermolli.

The chief offensive movement of Ermolli in December, 1914, was directed toward the relief of Przemyśl. As has been indicated, his lines ran through Grybów, Krosno, Sanok, and Lisko, thereby putting a wedge between the army of Brussilov and that of Dmitrieff. He attacked Dmitrieff from the east along the line of the Biala and the Dunajec. In Christmas week Dmitrieff administered a heavy defeat to him, and took nearly thirty thousand prisoners and many guns. In this way he helped prepare for new plans which Grand Duke Nicholas and his staff had prepared for the Russian army in Galicia for the new year.

Cracow had successfully resisted assault, and seemed likely to hold out against the best efforts of the Russians. The gateway to Silesia had been closed. Hindenburg had achieved one of his chief objects in forcing the central Russian forces back. He had paid a huge price in men in order to establish a deadlock of warfare in trenches, about midway in the big bend of the Vistula. Nevertheless, from the German viewpoint, the result achieved was worth it.

If the battle for Silesia had been won in November, 1914, by General Russky and General Ivanoff on the field in front of Cracow, Italy and Rumania might have been brought into the fight by their continued advancing movement. Austria and Hungary thus might have been attacked and overcome by huge forces from three sides. If Austria-Hungary fell, the overthrow of Germany might have been threatened. Hindenburg's strategy had put this out of the range of possibility.

It was such developments as have been mentioned that caused the Russian commander in chief to decide on Hungary as the next object of attack. He planned to bring direct pressure upon Vienna and Budapest and so force first the Hungarians and then the Austrians to ask for terms of peace. If they did not, he



counted on Italy and Rumania entering the war and assuring victory for the Allies.

On Christmas Day, 1914, under such conditions, began the great battles of the Carpathians, which continued for many months to be a crisis of the war. The Russians were outnumbered, but their position was favorable. On December 25 they advanced on the Dukla Pass. Meanwhile fierce fighting continued at various points in Galicia. In the neighborhood of Tuchow, south of Tarnow, the Russians, on observing the advance of the Twenty-sixth Austrian Brigade, slipped past on parallel roads and surprised the Austrian rear. The Russians opened fire with machine guns and virtually annihilated the whole brigade. In two days' fighting in southern Galicia, near the Carpathians, the Russians captured more than 4,000 prisoners, including a major of the General Staff and five other officers, besides three heavy guns and two machine guns. In this region the Russians were moving small detachments through the mountain passes.

Many spectacular engagements took place during the development of the Russian offensive among the mountain spurs of the Carpathians. On Christmas Day, 1914, two Russian infantry regiments, under a murderous fire and wading waist deep in the icy water of the River Jasiolka, dislodged by bayonet charges the Austrians from their line and took as prisoners four officers and 150 men. On the same day an inferior force of Austrians surprised a Russian detachment and took 4,000 prisoners.

In another engagement south of the Vistula, in the region of Tarnow, the Russians drove back the Austrians from the Tuchow-Olpiny line. The enemy abandoned ten rapid firers and the Russians took prisoner 43 officers and more than 2,500 men. The next day, December 2, 1914, continuing the pursuit of the Austrians, the Russians captured 8 machine guns and about 1,000 prisoners. The Russians occupied the heights near Siedlizka, on the left bank of the Biala River. This gave them possession of a twenty-mile strip of territory separating the two Austrian forces.

Late in December, 1914, all attacks by the Austrians in the

territory between the Pilica and the upper reaches of the Vistula ceased and the Russians assumed the active offensive in this region. They cleared the left or easterly bank of the Nida River by the capture of an obstinately defended Austrian position which was taken by storm.

South of the Vistula, or astride it on the front from Opatow across the Biala River to Biecz, the Russians took prisoners 200 officers and 15,000 men in their sweeping process. A retreat of Austrians in Galicia along the Lisko-Sanok-Dulka-Zmigrod front was precipitate, the nature of the country favoring them, the corridor-like valleys and passes preventing the Russians from pursuing them over parallel roads or harassing their flanks. Only six roads cross the Carpathians, two of which are little more than mountain trails. Owing to the unbroken character of this region, the Russian cavalry was able to do little scouting, while the extreme cold interfered with the work of aeroplanes.

In western Galicia the Russians made progress in spite of the almost impassable condition of the country due to mud, driving the enemy from the front of Stromnik-Gorlice-Jasliska, taking guns and a large number of machine guns.

The year of 1914 closed with the Russian troops advancing in western Galicia, having stormed several fortified works of the enemy, east of Zakliczyn, making prisoners of 44 officers and 1,500 soldiers, and capturing 8 machine guns.

Southwest of Dukla Pass the Russians had dislodged the Austrians from positions they had strongly fortified. They had also realized an important success south of Lisko and had repulsed counterattacks by the enemy in the Carpathians at Uzsok Pass and renewed sorties by the garrison at Przemysl.

Early in January, 1915, the Russians developed great activity in Bukowina and the Carpathians, without making much impression on Austrian positions which they attacked on the Sucwaza River, in the Upper Csermosz territory, and also further west, on the ridges of the Carpathians. In the district of Gorlice and to the northwest of Zakliczyn determined Russian attacks were repulsed. During the fighting at Gorlice the Austrians stormed and captured a height south of there.

During the second week in January, 1915, heavy rains put a stop temporarily to the Russian offensive southward in the direction of Neu Sandek, and at the same time to the Austrian offensive in Russian Poland. A thaw following rain converted the whole country into a vast morass. It was physically impossible for the Austrians to bring up heavy artillery, without which the Russian position along the Nida River could not be forced.

The Russian lines on the east bank of the Nida followed the heights, which were admirably suited for intrenchments and well covered with positions for the Russian artillery fire. There was little firing, however, except an occasional artillery duel when the fog permitted and sporadic local infantry firing. Conditions were similar east of Cracow, the adversaries being well intrenched on opposite sides of the Dunajec River.

During this time another determined sortie was made by the garrison at Przemyśl, preceded by extensive cavalry reconnaissance. The Austrian infantry then advanced in force in the direction of a wood near the city. The Russians opened fire, but the Austrians rushed forward and gained the cover of the woods. They continued to push forward and the Russians permitted them to advance close to their position before making a serious attempt to halt them.

With the fighting thus at close range, the Russians opened a terrific fire from rifles and machine guns. The battle raged for several hours, with heavy losses on both sides. The Austrians then retired to the fortress.

From the middle to the end of January, 1915, fierce snowstorms and bitter cold interfered with the activity of both Russians and Austrians. There were few engagements. Toward the end of the month, concentration of Austrian troops in Bukowina became stronger. On January 21, 1914, an Austrian force, including an infantry division with artillery, attacked the Russian front in the region of Kirlibaba, but was repulsed.

On the night of January 27, 1914, the Russians were driven back in the Upper Ung Valley from their positions on both sides of Uzsok Pass. This was one of the most important of the Carpathian passes, for the possession of which many important



engagements had been fought since the beginning of the war. It was strongly intrenched and stubbornly defended in several good positions, one behind the other. It fell into the hands of the Austrians after three days of hard fighting. West of the Uzsok Pass, Russian attacks were repulsed with heavy losses. Near Vezeralles and Volovco battles ended with the Russians being driven from the heights of the pass. The Austrians took 400 prisoners.

During the latter part of January, 1915, there were no developments of importance in Galicia.

## PART III — RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN

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### CHAPTER XXIII

#### FIRST CLASH ON PRUSSIAN FRONTIER

THE first clash of arms between the Russian and German armies occurred on August 6, 1914, near Soldau, East Prussia. In this chapter we will follow the events which were taking place on this frontier, simultaneously with the movements of the German invasions of Belgium and France, the Austro-Serbian campaigns, the Russian invasion of Austria, and the campaigns in the other parts of the world. The general causes preceding the outbreak of the war have been fully narrated in Volume I, while the theatre of the following campaign is clearly described in the chapter on that subject. It is necessary at this time, however, to review the fighting lines before we bring the mighty German army and the Russian hosts into combat on their first battle ground.

We have seen that for many years previous to the outbreak of the great European War all the countries involved had been forced by political, economic, and social conditions to work, each country in its own way, toward the same main object—military preparedness. Many factors, of course, determined not only the means for achieving this result, but also the degree to which it was finally accomplished. At this time we are interested only in the results so far as they affected Russia and Germany at the beginning of the war.

When the armies gathered on the Russo-German frontier, both of these countries had reached a high degree of military efficiency. Germany, which for decades had been the acknowledged leader

among the great powers as far as army development was concerned, had practically concluded the increases and improvements for the accomplishment of which its people had only recently submitted to a special scheme of very extensive taxation, the "Wehrbeitrag." By the results of this move, we find that the western defenses against France and indirectly against England profited much more than those in the east against Russia.

Russia, as its army stood ready to strike its first blow at Germany, had drawn to the fullest extent the obvious conclusions impressed upon it by its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. Graft, which had played such great havoc during its last war, had been stamped out. The artillery equipment had been brought up to date and the troops in charge of it had increased vastly their skill in its use. Everywhere formations had been rearranged, increased and improved, and this rearrangement had affected especially the distribution of the empire's forces. Never before in its history had Russia concentrated so many troops in its eastern and central provinces.

In setting its armies into action, Germany faced by far the easier problem. Its territory was much more compact, its means of communication were vastly greater and superior, and racial differences between its various parts were practically nonexistent. With a total area of 208,825 square miles, the German Empire possessed 39,532 miles of railroad, whereas the Russian Empire in Europe with 2,100,000 square miles had only 35,447 miles of railroad. The Germans had the further advantage of having brought all their means of transportation to the very acme of perfection, while the Russians were lacking in equipment as well as in organization.

The remarkable quickness and effectiveness with which the Russian army operated at the moment of war indicates not only an unexpectedly high state of preparedness, but also a remarkably high degree of leadership on the part of its generals.

The general staffs of both Russia and Germany were as well prepared to meet on the battle ground as far as it had been within human power and foresight. Each side had collected all available information concerning the other. The German genius for



organization had proved itself especially valuable and fertile in this direction. On the basis of this knowledge, well-defined plans of campaign had been worked out, and the leaders of both sides had many opportunities to exercise their strategic abilities, not only by solving problems created by these plans theoretically across the tables in their respective war colleges, but also practically during the annual periods of maneuvers.

As the armies faced each other in the first week of August, 1914, the strategy of both sides was determined chiefly by three factors: (1) by the obstacles and defenses which nature itself had placed in the localities in which the fighting was likely to take place; (2) by the means of defense and offense which were available; (3) by political conditions.

At the beginning of the war all but the last were absolutely known quantities, and as far as Russia and Germany were concerned this last factor could be figured out comparatively easily. For it was clear that if Germany would become involved in a war with Russia, Austria would be found fighting by its ally's side and *vice versa*. It was also fairly reasonable to assume, and had immediately become a fact, that under such conditions Germany would find itself involved with France too, which would mean that Germany's available fighting strength would have to be divided into two parts at least. It was, of course, a matter of fairly common knowledge that Germany's concentration was much more powerful on its western border than on its eastern, so that Russia could count with reasonable certainty on a comparative weak, even if well organized, resistance on the part of Germany at the beginning of war.

Germany's strategy in the east was influenced chiefly by its plan for the western campaign, which we have already considered in the preceding chapters. The fight against France seemed to be of greater importance and urgency to Germany than that against Russia. Why German strategy reached this conclusion does not concern us here. In passing, however, it may be well to remember that the German provinces adjoining France directly, or indirectly behind Belgium and Luxemburg, were of much greater importance and value to the Germans than their

provinces adjoining Russia, and that even the temporary loss of these would probably have spelled disaster to Germany. Then, too, it was on the western side that England's influence was being felt; and, furthermore, the French army, though much less numerous than the Russian, was a more formidable adversary on account of its greater effectiveness, as well as of the certainty of its much quicker movements.

Russia had a preponderantly large advantage in numbers over Germany. The result of this fact, from a strategic point of view, was that Russia could dare much more than her adversaries. She could strike stronger, quicker, and with greater frequency in more directions, and could risk to extend her operations much farther. The fact that means of transportation, as has been pointed out, were much better developed in the German frontier provinces than in those of Russia, was a disadvantage only as long as Russia fought on its own territory, though even then, necessarily, the invading enemy would be hampered at least equally by the lack of transportation facilities.

Russia's natural advantage of greater numbers pointed clearly to an immediate offensive which would bring with it the promise of more advantages, while both German and Austrian conditions indicated with equal clearness as the safest and sanest strategy a policy of "watchful waiting," at least until such time when large enough forces could be spared from the western front or concentrated from available reserve sources to promise to a more aggressive policy a fair chance of success.

Thus Russia decided to strike immediately against Germany as well as against Austria. With the latter campaign we are not concerned here. How she devoted herself to this twofold task with all the power and means at her command we shall see in the following narrative.

The hosts of Russia were standing on the German frontier. In the four provinces adjoining Austria-Hungary a total of sixteen army corps, or one-half of all the Russian army in European Russia, were available. By July 31, 1914, the czar had ordered the general mobilization of army and navy. The German Ambassador in Petrograd was instructed to notify the Russian Gov-

ernment that unless this order was countermanded within twelve hours, Germany would immediately respond by mobilization of her army and navy. As the Russian mobilization had continued, Germany officially took the same step in the late afternoon of August 1, 1914, after a state of war had already been proclaimed for the entire empire on July 31, 1914.

The fighting forces on the German side at the beginning of the war on or near the east front included the First Army Corps at Königsberg, the Twentieth at Allenstein, the Seventeenth at Danzig, the Fifth at Posen, and the Sixth at Breslau. These mustered a total of forty-four infantry, twenty-one cavalry, and twenty-five artillery regiments, augmented by four battalions of rifles (Jaeger), and twelve formations of technical troops. The entire peace effectiveness of these formations was about 150,000 men, which at full war strength undoubtedly meant at least not less than 500,000 men, of whom about one-half were of the first line, the balance being made up of reserves and Landwehr troops.

The Russians drew up, in the face of the Germans, two armies: the Army of Poland and the Army of the Niemen. The latter in peace time centered in Vilna and consisted of five army corps; the former used Warsaw as its base and consisted of at least as many army corps. It now held a wide front from the Narev in the north to the valley of the Bug River. These two armies together had an effectiveness of almost twice as many men as the German forces, supported as they were by a series of well-garrisoned fortresses: Grodno, Osowiec, and Bialistock in the north; Lomza, Novo Georgievsk, and Warsaw in the center; and Ivangorod and Brest-Litovsk in the south. In its entirety the mobilization of these forces was completed about the third week of August, 1914, but by the end of the first week the Army of the Niemen had completed its mobilization, and it was from there that the first blow was struck.

This army was commanded by General Rennenkampf, one of the few Russian generals who had succeeded in coming through the Russo-Japanese War, not only with an untarnished, but even with an enhanced reputation. Its task was to invade the northern part of East Prussia, striking directly at Königsberg.



Small engagements, of course, took place all along the Russo-German border between the advance guards of the two armies from the day war had been declared.

On August 6, 1914, a Russian cavalry division crossed over into the enemy's country south of Eydtkuhnen. The next ten days saw many isolated advances of this nature, all of them initiated by the Russians, and most of them accomplishing their respective objects. One small force ventured as far north as the immediate proximity of Tilsit of Napoleonic memory.

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## CHAPTER XXIV

### ADVANCE OF RUSSIANS AGAINST THE GERMANS

ON August 16, 1914, within seventeen days after the official beginning of the Russian mobilization, everything was in readiness for the general advance. The next day immediately developed the first strong German resistance. At Stallupöhnen the German First Corps from Königsberg, under General von François, supported by two reserve corps, attempted to stem the Russian flood. Though they succeeded in taking 3,000 prisoners and some machine guns, they had to fall back upon Gumbinnen. The pressure of the superior Russian numbers—four active and two reserve corps—proved too strong. The battle front now was about thirty-five miles long, extending from Pillkallen on the north to Goldap on the south, with Gumbinnen in the center.

On August 20, 1914, the first real battle on the eastern front was fought before this pretty country town, which was founded in the beginning of the eighteenth century, and had gradually acquired about 15,000 people. General Rennenkampf used his numerical superiority for a powerful onslaught against the enemy's center. Fourteen hours of the most stubborn fighting—beginning at dawn and ending only with the coming of night—resulted in the final withdrawal of the German center. Though

artillery did some preparatory work, it was the slashing thrust of glittering bayonets in massed formations and the tearing devastation of hand grenades that carried the day. The German wings kept up their resistance for the next day, but finally joined the main army which had withdrawn through Gumbinnen to Insterburg. The losses on both sides probably were about even, amounting to at least 5,000.

The certainty of the Russian numerical superiority undoubtedly was responsible for Von François's continuation of his retreat to his main base, Königsberg. The Russians lost no time in following and reached Insterburg on August 23, 1914. Practically without further opposition all of northern East Prussia as far as the river Memel was in General Rennenkampf's hands, Tilsit, Labiau, Tapiau, Gerdauen, Korschen, Rastenburg, Angerburg, and Goldap indicate the limits of his conquest. With it went four of the six railroads centering in Königsberg, leaving open only the two lines running to Allenstein and Danzig, which, of course, meant serious danger to this important German fortress.

The Russian Army of the Narew had, in the meantime, pushed its advance with equal rapidity and success from the south. Its commander, General Samsonoff, had won laurels in Manchuria, and had acquired considerable military reputation as a commander in Turkestan and as a member of the general staff. He had approximately as many men at his disposal as his colleague—about 250,000. His task, however, was more difficult. For his entire front would face, almost immediately after crossing the border, the treacherous lake district in the south of East Prussia. For his advance he used the two railroads from Warsaw into East Prussia, on the west through Mława and Soldau, and on the east through Osowiec and Lyck. From the latter town he pushed his right wing forward in a north-westerly direction, and sent his center toward the southwest to Johannisburg.

On August 23 and 24, 1914, to meet this advance, the Germans had available only one active army corps, centered in Allenstein, the Twentieth. Local Landwehr formations found the task

of delaying the Russians far beyond their power. In quick succession Samsonoff took Soldau, Neidenburg, Ortelsburg, and finally Allenstein. At Frankenau, just west of the Mazurian Lakes, his right wing connected with the Twentieth German Corps, which, supported by strongly prepared intrenchments, managed to hold up the Russian advance, but finally had to give way and fall back on Allenstein and Osterode. This gave to the Russians command of one more railroad to Königsberg, that from Allenstein. Though the two Russian armies had not yet formed a solid connection, they were in touch with each other through their cavalry, and the Russian front was in the form of a doubly broken line running from Friedland through Gerdauen to Angerburg (Niemen Army) and from there through Frankenau and Allenstein to Soldau (Narew Army). The former, facing southwest, in connection with the latter, now threatened not only Königsberg, but the defensive line of the Vistula from Thorn to Danzig. The greater part of East Prussia seemed securely in the possession of more than 500,000 Russian soldiers, chiefly of the first line, and under apparently very able leadership.

The occupied territory suffered severely. Bombardment and fire had laid waste, at least partially, some of the towns and a great many of the villages. Requisitions for the support of the invading army necessarily brought great hardships and losses to the unfortunate inhabitants. The avalanche-like success of the Russian arms, the clearly displayed weakness of German numbers and the rapid retreat of their forces naturally added to the terror of the peasants who make up the largest part of East Prussia's population. By thousands they fled from their villages and hamlets, carrying on their slow ox carts or on their shoulders whatever they had gathered as their most precious possessions in their first hours of fear and terror. To them the word "Cossack" still called up pictures of the wild hordes that had overrun their country during the Seven Years' War, and later again in the Napoleonic wars. The large, strongly fortified cities of Königsberg and Danzig seemed to hold out the only hope for life and security, and toward these they flocked in ever-increasing masses. Even Berlin itself had brought home to it some of the



more refined cruelties of war by the arrival of East Prussian refugees.

We have already seen that at the outbreak of the war only five active German corps were left on the eastern front. Two, the First and the Twentieth, had, so far, had to bear the brunt of the Russian advance; one other, the Sixth, had been sent from Breslau to detract, as much as possible, the Russian onslaught against the Austrian forces in Galicia; and the other two, the Fifth and Seventeenth, stationed in Danzig and Posen, were too far back to be immediately available.

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## CHAPTER XXV

### BATTLE OF TANNENBERG AND RUSSIAN RETREAT

**W**HEN on August 22, 1914, the full strength of the Russian attack became evident, the German General Staff decided on heroic measures. An immediate increase of the German forces to the point where they would match the Russian seemed out of the question, and the solution of the problem, therefore, clearly lay in the ability of the general staff to find a general who could, with the forces on hand, meet the requirements of the situation—free East Prussia of the invader.

Fortunately for Germany, its hour of need on the eastern front brought forth this man. There had been living for a number of years in the west German city of Hanover a general who had been retired in 1911 as commander of an army corps. His name was Paul von Hindenburg. He was at that time in his sixty-seventh year, but having been an army officer since his youth, he was "hard as nails," and from a military point of view still in the prime of his years as a leader.

It was well known in military circles that Von Hindenburg had acquired the most thorough knowledge of the difficult lake district south of Königsberg. He had devoted his time and

energies for years to a most exhaustive study and investigation of the Mazurian lakes and swamps. Again and again he had tramped through them on foot, picked his way along their treacherous paths on horseback, and finally put their few roads to the supreme test of the motor car. He knew their every shortcoming and advantage. His topographical information included fording places for men and guns, and quicksands.

Much of this knowledge he passed on to younger officers to whom he lectured at the General Staff College in Berlin, and when, only some years ago, practically all arrangements had been concluded by powerful financial interests to drain and cultivate his beloved lakes and swamps for agricultural purposes, he succeeded in overthrowing these plans at the last moment. It is said that so powerful were these interests that Von Hindenburg succeeded only by going, at last, to the emperor himself, and convincing him that the natural defensive possibilities outweighed in value any amount of increased acreage of reclaimed land.

We have already shown the problem which faced Von Hindenburg. To drive the Russians out of East Prussia he had to defeat two armies composed of at least 500,000 men, whose offensive momentum had been raised to a very high power by a highly successful advance of more than a week's duration. He, himself, could count only on far inferior numbers, not more than the equivalent of four army corps. These he had to assemble without loss of time and with as much artillery equipment as could be spared from all directions. From Königsberg came the biggest part of the beaten First Corps and its reserves. What was left of the Twentieth Corps, of course, was right on the ground. Undoubtedly the fortresses of Danzig, Graudenz, Thorn, and Posen had to yield parts of their garrisons. However, most of these were troops of the second line.

On August 23, 1914, Von Hindenburg arrived at Marienburg, about seventy miles southwest from Königsberg and almost as far to the northwest from Allenstein, and assumed command of the East Prussian forces. Only three days later, on August 26, 1914, he was ready to put in execution the plans on which he had worked for almost a lifetime.





Hindenburg's general strategical plan was as simple as the carrying out of it, considering the means at his command was difficult. Facing him were two armies still out of contact with each other, or at least only very loosely connected. Each alone outnumbered him at least by 50,000; combined they were more than three times as powerful as all his forces. His only hope, therefore, was in attacking them separately. Thus he chose to strike first at Samsonoff's army which was much farther spread out than Rennenkampf's, and would find it much more difficult than the latter to keep open its main line of retreat and supply. Its left rested on Soldau, its right on Frankenau, while its center had been pushed forward to Allenstein through Soldau, and south-east from it ran the only direct railroad to his Polish base by way of Mława. Three other lines centered there, one in the west from Thorn, one in the northwest from Eylau (connecting with Danzig and Königsberg), and one in the east from Neidenburg, which from there run north to Allenstein and northeast to Johannisburg and Lyck. Apparently centering his efforts on pushing his advance, Samsonoff had neglected to secure the former two roads.

On August 26, 1914, Von Hindenburg occupied both and took Soldau Junction. The shortest line of retreat had now been cut off to the Russians, whose forces were scattered over a considerable territory, and on account of lack of railroads could not be concentrated quickly or efficiently at any one point. Though a determined effort was made on August 27, 1914, to retake Soldau, it was foredoomed to failure. Samsonoff's left was thrown back on Neidenburg, making his front even more unwieldy than before.

At this time the German front was very short, its left being at Hohenstein, about halfway between Soldau and Allenstein and slightly northeast of Tannenberg. But it made up in activity what it lacked in length. In vain the Russians tried to break the German ranks and open up a road to the northwest. Much blood was spilled on both sides during three days' fighting, but the German line held. In the meantime the Russians had evacuated Allenstein, feeling the imperative need of shortening their front. This gave Von Hindenburg the railroad that ran almost parallel to the Russian front as well as the splendid main

road that runs alongside of it. Commandeering every available motor vehicle from the entire surrounding countryside, he immediately extended his line and swung around the Russian right as previously he had swung around their left. Almost every road, rail or otherwise, that was of any importance was now in the hands of the Germans and along them could be sent men and guns with overwhelming rapidity. With relentless energy Von Hindenburg now used his intimate knowledge of the territory in which he was fighting. Wherever he knew the most hopeless territory to be, there he drove the Russians. Mazurian swamps and lakes did all that he had ever claimed they would do and more. They swallowed up his enemy by the thousand, they engulfed his guns and sucked in his horses.

Within a week after Von Hindenburg had reached East Prussia the problem of the Narew Army had changed from how to extend its advance most quickly to how to escape from this bottomless pit along the few inadequate lines of escape that were left. The morale of this Russian army was broken. For even the most stolid Russian peasant soldier, whom neither the roar of guns nor the flash of bayonets could move, quaked at seeing whole companies and batteries disappear, in less time than it takes to tell about it, in the morasses of a country without firm roads and a minimum of solid ground.

On the last day of August, 1914, thousands of Russians had laid down their arms and were sent back into central Germany. Of Russian armies of more than a quarter of a million nearly a hundred thousand fell into German hands. Almost half as many more were killed or wounded. The Russian commander in chief was killed on August 31, 1914. Only one corps escaped by way of Ortelsburg and Johannsburg, while scattered fragments of varying size fought their way out, some into north Poland and some into the protecting arms of the Niemen Army. Most of the guns of Samsonoff's army were either captured by the Germans or lost in the swamps. This one week's battle among the Mazurian lakes is known now as the Battle of Tannenberg, so named after a small town west of and halfway between Soldau and Allenstein.

# THE CAMPAIGNS IN EAST PRUSSIA AND POLAND

RUSSIAN AND GERMAN SOLDIERS, TRENCHES,  
HOSPITALS AND PRISONERS · VIEW OF A GER-  
MAN SERVICE IN THE BELGIAN SENATE CHAMBER



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German soldiers constructing trenches in the snow-covered fields. In spite of special provision made in all the armies for the comfort of their soldiers, the winter campaigns were full of hardship





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A large, well-equipped German hospital, where wounded German, French, Belgian, and British soldiers are cared for with German thoroughness and efficiency



Copyright, Paul Thompson

German soldiers with shield-protected machine guns entrenched in the Mazurian Lake country. An officer watches the effects of their fire through a telescope





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A large division of German cyclists on one of the muddy and difficult highways of Poland. Throughout western Russia, swamps and bad roads hinder the armies





Copyright, Paul Thompson

A picturesque group of Russians in Poland, stopping to drink from the partly frozen stream they are passing



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Officers of the German military and civil government of Belgium attending a religious service in the Senate Chamber of the Belgian Parliament



Copyright, Paul Thompson

Great numbers of prisoners were taken in the German drives into Russia. Here Germans are distributing bread to 15,000 Russian prisoners at Augustowo, Russian Poland





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German aeroplane guns, mounted on turntables. They can be turned quickly to any direction and to whatever angle of elevation is required

Without giving his troops any rest Von Hindenburg now turned against Rennenkampf's forces. But, in spite of the rapidity of movement, the German commander could not accomplish all that he had set out to do. Apparently his plan was now to strike north past Angerburg and Goldap to Gumbinnen, or possibly even to Eydtkuhnen in order to cut off the retreat of the army of the Niemen and drive them in a southerly direction to their destruction in the Mazurian lakes, just as he had done in his easterly drive against the Narew Army. But Rennenkampf was too quick. He recognized the danger that threatened him through the defeat of Samsonoff's forces and he began his retreat as soon as it became evident that the other army's cause was lost. He was in a much more advantageous position than his colleague had been. For not only did the territory through which he had to fall back offer no particular difficulties when once he had escaped Hindenburg's attempt to push him up against the Mazurian lakes, but he had also a fairly efficient network of railroads at his command centering in Insterburg.

Long before he evacuated this city on September 11, 1914, he had drawn in most of his outlying formations in the north and west and had sent them back safely across the border and behind the protection of the Niemen and its shield of fortresses—Kovno, Olita, and Grodno. In this he was also materially assisted by the stubborn resistance which Von Hindenburg encountered at Lyck at the hands of a small army that had been sent out from Grodno to aid him, and the nucleus of which consisted of an entirely new Finnish, and an equally complete, Siberian Corps. In spite of this, however, the pressure of the victorious Germans was strong and rapid enough to force him to a generally hurried retreat. The losses in killed and wounded were comparatively small, for almost all the fighting was rear-guard action. But the Germans succeeded in gathering in about 30,000 more prisoners, chiefly detachments that had been unsuccessful in connecting in time with the main army. Much more serious was the loss of some 150 guns and vast quantities of war material for the removal of which both time and means had been lacking.

On September 15, 1914, Von Hindenburg could announce that the last of the invaders had either been captured or driven back and that not an acre of German soil was in the possession of the Russian forces. On that date, moreover, he had already advanced far enough into Russian territory to occupy the seat of government of the Russian province of Suwalki, almost 150 miles in direct line east of Tannenberg, though less than 20 from the German border. From that point on he intrusted the further conduct of these operations to Lieutenant General von Morgen, who had been one of his division commanders at Tannenberg.

By September 23, 1914, Rennenkampf had completed his retreat behind the Niemen. The fighting which took place during the ensuing week is commonly designated as the "Battle of Augustovo," though it covered a much larger area. Augustovo itself is a small town about ten miles from the German frontier, about twenty miles south of Suwalki, and forty miles northwest from Grodno.

The German advance clearly suggested an attempt on their part to force a crossing of the Niemen. This in itself was a very difficult undertaking. The river is more than 600 feet wide, too deep to ford, and naturally none of the few bridges over it were available for the Germans. Furthermore its right bank, which was held by the Russians, is very high, commanding absolutely and practically everywhere the low left bank which in many places is almost as swampy as the worst parts of the Mazurian lakes. West of the Niemen and between it and the frontier the country is full of lakes, much as in the Mazurian region. The Germans, of course, were under the same disadvantages there as the Russians had suffered from in East Prussia. Of railroads there were none except one, running in the shape of a semicircle from Grodno through Augustovo and Suwalki to Olita.

On September 25, 1914, in spite of these conditions and disregarding the weakened state of their forces, the Germans attempted to cross the Niemen simultaneously at two places. About thirty miles north of Grodno they had constructed a



pontoon bridge and began to send across their infantry. It was only then that the Russians opened up their murderous fire from well-protected positions. Against it the Germans were practically helpless. In spite of large numbers of guns that they brought up, and in spite of repeated efforts of crossing in massed formations, the result was the same: immense losses on the part of the Germans and comparatively slight ones on the part of the Russians. Indeed, the last attempt was not only frustrated, but the Russians even forced back the Germans some miles.

Somewhat farther south the other attempt met with a similar fate. There not only had the Russians posted their heavy guns on the right bank, but infantry had been strongly intrenched on the left. Their combined opposition forced back the Germans under heavy losses after they had fought all day and all night. During the last week of September, 1914, the Germans were gradually forced back along their entire front. Much of the fighting was done in the dense forests east of Augustovo and was hand-to-hand fighting. In the afternoon of October 1, 1914, the Russians recaptured Augustovo after the Germans had made a determined stand, yielding only when heavy guns bombarded their positions from the west and northwest. On the next day the Germans had to retreat from Suwalki and withdraw the lines that they had extended northward, and fall back behind their frontier. This meant the end of the German attempt to cross the Niemen and the beginning of the second invasion of East Prussia.

## CHAPTER XXVI

SECOND RUSSIAN INVASION OF  
EAST PRUSSIA

WONDERFUL as had been Von Hindenburg's accomplishment in defeating the Russians and practically destroying one of their first-line armies, the latter's recuperative power was almost as surprising. Deprived of the prize of three weeks' fighting, defeated, and driven by the enemy on their entire front for a depth of fifty miles into their own country, they were nevertheless ready in a few days for a new offensive. Undoubtedly this was partly due to the talent of their new commander, General Russky, who had been sent up from Galicia, where he had gathered experience as well as honors. But more so was it due to the protecting defenses of the Niemen and the opportunities they offered for reorganization, rest, and the collection of new forces.

The situation which was faced on the first week of October, 1914, was perilous to all the armies engaged. Russia's fortresses on its eastern front were concerned for a twofold purpose. In the first place, they were to lend increased power of resistance to whatever means of defense nature had provided, and this function, of course, determined their location. Wherever rivers or other natural obstacles would offer themselves to an invading enemy, there Russia had added especially strong artificial defenses.

Any army invading Russia from East Prussia in a southerly direction would have to cross the Narew River and its principal tributary on the right, the Bober. These two run, roughly speaking, parallel to the Russo-German border at a distance of about thirty to thirty-five miles, and no army attempting an invasion east of the Vistula and south of the Niemen could advance farther than this short distance without first crossing the Narew and Bober.

The group of fortresses along this natural line of defense

begins opposite the southwestern corner of East Prussia with Osowiec, situated on the railroad that runs from Lyck Bialistock. Thence it stretches in a southwesterly direction through Lomsha, Ostrolenka, Rozan, Pultusk to Novo Georgievsk, which latter is the most important of these, commanding as it does the conflux of the Narew, Wkra, and Vistula rivers.

This series of fortified places forms the center of the system of fortifications against Germany. In a southeasterly direction from it the Vistula offers another strong natural line of defense strengthened still more by the two big fortresses of Warsaw and Ivangorod, behind which, on a bend of the Bug River and almost equally distant from both, Brest-Litovsk, at the very western end of the vast Pripet swamps, defends the entrance to central Russia, to Smolensk and Moscow.

Adjoining Osowiec on the north and making even more formidable and naturally very strong defensive line of the River Niemen are Grodno, Olita, and Kovno.

The second purpose of all these fortified places is to protect the rear of an offensive army advancing toward Germany and to offer a haven of refuge if it should become necessary for such an army to fall back. At the same time they serve as powerful bases and screens behind which an army of defense could quickly be changed into one of offense. Not only had they served well this last purpose at the time of mobilization, but again and again later on weakened Russian armies succeeded in retreating behind these protecting shields, from which they emerged again a little later, bent on new attacks, after they had been strengthened by reinforcements from Russia's inexhaustible resources of men.

It was thus that the Russian armies saved themselves after Von Hindenburg's smashing victory at Tannenburg. Out of about 650,000 men, forming the Army of the Narew, and the Vilna Army, more than 300,000 had succeeded in reaching the shelter of their fortresses.

At that time the German forces, sadly in need of rest, were much too small and too weak to attempt an energetic general attack against either the Niemen or the Narew-Bug lines of



defenses. However, in order to prevent another invasion of East Prussia something had to be done. They therefore advanced a goodly distance into the province of Suwalki, occupying even the seat of its government, a town of the same name. Farther south Osowiec represented a continuous danger to East Prussia, being very close to the border and on the direct railroad to Lyck. Though the Germans were in no condition to undertake a siege, they determined to attempt at least to close the crossing of the Bober at this most advantageous point.

September 18, 1914, saw the beginning of this movement and ten days later heavy artillery in limited force was thundering against the gates of the small but strong fortress.

The suffering on both sides during this period was very great. Keeping continuously moving, fighting day and night under conditions the natural difficulties of which had been increased still more by unending rainstorms, resulting in long delays for food and other supplies, Russians as well as Germans displayed wonderful energy and perseverance. And in spite of these difficulties, in spite of roads ankle deep in mud, the Germans advanced and the Russians re-formed their forces.

On October 2, 1914, the Russian advance started from Grodno as a base. The Third Siberian and parts of the Twenty-second Finnish Army Corps, forming the left wing, met the enemy at Augustovo. For two days the battle lasted, and though it involved only comparatively small numbers it was one of the most sanguinary engagements of this period. Both sides lost thousands of men and large quantities of war equipment. The Germans having received reinforcements, attempted a flanking movement against the right wing, undoubtedly with the intention of attacking the Russians from the rear. They succeeded in getting a small force around the Russian right, which, however, had to be withdrawn very soon. For the balance of October the fighting raged along the entire front from the Niemen in the north to Lomsha in the south, a distance of about 150 miles. Neither side was able to gain any decisive advantage, for both the offensive and the defensive was fought with equal stubbornness. One day fortune would smile on Russia's masses, only

to turn its back against them during the next twenty-four hours. The lack of success of the German flanking movement around the Russian right brought to the latter greater freedom of movement. It advanced toward Wirballen with the object of gaining the road to Eydtkuhnen and Stallupoehnen, which would enable them to strike once more for the important junction at Insterburg. This attempt resulted in another minor but very sanguinary engagement north of Vysztyt Lake. Again no decision had been reached, though the Russians were getting closer and closer to East Prussia. A Russian attempt to outflank the German left at Schirwindt, a few miles north of Eydtkuhnen and right across the line in East Prussia, was not any more successful than the previous German attempt, and weakened the Russian right, just as a similar failure on the other side had weakened the German left. Again honors, hardships, and losses were fairly even.

In the center the Russian advance covered an extensive plain, known as the Romintener Heide. There, too, continuous fighting, a great deal of which was carried on at night, involved usually only comparatively small formations and the result was equally indecisive.

The Russian left wing had been more successful. It had fought its way across the border and taken Wargrabova. The Germans, however, succeeded in retaking this place as early as October 9, 1914, pursuing the Russians and finally stormed their strong intrenchments a week later. The country here is slightly elevated and the Russians had dug themselves in rather elaborately. Manyfold rows of trenches, in some places six and eight deep, had been thrown up around the small village of Vielitzken which suffered severely during the German onrush.

In the meantime another attempt to take Lyck had succeeded. The direct road through Osowiec was not available on account of the German force located there. So the Russians sent a division forward from Lomsha which, taking Bialla, reached Lyck on October 8, 1914. The Germans, lacking sufficient forces for a successful defense, withdrew not only from Lyck, but also from before Osowiec.

But by October 13, 1914, the Niemen Army's advance into East Prussia had been either forced back or delayed to such an extent that this comparatively weak Russian advance in the extreme south was out of touch with the main forces of the Niemen Army, and therefore in turn was withdrawn.

This practically finished the second Russian invasion of East Prussia. The German forces gradually cleared all of their country of the enemy and followed him even into his own territory. But although continuous fighting went on during the last week of October, again chiefly around Augustovo and Bakalartshev, the Russians for the time being contented themselves with a defensive policy, just as the Germans were satisfied with their success in preventing the Russian advance without going over to a clean offensive.

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## CHAPTER XXVII

### FIRST GERMAN DRIVE AGAINST WARSAW

WE have already spoken of the strategic position of Russian Poland, of its vulnerability, exposed as it is to attack from the Central Powers on three sides, and finally what Russia had done to strengthen Poland's natural line of defense, the Vistula River, by building fortresses on its most important points. It may be well to recall here that the lower part of this river flows through West Prussia, from Thorn to the Gulf of Danzig. For almost a hundred miles, from Thorn to Novo Georgievsk, it cannot actually be considered of defensive value to Russia; flowing slightly northwest from the latter fortress to the border it is open to German use on either side. But at that point, about twenty miles northwest of Warsaw, any army coming along its valley would have to take first this important fortress before it could continue farther into central Poland. Should it fail in this it would have to withdraw its forces from the right bank and then force a crossing at some point between Novo Georgievsk and the point where the Vistula enters Russian Poland from Austrian Poland, a few



miles east of Cracow. It is at this point also that the Vistula is swelled by its most important tributary, the Bug River, which, roughly speaking, flows parallel to the Vistula at a distance of about seventy miles from the Galician border to a point on the Vilna-Warsaw railroad, about fifty miles east of Warsaw, where it bends toward the west to join the Vistula. The Bug River thus forms a strong secondary natural line of defense. In the north the Narew—a tributary of the Bug—forms an equally strong barrier against an army advancing from East Prussia.

There cannot be much doubt that the plan of the Central Powers originally was to take Poland without having to overcome these very formidable obstacles. If Von Hindenburg had succeeded after the battle of Tannenberg in crossing the Niemen, and if, at about the same time the Austro-Hungarians had also succeeded in defeating their Russian adversaries in Galicia, described in another chapter, this object could have been accomplished very easily by a concerted advance of both along the east bank of the Bug, with Brest-Litovsk as the most likely point of junction. The result would have been twofold: in the first place all of Poland would have been in the hands of the Central Powers; for Russia either would have had to withdraw its forces from there before their three main lines of retreat—the railroads from Warsaw to Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev—had been cut by the invaders, or else the latter would have been in a position to destroy them leisurely, having surrounded them completely. In the second place it would have meant the shortening of the eastern front by hundreds of miles, making it practically a straight line from the Baltic Sea to some point on the Russo-Galician frontier.

In the preceding chapters, however, we have seen that up to the beginning of October, 1914, neither the Germans nor the Austrians had accomplished this object. The former had to satisfy themselves with having cleared their own soil in East Prussia of the Russian invaders and with keeping it free from further invasions, while the latter were being pressed harder and harder every day and had to figure with a possible invasion of

Hungary. It was then that the Central Powers decided to invade Poland from the west, and thus gradually drove out the Russians. Why they persisted in their efforts to gain possession of Russian Poland is clear enough. For in addition to the above-mentioned advantage of shortening and straightening their front, they would also deprive Russia of one of its most important and populous centers of industry, in which the czar's domain was not overrich, and it would remove forever this dangerous indentation in the back of the German Empire.

Before we consider in detail the first German drive for Warsaw, it is also necessary to consider briefly political conditions in Russian Poland.

Ever since the partition of the old Kingdom of Poland among Germany, Austria, and Russia, the Polish provinces created thereby for these three empires had been a continuous source of trouble and worry to each. The Poles are well known for their intense patriotism, which perhaps is only a particular manifestation of one of their general racial characteristics—temperament. At any rate the true Pole has never forgotten the splendid past of his race, nor has he ever given up hope for a reestablishment of its unity and independence. It is a rather difficult question to answer whether Russia, Germany, or Austria have sinned most against their Polish subjects. The fact remains, however, that all three most ruthlessly suppressed all Polish attempts to realize their national ideals. It is equally true that Russia went further along that line than either Germany or Austria, and on the other hand did less for its Polish subjects than the other two countries. Both in Germany and Austria there existed therefore a more or less well-defined idea that the Russian Poles would welcome German and Austrian troops with open arms as their saviors from the Russian yoke. In Russia a certain amount of anxiety existed about what the Poles would do. The latter, in a way, at the beginning of the war found themselves facing a most difficult alternative. That their country would at some time or other become a battling ground of the contending armies was quite evident. Whether Russia or the Central Powers would emerge as the final victor was at least open to dispute. Whatever side the Poles

chose, might be the wrong side and bring to them the most horrible consequences. It was undoubtedly with this danger in view that the "Gazeta Warszawska" printed on August 15, 1914, an editorial which in part read as follows:

"Remain passive, watchful, insensible to temptation.

"During the coming struggle the Kingdom of Poland will be the marching ground of various armies; we shall see temporary victors assuming lordship for a while; but change of authority will follow, and inevitable retaliation; this several times, perhaps, in the course of the campaign. Therefore every improvident step will meet with terrible revenge. By holding firm through the present conflict you best can serve the Polish cause. In the name of the love you bear your country, of your solicitude for the nation's future, we entreat you, fellow countrymen, to remain deaf to evil inspirations, unshakable in your determination not to expose our land to yet greater calamities, and Poland's whole future to incalculable perils."

This, of course, was far from being a rousing appeal to support Russia's cause, but it was even further from being a suggestion to support that of the Central Powers and revolt against Russia. Polish newspapers of the next day printed a proclamation signed by the Commander in Chief Grand Duke Nicholas prophesying the fulfillment of the Polish dream of unity, at least, even if under the Russian scepter, and promising a rebirth of Poland "free in faith, in language, in self-government."

On August 17, 1914, four of the Polish political parties published a manifesto in which they welcomed this proclamation and expressed their belief in the ultimate fulfillment of the promises made. The net result of the sudden three-cornered bid for Polish friendship and support, then, seems to have been that the leaders of Polish nationalism had decided to abstain from embarrassing Russia, even though their resistance against Germany and Austria with both of which other Poles were fighting was not always very deep-seated.

During the first month of the war practically nothing of importance happened in the Polish territory. German detachments



occupied some of the towns right across the border, in many instances for a short time only. Mlawa, Kalish, and Czeszochowa were the most important places involved.

On August 31, 1914, however, the occupation of Radom, about 130 miles from the German frontier, was reported, and a few days later that of Lodz, next to Warsaw the biggest city of Russian Poland and an important manufacturing center. At about the same time all of the places along two of the railroads running from Germany to Warsaw, Thorn to Warsaw, and Kalish to Warsaw, as far as Lowitz, where they meet, were occupied. In this territory the Germans immediately proceeded to repair the railroad bridges destroyed by the retreating Russians, who, apparently, had decided to fall back to their defenses on the Vistula. The Germans must have felt themselves fairly secure in their possession of this territory, for on September 15, 1914, Count Meerveldt, then governor of the Prussian Province of Münster, was appointed its civil governor. A day later the commanding general (Von Morgen) published a proclamation, addressed to the inhabitants of the two provinces of Lomza and Warsaw. In it he announced the defeat of the Russian Narew Army and Rennenkampf's retreat and stated that larger forces were following his own army corps, which latter considered them as its friends and had been ordered to treat them accordingly. He called upon them to rise against their Russian oppressors and to assist him in driving them out of beautiful Poland which afterward was to receive at the hands of the German Emperor political and religious liberty.

About ten days later the "additional stronger forces," which General von Morgen had prophesied, put in an appearance. They consisted of four separate armies, one advancing along the Thorn-Warsaw railroad, another along the Kalish-Warsaw line, a third along the Breslau-Czeszochowa-Kielce-Radom-Ivangorod railroad, and the fourth from Cracow in the same direction. Just how large these four armies were is not absolutely known. Estimates range all the way from 500,000 to 1,500,000 which makes it most likely that the real strength was about 1,000,000. Of these all but the Fourth Army were made up of German sol-

diers, whereas the Cracow Army consisted of Austrians, forming the left wing of their main forces which about that time had been rearranged in western Galicia.

By the time all of these armies were ready to advance, the victor of Tannenberg, Von Hindenburg—who meanwhile had been raised to the rank of field marshal—had been put in supreme command of the combined German and Austro-Hungarian armies in Poland. Though he was fighting now on territory concerning which he had at least no superior knowledge than his adversaries, his energy made itself felt immediately. He pushed the advance of his four armies at an overpowering rate of speed and forced the Russians, who apparently were not any too sure, either about the strength of the opposing forces or their ultimate plans, to fall back everywhere. By October 5 the Russians, attempting to make a desperate stand near Radom, had been forced back almost as far as Ivangorod, and within the week following the Austro-German army, still further south, had reached the Vistula between the Galician border and Ivangorod. The advance of the Germans as well as the retreat of the Russians took place under terrific difficulties, caused by torrential rains which poured down incessantly. Some interesting details may be learned from a letter written about that time by a German officer in charge of a heavy munition train: "From Czeszochowa we advanced in forced marches. During the first two days roads were passable, but after that they became terrible, as it rained every day. In some places there were no roads left, nothing but mud and swamps. Once it took us a full hour to move one wagon, loaded with munitions and drawn by fifteen horses, a distance of only fifteen yards. . . . Horses sank into the mud up to their bodies and wagons up to their axles. . . . One night we reached a spot which was absolutely impassable. The only way to get around it was through a dense forest, but before we could get through there it was necessary to cut an opening through the trees. For the next few hours we felled trees for a distance of over five hundred yards. . . . For the past eight days we have been on the go almost every night, and once I stayed in my saddle for thirty consecutive hours. During

all that time we had no real rest. Either we did not reach our quarters until early in the morning or late at night. What a bed feels like we've forgotten long ago. We consider ourselves lucky if we have one room and straw on the floor for the seven of us. For ten days I have not been out of my clothes. And when we do get a little sleep it is almost invariably necessary to start off again at once. . . . Even our food supplies have become more scarce day by day. Long ago we saw the last of butter, sausage, or similar delicacies. We are glad if we have bread and some lard. Only once in a great while are we fortunate enough to buy some cattle. But then a great feast is prepared. . . . Tea is practically all that we have to drink. . . . The hardships, as you can see, are somewhat plentiful; but in spite of this fact I am in tiptop condition and feeling wonderfully well. Sometimes I am astonished myself what one can stand."

Early in October, 1914, the Germans came closer and closer to Warsaw. At the end of it they were in the south, within twenty miles of the old Polish capital—at Grojec. At that time only a comparatively small force, not more than three army corps, was available, under General Scheidemann's command, for its defense. These, however—all of them made up of tried Siberian troops—fought heroically for forty-four hours, especially around the strongly fortified little town of Blonie, about ten miles west of Warsaw. The commander in chief of all the Russian armies, Grand Duke Nicholas, had retired with his staff to Grodno, and Warsaw expected as confidently a German occupation as the Germans themselves. But suddenly the Russians, who up to that time seem to have underestimated the strength of the Germans, awoke to the desperate needs of the situation. By a supreme effort they contrived to concentrate vast reenforcements to the east of Warsaw within a few days and to change the proportion of numbers before Warsaw from five to three in favor of the Germans to about three to one in their own favor.

On October 10, 1914, panic reigned supreme in Warsaw. Although the Government tried to dispel the fears of the populace



by encouraging proclamations, the thunder of the cannons, which could be heard incessantly, and the very evident lack of strong Russian forces, spoke more loudly. Whoever could afford to flee and was fortunate enough to get official sanction to leave, did so. The panic was still more intensified when German aeroplanes and dirigibles began to appear in the sky. For fully ten days the fighting lasted around the immediate neighborhood of the city. Day and night, bombs thrown by the German air fleet exploded in all parts of the city, doing great damage to property and killing and wounding hundreds of innocent noncombatants. Day and night could be heard the roar of the artillery fire, and nightfall brought the additional terror of the fiery reflection from bursting shrapnel. The peasants from the villages to the west and south streamed into the city in vast numbers. Thousands of wounded coming from all directions added still more to the horror and excitement.

The hardest fighting around Blonie occurred from October 13 to 17, 1914. On the 13th the Germans were forced to evacuate Blonie, and on October 14 Pruszkow, a little farther south and still nearer to Warsaw. On October 15 the Russians made a wonderful and successful bayonet attack on another near-by village, Nadarzyn. The next day, the 16th, saw almost all of this territory again in the hands of the Germans, and on the 17th they succeeded even in crossing the Vistula over a pontoon bridge slightly south of Warsaw. However, even then the arrival of Russian reinforcements made itself felt, for after a short stay on the right bank of the Vistula the Germans were thrown back by superior Russian forces. All that day the fighting went on most furiously and lasted deep into the night. The next day at last the Russian armies had all been assembled.

## CHAPTER XXVIII

GERMAN RETREAT FROM RUSSIAN  
POLAND

ON October 19, 1914, the Germans, who apparently had accurate information concerning the immense numbers which they now faced, gave up the attack and began their retreat. The retreat was carried out with as much speed and success as the advance. By October 20 the Germans had gone back so far that the Russian advance formations could not keep up with them and lost track of them. Without losing a gun, the First German Army managed to escape the pursuing Russians as well as to evade two attempts—one from the south and one from the north—to outflank them and cut off their retreat.

During the fighting before Warsaw the total front on which the Russian armies were battling against the German and Austrian invaders of Poland was about 160 miles long, stretching from Novo Georgievsk in the north, along the Vistula, through Warsaw and Ivangorod to Sandomir at the Galician border in the south. All along this line continuous fighting went on, and the heaviest of it, besides that directly before Warsaw, took place around the fortress of Ivangorod. Two attempts of the Russians to get back to the left side of the Vistula on October 12 and 14, 1914, were frustrated under heavy losses on both sides. A German soldier states in a letter written home during the actual fighting before Ivangorod that at the end of one day, out of his company of 250, only 85 were left—the other 66 per cent having been killed or wounded.

Just as the Russians had succeeded in assembling sufficient reinforcements at Warsaw, to make it inevitable for the German forces to retreat, they had brought equally large numbers to the rescue of Ivangorod. However, these did not make themselves really felt there until October 27, 1914. Previous to that date the Germans and Austrians captured over 50,000 Russians and thirty-five guns. When, on October 23 and 24, 1904, aeroplane

scouts discovered the approaching vast reenforcements, and similar reports were received from the First Army fighting around Warsaw, the German and Austrian forces were all withdrawn. The retreat of these groups of armies was accomplished much in the same way as of that in the north, except that it began later and brought with it more frequent and more desperate rear-guard actions. The Russians, who were trying desperately to inflict as much damage as possible to the retreating enemy, showed wonderful courage and heroic disregard of death. In some places, however, the Germans had prepared strong, even if temporary, intrenchments, sometimes three or more lines deep, and the storming of these cost their opponents dearly.

By October 24, 1914, the invaders had been forced back in the south as far as Radom and in the north to Skierniewice; by October 28 Radom as well as Lodz had been evacuated and were again in Russian hands. The lines of retreat were the same as those of advance had been, namely, the railroads from Warsaw to Thorn, Kalish, and Cracow. Much damage was done to these roads by the Germans in order to delay as much as possible the pursuit of the Russians. Considerable fighting occurred, however, whenever one of the rivers along the line of retreat was reached; so along the Pilitza, the Rawka, the Bzura, and finally the Warta. By the end of the first week of November the German-Austrian armies had been thrown back across their frontiers, and all of Russian Poland was once more in the undisputed possession of Russia.

In a measure Von Hindenburg followed the example of his Russian adversaries when he withdrew his forces from Poland into Upper Silesia in November, 1914, after the unsuccessful first drive against Warsaw, of which we have just read the details. His reasons for taking this step were evident enough. When it had been established definitely that the reenforcements which Russia had been able to gather made futile any further hope of taking Warsaw with the forces at his command, only two possibilities remained to the German general: To make a stand to the west of the Vistula until reenforcements could be brought up, or to fall back to his bases and there concentrate enough additional



forces to make a new drive for Poland. He chose the latter, undoubtedly because it was the safer and less costly in lives.

How quickly the German retreat was accomplished we have already seen. In spite of their rapidity, however, the Germans found time to hold up the Russians, not only by severe rear-guard actions, but also by destroying in the most thorough manner the few railroad lines that led out of Poland. In this connection they proved themselves to be as much past masters in the art of disorganization as they had hitherto shown themselves to be capable of the highest forms of organization.

About November 10, 1914, Von Hindenburg had completed his regrouping. The line along which the Russians were massed against him stretched from the point where the Niemen enters East Prussia, slightly east of Tilsit, along the eastern and southern border of East Prussia to the Vistula at Wloclawek, from there to the Warta at Kola, where it turns to the west, along and slightly to the east of this river through Uniejow-Zdouska-Wola to Novo Radowsk. From there it passed to the north of Cracow in a curve toward Galicia, where strong Russian armies were forcing back the Austrians on and beyond the Carpathians. Along this vast front—considerably over 500 miles long—the Russians had drawn up forces which must have amounted very nearly to forty-five army corps, or over 2,000,000 men. These were distributed as follows: The Tenth Army faced the eastern border of East Prussia west of the Niemen; the First Army the southern border of this province, north of the Narew and both north and south of the Vistula; the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Armies, forming the main forces of the Russians, fronted along the Warta against lower Posen and Upper Silesia, while the balance of the Russian armies had been thrown against the Austro-Hungarian forces in Galicia.

Against these Von Hindenburg had three distinct armies which were available for offensive purposes. The central army under General von Mackensen was concentrated between Thorn and the Warta River; a southern army had been formed north of Cracow and along the Upper Silesian border, and was made up chiefly of Austro-Hungarian forces with a comparatively slight

mingling of German troops. North of the Vistula, between Thorn and Soldau, a third and weaker army had been collected for the protection of West Prussia. In Galicia, of course, stood the main body of the Austro-Hungarian forces, and in East Prussia defenses had been prepared which made it possible to leave there weaker formations for defensive purposes only.

The Germans fully appreciated the danger of the Russian numerical superiority. If these mighty forces were once allowed to get fully under way and develop a general offensive along the entire front, the German cause would be as good as lost. The main object of Von Hindenburg, therefore, was to break this vast offensive power, and he decided to do so by an offensive of his own which, if possible, was to set in ahead of that of the Russians. Though the latter most likely had at least one-third more men at their disposal than he, he had one advantage over them, a wonderfully developed network of railroads, running practically parallel to this entire line. The Russians, on the other hand, had nothing but roads running from east to west or from north to south, which could be used as feeders only from a central point to a number of points along their semicircular line. Troops having once been concentrated could be thrown to another point if it was at any distance at all only by sending them back to the central point and then sending them out again on another feeder, or else by long and difficult marches which practically almost took too much time to be of any value. Von Hindenburg could, if need be, concentrate any number of his forces at a given point, deliver there an attack in force and then concentrate again at another point for a similar purpose, almost before his adversary could suspect his purpose. His plan was to attack with his strongest forces under Von Mackensen the weakest point of the Russian line between the Vistula and the Warta, beat them there and then march from the north against the right wing of the main forces of the Russians, which latter was to be kept from advancing too far by the mixed Austrian and German army. On his two outmost flanks, in East Prussia and East Galicia, nothing but defensive actions were contemplated.

The Russian plan was somewhat similar, except that their

main attack apparently was to be directed in the south against Cracow, and from there against the immensely important industrial center of Silesia. At the same time, they intended to press as hard as possible their attacks in East Prussia and Galicia in order to force a weakening of the German center.

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## CHAPTER XXIX

### WINTER BATTLES OF THE POLISH CAMPAIGN

DURING November and December, 1914, and January, 1915, much of the fighting which took place on this immense front consisted of engagements between comparatively small formations, and is very difficult to follow in detail. For convenience we shall consider first the fighting in Poland, and then separately that in East Prussia, although, of course, they were carried on concurrently.

On November 10, 1914, the Germans had reached Komn on the Warta, where it met a small Russian force, of which it captured 500 men and machine guns. Two days later, November 12, the Russians crossed the Warta, and their advance troops, chiefly cavalry, had almost reached Kalish on the East Prussian border. On that day, however, they were forced back again a short distance. Similar engagements took place at various points along the entire line, chiefly for the purpose of testing their respective strength.

November 14, 1914, however, saw the first more extensive fighting. Von Mackensen's group had reached by that time Wloclawek on the western bank of the Vistula and slightly east of the Thorn-Lowitz railroad, about thirty miles from Thorn. One of the Russian army corps of General Russky's group made a determined stand. However, it was forced to fall back and lost 1,500 prisoners and some ten machine guns. The Germans followed up this gain by pressing with all their power against the



right wing of the Russian center army. For two or three days the battle raged along a front running from Wloclawek south to Kutno, a distance of about thirty miles. Both of these country towns are situated on the strategically very important railroad from Thorn to Warsaw by way of Lowitz. The Russians had two or three army corps in this sector, including the one that had been forced back from Wloclawek. The Germans undoubtedly were in superior force at this particular point, and were therefore able to press their attack to great advantage. The final result was a falling back of the entire Russian right to the Bzura River after both sides had lost thousands in killed and wounded, and the Russians were obliged to leave over 20,000 men, 70 machine guns, and some larger guns in the hands of the Germans. Von Mackensen was rewarded for this victory by being raised to the rank of "general oberst," which in the German army is only one remove from field marshal.

In a measure separate battles in this Polish campaign sink, at this time, into insignificance. For the total number of men involved, the extent of the battle ground, the frequency of engagements which under any other circumstances would, without any doubt, have been considered battles of the first magnitude, stamped them at this time as "minor actions." The fighting, however, was as furious as at any time, the hardships as severe as anywhere, and the valor on both sides as great as ever. Again the wonderful mobility of the German army organization was one of the strongest features. A French critic says of the fighting in Poland at this time that "it was the most stirring since Napoleonic times. It forced generals to make movements and to change and improvise plans to an extent which war history never before had registered." Dr. Boehm, the war correspondent of the "Berliner Tageblatt," says that the advance was so fast that the infantry frequently had no time to lay down before firing, but had to do so standing or kneeling. Artillery most of the time moved on to a new position after having fired only a few shots. He also mentions the many cadavers of horses that could be seen everywhere. Some of these, of course, were the victims of rifle or gun fire. But more had a small round hole in their forehead

where the shot of mercy out of their own master's revolver had put them out of their misery. For the condition of the roads was such that, chiefly on account of the rapidity of the advance, large numbers of horses would fall down, weakened and often with broken legs.

Among one of the minor results of the battle of Kutno, necessitating the hurried withdrawal of the Russians, was the capture of the governor of Warsaw, General von Korff. He was surprised in his automobile by a troop of German cavalry toward which he was driving apparently in the belief that they were Russians.

During this period the Russians made an attack against the Germans between Soldau and Thorn. The left wing of this group was advancing along the right bank of the Vistula against Thorn, but was successfully stopped by the Germans at Lipno and thrown back in the direction of Plock. By November 16, 1914, the Russians had lost in that sector a total of about 5,000 prisoners with a proportionate number of machine guns. In general throughout the entire fighting in this territory the Russian losses by capture were astonishingly high. Of course, the Germans, too, lost men in this manner; but being in the offensive they suffered less, while the Russians, continually forced to fall back, often found it impossible to withdraw advanced formations in time. Further to the north the Russians had reached the border along the Warsaw-Danzig railroad. An attempt to cross and take Soldau, however, miscarried, and on November 18 they fell back for the time being on Mlawa.

By this time the Russian defense had stiffened. Von Mackensen was now well fifty miles within Russian territory. But for the next few weeks the Bzura was used with great success as a natural line of defense by the Russians.

From the 18th to the 30th of November, 1914, the fighting continued without pause along the entire line. In the north of the central group it centered around Plock, in the center of the same group around the important railroad junction Lowitz, and in the south once more around Lodz. One day would bring some advantages to the Russians, the next day to the Germans. Much of

this fighting assumed the character of trench warfare, though, naturally, not to the extent that this had taken place on the western front. By December 1, 1914, the troops under Von Mackensen fighting around Lodz and Lowitz claimed to have captured a total of 80,000 men, 70 guns, 160 munition wagons, and 150 machine guns. Still further down south the Austro-German group had much the same kind of work to do. The fighting there centered first around Czystochowa, and later around Novo Radowsk.

About the end of November, 1914, it looked for a time as if the Russians were gaining the upper hand. After they had fallen back to the Bzura, Von Hindenburg directed, with part of his left wing, an attack against Lodz from the north. Success of this move would mean grave danger to the entire central group of the Russians, the Warta Army. It threatened not only its right wing, but would also bring German forces in the back of its center and cut off its retreat to Warsaw. The Russian commander recognized the danger, and immediately began to throw strong reinforcements toward Lodz from Warsaw. To meet these Von Hindenburg formed a line from Lowitz through Strykow to Brzeziny. A Russian success would mean immediate withdrawal of these forces from their attack against Lodz, and possibly have even more important results. At the last moment the Russians brought up reinforcements from the south, and with them almost surrounded one of the German army corps which had advanced about ten miles to the southeast of Brzeziny to Karpin. For three days it looked as if this corps would either be annihilated or captured, but at last it succeeded in breaking through by way of Galkow to Brzeziny not only with comparatively small losses of its own, but with a few thousand of captured Russians.

For eighteen days the fighting lasted before Lodz. The Russians resisted this time most stubbornly. They had thrown up strong fortifications around the entire town, which they used as a base for continuous counterattacks.

As late as December 5, 1914, fighting was still going on, but finally that night the Russians made good their withdrawal, and



on the 6th the Germans were once more in Lodz. This was partly the result of an unsuccessful attempt on the part of the Russians to relieve Lodz from the south. Between the battle ground around Lodz and that on which the most southern Austro-German group under the Austrian General, Boehm-Ermolli, was fighting there was a slight gap. Through this—just west of Piotrkow—an attack could be made against the right wing of Von Mackensen's army. To meet this stroke a small separate army was formed under the command of the Austrian cavalry general, Von Tersztyansky, consisting of one German brigade, one Austro-Hungarian brigade, and a cavalry division. This shows the close cooperation which existed at that time between the forces of the Central Powers. This new army group took in the first days of December 19, 1914, some of the smaller places west and south of Piotrkow.

From then on until December 15, 1914, fighting went on day and night. One small village—Augustijnów—changed hands three times within one day—December 8, 1914—remaining finally in the possession of the Austro-Germans. In the evening of the 15th Piotrkow was finally taken by storm. This not only prevented any further attack against Von Mackensen's right, but also gave the Austro-Germans possession of the railroad from Cracow to Warsaw as far as Piotrkow, and secured to them the most important crossings over the Pilitza.

This long-continued fighting, lasting almost the entire twenty-four hours of every day and being accompanied by very severe artillery duels, spelled ruin to very many of the towns and villages involved; especially a large number of the latter in the immediate vicinity of Lodz suffered terribly. In many of them not a single house or hut was left standing, and thousands of Polish peasants, who even at the best had no superfluity of riches, were deprived of everything they possessed. Fire added to the terror; for most of the houses were covered with straw, and the destruction of one was usually quickly followed by the burning of all others within reach.

The losses of the Russians were not only very heavy in prisoners, but also in wounded and killed, although in the latter re-

spect the invading armies suffered almost as severely. Generals Scheidemann and Welitschko, both corps commanders, lost their lives, while it was reported that General Rennenkampf, who failed to come to the rescue of Lodz in time, was placed before a court-martial.

After Lodz had been occupied on December 6, 1914, Von Mackensen's army followed the retreating Russians. The latter offered the most stubborn resistance and a great deal of very close fighting took place. In many instances the Russian rear guard dug itself in wherever the ground offered possibilities to do so quickly and then frequently protected its positions with barbed wire. The storming of these of course caused the Germans heavy losses and delayed them sufficiently to allow the Russians to withdraw in good order.

For the possession of Lowitz, one of the most important railroad junctions west of Warsaw, the battle raged more than two weeks. It began as early as November 25, 1914, but it was not until about December 15, 1914, that the Russians gave up this point. They had thrown up very strong fortifications on all sides of the town and the Germans under General von Morgen had to bring up a strong force of artillery before they could reduce the place. The result was that this little town which had been in the thick of the fighting so many times was finally almost entirely destroyed and the outlying countryside became a scene of the most complete and terrible devastation.

Some of the most violent fighting before Warsaw occurred at this time along the upper Bzura and its southern tributary, the Rawka. The Russian line ran now almost straight from the influx of the Bzura into the Vistula, along the east bank of the former through Sochaczew, then along the east bank of Rawka through Skierniewice and Rawa, from there along some hills to the river Pilitza, crossing it at Inowolodz, through Opoczno and along the River Nida to the Vistula and beyond it through Tarnow into Galicia. In spite of their strong intrenchments and their heroic fighting the Russians were gradually, though very slowly, forced back. A great deal of this fighting was trench warfare of the most stubborn type. This necessarily

meant that for weeks the line wavered. One day the Germans would force a passage across one, or perhaps all, of the rivers at one or more points, only to be thrown back the next day and to have the Russians follow their example with an offensive excursion on the west bank. These continually changing "victories" and "defeats" make it next to impossible to follow in full all the developments along this line. By December 25, 1914, the Germans held Skierniewice; by December 27, 1914, Inowolodz; by January 3, 1915, Rawa; by January 5, 1915, Bolimow.

Throughout the entire month of January, 1915, the most ferocious fighting continued around all these places, and many of them changed hands two or three times. Both sides very freely used the protecting darkness of night to make attacks, and this naturally added a great deal to the hardships which the troops had to suffer. It must also not be forgotten that by this time winter had set in in earnest. Snow covered the ground and a very low temperature called for the most heroic endurance on the part of everybody.

One of the American war correspondents, who at this time was with the Russian forces before Warsaw, gives a very vivid description of a night cannonade in the neighborhood of Blouie: "The fire of the German cannons is unbearable. Night grows darker and darker. Everywhere, in a great circle, the country is lighted up by camp fires which send their flames toward heaven in a cloud of smoke. These little red spots throw everywhere a fiery glow over the snow, and down upon this wonderful color symphony the moon pours its weak, ghostlike light through a curtain of clouds so that people seem to float away as in a dream. In the foggy twilight three battalions march to the front. . . . The noise of the gunfire penetrates to us in separate, spasmodic outbreaks. Flashes of fire flare up on the horizon. . . . Gradually we come closer and closer to the firing line. Now we are only two or three miles away from the firing batteries. We turn toward the west and there a magnificent battle panorama lies before our eyes. The moon sheds just enough light through the clouds to make it possible to recognize the shadows on the snow. The flat, white field is lined with a seam of black trees. Behind these thin



woods stand the cannons. They stretch out in a long line, as far as the eye reaches, and their irregular positions are shown by the red tongues of fire which flare up again and again. The noise of the battle, which had sounded all around us, has now swollen into the roaring thunder of cannons. At a short distance, where the sky seems to touch the field, other flashes flare up, these are the German cannons. Sometimes as many as four of these flashes break forth at one time and tear the dull twilight with their glaring brightness. For a moment all the surrounding country with its phantastic shadows and its darting lights is submerged in blinding brilliancy; then another glittering light captures the eye. It is a bursting rocket which breaks up into thousands of little stars and illuminates the vast field of snow everywhere so that it glitters and glares.

"But again another light appears in the dusky sky. A spray of gold! That is an exploding shrapnel, and almost at the same point three more of these missiles burst into their reddish golden glow. Then the giant arm of a searchlight is thrust out into the midst of the foggy, swelling atmosphere and shows houses, fences and paths with an unsparing clearness. Irresolutely the mighty finger of light wanders across the plain as if it were searching for something and could not find it. At last it throws its coldling, shining ray on a defile and rests there. And suddenly out of the darkness there flares up a multitude of little flashes which look from the distance as if innumerable matches were struck and gave off sparks. The sparks run in a straight line, and these bounding lights show the position of the trenches. Another line of sparks puts in appearance, seemingly only a short distance away. That is formed by the battalions of the advancing, attacking enemy. Then suddenly a ribbon of flame cuts through the shadows, and the sharp echo of machine guns bites into the night air. But so immensely far spreads the battle panorama that the eye is able to fix only small sections at a time. . . ."

Among the many small villages and towns in this small sector between Warsaw and Lowitz, Bolimow saw the most furious fighting. Almost step by step the Russians fought here

the German advance, and when finally they gave way for a mile or less after days and nights of grueling fighting, they did so only to throw up immediately new defenses and force the invaders to repeat their onslaught again and again. At any other time of the year this part of the country would have yielded little ground for fighting; for it is covered extensively with swamps. But now the bitter cold of midwinter had covered these with ice solid enough to bear men and even guns. On January 28, 1915, the Germans at last threw the Russians out of their strong intrenchments at Bolimow. But others had already been prepared a short distance to the east, at a small village, Humin.

The attack on this particular position began in the morning of the last day of January, 1915. For three days the battle raged until, late in the afternoon of February 2, 1915, the Germans took Humin by storm. At times it is difficult to decide whether battles involving vast fronts and equally vast numbers, or those fought in a small space and by comparatively small numbers are the more heroic and ferocious. In the latter case, of course, individual valor becomes not only much more noticeable, but also much more important and details that are swallowed up by the great objects for which great battles are usually fought stand out much more clearly. It will, therefore, be interesting to hear from an eyewitness, the war correspondent of one of the greatest German dailies, the "Kölnische Zeitung," what happened during the three days' battle of Humin:

"It was seven o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1915. Punctually, in accordance the orders given out the previous evening, the first shot rang out into the snowy air of the gray morning at this hour from a battery drawn up some distance back. Like a call of awakening it roared along, and fifteen minutes later when it had called everyone to the guns—exactly to the minute the time decided on by general orders—the battle day of January 31, 1915, began with a monstrous tumult. With truly a hellish din the concert of battle started. A huge number of batteries had been drawn up and sent their iron "blessing" into the ranks of the Russians. Field batteries, 15-centimeter

howitzers, 10-centimeter guns, 21-centimeter mortars, and, to complete the wealth of variety, 30-centimeter mortars of the allied Austrians joyfully shouted the morning song of artillery. A dull noise roared around Bolimow, for in back of the town, before it, to the right and to the left, stood the various guns in groups of batteries, and through the air passed a shrill whistle. But it was not only their hellish din which made one tremble and start up, but even more so the dismal, powerfully exciting howl of the gigantic missile of the great mortars, chasing up and 'way into the air almost perpendicular. It sounded each time as if a giant risen from out of the very bowels of the earth sent up great sobs. Like a wild chase of unbridled, unchained elements the powerful missile shot up high from the gun barrel.

"A shriek of the most horrible kind, a trembling and shaking started in the wildly torn air, a continual pounding, hissing whirlwind shot up like a hurricane, lasted for seconds and disappeared in the distance like some monstrous mystery. Surrounded by a glare of fire, encircled by blinding light, licked by sheaves of flames, the short barrel of the mortar drew back at the moment of firing. Clouds of dust rose; they mixed gray with brown, with the smoke of gunpowder which hid from sight for a few moments the entire gun, and then it rained down from the air, for whole minutes, the tiny pieces into which the cover of the charge had been torn. After every shot of the big mortars, the heavy howitzers and the 21-centimeter mortars—which usually are the loud talkers in an artillery battle—could hardly make themselves heard. An entire battery of them could not drown the noise of *one* shot from an Austrian mortar. It sounded like a hoarse but weak bark as compared with this gigantic instrument of death and destruction.

"During the morning the sky cleared; this enabled the observers to sight more accurately. Orders were sent over the telephone; the telescope controlled the effect of the gunfire, and one could see plainly how, in a distance of a few miles, the hail of shot descended on the enemy's trenches. 'Way up towered the geysers of earth when the shot struck home. Above the Russian trenches lay a long white cloud of powder forming a great wall of waves.



The dull thunder of the guns was tremendous. It whistled and howled, it cried and moaned, it roared like the surf of the ocean, like the terrifying growl of a thunderstorm, and then it threw back a hundredfold clear echo. In between came the dull crack of the Russian shrapnel. They broke in the broad, swampy lowlands of the Rawka; they pierced the cover of ice which broke with a tremendous noise while dark fountains of bog water gushed up from the ground. In front and in back of the German batteries one could see the craters made by the Russian hits; they were dark holes where the hard frozen ground had been broken up into thick, slaglike pieces weighing tons and all over the white cover of snow had been strewn, dark brown and as fine as dust, the torn-up soil.

"Then the storm of the trenches set in. At a given hour the roar of the guns stopped suddenly. A few minutes later the masses of infantry, held in readiness, arose. They came up from their trenches, climbed over their walls, sought cover wherever it could be found, and were promptly received by rifle and machine-gun fire from the Russians. That, however, lasted only a moment; then they advanced in a jump; the attacking line thinned out, stretched itself out and, continually seeking cover, tried to advance. A few minutes only and the first Russian trench line was reached. In storm, with bayonet and rifle butt, they came on and broke into the trenches. They were fighting now man for man. Then the artillery fire set in again. Again in the afternoon the infantry advanced in storm formation against the head of the village and the trenches flanking it. From them roared rifle and machine-gun fire against the storming lines. Nothing could avail against these intrenchments. Again artillery was called upon to support the attack.

"It was now five o'clock in the afternoon on January 31, 1915, and the artillery fire still roared over the white plain. Here and there were a few scattered farms, deeply snowed in. In the distance stood forests, darkly silhouetted against the sky, covered with heavy, low-hanging snow clouds. In between were yawning depths, and farther up other curtains of clouds glowing

in the full purple light of the setting sun. A wonderful majesty lay on the heavens at that hour. But down on the earth, across the white plain, the fighting German troops still crowded against the enemy. Again infantry fire started and became the livelier the nearer twilight approached and the deeper evening shadows prepared the coming night.

"The 1st of February, 1915, the second day of battle, broke damp and cloudy. Once more artillery fire set in. Later in the morning, just as on the first day, the infantry again attacked. While the roar of the battle went on, some of the men prepared the last resting place for their comrades who had fallen on the previous day. Silently this work was done. Here there were single graves, and then again places where larger numbers were to be put to rest together. One such grave was dug close to the wall of the cemetery and in it were bedded the dead heroes so that their closed eyes were turned westward—toward home. A chaplain found wonderful words at the open grave, blessing the rest of those who had fallen on the field of honor and speaking to their comrades of the joys of battle and of its sorrows while they said farewell to the dead with bared heads.

"The guns still roared; then they were silent and then roared on again. A remarkable tension was in the air. In a discord of feelings the day drew to its end, and after that the third day of battle, the 2d of February, dawned with renewed fighting. It was noon. We were sitting at division headquarters, lunching, when the telephone rang loudly. With a jump a staff officer was before it. 'General, the Russian lines are giving way.' Quickly the general issued his orders. Once more the fighting set in with all the available strength and vigor. The thunder of the guns was renewed, and so the third day of battle ended with the storming of the strong Russian positions in Humin and with the occupation of the entire village by the German troops."

After the storming of Humin the Germans took the heights near Borzimow, which commanded the road Bolimow-Warsaw. Here, too, the fighting was very hard. South of Humin, near Wola-Szydlowieca, the Russian lines again were broken on February 3, 1915, after a combined artillery and infantry attack,

which began early on February 2, 1915, and lasted for more than twenty-four hours. The next ten days brought continuous fighting at many points, some of it almost as ferocious as that of which we have just spoken, but none of it yielding any important results to either side. With the middle of February a lull set in in this sector of the front. Of course the fighting did not stop entirely. But the Germans did not advance farther, and the Russians were unable to break their lines or to force them back anywhere to any appreciable extent.

Of course all this fighting took place near enough to Warsaw to be heard there and to fill its inhabitants with terror and fear of a possible siege or attack on the city proper. Although a great many people had fled to the interior, thousands of others had flocked to the city, especially from those outlying districts that had been overrun by the invaders. Most of these were practically destitute and without means or opportunity to earn any money. The Russian Government did its best to help them, and provided nineteen asylums and thirteen people's kitchens which, it is reported, distributed each day 40,000 portions. Wood, coal, and oil gradually became more and more scarce and advanced to very high prices, causing a great deal of suffering, especially among the poorer classes.

Again reports of various neutral war correspondents, located at that time in Warsaw, are of great interest. Says one: "The thunder of the cannons has started up once more. Only the forts of the belt line of fortresses are still silent. The railroad to Wilanow has been closed. No one is allowed to go beyond Mokotow. In front of the two railroad stations silent crowds of people are standing, their features showing their terror. They stand there like they would at a fire to which the firemen are rushing with their engines and ladders. One's feet are like lumps of ice, one's head feels foolish and empty. Doors and windows in the big new houses in Marshalkowska Street have been boarded up in expectation of the rifle fire. It reminds one of a boat when, before the breaking of the storm, hatches are closed up and sails are trimmed. Omnibuses come in loaded with wounded, likewise butcher wagons with similar loads. Many of the lighter



wounded soldiers limp on foot. With nightfall the entire city falls into darkness—strange, ghostlike. People creep along the walls with bowed heads. The silence of the night only intensifies the roar of the untiring guns, and they seem then to come closer."

During all this time the German dirigibles and aeroplanes were very active, too, throwing bombs. Granville Fortescue pictures the terror spread by them most realistically. "Warsaw's inhabitants know now well the meaning of an aeroplane, and whenever they see one approach they run in wild terror into their houses and cellars. Before every open door pushing, shouting crowds mass themselves, and serious panics are caused when the sharp crack of the exploding bomb shakes and rattles all the windows. As soon as the danger is passed the curious collect, first with hesitation, then bolder and bolder, around the spot where the bomb fell and gape with terror at the powerful results produced by the explosion. Here a stretch of the railroad has been destroyed; the walls of the near-by houses are covered with innumerable holes looking like smallpox scars; others, of the splinters from the bomb, have dug themselves deep into the ground and not a single window in the vicinity is unbroken."

A winter of the most bitter misery has closed in on the unfortunate city; miserable-looking shapes by the thousands, without home or food, crowd the narrow, crooked streets. As sand flows through an hourglass, so regiment after regiment, from every part of the vast empire of the czar, streams through the streets which now are black with people. From far-distant Siberia and from the borderlands of Turkestan these gray-clad soldiers pour through Warsaw to the plains of Poland. In their dull features no trace can be discovered of what they feel or think. One can study the faces of these Tartars, Mongols, and Caucasians as much as one pleases, there remains always the same mystery. Tramp, tramp, tramp—they march from the Kalish station along the railroad until they disappear together with the horizon in a single gray mass—who knows whither, who knows whence? It is at such times that one realizes the magnitude of

Russia if one considers that many of them have traveled all the way from the Ural Mountains.

Quietness and gloominess now reign in Warsaw's hospitals, in which formerly there was so much life and activity. The patients have been sent, as far as their condition permitted, into central Russia to recuperate, and at this time only slightly wounded men are brought in. This is a bad sign, for the doctors figure correctly that it indicates that those seriously wounded are left on the battle fields and perish there. The hotels, on the other hand, are full of life. There officers have settled down; every rank and every branch of the service is represented here, from the grizzly general down to the beardless lieutenant; every province of the immense empire seems to have sent a representative. You may see there the most fantastic figures: Caucasian colonels with enormous caps, huge mustaches, and black boots, figures which look still exactly like the Muscovian warriors from the days of Napoleon. It strikes one as very strange to hear so many German names borne by these Russian officers. And while the poor inhabitants of Warsaw await their fate with fear and trembling, the officers are the only ones full of joy, for war is their element and a promising opportunity for thousands of enticing possibilities which peace never brought them.

During November and December, 1914, both in north and south Poland, continuous fighting went on along the lines. In south Poland the field of action was at first north of Cracow, between the Rivers Warta and Pilitza, and later between the latter and the River Nida. But although the result of this fighting—which mainly was in favor of the German-Austrian forces—to a certain extent influenced the result in the central sector to the west of Warsaw, the details of it do not properly call for consideration at this time and place. For it was directed much more by the Austrian General Staff than by that of the German armies, the forces involved were preponderantly Austro-Hungarian, and it was more closely connected with the Russian attack on Galicia and the Carpathians than with Von Hindenburg's attack on the Russian center. It will find its proper consideration in another place in connection with the Galician campaign.

Suffice it to say here that the Austro-Hungarian forces under Boehm-Ermolli, supported by the German division under General van Woyrsch, carried successfully that part of Von Hindenburg's general plan which had been assigned to it—the protection of the right wing of his central group of troops and the shielding of Cracow from a direct Russian attack.

To the north of the central group—north of the Vistula and between it and the Narew—the Germans had assembled, as we have already stated, another group which had as its bases Soldau and Thorn. Their chief task was to protect the German provinces of West and East Prussia from a Russian attack from Novo Georgievsk and Warsaw.

During November, 1914, these forces restricted themselves entirely to defensive fighting along the border. With the beginning of December, however, when the Russians had temporarily weakened their forces fighting north of the Vistula in order to send additional support to the defenders of Warsaw, the Germans attempted an advance which for a short time was successful.

On December 10, 1914, Przasnysz, about twenty-five miles southeast of Mlawa, was stormed after the latter place had been occupied some time before. By December 15, 1914, however, the Russians had again stronger forces at their command for this part of the front, and with them they not only threw the Germans again out of Przasnysz, but forced them to evacuate Mlawa and retire behind their border. A week later, about December 22, 1914, the Germans again advanced from Soldau and Neidenburg, and by December 24, 1914, Mlawa once more was in their hands. Although the fighting in this sector practically went on without intermission from the beginning of November, 1914, to the end of February, 1915, comparatively small forces were involved on both sides. This, of course, excluded any possibility of a decisive result on either side, and we can therefore dismiss this end of the campaign with the statement that, although the Germans north of the Vistula were more successful in keeping the Russians off German soil than the Russians were in keeping the Germans out of Poland, the lat-



ter did not make here any appreciable headway in the direction of Warsaw, and accomplished no more than to keep a goodly number of Russian regiments tied up in the protection of Novo Georgievsk and the northern approach to Warsaw instead of permitting them to participate in the repulse of the main attack against the Polish capital, where they would have been very useful indeed.

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## CHAPTER XXX

### WINTER BATTLES IN EAST PRUSSIA

THE most northern part of the eastern front is now the only one left for our consideration. We have already learned that when the German General Staff planned its second drive against Warsaw, it had been decided to restrict the German forces collected in East Prussia south of the Niemen and east and south of the Mazurian Lakes to defensive measures. At that time—the beginning of November, 1914—and until about the beginning of February, 1915, they consisted of two army corps under the command of General von Bülow, who at the outbreak of the war and for a few years previous to it had been in command of a division with headquarters at Insterburg, and who was therefore well qualified for his task through his intimate knowledge of the territory. About 50 per cent of his forces belonged to the Landwehr, about 25 per cent to the Landsturm and only about 25 per cent were of the first line. These faced a numerically very superior force variously estimated at five to seven army corps. The Germans therefore found it necessary to equalize this overpowering difference by withdrawing behind a strong natural line of defense. This they found once more behind the greater Mazurian Lakes to the south and behind the River Angerapp which flows out of the lakes at Angerburg to the north until it joins the river Pissa slightly to the east of Insterburg.

These positions apparently were prepared during the early part of November, 1914. For as late as November 15, 1914, fight-

ing took place at Stallupoehnen on the Kovno-Königsberg railroad and some ten miles east of the Angerapp. A few days earlier, on November 9, 1914, a Russian attack, still farther east, north of the Wysztiter Lake, had resulted in considerable losses to the Russians. North of the Pissa River the Germans managed to stick closer to their border, along which there flows a small tributary of the Niemen offering natural protection. Considerable fighting took place in this territory around the town of Pillkallen, but the German line held.

On November 30, 1914, the Russians had again occupied that part of East Prussia located between the border and the Mazurian Lake-Angerapp line. On that day the first of a long series of attacks against this very strong line was made east of Darkehmen, but was as unsuccessful as all its successors. The German Emperor saw some of this fighting during a short visit to the East Prussian defenders. All through December, 1914, the Russians made repeated attacks against the German lines, always without accomplishing their object of breaking through it and advancing again against Königsberg. Of course, they inflicted severe losses on their adversaries, though their own, both in disabled and captured, were much more severe, due to the disadvantages which the difficult territory heaped upon the attacking side. By the beginning of January winter had set in in full earnest and the weather became so severe that no fighting of any importance took place throughout the entire month. The only exceptions were Russian attacks about January 15, 1915, against Loetzen, the German fortress on the eastern shore of the northernmost group of the lakes, which, however, brought no results. At the same time Gumbinnen was once more the center of considerable fighting.

Later in the month, January 26, 28, and 29, 1915, this town again and again had to pay dearly in additional destruction of what little of it that was still left of its former prosperity for the advantage of being located on the Königsberg road. On January 30, 1915, the Russians attempted to break through a little further south at Darkehmen—but still the German lines held.

In the meanwhile new troops had been prepared and collected

and were being rushed to that part of the east front for the purpose of clearing all of East Prussia of its invaders. These reenforcements were sent to the right and left wings of the Mazurian Lakes-Angerapp line, and the former began its attack in February. A few days before an exceptionally heavy snowfall, accompanied by very high winds and very low temperatures, had set in. This not only added to the hardships of the troops, but increased immensely the difficulties with which the leaders on both sides had to contend. On account of the weather the roads became impassable for motor cars and the railroads were hardly in better condition. At no time could a general count with any amount of certainty on the prompt execution of movements. Trains were delayed for hours and regiments appeared in their allotted positions hours late.

The right wing of the German front was sent around the southern end of the lake chain by way of Johannsburg. There the Russians had thrown up very strong fortifications in connection with the dense forests surrounding this town. To the southeast the river Pisseck forms the outlet for one of the lakes and flows toward the Narew. This line, too, was held by the Russians, who had considerable forces, both in Johannsburg and to the east in Bialla. In the late afternoon and during the night of February 8, 1915 a crossing over the Pisseck was forced and Johannsburg was stormed. Russian reenforcements from the south—Kolno—arrived too late and were thrown back with considerable losses in men and guns. In spite of the bitter cold the Germans pressed on immediately. They took Bialla on February 9, 1915, and then immediately pushed on to Lyck with part of their forces. This town, like so many other East Prussian towns, had suffered cruelly, having been in the thick of the fighting almost from the beginning of the war. Now the Russians again made a most determined stand in its vicinity, induced, no doubt, chiefly by the defensive advantages which the territory offered here. To the west of Lyck, beyond the Lyck Lake, they had built up very strong intrenchments which resisted all German attacks for days, and it was not until the middle of February, 1915, that they gave up these positions. But even then they con-



tinued to hold Lyck itself, and it was not taken until after the middle of the month. The other part of the right wing in the meantime had forced the Russians out of the southeast corner of East Prussia and was advancing against Grajeko and Augustovo. In the north the German left wing had pushed its advance simultaneously, starting from around Tilsit and the Niemen line. The Russians fell back on strongly prepared intrenchments along the line Pillkallen-Stallupoehnen, but by February 10, 1915, they had to give up this line and withdraw still farther south and east toward Eydtkuhnen, Kibarty, and Wirballen, all places of which we heard considerable during the previous battling in East Prussia. It was snowing furiously and the Russians apparently counted with too much certainty on this as a means of keeping the Germans from following closely. They procured quarters in these three towns and were going to enjoy a much needed rest for one night. But during that night the Germans, overcoming all difficulties of snowdrifts and impassable roads, attacked and stormed Eydtkuhnen as well as Wirballen and killed, wounded, or made prisoners almost all the Russian forces located there, amounting to about 10,000 men with considerable artillery and even greater quantities of supplies. Gumbinnen also was retaken by the Germans and by February 12, 1915, they were on Russian territory and advancing once more against Suwalki.

By the middle of February the last Russian had been driven out of Germany. This series of battles, known commonly as the "Winter Battle of the Mazurian Lakes" not only freed East Prussia, but yielded comparatively large results in the numbers of prisoners taken. In nine days' fighting about 50,000 men, 40 guns, and 60 machine guns were captured. Both sides, of course, suffered also heavy losses in killed and wounded. These great battles here briefly summarized to round out the account of the operations of the first six months are described in greater detail in Volume IV.

## CHAPTER XXXI

RESULTS OF FIRST SIX MONTHS OF  
RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN

THIS brings us approximately to the end of the first six months' fighting at the eastern front. It will be well now to pause for a short space of time and to sum up the results of the tremendous conflict which has been narrated. However, before we consider these results from a military point of view and strike the balance of successes achieved and failures suffered, let us see how they affected those who were the actors in this terrible tragedy of mankind—the men who fought these battles and their leaders, and the poor, unfortunate men, women, and children whose habitations had been thrown by an unkind fate into the path of this vortex of death and destruction.

In determining the total losses which the Russian and German forces suffered during the first six months of the war, it is next to impossible to arrive at this time at absolutely correct figures. This is especially true in regard to the German troops. In a way this sounds strange, for the German talent for organization made itself felt in this respect, just as much as along other lines, and in none of the countries involved were the official lists of losses published as rapidly, frequently, and accurately as in Germany, especially in the early stages of the conflict. However, these lists included the German losses on all fronts as well as on the seas, and therefore are available for our purposes only as a basis for a computation of average losses. But by taking these totals and comparing them with other figures from various sources—newspapers, official Russian reports, English and French computations (non-official), statistics of the International Red Cross, etc.—it is possible to determine a total per month of German losses of all kinds—killed, wounded, missing, and captured—for all fronts on which German forces were fighting during the first six and a half months of the war. This total is 145,000 men per month. Assuming that all in all the losses were about evenly di-

vided on the western and eastern fronts, and disregarding the comparatively small losses of the navy, we get a monthly average of German losses at the eastern front of 72,500 men, or a total for the entire period of 471,250 men. This does not include those wounded who after a varying period of time were again able to return to the fighting, and whose number of course was very large, but represents the number of those whose services had been lost to the German forces for all time.

In the case of the Russian losses it is somewhat easier to arrive at fairly accurate figures, at least as far as their losses through capture are concerned. For the official German figures in this respect go into great detail and undoubtedly may be accepted as generally correct. During the early part of the war when the Russians were fighting along the border and on East Prussian territory they lost 15,000 officers and men by capture, at Tannenberg 90,000, and immediately afterward in the Lake district 30,000 more. In October, 1914, fighting in the province of Suwalki, during Hindenburg's advance to the Niemen and his retreat, he captured 10,000, and by November 1, 1914, there were according to the official German count 3,121 officers and 186,797 men in German prison camps. By January 1, 1915, this number had increased to 3,575 and 306,294 respectively, and by the middle of February the total in round numbers must have been at least 400,000. That this is approximately correct is proven by the statement of the Geneva Red Cross published in the "Journal de Genève," which gives the total of Russian prisoners in the hands of the Central Powers by the end of February as 769,500. According to the same source the Russians had lost by that time in killed 743,000 and in totally disabled 421,500, while their slightly wounded—those who finally returned again to the active forces—reached the huge total of 1,490,000. These figures again are for the entire Russian forces, those fighting against German as well as Austro-Hungarian forces. Just what proportion should be assigned to the Russian forces fighting against the Germans is rather problematical. For while these were fighting on a much larger front than those who had been thrown against Galicia and the Bukowina, the



latter were comparatively much more numerous and, therefore, probably suffered proportionately larger losses. Some of the losses also occurred in the fighting against Turkey. However, we will be fairly safe—most likely shooting below rather than above the mark—in estimating one-half of all these losses as having been incurred on the Russo-German front. This, then, would give us for the period of August 1, 1914, to February 15, 1915, the following total Russian losses in their fighting against the German forces: Killed, 371,500; totally disabled, 210,750; captured, 384,750, a grand total of 967,000, or about twice as much as the German losses.

Even these figures, without any further comment, are sufficient to indicate the terrible carnage and suffering that war inflicted on the manhood of the countries involved. But if we consider that every man killed, wounded or captured, after all, was only a small part of a very large circle made up of his family—in most cases dependent on him for support—and of his friends, even the most vivid imagination fails to give proper expression in words of the sum total of unfathomable misery, broken hearts, spoiled lives, and destroyed hopes that are represented in these cold figures.

At various points in our narrative we have had occasion to speak of the various generals, both Russian and German, who were directing these vast armies, the greatest numerically and the most advanced technically which mankind has ever seen assembled in its entire history. To go into details concerning the hundreds of military geniuses which found occasion to display the fruits of their training and talent would be impossible. But on each side there was among all these leaders one supreme leader on whose ability and decision depended not only the results of certain battles, but the lives of their millions of soldiers—yes, even the fate of millions upon millions of men, women and children. The Russians had intrusted their destiny to a member of their reigning family, an uncle of the czar, Grand Duke Nicholas, while the Germans had found their savior in the person of a retired general, practically unknown previous to the outbreak of the war, Paul von Hindenburg. Each had

been put in supreme command, although the former's burden was even greater than that of the latter, including not only the Russian forces fighting against the Germans, but also those fighting against the Austro-Hungarians. On both, however, depended so much that it will be well worth while to devote a short space of time to gain a more intimate knowledge of their appearance, character and surroundings. We will spend, therefore, a day each at the headquarters of these two men by following the observations which some well-known war correspondents made during their visits at these places.

The war correspondent of the London "Times" had occasion during his travels with the Russian armies to make the following observations: "Modern war has lost all romance. The picturesque sights, formerly so dear to the heart of the journalist, have disappeared. War now has become an immense business enterprise, and the guiding genius is not to be found on the firing line, any more than the president of a great railroad would put on overalls and take his place in an engine cab. Here in Russia the greatest army which ever met on a battle field has been assembled under the command of one individual, and the entire complicated mechanism of this huge organization has its center in a hidden spot on the plains of West Russia. It is a lovely region which shows few signs of war. In a small forest of poplars and pines a number of tracks has been laid which connect with the main line, and here live quietly and peacefully some hundreds of men who form the Russian General Staff. A few throbbing autos rushing hither and thither and a troop of about 100 Cossacks are apparently the only features which do not belong to the everyday life of the small village which is the nearest regular railroad station. Many hundreds of miles away from this picture of tranquillity is stretched out the tremendous chain of the Russian front, each point of which is connected with this string of railroad cars by telegraph. Here, separated from the chaos of battle, uninfluenced by the confusion of armed masses, the brain of the army is able to gain a clear and free view of the entire theatre of war which would only be obscured by closer proximity."

Another, a French correspondent, says: "Whatever happens anywhere, from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains, is known immediately in the big blue railroad cars whose walls are covered with maps. Telegraph and telephone report the most minute occurrence. Should the commander in chief desire to inspect a position or to consult personally with one of the commanding generals there is always an engine ready with steam up. Headquarters suddenly rolls off; and, after two or three days, it returns noiselessly, with its archives, its general staff, its restaurant, and its electric plant. The Grand Duke rules with an iron fist. Champagne and liquor is taboo throughout the war zone, and even the officers of the general staff get nothing except a little red wine. Woe to anyone who sins against this order, here or anywhere else at the front. The iron fist of the Grand Duke hits, if necessary, even the greatest, the most famous. At a near-by table I recognize an officer in plain khaki, Grand Duke Cyril. The proud face and the powerful figure of the commander in chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, is sometimes to be seen in this severe room. Shyly one approaches the chief commander upon whose shoulders rests all the responsibility; and the attitude of the man who has been chosen to lead the Russian armies to victory does not encourage familiarity. Next to him I notice Janushkewitch, the Chief of the Great General Staff, with the gentle, almost youthful face of a thinker. But everything is ruled by the personality of the Grand Duke, which, with its mixture of will power and of gracious majesty, is most captivating."

Let us now rush across space and follow still another war correspondent, this time a representative of the German press, to the headquarters of the German armies: "Field Marshal von Hindenburg has an impressive appearance. With his erect, truly military carriage he makes a picture of strength and health. With him appears a very young-looking general who cannot be older than fifty years. A high forehead, clear blue eyes, a powerful aquiline nose, an energetic mouth, a face—in one word—which would be striking even if the man, to whom it belongs, would not be wearing a general's uniform and the



insignia of the order 'Pour le mérite'—one knows that one is face to face with the chief of the General Staff, Ludendorff. The Field Marshal greets his guest with charming friendliness, leads the way to the table and offers him the seat to his right. During the simple evening meal he rises and offers the toast: 'The German Fatherland!' Around the table are about ten officers, among them Captain Fleischmann von Theissruck of the Austrian army, who represents the Austrian General Staff. The Field Marshal mentions a letter which he received from some one entirely unknown to him in which the writer reproaches him most severely because some Cossacks had entered some small town on the border. 'That will happen again and again,' he says, 'and cannot be avoided. I cannot draw up my troops along the entire border, man by man, like a quarantine guard. To gather forces quickly again and again and to beat the Russians again and again, that is the best way to make them disgusted with their stay at the German border.' Then he relates some details about the battle of Tannenberg. He does not tire of entertaining his guest with interesting details about the fighting. He mentions the vast number of presents which have been sent to him by his numerous admirers. 'It is touching how good people are to me. A great many of their gifts are very welcome—but what shall I do with framed pictures while I am in the field? What shall I do after the war is over? Nothing. I'll go back to Hanover. There are lots of younger men [pointing to Ludendorff and the others] who want their chance, too. With my years, there is nothing more beautiful than to retire after one's work has been done and to make room for the younger generation.' "

Apparently the men at the "helm of the ship" lead a life of comparative ease and security. But if we consider the fearful responsibilities that they have to carry and the tremendous mental strain under which they are continuously, we can readily see that their lot is not to be envied. Of course, their rewards are equally great if they are successful. But what if they fail? At any rate they, as well as the troops who fight under them, have the glamour of fighting, the promise of glory, the sense

of duty well done, to sustain them. - But what of those others, equally or even more numerous, on whose fields and forests, in whose streets and market places, around whose houses and churches the battles rage and the guns roar? What of the women and children, the sick and the old, whose fathers, husbands and sons are doing the fighting or, perhaps, have already laid down their lives upon the altar of patriotism? What is there left for them to do when they see their houses go up in flames, their few belongings reduced to ashes, their crops destroyed and even their very lives threatened with death and sometimes—worse yet—with dishonor?

All this and more, millions upon millions of Russians and Germans, rich and poor alike, had to suffer most cruelly. And on the eastern front this suffering in a way, perhaps, was even more severe than in the west. For there the actual fighting, while extending over an equally long front, was much more concentrated, and after the first few months did not move forward and backward; and existence, except in the immediate vicinity of the firing line, was at least possible, even if dangerous and precarious. But in the east thousands upon thousands of square miles in East Prussia, in West Russia, and especially in Poland, the fighting passed in ever advancing and retreating waves as the surf rolls along the beach, and soon gunfire and marching millions of armed men had leveled the country almost as smoothly as the waves of the ocean grind the sand.

In East Prussia the devastation wrought by the Russians, some through wanton lust for destruction and in unreasoning hate for the enemy, but mostly through the pressure of military necessity, was terrible, especially east of the Mazurian Lakes and south of the Niemen. But there, at least, the poor inhabitants had the consolation of being able to return to their destroyed homes after the Russians had been finally driven out and to begin to build up again what war had destroyed, and in this they had the help and support of their highly organized government and their more fortunate compatriots from the interior.

In Poland, however, especially in the rural districts, even that consolation was lacking. For after German and Russian armies

alike had passed over the country again and again, not only destroying values that it had taken centuries to build up, but on account of the huge masses concerned frequently denuding the entire countryside of absolutely every means of sustenance, the final result was occupation by the enemy. And even if that enemy, true to his inherent love of order and to his talent for organization, immediately proceeded to establish a well-regulated temporary government, at the best his efforts would have to be restricted; for he had not much to spare, neither in men to do the work needed, nor in means to finance it, nor even in food to give sustenance to those who had lost everything.

And the worst of it was that for years previous to the outbreak of the war the two principal races inhabiting Poland—the Poles and the Jews—had been fighting each other, with the Russian sympathies strongly on the side of the Poles. Now when war overtook this unfortunate country, both the Poles and the Russians threw themselves like hungry wolves upon the unfortunate Jews. They were driven out from their villages, often the entire population irrespective of age, sex, or condition. They were made to wander from one place to another, like so many herds of cattle, except that no herd of cattle had ever been treated as cruelly as these poor helpless droves of women, children, and old and sick people whose men folk were fighting for their country while this very country did its best to kill their families. This is not the place or time to go into this horrible catastrophe, beyond stating this fact: In July, 1914, Poland had been inhabited by millions of hard-toiling people who, though neither overly blessed with wealth or opportunities, nor enjoying conditions of life that were particularly conducive to happiness, were at least able to found and raise families and to sustain an existence which was bearable chiefly because of the hope for something better to come. Six months later—January, 1915—these millions had stopped toil, for their fields were devastated, their cattle had been killed or driven away, their houses had been burned down. Hundreds of thousands of them had been forced to flee to the interior, other hundreds of thousands had died, some through want and illness, some during the fighting around their homes, some



through murder and worse. Families had been broken up and others wiped out entirely, and thousands of mothers had been separated from their children, perhaps never to see them again. Even if, in isolated cases, destruction, and even death, was merited or made inevitably necessary, in the greatest number of cases the suffering was as undeserved as it was severe.

From a military point of view the net result of the fighting during the first six months of the war most decidedly was in favor of the Germans. February, 1915, found them conquerors along the entire extent of the Russo-German front, and the Russians those who had been conquered. In spite of the wonderful things which German arms had accomplished, however, they had fallen far short of what they had apparently set out to do, and in that wider sense their successes came dangerously near to being failures. But even at that they were still ahead of their adversaries; for though they had not gained the two objects for which they had striven most furiously—the possession of Warsaw and the final destruction of the offensive power of the Russian armies—they held large and very important sections of the Russian Empire, they had driven the enemy completely out of Germany and forced him to do his further fighting on his own ground, and they had reduced the effectiveness of his armies by vast numbers, killing, disabling, or capturing, at a most conservative estimate, at least twice as many men as they themselves had lost.

During the first three weeks of August, 1914, the Russian armies had invaded East Prussia and laid waste a large section of it. Then came the débâcle at Tannenberg, and by the middle of September, Germany was freed of the invader, who had lost tens of thousands in his attempt to force his way into the heart of the German Empire. Not satisfied with these results, the Germans on their part now attempted an invasion of large sections of West Russia, pursuing their defeated foes until they reached the Niemen and its chain of fortresses which they found insurmountable obstacles. It was once more the turn of the Russians, who now not only drove back the invading Germans to the border, but who by the beginning of October, 1914, faced again an invasion of their East Prussian province. However, less than

two weeks sufficed this time to clear German soil once more, and by October 15, 1914, the Russians had again been forced back across the border. By this time the German Commander in Chief, Von Hindenburg, had learned the lesson of the Niemen. Instead of battering in vain against this iron line of natural defenses, he threw the majority of his forces against Poland, and especially against its choicest prize—historic Warsaw. October 11, 1914, may be considered the approximate beginning of the first drive against the Polish capital. During about two weeks of fighting the German armies advanced to the very gates of Warsaw, which then seemed to be theirs for the mere taking. But suddenly the Russian bear recovered his self-control, and with renewed vigor and replenished strength he turned once again against the threatening foe. By October 28, 1914, the Germans in North and Central Poland and the Austro-Hungarians in South Poland had to retreat.

November 7, 1914, became the starting date for the third Russian invasion of East Prussia. The Germans now changed their tactics. Instead of meeting the enemy's challenge and attempting to repeat their previous performances of throwing him back and then invading his territory, they restricted themselves, for the time being, to defensive measures in East Prussia, and launched a powerful drive of their own against Russian territory. For the second time Warsaw was made their goal. By this time, to a certain extent at least, the offensive momentum of both sides had been reduced in speed. Where it had taken days in the earlier campaigns to accomplish a given object, it now took weeks. Of course the rigors of the eastern winter which had set in by then played an important part in this slowing-up process, which, however, affected the speed only of the armies, but not the furor of their battling. December 6, 1914, brought the possession of Lodz to the Germans, and on the next day the Russians were taught the same lesson before the Mazurian Lakes that they had taught to the Germans a few months before when they faced the Niemen. East Prussia up to the Lakes was in the hands of Russia, but beyond that impregnable line of lakes and swamps and rivers they could not go.

In the meanwhile the drive against Warsaw was making small progress in spite of the most furious onslaughts. There, too, a series of rivers and swamps—less formidable, it is true, than in East Prussia, but hardly less effective—stemmed the tide of the invaders. For more than two weeks, beginning about December 20 and lasting well into January, the Russians made a most stubborn stand along the Bzura and Rawka line, and successfully, though with terrible losses, kept the Germans from taking Warsaw. However, in order to accomplish this they had to weaken their line at other points and thus bring about the collapse of their drive against Cracow, by means of which they expected to gain from the south the road into Germany which had been denied to them again and again in the north.

The end of January, 1915, found the Germans practically as far in Poland as the beginning of the month. It is true that they had made little progress in four weeks, but it is also true that they had given up none of the ground they had gained. And with the coming of February, 1915, they reduced their offensive activities at that part of the front and turned their attention once more to East Prussia. The second week of February, 1915, brought to the Russians their second great defeat on the shores of the Mazurian Lakes. By February 15 East Prussia again had been cleared of the enemy, and parts of the Russian provinces between the border and the Niemen were in the hands of the Germans who apparently had made up their minds that they were not going to permit any further Russian invasions of East Prussia if they could help it. They now held a quarter of Poland and a small part of West Russia, while the Russians held nothing except a long battle front, stretching almost from the Baltic to the Carpathian Mountains and threatened everywhere by an enemy who daily seemed to grow stronger rather than weaker.



## PART IV—TURKEY AND THE DARDANELLES

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### CHAPTER XXXII

#### FIRST MOVES OF TURKEY

THE entrance of Turkey, the seat of the ancient Ottoman Empire, into the Great War in 1914, with its vast dominions in Europe, Asia, and Africa, created a situation which it was appalling to contemplate. The flames of world war were now creeping not only into the Holy Land, the birthplace of Christian civilization, but to the very gates of Mecca, the "holiest city of Islam." Would the terrible economic struggle in Europe, the war for world trade, now develop into a holy war that would bring the religious faiths of the earth on to a great decisive battle ground?

The seething flames of economic supremacy that were consuming Europe had threatened from the beginning of the war to creep into the Occident, as we shall see in the chapter on "Japan and the Far East." Moreover, as described in "Naval Operations," it was in the waters of the Near East that the first big incident of the war on the sea took place.

Despite the fact that the public had been looking forward to an immediate clash of the dreadnought squadrons of the two countries somewhere between the east coast of Scotland and the Dutch shore, nothing of the kind happened. Instead, both grand fleets ran to safety in the landlocked harbors of their respective countries.

In was to the Mediterranean in the first week of August, 1914, that the attention of the world was first drawn by events. Two German warships, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, were off the coast of Algeria. The first was one of the finest ships of the

German navy, a superdreadnought battleship cruiser of 23,000 tons, capable of making more than 28 knots an hour. Her main battery consisted of ten 11-inch guns, and in addition she mounted twelve 5.9-inch guns and twelve 21 pounders. She was capable therefore of meeting on equal terms any enemy vessel in the Mediterranean, and more than capable of outrunning any of the heavier vessels of the French or British navy stationed in those waters. The *Breslau* was capable of a similar speed, but was a much weaker vessel, being a light cruiser of only 4,478 tons. Both of these vessels had enormous coal capacities, the *Breslau*, in particular, being able to travel more than 6,000 miles without refilling her bunkers.

The speed and the coal capacity of these vessels were to prove of vital importance in the events of the next few days. For their rôle was to be one of flight, not to battle. England alone and, in an overwhelming degree, England and France combined hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned the two German warships in the Mediterranean. Realizing this, the German commander, after firing a few shots into the Algerian coast towns of Bone and Philippville, steamed northwest with the intention either of outwitting the English and French squadron commanders, or of running through Gibraltar and so on to the broad Atlantic to wage war upon the British mercantile marine. The British, however, were alive to this danger and headed off the two German warships. Whereupon they turned northeast.

Early on the morning of Wednesday, August 5, 1914, these ships were discovered steaming into the harbor of Messina, Italy. The English and French fleets, close upon the heels of the enemy, immediately took up positions at either end of the Straits of Messina, confident that they had successfully bottled up the Germans.

Then quickly there developed one of the most dramatic incidents in the history of naval warfare. It is described in this chapter as well as in the narrative on "Naval Operations" because of its direct bearing on Turkish politics and policies. The captain and officers of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* went ashore at Messina, made their wills and deposited their valuables with the

German consul. The decks of the apparently doomed vessels were cleared for action, flags run up to the resounding cheers of the sailors and with the brass bands of the boats playing "Heil dir im Siegerkranz" they steamed swiftly out of Messina harbor to what seemed like certain destruction.

A blood-red sun was quickly setting in the perfect Italian sky. The bands were hushed aboard the German warships, every light was dimmed, and the sailors were ordered to their posts. In tense whispers they discussed the coming fight. The ships were already at top speed plowing through the waters of the Mediterranean as fast as the throbbing engines could urge them. A sharp lookout was kept for the enemy, but as one hour, two hours, three hours passed and none was seen it became apparent that for the time at least they had evaded detection. Rounding the southern coast of Italy, they turned due east and the course laid for Constantinople.

Morning came and still, at 28 knots an hour, the German warships were speeding toward the Turkish capital—and safety. To the rear, too far to reveal their funnels, the pursuing French and English squadron followed, thin lazy strips of smoke attested their presence to the men aboard the *Breslau* and the *Goeben*.

Suddenly far to the southeast the masts of a single vessel were seen on the horizon. Then the smokestacks of the British light cruiser *Gloucester* poked their tops above the skyline and daringly she opened fire on the mighty *Goeben*. Tempting, however, as the opportunity was for the German commander with an overwhelming force at his heels he dared waste no time nor run the risk of a chance shot disabling his vessel. He sheered off sharply to the northeast and in a few hours lost the plucky *Gloucester* to view.

At the end of this week in August the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, their engines hot from constant steaming at forced speed, but with flags flying and bands playing, steamed through the narrow channel of the Dardanelles, through the sea of Marmora, and cast anchor off the gloriously beautiful city of Constantinople. As quickly as the formalities would permit the two German warships were transferred to Turkish sovereignty, and to all intents



and purposes, as future events proved, the Ottoman Empire entered the war as an ally of Germany and Austria.

Turkey's attitude in these early days of the crisis of August, 1914, was conditioned by several major causes easily discernible. For almost a generation, Germany has been sedulously cultivating Turkish friendship. With that single-minded purposefulness so conspicuous in her diplomacy, Germany found it easy, especially under the régime of the former Sultan Abdul Hamid II to outmaneuver the easy-going diplomacy of France, Russia, and England. Indeed, she found a real rival only in England, who, starting with the initial advantage of long political friendship with the Turkish people and the good will that grew out of the Crimean War, successfully opposed many of the chess moves of her German rival.

However, with the coming to Constantinople as German Ambassador of the late Marshal von Bieberstein, German prestige became supreme. Easily the best German diplomatist of the present generation, Von Bieberstein dominated the diplomatic corps at Constantinople and practically dictated the foreign policy of Turkey. Through him, the Deutsche Bank secured the great Bagdad railway concession and completed the commercial subjugation of the country by Berlin.

These disquieting developments had been watched with anxiety in London. But it was not until Von Bieberstein sprang the Bagdad railway surprise that England fully awoke to the situation. Then she stepped in and prevented any extension of the line to the Persian Gulf, an area which British political and commercial circles regarded as peculiarly their own.

At the same time an effort was made to reclaim the position Great Britain had lost in Turkey. With the fall of Abdul Hamid and the coming of the Young Turks there seemed a chance to do this, especially as Germany was looked upon by the members of the Committee of Union and Progress as the chief support of the deposed sultan. Kaiser William, however, played his cards with consummate skill. The German policy was quickly adapted to the new situation. Von Bieberstein was eventually shifted to London and the leaders of the Young Turks, such as the youthful

and popular Enver Bey, were invited to Berlin to come under the influence of the German army chiefs. The British Government, then in the midst of negotiations with Russia and unwilling or unable to enter into any outside arrangement that seemed to oppose the satisfaction of the Russian dream of Constantinople, refused to accept the Young Turks' invitation to guarantee the integrity of the Turkish Empire for a limited period in return for commercial and political concessions. On the other hand, Emperor William reaffirmed to the new sultan his guardianship of Islam and his interest in the welfare of the Mohammedans wherever found.

But perhaps the deciding factor in the inclination of the Turks toward Germany and her ally was to be found in the situation of the Mohammedan world. Turkey had never reconciled herself to the English control of Egypt and India and saw in the present war a possibility such as had never occurred before and possibly would never occur again of wresting from the British the far-flung lands peopled by the followers of Mohammed. With powerful allies, and on more even terms than they had ever dreamed of, they could now do battle with the enemy that held their race in subjugation and with Russia, whose avowed object through generations had been the capture of Constantinople, the possession and perhaps desecration of the holy places of their religion and the dismembering of the last self-governing state of Mohammedanism.

These, then, were the major considerations that weighed with the Turkish people, no less than with the Turkish Government, in coming to a decision. So tremendous were the stakes at issue, so widespread, almost world-wide, were the interests involved, that Turkey, situated as it was guarding practically the sole gateway leading from Europe to Russia, could not hope to remain neutral. For better or for worse a decision between the two warring factions must be made.

England, France, and Russia protested vigorously against the action of the Turkish Government in taking over the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*. Turkey replied by drawing attention to an incident that had seriously inflamed public opinion in the Ottoman

Empire. When the war started two first-class battleships, the *Sultan Osman* and the *Reshadie*, were nearing completion for Turkey in English yards. Without any diplomatic preliminaries the British admiralty confiscated the two ships on the grounds of naval necessity. Whatever may have been the English motive, the Turkish people regarded this as an attempt on the part of England to weaken the Ottoman Empire and to make it impossible for it to safeguard its national interests in the troublesome days that were surely to come to neutrals as well as to belligerents.

But the Entente Powers hesitated to force a break on the *Goeben* and *Breslau* question and the diplomatic correspondence of the period shows that they had strong hope, not only at that moment, but up to the moment of the final severance of relations of keeping the Turkish nation in a state of neutrality at least. Signs were multiplying, however, that such was not the intention of those in control at Constantinople.

In August and September, 1914, great activity prevailed throughout the country. Arms and ammunition, especially heavy artillery in which the Turkish army was notoriously weak, constantly arrived from Germany and Austria. Every train from the central countries brought German army officers and a sprinkling of German noncommissioned officers with which to stiffen the Ottoman troops. The army was mobilized and General Liman von Sanders, a distinguished German officer, was appointed inspector general of the Turkish army. Immense stores of food and munitions were concentrated at Damascus, Constantinople, Bagdad, and on the Trans-Caucasus frontier, while a holy war against the infidel was openly preached.

German vessels lying off Constantinople seem to have been given more or less of a free hand and frequently searched Russian and British vessels for contraband. The Turkish authorities appear to have gone as far as they dared in preventing Russian supplies getting through to the Black Sea. Russia protested and at times, along the shores of the Black Sea, used methods closely bordering upon open warfare. Both sides, however, seemed reluctant to take definite steps toward an open break.



In so far as Turkey was concerned this was probably due to a disagreement among the members of the Government and others of powerful influence outside official life. It was said that the sultan, the grand vizier, and Djavid Bey, Minister of Finance, as well as a majority of the cabinet, were opposed to war. However that may be, the issue was soon decided by a small but immensely powerful clique headed by Enver Bey and Talaat Bey, two of the more prominent and forceful of the Young Turk leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress.

Of all the figures in Turkish life during the first months of the Great War, the most picturesque and probably the most influential in the events that led up to the outbreak of hostilities in Turkey was that of the youthful Enver Pasha. He was one of the heroes of the remarkable rebellion that resulted in the downfall of Abdul Hamid, and since then he had ever played a leading part in the constantly shifting drama in Constantinople. Dapper, alert intelligent, and approachable, modest almost to the point of shyness, Enver was almost a venerated figure among the Turkish people. As he passed on horseback, his slim figure erect and stiff in its military pose, he attracted more attention and interest than did the sultan himself.

He formed the chief and perhaps the strongest link between Constantinople and Berlin. Honored in an unprecedented manner by the sultan, Enver's influence in Constantinople was almost supreme. It is through him that the various negotiations with Berlin were conducted. Soon after the triumph of the Young Turk movement Enver went to Berlin as military attaché to the Turkish Embassy, and thoroughly imbibed the Prussian military spirit. He returned to the Turkish capital an enthusiastic admirer of the German army system and became a willing ally of General Liman von Sanders in the latter's attempt to repair the weaknesses of the Turkish army revealed by the Balkan War.

Second only to Enver Pasha in those critical days was Talaat Bey, an old and more experienced member of the inner council of the Committee of Union and Progress and also a prominent figure in the revolution against Abdul Hamid. He was described by Sir Louis Mallet, British Ambassador to Constantinople, as the

most powerful civilian in the cabinet and also as the most conspicuous of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. He was troubled by no such personal modesty and shyness as was Enver. He was, however, a much harder man to judge. Enver was openly pro-German in the weeks that preceded the actual break with the Entente Powers, but for a long time the real intentions of Talaat Bey were in doubt—at least they were to the British, French, and Russian Ambassadors.

Djemel Pasha, Minister of Marine, while pro-German in his sentiments, is believed to have hesitated in advising an open break, largely because of the condition of the Turkish navy and the state of Turkish finance. The arrival of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, the importation of hundreds of German sailors to stiffen the Turkish marine, and, during October, the receipt of about \$20,000,000 in gold from Berlin, won him over. In the end Djemel Pasha stood with Enver and Talaat.

Other members of the Turkish Cabinet made a demonstration of attempting to hold their country to an uneasy neutrality. Whether their efforts were sincere or designed to prevent an open rupture until the psychological moment had arrived it is impossible to say. Sir Louis Mallet, in his private dispatches to his Government, expresses his firm conviction that the sultan, the heir apparent, the grand vizier, Prince Said Halim, Djavid Bey, the Minister of Finance and a clear majority of the cabinet were determined not to allow Turkey to be drawn into the war. Up to the very last minute the British Ambassador did not despair of the success of this peace party. Events were too strong for these advocates of neutrality—events and the control of the all-important army and navy by Enver and his associates. By the sword the Ottoman Empire was reared and by the sword it has been ruled ever since.

During the months of September, 1914, and October, 1914, there were many plain signs that Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey were heading straight for a break. On September 9, 1914, the Porte gave notice of the proposed abolition of the capitulations by which the various powers enjoyed extraterritorial rights. At the same time what amounted to a final demand was made upon

the British Government to return the two Turkish battleships seized at the outbreak of the war.

Extraordinary efforts were made by all the Entente Powers to keep Turkey neutral. They proposed to agree to the abolition of the capitulations as soon as a modern judicial system could be set up in Turkey; they agreed to guarantee the independence and integrity of the country for a limited but extended term of years; they declared that Turkey would not suffer by any changes of national frontiers growing out of the war; and England even promised to return the two superdreadnoughts upon the conclusion of the war, claiming that their retention meanwhile was absolutely necessary for her protection.

The main stipulations made by the Entente Powers in return for these concessions were that the German crews of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* be sent out of Turkey and that General Liman von Sanders and the other members of the German military mission be dismissed. With these demands Turkey refused to comply, after hesitating over the first. Indeed, the strength of the German stiffening in Turkey was constantly becoming greater: by the middle of September there were no less than 4,000 German officers and noncommissioned officers in Constantinople alone and every train from the north brought others. This situation of tension between Turkey and the Entente Powers continued all through September and October. The outside world momentarily expected an open rupture.

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## CHAPTER XXXIII

### THE FIRST BLOW AGAINST THE ALLIES

ON October 29, 1914, came news of a Bedouin invasion of the Sinai peninsula and an occupation of the important Wells of Magdala on the road to the Suez Canal. England became alarmed, and her composure was not restored by the news that came a few hours later. Claiming that Russia had taken aggres-



sive action in the Black Sea, three Turkish torpedo boats sailed into Odessa Harbor, shelled the town, sank a Russian guardship, and did other considerable damage.

On the following day, October 30, 1914, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople asked for his passports and the British and French representatives with evident reluctance soon followed suit. On November 1 Turkey was definitely and irretrievably at war with the Entente Powers and an ally of Germany and Austria.

The war from the point of view of the Turkish people was a matter of four frontiers. There was the Dardanelles to guard; there was Egypt and the Suez Canal to be threatened and perhaps captured; there was the Caucasus, where across towering mountains and deep gorges the Ottoman faced the Russian, his hereditary and most feared enemy; and finally there was Mesopotamia. All of these theatres of possible warfare presented military problems, and one of them naval problems among the most intricate and interesting of those facing the nations involved in this unprecedented war. In the Caucasus the mountains and the scarcity of broad passes and good roads, the almost entire lack of railway facilities and the whole nature of the country rendered offensive operations as difficult as on the north-east frontier of Italy or in the Carpathians. In Syria and on the road to the Suez Canal, the waterless desert, the entire absence of railways, the paucity and inadequacy of roads and the nature of the obstacles to be crossed before an invasion of Egypt was possible made the task one of terrible difficulty. In the Dardanelles the peninsula of Gallipoli, strong as it was in natural advantages, was open to naval attack from two and perhaps three sides and its defense must prove not only a costly affair but one the issue of which must be constantly open to doubt. Lastly in Mesopotamia the task for the Turks was a comparatively easy one, for an invading army must meet with constant difficulties through lack of water, excessive heat, absence of roads and railways and distance from real base of supplies.

At the time of Turkey's entry into the war, military opinion all over the world was divided on the question of the relative

efficiency of her army. All agreed, however, that as an individual fighting animal the Turk had few if any equals. Centuries of warfare had established his reputation, and the wonderful defense of Plevna had set the seal upon it. On the defensive, it was believed by many, he was unbeatable, conditions of supply and equipment being equal.

The Balkan War, however, had been a severe blow to his prestige. It was widely felt that his defeat by the Bulgars, the Serbians, and the Greeks had revealed serious, even vital, weaknesses in the Ottoman army. Consequently the test of Turkey in the Great War was anxiously awaited by both allies and foes. Tremendous issues were at stake, and the failure or success of the soldiers of the Crescent in standing before the troops of Russia, France, and Great Britain was bound to have an important, perhaps decisive, influence on the outcome of the struggle as a whole.

It is doubtful if the general staff of any of the warring countries had any accurate or dependable figures of the Turkish army. Especially was this so of the army on a war footing. At one time only Mohammedans were permitted to serve with the colors, the citizens of other religious beliefs being called upon to pay a yearly tax in lieu of service. Of recent years, however, that law was altered, and in the Balkan War Mohammedan and Christian served side by side and fought with equal ardor for their country. Just how large a proportion of the Christian population had been incorporated into the army at the time of the outbreak of hostilities few experts were in any position to estimate.

Germany, because of her painstaking investigations in Turkey as well as in every other country, probably was in possession of more accurate data than any other nation, not even excepting the Turks themselves. The best neutral authorities speak of 1,125,000 as the total war-time strength of the Ottoman forces, but that estimate was made prior to the war and before the world had learned that nations under modern conditions are able to place a much larger proportion of their available manhood in the field than was ever thought possible. Probably the Turkish war strength was underestimated. The chief difficulty was not in

finding the men, but in providing quickly equipment, and at the outset that was evidently a very real obstacle in Turkey.

The Turkish army was essentially a German creation, and largely the personal accomplishment of that remarkable military organizer and student of war, Field Marshal von der Goltz. Von der Goltz spent a decade with the Turkish army, and returned to Germany only to reorganize the eastern defenses of his country in preparation for the Great War. When Turkey entered the struggle he returned to Constantinople at Enver Bey's personal request.

The Turk does not become subject to military duty until he reaches the age of twenty. Then, however, for the next two decades he belongs to the army, either actually or potentially. The first nine years are spent in the Nizam or first line, first with the colors and then in immediate reserve. Then come nine years in the Redif or Landwehr, and, finally, two years in the Mustaph'phiz or Landsturm.

All branches of the Turkish army were not equally good. Cavalry and infantry were probably the equal of corresponding troops in the armies of any other country, but the inefficiency of the artillery was blamed for the débâcle of the Balkan War. Many of the thousands of German troops poured into Turkey before and after she entered the war were trained gunners sent with the object of stiffening the weakest arm of the Turkish army.

The Turkish army has always suffered, as have the armies of many other countries, from a shortage of properly trained officers. Since the advent of the Young Turks, and especially since Enver Pasha, with his German training, succeeded to the position of Minister of War and Commander in Chief, the personnel of the officers' corps has been vastly improved. But it takes years—yes, generations—to create an adequate supply of officers and non-commissioned officers for an army of the proportions of Turkey's, and the assistance of the German stiffening must have been of inestimable advantage to the Ottoman command.

At the outbreak of the war the Turkish army was disposed in four regional groups. The number of men actually with the colors, according to the best estimates, was 500,000, with another



250,000 trained men in immediate reserve awaiting equipment. In or near Constantinople were about 200,000 troops, including the First, Third, and Fifth Corps, a part of the Sixth, and four cavalry brigades. In Thrace, watching the uncertain Bulgars and Greeks, were the Second and most of the Sixth Corps with cavalry regiments and frontier guards. In Palestine, menacing the Suez Canal, were the 40,000 troops of the Eighth Corps, besides unnumbered irregular Arab forces, who could not, however, be depended upon. In the Caucasus the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Corps and three brigades of cavalry were facing the Russian forces across the winding frontier. At Bagdad the Thirteenth Corps, and at Mosul the Twelfth, stood guard over Mesopotamia.

For centuries England had had a very genuine and active interest in the Persian Gulf, recognizing its strategic and potential commercial importance with that foresight which has distinguished her statesmen and traders for generations. Russia had been regarded as the most likely nation to contest England's predominance in that quarter of the world, and her every move was watched and checkmated in Downing Street.

At the outbreak of the war, however, and for a decade before, Germany had given many signs that she had to be reckoned with in any arrangements in the waters washing the shores of Mesopotamia. And it soon became apparent that the domination of that part of Turkey was to be one of the chief spoils of victory. Much has been written about Germany's territorial ambitions. Much of it is based upon pure speculation, but publicists in Germany make no disguise of the Fatherland's desire to win and make a political and economic unit of the countries now embraced in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Servia, perhaps Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey in Europe and Asia. One has but to take up the map and outline this aggregation of states and turn to a table of statistics to realize the enormous advantages and powers of such a unit. Politically and economically, it would dominate Europe as has no other power for many generations. Economically and financially, it would be absolutely independent of the rest of the world, but even if it were not, no nation or combination of nations could afford to attempt to isolate it.

## CHAPTER XXXIV

## BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA

IT was some such considerations as these working in the minds of the members of the British Government that impelled them to undertake an offensive in Mesopotamia almost immediately after the break of relations with Turkey. But in addition there were two other reasons. Russia feared a Turkish attack in force in the Caucasus and called to England and France for a diversion. The Mesopotamia campaign working on the right flank of the Turkish forces, as a whole, was an ideal operation intended to draw troops from the Russian frontier. Secondly, the moral effect of any considerable British success in Mesopotamia, and especially the capture of Bagdad, was bound to be very great. Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania were believed to be waiting for a cue to enter the struggle, and perhaps turn the scales in the Balkans, while the attitude of the Mohammedans in the French and British possessions was largely dependent upon the prestige of those two countries.

Finally, in considering the relative importance of particular campaigns, observers are likely to lose sight of the tremendous importance of possession. In law possession is said to constitute nine points. In warfare, and in diplomacy, which must eventually follow, possession is even more important. When the plenipotentiaries of the warring nations gather around the peace table to arrive at a basis of settlement and the cards are laid on the table, that nation in possession of disputed territory, whatever may be her military and financial condition, is in a position to largely influence the terms. Only by the concession of equivalent advantages or considerations will it be possible to oust her.

How widely this is recognized will be evidenced by the scramble that is made by each of the warring nations to secure possession of the land regarded as its particular sphere of influence. This is true of Mesopotamia, as of many other parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

# THE CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONY OF KIAO-CHAU

A ZEPPELIN ON THE SEA • ARMY BALLOON AND HANGAR  
RESCUING A SEAPLANE • A NIGHT VIEW OF THE AISNE



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Sometimes air duels take place above the clouds. Again, an aviator hides for safety by flying above thick clouds, or above a light cloud to observe battle lines, himself unseen





German Far Eastern squadron—"Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau," "Emden," "Leipzig,"  
and "Nürnberg"—at anchor in Kiao-chau Bay




German infantry at Tsing-tau, mounted on stocky Mongolian ponies. These soldiers aided in the defense of Kiao-chau



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A Zeppelin riding the surface of the sea. These great German airships have made repeated raids not only on English coast towns, but on London and Paris as well





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A German army balloon leaving its hangar at Metz. Without the protection of such sheds, dirigibles and other balloons would be battered to pieces by high winds



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A British seaplane, wrecked at the close of a scouting trip over the North Sea, is being drawn ashore by sailors and the crowds on the beach



Copyright, Modern Photo Service

The night reconnaissance of a French aviator over the valley of the Aisne, where the armies of the warring powers have been entrenched since October, 1914





Religious dignitaries at Nikko, Japan, crossing the Red Lacquer Bridge to the temple of Iyeyasu, to announce the declaration of war to the spirits of the Imperial Ancestors

It is evident that the Turkish military authorities were taken somewhat by surprise by the rapidity with which the British Government in India perfected their arrangements for an attack upon Mesopotamia. Knowing that the total British army was extremely limited, it was thought that France, and possibly Egypt, would absorb British military activity for some months to come. There was every reason, however, why the British should not delay the attack upon the shores of Mesopotamia washed by the Persian Gulf. Running down to the left bank of the Shat-el-Arab to a point (Abadam) almost directly opposite the Turkish village of Sanijeh was the enormously important pipe line of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Now this pipe line was one of the main supplies of the British navy which, with the launching of the newer superdreadnoughts, was becoming increasingly dependent upon oil instead of coal. So much was this so that the British admiralty some time before the war bought a controlling interest in this same Anglo-Persian Oil Company. It was, then, primarily to protect this fuel supply from a Turkish raid that an early descent upon the Mesopotamian coast was planned.

On November 7, 1914, the Poona Brigade, composed of white and Indian troops, under command of Brigadier General W. S. Delamain, appeared off the Turkish village of Fao, where an antiquated Turkish fort lies amid a grove of palm trees. Against Persian Gulf pirates it could have put up a valiant fight, but it was a poor match for the guns of the British gunboat *Odin*. The defenders fled and the British force sailed up the Shat-el-Arab. At Sanijeh they effected a landing, intrenched, and awaited the coming of two additional brigades.

It soon became apparent that the Turks, either because they were not prepared or because they preferred to make their real stand nearer their base of supplies, did not intend to offer any serious opposition to the British advance. They adopted tactics designed to harass and delay the invaders, however, and on the 11th of November a small force moved out of Basra and engaged the Indian troops attached to General Delamain's command. After a sharp action the Turks retired. No further opportunity was given them to attack in small force, for two days later Lieu-

tenant General Sir Arthur Barrett arrived at Sanijeh with the Armednagar and the Belgaum Brigades, both made up of Indian troops with a stiffening of British regiments.

By November 16, 1914, the whole of the British forces were ashore, and on the following day at daybreak General Barrett ordered an advance. The main Turkish forces were located at Sahil, about halfway between Sanijeh and Basra. The battle was opened by an artillery duel. The British had a great advantage in the possession of gunboats, upon which had been mounted guns of considerable caliber. The Turks had selected their positions with great skill and knowledge, and despite the heavy artillery preparation, the British troops, when they did advance, were badly punished. Recent rains had made the ground heavy, almost marshy, and the entire absence of vegetation gave the Turkish riflemen and machine-gun crews an excellent chance to work. Slowly the Turks were forced out of their advance positions, but just as the invaders were about to take advantage of the retreat of the enemy a curious phenomenon occurred. Between the advancing British and the retiring Turks a mirage interposed and effectually screened the movements of the latter. Because of this and the heavy ground no pursuit was possible.

This action, resulting in the loss of 353 of the British force and an even larger number of the Turkish troops (estimated by the British at 1,500, but which is almost certainly an exaggeration), decided the fate of Basra. Some opposition was made to the passage of the British river expedition, and at one point an unsuccessful attempt was made to block the passage of the Shat-el-Arab by the sinking of three steamers.

About ten o'clock in the morning of November 22, 1914, the British river force, after silencing a battery that had been hurriedly erected by the Turks just below the town, reached Basra, and General Barrett hoisted the British flag on the German Consulate, the customhouse having been fired by the retreating Turks. Some time was spent by the invaders at Basra in preparing a base.

It was not until December 3, 1914, that Lieutenant Colonel Frazer of General Barrett's force with Indian troops and some



of the Second Norfolks advanced on Kurna, fifty miles above Basra, at a point where the Tigris empties into the old channel of the Euphrates. Lieutenant Colonel Frazer's force was accompanied by three gunboats, an armed yacht, and a couple of armed launches. The troops landed four miles below the town and intrenched, while the river force moved up and shelled Kurna. When the troops advanced, it immediately became apparent that the strength of the Turks had been underestimated and that Lieutenant Colonel Frazer's force was much too small to dislodge them. After losing heavily, Frazer ordered a retreat to the intrenchments four miles down the river, and sent word to Basra for reinforcements.

On December 6, 1914, General Fry appeared with additional troops, and plans were laid for attacking Kurna on the flank. Just as the scheme was nearing completion, however, Turkish officers appeared at the English camp and asked for terms. Conditions were refused, and finally the Turks laid down their arms.

With the capture of Kurna the British secured control of the delta of the Euphrates, made impossible any raid upon the Persian Gulf and its oil supply except in great force, and laid the foundations of an ambitious campaign against the strategic points of the whole of Mesopotamia. Elaborate intrenched camps were built at Kurna, and near by at Mezera, to await the coming of larger forces and supplies.

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## CHAPTER XXXV

### CAMPAIGN IN THE CAUCASUS

DISQUIETING as was the British offensive in Mesopotamia, the Turkish General Staff were not to be drawn by it from considerations of larger strategy. Acting in agreement with the German and Austrian General Staffs, plans were rapidly pushed for an aggressive offensive in the Caucasus, that old-time battling ground of the Russians and the Turks. Germany was being hotly

pressed in France by the combined armies of Belgium, France, and England, and feared a general offensive on the part of the Russian army.

Turkey's Caucasus campaign in November and December, 1914, was undertaken primarily to relieve the eastern pressure on Germany. In judging it the reader should not lose sight of this larger phase, nor of its relation to the general strategic plans of the Central Powers.

Across the great isthmus separating the Caspian and Black Seas run the Caucasus Mountains. Parallel to this range of towering mountains, the highest in Europe, runs the frontier line of Russia and Turkey and Russia and Persia, winding in and out among the Trans-Caucasian Mountains. About two hundred miles from the Russo-Turkish frontier stands Tiflis, the rich and ancient capital of Georgia, and one of the prime objectives of any Turkish offensive. One of the few railroads of this wild country runs from Tiflis through the Russian fortress of Kars, forty-five miles from the Turkish frontier, to Sarikamish, thirty miles nearer. On the Turkish side the fortress of Erzerum stands opposed to Kars, but suffering in comparison by the lack of railroad communication with the interior of Turkey.

Military authorities believed it to be impossible for Turkish troops to take the offensive in the Caucasus in midwinter. Most of the towns stand 5,000 or 6,000 feet above sea level, and bad roads and snow-choked passes served to make the movement of troops, even in small numbers and unencumbered by supplies and artillery, a task of tremendous difficulty.

Despite all these discouraging circumstances, however, the Turkish General Staff, dominated by the indefatigable and ambitious Enver Pasha, was not to be deterred. A brilliant and daring plan of campaign, aiming at the annihilation or capture of the entire Russian Caucasian army, the seizure of Kars and Tiflis, and the control of the immensely valuable and important Caspian oil fields, was prepared. The unwelcome task of carrying this plan to completion and success was intrusted to Hassan Izzet Pasha, under the general guidance of Enver Pasha and his staff of German advisers.

The heroic efforts of the Turkish troops, their grim but hopeless battle against equally brave troops, appalling weather conditions, and insuperable obstacles, their failure and defeat when on the very verge of complete success, make an intensely interesting story.

Stationed at Erzerum, Turkey had the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Corps. In addition, the Thirty-seventh Arab division had been brought up from Bagdad to strengthen the Eleventh Corps. At Trebizond two divisions of the First Corps had been brought from Constantinople by sea. These forces totaled about 140,000 troops. At and about Kars, General Woronzov, the Russian commander, had between 100,000 and 110,000 troops at his disposal from first to last. But although weaker in numbers he had the inestimable advantage of operating with a line of railroad at his back, whereas the Turkish commander had to depend entirely upon road transit, 500 miles from the nearest railroad.

The plan of the Turkish command was simple enough on paper. It was a repetition of the tactics attempted by Von Kluck at the battle of Mons and by Von Hindenburg in East Prussia. In fact it was a maneuver constantly repeated by the German commands throughout the war. The Russian main force was to be baited as far as possible beyond the railhead at Sarikamish by a strong demonstration of a part of the Turkish army. The Russians were to be held on this front long enough to permit a double flanking movement, working on the Russian right and aimed at Sarikamish and Kars.

The conditions absolutely necessary for the success of the Turkish plan were the holding of the Russian force beyond Sarikamish, and the accurate timing of the flanking attacks, otherwise the Russian commander would be able to deal with each force separately and defeat and perhaps destroy them.

The campaign opened on November 20, 1914. The Russians, advancing across the frontier from Sarikamish, took Kopriukei, within thirty miles of Erzerum. There, for some time, they remained while the Turkish command prepared for their great coup.

About the middle of December the Eleventh Corps of the



Turkish army moved out of Erzerum, engaged the Russians at Koprikeui, defeated them after a short, sharp struggle, and drove them in disorder a dozen miles to Khorasan. While the Eleventh Corps was thus engaged the Ninth and Tenth Corps, marching forty miles to the north in terrible weather, succeeded in crossing the high mountains that guard the Russian frontier. On Christmas Day they looked down on the town of Sarikamish and the vital railway that stretched away to the eastward. At the same time the two divisions of the First Corps, stationed at Trebizond, making a wider sweep, had, by forced marches through a blinding blizzard that constantly threatened to make necessary the abandonment of the heavy artillery, reached the vicinity of Ardahan.

Reference to a map of the Caucasus will show how advantageously placed the Turkish army was at this time. The Russians had been badly checked at Koprikeui: two army corps were threatening the communications of the advanced Russian troops, and were ideally placed to pierce the Russian line at Sarikamish. At Ardahan a strong force not only prevented a wide turning movement from Kars, but actually threatened to turn the extreme Russian right flank.

At this point, "General Winter," ever an ally of the Russian army, intervened. Operating miles from their base of supplies, finding it impossible to maintain communications between the several corps, the Turkish troops were soon to be in serious difficulties. The long and arduous marches over almost impossible mountains had been too great a strain on even the hardened mountain troops of the Ottoman army. Food was short, and many of the big guns and much of the vital ammunition had been abandoned in the mountain passes. Finally, that necessary condition of synchronization in attack was lacking because of the impossibility of communication between the several Turkish commanders.

The Tenth Corps had reached and was threatening the railway east of Sarikamish on the road to Kars. Its defeat was absolutely necessary to the safety of the Russian army. It was therefore the object of General Woronzov's first attack. During four days

every available man and gun he could bring up on the railway were thrown against the rapidly dwindling ranks of the Tenth Corps. The Turks fought bravely and tenaciously, but weight of numbers and superiority of communications told in the end, and the remnants of the Ottoman forces were driven into the mountains to the north.

The defeat and retreat of the Tenth Corps exposed the left flank of the Ninth, commanded by Iskan Pasha. General Woronzov took full advantage of the situation. Iskan and his 40,000 troops were soon fighting a desperate battle against an enveloping movement that threatened to encompass them on four sides. The cold was intense; hundreds of soldiers in the week of continuous fighting froze to death; dozens were later found standing by their guns, stiff and upright in death. In a score of mountain gullies, 10,000 feet above sea level, thick with a blanket of white snow rapidly becoming crimson with the blood of the dead and wounded, the soldiers of the Crescent fought fanatically to the last.

Of the 40,000 troops of the Ninth Corps, a bare 6,000 struggled out of the mountains to the vicinity of Sarikamish, where they were rallied by Iskan Pasha. For six days and nights this heroic band made a determined attempt to capture the town held by a comparatively weak Russian garrison. Finally, when, surrounded by overwhelming Russian forces, it became apparent that no Turkish relief could reach him, Iskan Pasha and the remnant of his once proud corps surrendered.

The scenes on the battle fields were beyond adequate description. In a great dip between two towering peaks the slaughter of the Turks had been especially great. There no less than 1,500 bodies, piled two and three deep, were counted in one confined area.

Sarikamish was defended against Iskan's 6,000 by a mere handful of soldiers. Time and time again urged by their German officers, the Turks hurled themselves against the thin Russian line. It bent but did not break, as step by step, fighting fiercely all the way, it retreated before weight of numbers. And when relief did come to the defenders, and Iskan and his force were

compelled to surrender, the brave little Russian band was completely exhausted.

In their pursuit of the remnants of the Tenth Corps the Russians met with some of the difficulties that had been the undoing of the Turks. Furthermore, although the Ninth Corps had been hemmed in so that no relief could reach it, the Turkish command had by no means lost the power of effective counteraction. The Eleventh Corps at Khorasan carried on an energetic campaign against the Russian front, gained a local and tactically important success, and drove the enemy back as far as Kara-Urgan, less than twenty miles from Sarikamish. Indeed, so serious became the threat to the Russian forces that General Woronzov, much against his wishes, was compelled to call off the pursuit of the Tenth Corps and strengthen the Sarikamish front with the troops that had been operating farther to the east.

In the second week of January, 1915, between these forces and the Eleventh Corps of the Turkish army a fierce battle, lasting several days, opened. The struggle was of the utmost intensity, at times developing into a hand-to-hand combat between whole regiments. On January 14 the Fifty-second Turkish Regiment was put to the bayonet by the Russians. At Genikoi a regiment of Cossacks charged, during an engagement with a portion of the Thirty-second Turkish Division, and killed and wounded more than 300.

It must be remembered in judging the terrible nature of the struggle that the armies were fighting in difficult country. The battle of Kara-Urgan, furthermore, was waged in a continual snowstorm. Thousands of dead and wounded were buried in the rapidly falling snow and no effort was made to recover them. By the end of this week, January 16, 1915, owing largely to their superior railway communications and the possibility of reinforcements, the Russians had not only checked the Turkish offensive, but had decisively defeated the Eleventh Corps. Pressing their advantage the Russians pursued the beaten Turks toward Erzerum, but the heavy snows prevented them gaining the full fruits of their victory.

If the Eleventh Corps had not won a victory it had, however,



accomplished its object in that it had relieved the pressure on the Tenth and enabled it to make good its escape to the north, where it proceeded to effect a junction with the First Corps. The experience of this First Corps had not been a happy one. We left it on Christmas Day, 1914, overlooking Ardahan. A week later it entered the city and prepared to carry out its rôle in the general offensive by advancing upon the Russian right flank at Kars. It met serious opposition, however, when it attempted to move out of Ardahan, was itself compelled to retreat, and finally sought safety beyond the ridges to the west. There, in the valley of the Chorûk, it joined up with the Tenth Corps. Together they continued their retreat upon Trebizond. Subsequently they tried a new offensive in the Chorûk valley which was undecisive, however, and at the end of January, 1914, the situation had developed into a deadlock.

The Turkish troops in their operation in the Caucasus appeared to have suffered from the difficulty of keeping open their sea communications with Constantinople. Lacking railways they relied too much upon supplies arriving at Trebizond. The Russian fleet in the Black Sea was active, however, and upset the Turkish calculations. In the first week of January, 1915, at Sinope a Russian cruiser discovered the Turkish cruiser *Medjidieh* convoying a transport. After a short engagement the *Medjidieh* was put to flight, and the transport sunk.

On January 6, 1915, the Russian Black Sea fleet ran into the *Breslau* and the *Hamidieh* and damaged them both in a running fight. A week later Russian torpedo boats sank several Turkish supply boats near Sinope.

While this fighting was taking place in the north, farther to the south toward the Persian frontier the Russians were attempting a turning movement against the Turkish right flank. At the same time that the Russian force in the north crossed the Turkish frontier the Russian column entered Turkey fifty miles farther southeast. On November 8, 1914, this force entered the Turkish town of Kara Kilissa. A week later, making its way southwest for a distance of twenty miles, it engaged,

near the village of Dutukht, a Turkish force composed largely of Arab troops of the Thirteenth Corps. At the outset the Russians met with a measure of success, but on November 22, 1914, the Turks, having been reenforced by troops from Bagdad, began a fierce offensive. After indecisive fighting in the Alash-gird valley the Turks, about the middle of December, 1914, almost caught the Russians in a bold enveloping movement north of Dutukht. In order to escape the Russians were compelled to retreat hurriedly and thus ended their offensive operation in this section.

Still farther to the south, in Persia, the Turks and Russians also battled. Not only because of political conditions, but because of the nature of the country, it was easier for Russia and Turkey to attack each other through Persia than directly across other frontiers, just as it was easier for Germany and France to reach each other across Belgium. At the outbreak of war both Turkey and Russia, recognizing these circumstances, were occupants of Persian territory. Early in November two Russian columns marched across the northwest corner of Persia and into Turkey by the Kotur and Khanesur passes, evidently with the important city of Van, on the lake of that name, as an objective. At a point near Dilman, and again at Serai, they drove the Turkish troops back toward Van, but were checked by reenforcements.

Meanwhile the Turks had a more considerable success to the south. Apparently taking the Russian higher command completely by surprise, Turkish troops advanced almost unopposed to Tabriz, the most important of the cities of northern Persia. Alarmed by this, Russia sent a strong force which, on January 30, 1915, succeeded in recapturing the city.

Thus, up to the end of January, 1915, nothing decisive had been accomplished on the Caucasian front by either Turkey or Russia. The Battle of Sarikamish, resulting in a Turkish loss estimated by the Russian authorities at 50,000, while decisive enough locally, seems to have had no appreciable effect upon the situation as a whole. For reasons resting very largely in the difficulty of finding the troops necessary, as well as in the con-

ditions of the country and the weather, the Russians had been unable to follow up their success. Indeed, the offensive appears to have continued in the hands of the Turks.

It is probably the case that Russia was unwilling to detach any considerable number of troops from her Polish and Galician front, where important events were brewing. Her General Staff rightly regarded the Caucasian front as of secondary importance—and like Austria on her Italian frontier, determined to fight a defensive campaign.

However that may be, conditions after the first few months of campaigning settled down into a stalemate. Engagements on a relatively small scale were reported from time to time, but the balance of advantage remained fairly even. Both countries had fronts where victories would bring larger returns and more immediate effect upon the ultimate outcome of the war.

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## CHAPTER XXXVI

### TURKISH ADVANCE AGAINST EGYPT

TO the Turk no operation of the war appeared more important than did the campaign against Egypt. That in the early days of the struggle in 1914 he contented himself with what amounted to little more than a demonstration designed to hold as many British troops in Egypt as possible was due primarily to considerations of larger strategy. Undoubtedly, by his incursion into the Sinai Peninsula and his half-hearted attempt with a hopelessly small force to cross the Suez Canal, he learned many lessons invaluable in any future and more ambitious campaign. Considered as a diversion the early advance upon the Suez was a success: as a serious military operation, resting on its own legs, it was a fiasco.

No operation the Turks might have conducted could have been so unwelcome to the British as was that against Egypt. For weeks in advance it was discussed by English writers and, while



they all, naturally, agreed that it was foredoomed to failure, there was an undercurrent of apprehension in official circles. It was realized that many untried problems and theories would be put to a severe test by such a campaign, if undertaken in a serious way by a large and well-equipped force. Of a purely Turkish force, commanded and organized by Turkish officers, there was no fear, but such wonderful organizers had the Germans proved themselves to be that the combination of Teuton brains and Turkish fighting qualities and endurance was regarded as formidable.

It was realized in England also that any measure of success that might come to an invading force would have two very serious results. It would not only threaten, and perhaps sever, the shortest route to the east and so seriously embarrass the trade, military and naval efficiency of the Allies, but it would have a grave and perhaps decisive effect upon Mohammedan malcontents in Egypt and India.

The exact truth of the conditions in India and Egypt will possibly never be known, so rigorous were the operations of the censorship set up by the British War Office. One thing is certain, however: in both countries political conditions were serious before the war and they could not, by any stretch of optimism, be conceived as improving with the coming of a great struggle aimed at the only remaining independent Mohammedan power.

For many months previous to August, 1914, the Indian office in London had been apprehensive of rebellion in India. In Egypt the circumstance that at the beginning of the war the British authorities announced that they would make no use of the native Egyptian army speaks for itself. It was believed in Constantinople and in Berlin that both Egypt and India were ripe for a terrible revolt against the rule of the British Raj: the uprisings of millions of fanatical natives that would forever sweep British control from these two key places to the trade of the world and would institute a Turkish suzerainty, backed and controlled by Berlin. This was thought all the more likely as thousands of the British regular troops had been withdrawn

from India and Egypt for service in France, being replaced by raw levies from England and the Colonies.

These, then, were the major considerations that prompted the early offensive against Egypt. It was based upon sound political and military strategy. Just how near it came to complete success, just how much additional worry and effort it added to the burden of Great Britain and France, only a complete revelation of the progress of events in all fields will tell.

In the attack upon the canal the Turks operated primarily from their base at Damascus. As preparations progressed the troops that were to take part in the actual advance were concentrated between Jerusalem and Akabah. Under command of Djemel Pasha, Turkish Minister of Marine, there were gathered some 50,000 troops consisting mostly of first line troops of the best quality, reenforced by about 10,000 more or less irregular Arab Bedouins.

During November and early December, 1914, the force was moved forward by slow and methodical stages, until by December 15 it was awaiting orders to advance, encamped on the confines of the great desert that separated it from its objective.

Here it is well that the reader should have a good idea of the difficulties of the task the Turkish higher command had imposed upon Djemel Pasha and his troops.

The two chief difficulties to be met by the invaders of the Sinai were lack of transport facilities and lack of water. Three routes were possible for the Turkish army, all artificial obstacles being for the moment ignored; two by land, across the Sinai desert, and the third by sea, across the Mediterranean. The latter, however, must be ruled out because the seas were controlled by the Anglo-French fleet. For the same reason, the northern land route had many disadvantages, because it could be commanded for a part of its length by warships. However, it is instructive to examine it in detail.

The whole region crossed by the sea road is desert of the most difficult and forbidding character. By this road all the great invasions—the Roman, Egyptian, Assyrian, Greek, and French—have been made. The road enters the desert at El

Arish and from there to El Kantara on the Suez Canal, the probable point of attack of an army moving by this route, is 100 miles. Over this whole distance there are only three places, once an army has left El Arish, where water can be had. The first is a matter of a day's march, at El Maza, thirty miles away; the second is at Bir-El-Abd, another day's march; and the third at Katieh, within striking distance of the canal. Without the construction of a special railway the transport of a force large enough to efficiently control the canal by this route seems to be out of the question.

The southern route, known as the Hadj, or Pilgrim's Road, running from Akaba to Suez, besides being longer is even worse off in the matter of water. This was the traditional path of pilgrims traveling from Egypt to Mecca, and still is much in use for that purpose.

Something like 150 miles separate Akaba and Suez, yet only two watering places are to be found in the whole distance. The first is three days' march from the former place, at a point called Nakhl, where modern cisterns had been built and an adequate supply of water for a large force probably was obtainable. The next watering place is another three days' march, at Ayun Mousa, or Well of Moses, within a short distance of the canal.

But tremendous as were the problems facing a considerable body of men in attempting to cross the Sinai desert and arrive at the Suez Canal in condition to fight a strong, fresh and fully prepared foe, they were not to be compared to the difficulties that would face such an army when the canal had been reached. We have seen how great an obstacle a wide river, such as the Vistula, proved to be to an army when attempting to cross in the face of a prepared enemy. In the case of the Suez Canal, although there were no strong currents, a force attempting to cross it had to contend with two added difficulties: The Suez Canal could not, in the circumstances be turned, as was the Vistula by the Germans. Furthermore its defensive value was immeasurably increased by the circumstance that it could and did carry warships of the largest type which not only had the value of fortresses mounting the heaviest of guns, but were mobile as



well. And finally, because of the nature of the shores of the canal, it was possible for an attacking force to cross it at but few points.

The question of crossing the canal or dominating it in any sense was for the Turks largely a question of bringing to bear a superior force of artillery—a task that had only to be stated to reveal its difficulties. No force with smaller or fewer guns would hope to cross the Suez in the face of the concentration of artillery and naval gunfire that the British could bring to bear at any threatened point.

The defenders on the western side of the canal had the additional advantage of railway communication running along the entire canal from Suez to Port Said, and connecting with interior bases.

There were five points from which, once having conquered the desert and reached the canal, the invaders could advantageously launch an attack or attacks upon the canal defenses. The first is just south of El Kantara, where the old sea road crosses the Suez. Just south of Ismailia a group of heights on the east bank provides a second opportunity. The third is found at the point called the Plateau of Hyena. The fourth is just north of the Bitter Lake, and the fifth is to the south of the same body of water.

Late in December, 1914, Djemel Pasha began active preparations for an advance upon the canal. This campaign the Turks later called a reconnaissance in force and as, of their total strength of 50,000 men, only 12,000 at the outside and possibly less were used, the limited term seems justified. Although the southern route was used by the main force, a small force eluded the watchfulness of the Anglo-French naval patrol operating along the shore commanding the first day's march of the northern, or sea road, and ultimately struck at El Kantara. Furthermore, sometime before one of these two forces—the larger, or southern—reached the vicinity of the canal, it split and conducted an independent attack at Suez.

There had been much speculation among military writers all over the world as to the possibility or probability of the construc-

tion by the Turks of a light railway running a part of the distance across the Sinai Desert and linking up with the line to Mecca. It was realized that such a railway would be an enormous help to Djemel Pasha and his army, especially in the transport of supplies, ammunitions, and artillery. Indeed, it was held that only by the construction of such a railway, extending almost to the canal, could the absolutely essential artillery be brought into action. There was serious doubt of the ability of the Turks to build such a line. The strength of the German "stiffening" in the army based upon Damascus was believed to be slight. Djemel Pasha is said to have seriously opposed any great number of Teuton officers, especially in the higher commands. Thus the assistance the Turks could expect from the Germans in the organization and construction of such a railway would be small. Whether or not the schème was feasible at that time it is impossible to say. At any rate the Turks, for reasons best known to themselves, did not put it to a test.

The British force in Egypt was well supplied with aeroplanes and kept the Turkish army under constant observation. With the exception of the use of the first section of the road, covering a couple of days of time, there was probably no element of surprise in the Turkish attack upon the canal. Realizing the limited possibilities of attack from the east shore, the British, taking their lesson from experience in France, had constructed an elaborate system of trenches to the east of the canal at the five points where attacks would possess some likelihood of successful conclusion.

It was the end of January, 1915, before the Turkish army, marching in easy stages across the desert reached the vicinity of the canal. Their German mentors had constructed for them elaborate carriages with the wheels of enormous width to carry the artillery and the heavy supplies across the soft sands. Also, in preparation of a crossing of the canal, the Turks brought a supply of ready-assembled pontoon bridges, running on wheels and similar to those used by the German army in Europe, except that they were much lighter.

In the transport of all this material the Turks were dependent

upon camels, suited as are no other animals for work in the desert. In thousands, they had been collected at Hadj, the cooperation of the Arab Bedouins being specially valuable in this work. The consideration of these events in the campaign which begins in February, 1915, will be found in Volume III of this work.

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## CHAPTER XXXVII

### FAILURE OF "HOLY WAR" PROPAGANDA

ONE of the most interesting of the various phases of the war, so far as the participation of Turkey was concerned, was the religious development. Countless pages of learned speculation had been written for years before the struggle in an attempt to forecast the outcome of exactly the conditions that had arisen. It must be said at once that in the first six months of the war reality failed to live up to prophecy. The cataclysm that was expected by many to involve the revolt of millions and a vast change in the political color of much of the earth's surface did not appear. Any change that took place operated so quietly and on so comparatively small a scale that it was lost to view beside the greater interest of the struggle on the battle fields of France and Poland.

It is desirable, however, that the situation be examined. Abbas II, Khedive of Egypt, had early in the war openly shown his lack of sympathy with the British in Egypt. By his actions he left no doubt regarding his attitude. He not only vehemently expressed his adherence to Constantinople but left Cairo, and journeyed to Turkey, safe from British official pressure or persuasion. Whereupon the British Government called upon him to return, threatened him with deposition, and finally took that extreme step, setting up another in his place on December 18, 1914.

Furthermore, the day before, Great Britain declared Egypt a British protectorate independent of Constantinople. In this action Great Britain relied not upon any legal right to take such action, but merely upon the right of actual possession. Since



Great Britain had taken over the government of Egypt in 1883, she had acknowledged the sultan's rights of suzerainty and had countenanced the payment to that ruler of certain considerable yearly sums from the Egyptian exchequer.

Indeed, Great Britain was in Egypt merely by virtue of an international understanding and on a definite agreement to release her control of the country when certain conditions of political and financial stability had been restored. The other nations had, willingly, or unwillingly, become resigned to her possession of this strategically important land. Great Britain a decade before the war, at the beginning of that rapprochement with France which led up to the Entente and which had so many fateful consequences for the whole world, sought to legalize her position in Egypt—at least so far as the other great north African power was concerned. A bargain was struck with France by which the English occupation of Egypt for an indefinite period was recognized in exchange for a free hand in Morocco. Great Britain could now urge that the coming of war, and especially the entry of Turkey into the struggle, placed her administration in Egypt in a position impossible to maintain. In theory she was, so long as she acknowledged the suzerainty of the sultan, in the country merely on that ruler's sufferance. She admitted his ultimate authority and especially the loyalty and duty of the Egyptian army and khedive to him. Strictly she could make no move to prevent an armed occupation of the country by the sultan's troops nor could she call upon the khedive and his cabinet to repudiate Constantinople's sway. To put an end to this condition of affairs was the most legitimate reason for England's action.

Although the native Egyptian is in religion allied to the Turk, his religious fervor was not great enough to induce him to rise against British control. Among the better educated of the Egyptians and especially among those who had traveled, there was a strong "Nationalist" movement. At times, even in the period of peace, this movement had threatened to make matters extremely unpleasant for the British rulers. For some years before the war, German and Turkish agents had been working among these ardent Egyptian patriots, encouraging and ad-

vising them, and when war with Turkey came England was seriously alarmed. Using the country as a central base for her Turkish, Persian, and Balkan operations, Great Britain imported thousands upon thousands of troops into Egypt. Just how many hundreds of thousands of armed men passed in and out of the country from first to last only the records of the British war office would show, but it can be said that England never had a force of less than 90,000 trained men in Egypt at any one time.

Any chance of effective action that the Egyptian nationalists might have had was neutralized by the indifference and lack of interest in the vast body of their countrymen. There were more than 10,000,000 Mohammedans in Egypt, but only a small minority of them, under the most promising of circumstances, could have been counted upon to pay the least heed to the call of Constantinople. The Egyptian fellah is anything but a fighter. Lazy, unlearned, unambitious, he is content to accept his daily lot, perhaps conscious that the British rule has brought a certain amount of comparative prosperity even to him.

On the other hand, there were in Egypt something like 600,000 nomads, a very large proportion of whom could be depended upon to follow the lead of Constantinople. The males of these wild tribespeople were remarkable fighters, subject to no control, hating the English sway, and so independent of roads and transport that they could keep busy an even larger force of less mobile troops. Their chief weakness was their lack of cohesion and the impossibility of any concerted action on their part.

This, then, was the native situation in Egypt. In other parts of the world, where Great Britain maintained sway over large numbers of Mohammedans, the situation was equally complicated. With the issue of a call for a Holy War by the Sheik-ul-Islam, the religious ruler of the Mohammedan world, many well-informed observers looked for a large measure of trouble in India. So many were the elements of dissatisfaction, and even open revolt, in India that it was believed the Sheik-ul-Islam's call would be the match applied to the powder magazine.

The attitude of the various Indian potentates was uncertain. Some of them were known to be only outwardly loyal to the Brit-

ish authority. The now famous incident at the visit of King George to India, some years before the war, when one of the richest and most important of the native princes refused to bend the knee, was indicative of very widespread dissatisfaction. Innumerable cases of individual and even concerted violence against British rule immediately preceded the war, and several of these were openly encouraged by native princes.

So far as definite action was concerned, the opening of the war with Turkey and the months that immediately followed falsified all these predictions of disaster to British rule in India. Many of the native princes were effusive in their professions of loyalty to the British Empire, and several offered personal service at the front or financial contributions to the huge cost of the struggle.

Notable, and perhaps decisive, was the open adherence to Britain of the Agar Khan, the immensely powerful ruler of millions of Indian Mohammedans. The Agar Khan had spent many of the years previous to the war in England in daily association with English high society and official circles. At the outbreak of the war with Turkey, in October, 1914, at the request of the British Government, he visited Egypt, and it was largely upon his advice that the former khedive was deposed and the new one elevated to the post. Indeed, at one time there were strong rumors, afterward energetically denied by the British Government, that the Agar Khan had advised a Mohammedan repudiation of the authority of the caliph and the elevation of another to his place under a British guarantee. In support of this plan it was pointed out that Great Britain, judged by the number of adherents under her rule, was the world's greatest Mohammedan power. It was intolerable to many English people, especially to those of strong imperialistic tendencies, that the real control, even in theory, of so large and important a section of the people of the British Empire should be in Constantinople, safe from the "influence" and "persuasion" of the British Government. By these people it was held that the sultan's lineal claim was weak, and that an even better claim to the headship of the Moslems could be established for any one of several other men who might have been named. However, the plan was never achieved.



## CHAPTER XXXVIII

RESULTS OF FIRST SIX MONTHS OF  
TURKISH CAMPAIGN

WHAT was the situation as a whole, so far as Turkey and her military actions against the Allies were concerned, as to the outcome of these various operations in three fields—the Caucasus, Mesopotamia, and Egypt—during the first six months of the war? The military narrative is recorded in the chapter following. It will be seen that all of them were inconclusive. Indeed, from what we knew of the circumstances surrounding them, all we are justified in saying is that none of them was serious in the sense that they were not intended to have any decisive effect, directly, upon the progress of the war. Of them all it might be urged by a military authority that they were subsidiary operations, dangerous and wasteful in that they withdrew valuable men, munitions, brains, and energy from the decisive fronts. Their only justification is that they imposed similar action on the part of both armies, and so, in just that degree, scattered their forces. For the Turk it can be urged that at least two of the campaigns were forced upon him by his German mentors, while the third was imposed upon him by a British offensive. Furthermore, the Turk was entirely cut off from his Austro-German allies, and there was no possibility of his bringing his weight to bear in one of the main fields. From that point of view it is possible to justify the Turkish offensives as sound strategy.

Aside from a desire to protect the oil supply in Persia, it is hardly as easy to justify the British offensive in Mesopotamia. As events subsequently demonstrated, it was possible for the Turks to throw an overwhelming number of troops into Bagdad and to the south, and, furthermore, they were fighting under vastly more advantageous conditions than were the invaders. Only on the assumption that the Turks were hopelessly demoralized and disorganized, and that as fighting men they would belie

all their past history, was it possible to visualize success for the British operations in Mesopotamia.

Turkey had definitely come to grips with England and with Russia. She had in none of these fields measured swords with France, although she was equally at war with that country. The exact apportionment of the actual work to be done by the individual powers of the Entente seems to have led to considerable disagreement, and resulted at times in serious delay. Such arrangements depend, of course, upon each country's idea of its spheres of influence. Obviously, no country, if it can help it, is going to waste its men or its efforts in a field in which it has only a minor political or commercial interest. So far as France was concerned, the Caucasus, Egypt—aside from the possibility of the closing of the canal—and Mesopotamia were not of enough importance to justify her in participating in the struggle with the Turks even were it physically possible. All these remarks, of course, are subject to modifications imposed by considerations of the larger strategy of the Entente Powers; but for many months of the war the agreement of the Entente Powers in the matter of general strategy was conspicuous by its absence.

With her neighbors in the Balkans Turkey had maintained remarkably good relations considering the bitterness engendered, not only by centuries of strife, but by the recent events of the two Balkan wars. Bulgaria, smarting under the loss of territory through the attack upon her by Serbia, Greece, and Rumania in the Second Balkan War, was openly conducting friendly negotiations with Turkey for the acquisition of valuable territory—a compact that could mean only one thing. Greece, frightened by the menace of the German power, had resisted up to the moment all the blandishments of the Entente Powers, who urged her to active participation in the struggle. Rumania, largely isolated from the Entente Powers, menaced on the north by Austro-German forces, on the south by a revengeful Bulgaria, borrowed heavily from Britain, the universal money bag, but straddled the fence.

Thus Turkey, which in different circumstances might have been in a precarious military situation, felt reasonably secure, despite

her isolation. In the early part of the war, however, events moved rapidly and not exactly to her liking. For they threatened to sweep the whole Balkans into the whirl of war, and no man could tell exactly how the various petty states, under the stress of sympathy, military and naval considerations and dynastic control, would align themselves. With these events came, too, the first participation of France in the war against Turkey in the campaign in the Dardanelles, now to be described.

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## CHAPTER XXXIX

### THE DARDANELLES—STRATEGY OF THE CAMPAIGN

THE beginning of the bombardments in the Dardanelles opens a remarkable chapter in military and naval warfare. The desperate campaign to batter down the fortifications which lead to Constantinople and the disastrous attempt to conquer the most strongly barricaded city in the world, probably excited more world-wide interest or put to the test more theories of warfare than did the Dardanelles campaign undertaken by Great Britain with the assistance of France. It was fiercely attacked by military critics almost from the start. It was, however, a boldly conceived operation, calculated to have a most important effect upon the war as a whole—certainly upon the war in the southeast corner of Europe.

The Dardanelles campaign was largely conceived and controlled by the Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer Churchill, the remarkable and able British Secretary of the Admiralty. He has been widely condemned for his share of the operation, but revelations that have been made would appear to clear him of a great measure of the blame.

What were the considerations that weighed with the British admiralty in deciding to undertake one of the most difficult operations in the whole world? Primarily it seems to have had



the idea of relieving the pressure on Russia. The Turkish offensive in the Caucasus had come to grief about the end of December but a resumption was momentarily expected and feared. Hindenburg's victory at Tannenberg in East Prussia had been a terrible blow to Russia and she had no troops to spare for defense in the Caucasus.

Furthermore, Constantinople, besides being one of the objectives of the war, was Russia's only warm sea gate into Europe. It must have been apparent to the Russian military authorities that the existing supplies of munition and guns of the czar's army would not suffice to withstand a hard German-Austrian drive. In other words the condition that resulted in the defeat of the Russian army in Galicia and Poland in the summer of 1915 were foreseen. Russia called upon England and France to force the Dardanelles. One can find it easy to condemn the operation but few can be found who will deny that it was a glorious failure. One that added luster to the glory of the British army, navy, and many unmatched pages to the story of their bravery. And no less credit and glory did it bring to the Turkish armies.

In addition to the question of war supplies there were other reasons for opening the Dardanelles as soon as possible. Russia's ability to finance a war of the magnitude of the one there being fought, especially where large foreign purchases were made, depended very largely upon the maintenance of foreign commerce. Russia was buying from all the neutral world as well as from her Entente partners. England, for instance, was not only making for her millions of dollars' worth of war supplies, but she was, for the moment, financing many of Russia's purchases abroad.

In return for all this it was important that Russia should export as freely as possible. Now one of her most valuable commodities and one in high demand not only in England, but in other countries, was wheat. Millions upon millions of bushels of Russian wheat were stored in her great Black Sea ports waiting to be shipped through Constantinople when the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were commanded by Entente guns and ships. Greece, under the leadership of Premier Venizelos was hesitating on the brink of a plunge into the struggle as an ally of the En-



## GALLIPOLI

tente and not only agreed to the use of Greek islands but actually considered a proposal to send a Greek force of not less than 20,000 and possibly as many as 40,000 over to the Dardanelles. Bulgaria was in that state where a striking victory in the Turkish peninsula would have swept her off her feet. Italy was at loggerheads with Austria, her ally, and about to break.

Then from the English point of view there was the possible effect upon the Mohammedan throughout the British Empire. Possibly not for many years, if ever, will the world know the truth of the conditions in India during the war. One thing is certain. In one way and another there was much disaffection, much open rebellion and much fear of an even wider spread of revolt. The need for the maintenance and even strengthening of British prestige must have been constantly before the British ruler and no other campaign could possibly serve this end so efficacious as a successful assault upon Constantinople and the temporal power of the sultan. It would clinch probably for generations to come Britain's claim to be the great Mohammedan power of the world and would destroy the one condition that for years before and at that time especially had contained the seeds of rebellion against the British yoke.

In beginning the campaign which Great Britain and France carried on in the Dardanelles there reappeared a very old problem of war—the question of Warships versus Forts or land fortifications. It appears to have been the consensus of opinion among all except the more extreme exponents of battleships that land fortifications would possess an undoubted advantage in a contest against purely naval forces.

This it seems had been the opinion of the American naval authorities in the Spanish-American War, when the American commander, Admiral Sampson, was expressly warned not to risk his ships against the shore defenses of Santiago Harbor. It also appears to have been the opinion of many British admirals who have placed their views on record. Indeed, there was in existence the views of several competent naval authorities as to the possibilities of a purely naval attack upon this very system of defenses.

It was not by any means the first time that an attempt had



been made to force the Dardanelles. Many such attempts had proved this narrow neck of water running between high banks to be one of the great natural defensive spots of the world. The realization of that obvious and oft-proved fact had made Constantinople through the ages one of the most fought for and schemed for cities of the whole world.

It is necessary to study these attempts in order to understand clearly the difficulties which faced the British and French Allies in 1914. Of the previous attacks that had been made to force a way through the Dardanelles and so up to the city of Constantinople, that of the famous Admiral Hornby in 1877 was one of the most interesting as well as one of the most instructive. Ordered by the British Government to take his fleet past the forts that lined the approaching banks, he proceeded to carry out his orders, but wrote a warning in which he pointed out that, while it might be possible for his fleet to make its way into the Sea of Marmora, once there it would be helpless if the land defenses were controlled by the enemy. Out of coal, ammunition, and food, the ships would be at the mercy of the Turks. "Although the forts might not prevent a strong fleet passing through the Dardanelles, they certainly," wrote Admiral Hornby, "could sink armed and unarmed transports and supply ships." In view of these considerations, Hornby urged the British Government to provide a land force of sufficient strength to carry and hold the land defenses. His superiors, however, did not agree with him, for they told him to go ahead with a purely naval operation. His ideas were never put to a real test because the Turks offered no resistance to his passage of the straits.

The situation in the Great War of 1914 presented Constantinople as the same perplexing military problem. If we go back another three-quarters of a century to 1807, the experience of Admiral Duckworth throws some light on the subject, although conditions had changed radically. Duckworth, with his sailing ships, ran past the forts in the Dardanelles and anchored in front of Constantinople. It was hoped that a threat of bombardment would bring the Turks to their knees, but the latter refused to be intimidated. In the end, the British admiral ran out of food and

water and was compelled to leave without accomplishing anything.

The student of the War of 1914 also must consider that during the war between Italy and Turkey, the Italian General Staff is known to have worked out an elaborate plan for an attack upon the Dardanelles. However, at the critical moment, the European powers interfered and forced upon Italy an agreement that the war should not be extended to the mainland of Europe. In the Balkan War, the Bulgarians threatened the lines of Bulair, the narrow neck which connects the Gallipoli peninsula to the mainland, but never launched the attack.

When in 1914 the British and French determined to press a purely naval attack upon the Dardanelles, they appear to have been influenced by two major considerations. At the time there was not ready a sufficient number of troops to make a land campaign successful and, at the last moment, King Constantine of Greece repudiated a personal agreement made by Venizelos, the Greek Premier, with the Allies by which Greece was to provide at least 20,000 troops to assist the France-British fleet. Even after the fall of Venizelos it was still determined to push the naval attack because of the second consideration. In the opinion of the British admiralty the full power of modern naval guns of 11- and 12-inch had never been tested and in their opinion they would suffice to reduce the Dardanelles defenses in a comparatively short time. Furthermore, the British authorities appear to have relied largely upon the new 15-inch guns of the *Queen Elizabeth* and her sister vessels, then nearing completion in British yards. So tremendous was the power of these new guns and so great their range that it was believed the *Queen Elizabeth* and her sister ships could stand miles out of range of the heaviest of the Dardanelles guns and quickly smash them to an unrecognizable mass of ruins.

It was evident that the British naval command held these views even in spite of the experience of British warships off the coast of Belgium earlier in the war. For a while in 1914 British monitors and battleships bombarded almost at will the German troops posted along the coast running from the Dutch frontier

line almost to Nieuport. Finally, however, the Germans brought up heavy army and naval guns and, mounting them in concealed spots among the sand dunes, soon drove off the British naval force.

But Turkish guns were not German guns, Turkish gunners were not German gunners, and above all, the munition supply of the Turkish army was not fed by factories able to turn out a quarter of a million shells a day. Some such considerations as these appear to have convinced the British higher command that there was a difference in the two tasks.

The command of the Dardanelles forts at the entrance to Constantinople and the Black Sea is similar, except that it is perhaps more sure as to the command of the entrance to the Baltic by Copenhagen, the Mediterranean by Gibraltar, and, in a lesser degree, of the North Sea by Dover.

The narrow passage of water called the Dardanelles separates the peninsula of Gallipoli and the Asiatic shore of Turkey. It connects the *Ægean* Sea and the Sea of Marmora, which in turn, through the Bosphorus, connects with the Black Sea. Curiously enough this tremendously important waterway, the only warm sea outlet of Russia, had been closed against that country by the action of the very powers now fighting desperately to smash it open. The Black Sea was a Turkish lake in the seventeenth century but in the century following the growth of Russia in that part of Europe made the question of the control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles one of supreme importance to her. Thus we find, in the so-called "will" of Peter the Great, among other injunctions he lays upon his successors, an admonition never to rest until Constantinople had been wrested from the Turk. But whether this "will" is authentic or not, Russian policy has steadily kept that object in view.

The Crimean War was an attempt by France and England to stem the almost resistless tide of Russian expanse toward the southwest. Russian control of Constantinople was regarded as the chief danger that threatened the western powers and, in 1856, by the Treaty of Paris, not only was the strength of the Russian Black Sea fleet expressly limited, but the Dardanelles were closed



against the passage of Russia's warships into the Mediterranean. France and England revived what they called "an ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for ships of war of foreign powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus."

Turkey was of no mind to leave the enforcement of this "ancient rule" to the powers. She began the construction of more elaborate fortifications commanding both the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. German advice, especially after the Franco-Prussian War, was asked and obtained and Krupp sent some of his gigantic pieces for the defense of the narrow waters. This German cooperation with the Turks in the strengthening of those positions through all the years that have intervened is significant.

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## CHAPTER XL

### FORTIFICATIONS AND STRENGTH— FIRST MOVEMENTS

LET us inspect the fortifications in the Dardanelles at the beginning of the war in 1914. The Dardanelles, from end to end, have a length of forty-seven miles. From the town of Gallipoli to the Ægean, however, the full distance of the narrow section of the waterway, is a matter of thirty-three miles. At one point the passage is less than 1,400 yards wide and at no point is it more than 7,000. Although there is a good depth in much of the channel, shallows are to be met with in most unexpected places. To make navigation even more difficult, there is a swift and powerful surface current running through the Narrows, on some occasions at a speed of eight knots an hour. In addition there is not only a strong undercurrent, but, as well, many cross currents. At certain seasons of the year the wind and weather make navigation of large vessels almost impossible.

Both sides of the Dardanelles offered natural positions of enormous advantage to a defending force. On the Gallipoli side were

a tangled mass of rocks and hills, almost devoid of vegetation except for stubby yellow bushes. In a few of the little valleys, stray clusters of olive trees relieved the monotony of the view. Heights rose upon heights and along the shores of the peninsula nearly perpendicular cliffs made landings almost out of the question.

This whole peninsula was a difficult country to traverse even in times of peace. No large maps existed of its intricate paths, there were few roads, and those that did exist were so commanded by heights and concealed positions for guns and infantry that the progress of an attacking force would inevitably be most difficult and costly.

Water was almost nonexistent. Most of the available supply was so protected that an attacking force would in no case be able to use it until its task of conquest was complete. As such a force advanced inland, these difficulties as well as those of the country would constantly and rapidly increase. From Cape Helles, at the tip of the peninsula where a sandy beach made a landing possible, if difficult, the ground rapidly rose to a height of 140 feet. Hill country then led to ridges standing 600 feet, while a mile and a half beyond stood 600 feet in the air the commanding peak of Achi Baba, destined to play so large and so tragic a part in the struggle for the peninsula of Gallipoli. At the narrowest part of the Narrows, the real key position to the straits, stood the Kilid Bahr plateau, 700 feet, while to the northwest, almost 300 feet higher, stood the precipitous eminence of Sari Bair, a dense mass of trackless ravines and thickets.

Where the peninsula of Gallipoli joined the mainland is, comparatively speaking, a narrow neck of land. Even this, however, presented tremendous potential difficulties to any force. A hill almost 500 feet in height rose in the center and marshed on either side prevented a turning movement. Furthermore, the difficulties of landing a force in the face of an enemy strongly intrenched on the heights were not lessened by the circumstance that the cliffs rose to a height of 300 feet, almost straight from the water's edge. In short nature seems to have designed the country in every way as a protection against an armed force seeking to

force its way either in or out of the Black Sea. To just what extent these natural advantages had been utilized by the Turks it is impossible to say. It is not likely, however, that they, or their German mentors, had been idle, in view of the importance the Allies were known to attach to the straits.

In September, 1914, and probably for some time before, the Turks were known to be busy strengthening the forts. Subsequent events led to the conclusion that they, or their German advisers, were alive to the lessons of the early days of the war in France and Belgium and had made elaborate arrangements for the placing of heavy guns in concealed positions. In addition they perfected the mobility of even the heaviest of pieces, so that it became impossible for observation from the Franco-British ships or from aeroplanes to locate them with any certitude.

The Turks also seem to have secured a plentiful supply of sea mines, with which the waters approaching the Dardanelles and the actual passage of the straits were strewn along the shores. Toward the Narrows were constructed shore batteries for the launching of torpedoes, as well as for the launching of floating mines. The strong current of the straits could be depended upon to carry these latter engines of destruction among the allied ships of war should they venture within the narrow, confined waters of the Dardanelles.

This was the condition of affairs, then, on November 3, 1914, when a joint Anglo-French squadron sailed in close to the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula and opened a bombardment of the outer defenses of the Dardanelles. For this and subsequent naval operations against the Turkish position, England was able to detach from her main theatre of naval activity—the North Sea—a considerable number of old, but still extremely powerful, battleships and battle cruisers. These boats, with the exception of the *Queen Elizabeth*, which later appeared on the scene, were all built previous to the introduction of the dreadnought and were to a considerable extent made obsolete by that vessel. At any rate they could not engage the more modern ships of the German navy and could not be attached to the grand fleet of England because of



their lack of high speed and the heaviest of guns. For these reasons, although their loss in any engagement against the Turkish defenses would not be relished by the British authorities, still such a disaster would not be decisive in any war. As Winston Churchill subsequently pointed out, many of them would have, in the ordinary course of events, but a few more years of life in the British navy, so rapidly were modern battleships deteriorating under the rapid advance of naval science.

At the entrance to the straits the Turks had erected two major positions and several minor ones. On the Asiatic shore stood the Kum Kale Fort, known as the "New Castle of Asia." There the main battery consisted of four 10.2-inch guns. A short distance down the coast stood Yeni Shehr, where a main battery of two 9.2-inch guns and a short battery of smaller pieces had been erected. On the European side, opposite Kum Kale, stood Sedd-el-Bahr, with six 10-inch and two 5.9-inch guns. At Cape Hellas, the extreme point of the Gallipoli Peninsula, was the Erteghrul Battery, mounting two 9.2-inch guns and some minor pieces.

Each of the attacking warships fired about a score of shells at these forts and an attempt was made to determine just how much damage had been done. None of the forts were silenced, however, and it was finally decided by the commander of the Anglo-French naval force, Vice Admiral Cardén, that conditions were not propitious for pushing home the attack and the vessels retired out to sea, where they maintained a tight blockade of the Dardanelles. Then there followed a long period of naval inactivity, at least so far as the larger vessels were concerned.

About a month later, however, on December 13, 1914, the commander of a British submarine accomplished a feat in the Sea of Marmora that not only aroused his countrymen to enthusiasm but as well won for him the coveted Victoria Cross, the first instance of the winning of that decoration by a naval officer since the beginning of the war.

Lieutenant Holbrook was in command of the *B-11*, a 316-ton submarine launched as far back as 1906. It was in no sense to be compared to the giant underwater crafts that were being

launched and used at the outbreak of the war, some of them measuring 800 feet. The *B-11* carried only sixteen men in all—two officers and fourteen men.

Early in the morning of December 13, 1914, she started through the straits. Evidently her commander had knowledge of the disposition of the Turkish mine field, for Lieutenant Holbrook successfully navigated his ship through it, dived under five rows of mines, any one of which would have blown his frail craft into a thousand pieces, and came up under the side of the Turkish battleship *Messudiyeh*. The *Messudiyeh*, in any other navy, would have been retired long before, but Turkey had none too many ships and probably had been saving her to fight against the equally ancient vessels of some other minor power. Launched as far back as 1874, she had been reconstructed and rearmed in 1901. She was lying in the Sea of Marmora, guarding the very mine field under which Holbrook had dived his craft.

Holbrook observed the *Messudiyeh* through the periscope of the *B-11*, maneuvered for position, dived, came up again and launched his torpedo. It struck home and the ancient sides of the *Messudiyeh* gaped wide. Slowly she sank while Holbrook dived to safety. For nine and a half hours the latter felt his way out of the straits and when he returned to the fleet his little vessel and its daring crew received an enthusiastic demonstration from the soldiers of the larger warships. Besides the Victoria Cross, received by Holbrook himself, his second in command, Lieutenant Sydney T. Winn, received the Distinguished Service Order, and each of the fourteen members of the crew received the Distinguished Service Medal.

On the next day, December 14, 1914, the British submarine *B-9* attempted to repeat the feat, but the Turks were prepared. When she came to the surface mines were exploded all around her, and she had all she could do to make good her escape.

On January 15, 1915, not content that the British should have all the danger, or the glory, the French submarine, *Saphir*, entered the straits. Near Nagara Point she struck the bottom in one of those shallow spots that abound in the Dardanelles, was

compelled to come to the surface in a disabled condition and was quickly shot to pieces by the Turkish shore batteries.

The movement against the forts in the Dardanelles was now begun. The forementioned events were but the preliminaries. To understand them thoroughly it is necessary also to follow the preceding chapters on Naval Operations. The great story of the Dardanelles develops, however, in the narrative in Volume III of this work.



## PART V—JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST

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### CHAPTER XLI

#### WHY JAPAN JOINED THE ALLIES

THE battle lines of the Great War on land and sea were now beginning to encircle the earth. While the gigantic armies on the battle grounds of Europe were engaged in the greatest test of "the survival of the fittest" that the world had ever witnessed, while the sharp encounters on the seas were carrying the war around the globe, the outbreaks in the Far East were bringing the Orient and the Occident—the two competitive systems of civilization—into a strange alignment. The Moslem world was dividing against itself as had the Christian world. The followers of Buddha and the Brahmins were in direct conflict.

It is important, therefore, to consider in this chapter the development of events in the Far East, which have been only outlined in the preceding narratives. Of all the powers that joined the coalition against Germany in August, 1914, none could state a clearer cause of action than Japan. From the first outbreak of hostilities there was never any question of whether the "England of the East" would enter the war, and on which side she would be aligned. Japan decided promptly, and, having decided, acted with characteristic energy.

For a *casus belli* the Japanese statesmen had only to hold up to the eyes of the world the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had been signed on August 12, 1905. The object of this agreement was the maintenance of the general peace in eastern Asia and India, the preservation of the common interests of all powers in China, by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese

Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China, the maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting parties in the regions of eastern Asia and of India, and the defense of their special interests in the said regions. If these rights and interests were jeopardized, Japan and Great Britain agreed to discuss fully and frankly what measures should be pursued for defense, and to act in common in case of unprovoked attack or aggressive action wherever arising on the part of any other power or powers.

Thus, in those critical days of August, 1914, one of the first acts of the British Government, when war was declared on Germany, and the empire was reaching out for every possible means of defense and aggression, was to ask Japan for assistance under the terms of this alliance. And Japan did not hesitate—she threw herself vigorously into the Great War. The Japanese Emperor in his declaration of war against Germany did not suggest that Japan acted in response to her ally's direct request for assistance, but the Japanese Foreign Minister, Baron Kato, in his speech explaining the situation to the Diet, laid emphasis upon the treaty as the most important factor in the situation.

"German warships and armed vessels," said the foreign minister, "are prowling around the seas of eastern Asia, menacing our commerce and that of our ally, while Kiao-chau was carrying out operations apparently for the purpose of constituting a base for warlike operations in eastern Asia. Grave anxiety was thus felt for the maintenance of peace in the Far East.

"As all are aware," he continued, "the agreement and alliance between Japan and Great Britain has for its object the consolidation and maintenance of general peace in eastern Asia, and the maintenance of the independence and integrity of China, as well as the principle of equal opportunities for commerce and industry for all nations in that country, and the maintenance and defense respectively of territorial rights and special interests of contracting parties in eastern Asia. Therefore, inasmuch as we are asked by our ally for assistance at a time when commerce in eastern Asia, which Japan and Great Britain regard alike as one of their special interests, is subjected to a constant menace,

Japan, who regards that alliance as a guiding principle of her foreign policy, could not but comply to the respect to do her part."

The Japanese statesman offered this explanation to his people: "Germany's possession of a base for powerful activities in one corner of the Far East was not only a serious obstacle to the maintenance of a permanent peace, but also threatened the immediate interests of the Japanese Empire. The Japanese Government, therefore, resolved to comply with the British request, and, if necessary, to open hostilities against Germany."

Baron Kato's speech was delivered after Japan had declared war. The Western world, when it found time to turn its attention from the absorbing drama already being enacted in Belgium to the minor crisis in the Far East, was not left long in doubt regarding the intentions of Great Britain's ally. War was declared on August 24, 1914, nine days after Japan had dispatched to Germany an ultimatum, which Germany scornfully ignored.

The text of the ultimatum was as follows: "We consider it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbance of peace in the Far East, and to safeguard general interests as contemplated in the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great Britain.

"In order to secure firm and enduring peace in eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the agreement, the Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to give advice to the German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

"(1) To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters the German warships and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm those which cannot be withdrawn.

"(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.

"The Japanese Government announces at the same time that in the event of its not receiving by noon on August 23, 1914, an answer from the German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Japanese Govern-





## KIAO-CHAU (TSING-TAU)

ment, Japan will be compelled to take such action as it may deem necessary to meet the situation."

The intervention of Japan in the war, welcome as it was to Great Britain, created special problems for that empire. The British in China, and the people of Australia, New Zealand, and western North America had long been uneasy regarding the commercial and political policy of Japan. On the Pacific Coast of the United States and Canada a strong anti-Japanese sentiment had developed. British statesmen were apprehensive lest the entry of Japan into the war might be used to alienate American sympathy from the Allies and diminish the zeal of the Canadian and Australasian colonies for the war.

To meet this situation, the British Government issued a formal statement which said: "It is understood that the action of Japan shall not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Sea, except in so far as it may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific, nor beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, nor to any foreign territory except territory in German occupation on the continent of eastern Asia." This declaration went far toward allaying uneasiness, especially in the United States.

The Japanese people accepted the situation calmly. There were few noisy demonstrations. Germans living in Japan were not molested, notwithstanding the action of Germany, which immediately after the ultimatum was issued arrested every Japanese subject in Germany and seized funds of the Japanese Government deposited in the Deutsche Bank of Berlin. In Tokyo the chief of police told the people that although the two Governments had entered into hostilities, the people individually were not to cultivate hostility. The German Ambassador remained at the Japanese capital until August 30, 1914. A number of Germans who decided to stay in Japan were allowed to continue their regular occupations.

When no answer came from Germany up to the time of the expiration of Japan's ultimatum, the imperial rescript declaring the existence of a state of war was issued next day.

The emperor said: "We hereby declare war against Germany

and we command our army and navy to carry on hostilities against that empire with all their strength, and we also command all our competent authorities to make every effort in pursuance of their respective duties to attain the national aim within the limit of the law of nations.

“Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous effect of which we view with grave concern, we, on our part, have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, our ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiao-chau, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while her armed vessels, cruising the seas of eastern Asia, are threatening our commerce and that of our ally. The peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.

“Accordingly, our Government and that of his Britannic Majesty, after a full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests contemplated in the agreement of alliance, and we on our part, being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means, commanded our Government to offer, with sincerity, an advice to the Imperial German Government. By the last day appointed for the purpose, however, our Government failed to receive an answer accepting their advice.

“It is with profound regret that we, in spite of our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of our reign, and while we are still in mourning for our lamented mother.

“It is our earnest wish that, by the loyalty and valor of our faithful subjects, peace may soon be restored and the glory of the empire enhanced.”



## CHAPTER XLII

MILITARY AND NAVAL SITUATION  
IN THE FAR EAST

WE now pass to the first fighting ground in the Far East. Unlike the campaigns in the west, the war in eastern Asia developed along lines which any observer, possessing the least knowledge of history and international politics and military strategy, could foresee. From both military and commercial standpoints none of Germany's possessions in the Far East could compare in importance with the little tip of the Shantung Peninsula leased for a term of ninety-nine years from China in 1898. This concession, about fifteen miles long and ten miles across, was designated Kiao-chau. In the sixteen years since their tenure began, the Germans had laid out at Tsing-tau, situated at the extreme southern end of the peninsula, a city which was rapidly growing to foremost importance among the ports of the Chinese coast. A large part of the native population was induced to migrate, hills were leveled, roads constructed, trees planted, and waterworks and sewers laid out along the most up-to-date lines.

The Great War found Tsing-tau a modern city, almost European in appearance, with a magnificent harbor, where natural advantages had been enhanced by the construction of immense piers and breakwaters. One line of railway connected the port with Chi-nan, capital of Shantung Province, and Germany held concessions for the construction of two new lines. The census of 1913 showed a total population of 58,000, of which Germans, exclusive of the garrison, numbered 2,500. Non-German Europeans, Americans, and Japanese numbered but 630. The European quarter was distinctly Teutonic.

The attack on Tsing-tau was a foregone conclusion. As a naval base and a seat of menace to the commerce of hostile nations, Tsing-tau occupied an unexcelled situation, almost equidistant from Nagasaki and Shanghai, in virtually the same latitude as

Tokyo, San Francisco, and Gibraltar. Its defenses were second in strength only to those of Port Arthur and Hongkong.

Kiao-chau was under the administration of the German admiralty. The German fleet seized it in 1897 ostensibly to secure reparation for the murder of two German missionaries in Shantung. The ninety-nine-year lease subsequently arranged gave Germany the right to fortify the new concession, and the thoroughness with which this privilege was exercised was proved by the stout resistance the garrison was able to make against far superior forces of besiegers. The whole concession occupied 117 square miles.

Although Kiao-chau was the kaiser's only continental colony in Asia the outbreak of the war found Germany in possession of several islands and groups of islands in the Pacific. These included German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Caroline, Pelew Marrana, Solomon and Marshall Islands and a portion of the Samoan group. But the strongly fortified port on the Shantung Peninsula was the naval base for the protection of all these ocean possessions; and the Japanese statesmen rightly concluded that with Tsing-tau in their grasp the reduction of the other German colonies would be only a formal task of seizure. Therefore the 27th of August, 1914, four days after the declaration of war, saw a Japanese fleet blockading Tsing-tau and Japanese transports carrying troops for landing expeditions in cooperation with the warships.

Germany began the concentration of all available forces inside the Tsing-tau fortifications on August 8, 1914. But she was able to gather there when the siege began only 5,000 men, a handful compared with the great force Japan could muster for the reduction of the fortress. The garrison of peace times was augmented by reservists, who came from treaty ports along the Chinese coast, from Japan, Siberia, and from every part of the Far East near enough to enable German veterans to reach the city before communication was cut off.

The crew of the Austrian cruiser *Kaiserin Elizabeth*, more than 300 men, who had left Tsing-tau by railroad before Austria decided to join her ally in the Far East as well as in Europe,

hurried back in small groups and in civilian clothes to escape detection. Squads of the Landsturm, the last reserve, middle-aged men who had left their families and their business in all parts of China joined the ranks and went to drilling in preparation for the hard fighting expected as soon as the invading fleet passed the outer defenses of the harbor. Altogether the defenders mustered three artillery and infantry regiments and four troops of cavalry. They had three aeroplanes and a few machine guns and in the harbor were four small gunboats in addition to the *Kaiserin Elizabeth*.

Tsing-tau's principal points of defense were Mount Moltke, Mount Bismarck and Mount Iltis. The rugged slopes of these positions commanded the plain. Beyond the plain the important outer line of defense was along the Litsum River, which flows into Kiao-chau Bay and then through the mountains to the sea, a line about eight miles long and about ten miles distant from the city. Preparations to oppose a landing of hostile troops were made at points along the coast of the leased territory for a distance of twenty miles. At the entrance of the bay shore batteries and mines made a bombardment by the Japanese fleet impracticable, except with the support of land forces.

The first line of defense comprised five forts connected by trenches and barbed wire entanglements. The shore defenses consisted of five forts, called respectively: "The Kaiser's," armed with two large guns mounted upon unsheltered platforms and two cannon of medium caliber sheltered; "August Point," a square closed fort with unsheltered gun platforms, and two guns of large medium caliber; "Taisichen," unsheltered with four large cannon; "Kaiser Northeast," unsheltered four cannon; "Yunuisan Point," two cannon of medium caliber. The main line of defense was for both land and sea work; "Fort Moltke" at the base of the German left wing had a shelter trench and guns of medium caliber; "Fort Bismarck" had three heavy gun platforms in addition to a platform for rapid fire guns of large caliber. From this the guns could be turned in any direction. "Fort Iltis" mounted four heavy guns of large and medium



caliber besides mitrailleuse of large size. Two heavy guns were mounted in the summit of Mount Iltis.

In command of the German forces was the Governor General of Kiaochow, Admiral Meyer-Waldeck, a naval officer of experience and reputation. The defenses of both land and sea were under his control.

This entrance of Japan into the war introduced a factor fraught with unknown possibilities. Unlike the other enemies of the Teutonic alliance, Japan had nothing to fear for her home territory or her possessions. Secure from attack, she was able to devote all her energies to the task of driving the Germans out of the Far East. By this accomplishment she not only fulfilled the terms of her alliance with Great Britain, but strengthened her own supremacy in that quarter of the globe.

Tsingtau, since its occupation by the Germans, had been like a mailed fist brandished in her face. Since Japan's victory over Russia no other European power had occupied a position on the Asiatic coast that offered a threat comparable to this German stronghold. Also, it was only human that the Japanese remembered how Germany compelled them to abandon many of their fruits of victory in their last war with China.

The unknown factor of her participation was just how far Japan would go in aiding her new allies. The military and naval potentialities of the Island Kingdom when the war started were greater than ever before. She was twice as strong as when she went to war with Russia. Her navy was sufficiently formidable to resist, in home waters at least, that of any other power except England. Her army, twice-proved during recent years against the soldiers of Russia and China, was steadily increasing its size and equipment. Her predominant position in the Far East was absolutely assured.

The Japanese army, based to a certain extent upon the German model, numbered at the outbreak of the war somewhat over 250,000 men of all ranks. This was its peace strength. Military service was obligatory upon all able-bodied males between the ages of seventeen and forty. This law made available each year 550,000 men, but in practice during times of peace the annual

conscription amounted to only 120,000 men taken by ballot from among the number eligible. The total effective military strength of the Empire was estimated at a million and a half trained soldiers.

The army was divided into nineteen divisions, four independent cavalry brigades, three independent field artillery brigades, six regiments of heavy field artillery and a communication brigade. Each divisional unit consisted of two infantry brigades of six battalions each, a cavalry regiment (three squadrons of 120 men each), a field artillery regiment (six batteries of six guns), and a battalion of army service corps. A battalion of mountain guns was attached to certain divisions. Thus the army on a peace footing consisted of seventy-six infantry regiments (228 battalions), twenty-seven regiments of cavalry, 150 field batteries, nine mountain batteries, nineteen battalions of garrison artillery and nineteen battalions of engineers. When the reserves were summoned to the colors the Japanese system provided for an indefinite increase in the number of battalions for each regiment.

The Japanese navy had weathered a storm which at one time threatened to interfere seriously with its steady growth, and the year 1914 found it at a formidable climax of strength and efficiency. The war with Russia had left the nation on the verge of bankruptcy and the annual budgets from 1907 to 1910 contained no appropriations for naval increases. The lull in naval construction, however, was of short duration. The wisest statesmen realized, from the time when Japan first emerged from her Oriental seclusion and eagerly set out to learn the lessons of western civilization, that their country's insular situation made a strong navy the first requisite of national independence. It was the warships of the western world that forced the Japanese to open their door to the foreigner. Fifteen years after the Japanese had seen the foreign men-of-war riding dominant in their harbors, their antiquated collection of war junks had been replaced by an up-to-date navy, manned and officered by sea fighters trained upon the best western models. In 1910 the Japanese began to compare their naval equipment with that

of Germany, and from that time their shipbuilding program was designed to make them secure against the chance of German aggression, ever present since the leasing of Kiao-chau.

At the outbreak of the Great War the Japanese navy had nearly doubled its strength since the close of the war with Russia. It included two battleships of the dreadnought class, the *Kawachi* and the *Settsu*, both over 21,000 tons, with a speed of twenty knots, two dreadnought battle cruisers of 27,500 tons each and a speed of twenty-seven knots, the *Kongo* and the *Hiyei*; two semi-dreadnought battleships, the *Aki* and *Satsuma*, between 19,000 and 20,000 tons each and a speed of twenty and eighteen and a quarter knots, respectively; four first-class battle cruisers with speeds ranging from twenty to twenty-three knots and averaging 14,000 tons; six battleships of slightly heavier displacement and slightly less speed; six first-class coast defense ships, averaging 13,000 tons and seventeen and a half knots; nine first-class cruisers ranging from 7,300 to 9,800 tons and twenty to twenty-one knots; thirteen second-class cruisers, some of which had a speed of twenty-six knots; seven second-class coast defense ships; nine gunboats, two first-class destroyers capable of thirty-five knots an hour; two second-class destroyers with a speed of thirty-three knots; and forty-six other destroyers of varying speeds; thirty-one torpedo boats and thirteen submarines, besides auxiliary craft, hospital ships, dispatch boats, etc.

Although the Japanese air fleet gave a good account of itself during the operations before Tsing-tau it developed no surprises, and accomplished no exploits to confirm rumors prevailing before the war that in Japan naval aviation had reached a special and advanced stage. The Japanese Flying Corps conducted itself upon lines made familiar by the British, German and French aviators in Europe.



## CHAPTER XLIII

BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES—ATTACKS  
ON TSING-TAU FORTS

HAVING reviewed the military and naval situation in the Far East at the outbreak of war, we come now to the beginning of actual belligerent operations.

Japan's declaration of war against Germany was dated August 23, 1914. The morning of the preceding day witnessed the departure from Japanese war ports of the greatest fleet of warships and transports the Empire had sent to sea since the Russian War. It comprised the Second Squadron, embracing battleships, cruisers, destroyers and hydro-aeroplanes, a dozen in all. The transports carried land forces numbering 22,980 officers and men and 142 guns to be put ashore as soon as the landing forces had ground for their advantageous location.

The Japanese troops included the Eighteenth Division, under Lieutenant General Mitsuomi Kamio, who was Commander in Chief of the expedition; the Twenty-third Brigade of Infantry (Major General B. Horiuchi); the Twenty-fourth Brigade of Infantry, commanded by Major General Hanzo Yamanashi, Chief of Staff, and other divisional troops. The Twenty-ninth Brigade of Infantry (Major General G. Joholi). Siege Artillery Corps (Major General Y. Watanebe), the Miyama Heavy Artillery Regiment, the Yokosuka Heavy Artillery Regiment, the Shimonosoki Heavy Artillery Battalion, and the Tadanoumi Heavy Artillery Battalion. Detachments of Engineers and Army Service Corps from the Sixth and Twelfth Divisions. Two Railway Battalions. Railway Guard Troops, the Eighth Infantry Regiment. Detachment of the Flying Corps. Marine Artillery Detachment. Being intended for siege work this army carried no cavalry, horse artillery or light field artillery.

In command of the fleet was Vice Admiral Hikonojo Kamimura, whose reputation as one of Japan's war idols was established when his squadron had defeated three Russian war-

ships, the *Rurik*, *Gromoboi* and *Rossia*, off the east coast of Korea. Later his squadron had taken a commanding part in the great battle in the Japan Sea, which put an end to Russia's naval power in the East. Admiral Kamimura was sixty-five years old, and had spent the greater part of his life in naval service. After the final Russian defeat he was rewarded with the title of Baron and invested with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun and the first-class of the Golden Kite.

On September 23, 1914, the Japanese were joined by a British force of 1,369 men under command of Lieutenant Colonel Nathaniel Walter Barnardiston, commander of the British forces in North China, including Wei-hai-wei. Although the British did not arrive until a month after the forces sailed from Japan, the distance that separated Laoshan Bay, where the former made their landing on the original leased territory and thus avoided the breach of neutrality against China committed by the Japanese, was so much shorter and the landing place presented so much less difficulty than the Japanese encountered in their preliminary advance, that the British really arrived on the scene of actual operations just as the Japanese were finishing their first engagements in force, on September 28, 1914.

Colonel Barnardiston's command consisted of 910 noncommissioned officers and men of the Second Battalion South Wales Borderers, and 450 non-commissioned officers and men of the Thirty-sixth Sikhs, besides nine staff officers.

The bombardment of the Tsing-tau forts began on August 26, 1914, and on September 1, 1914, the Japanese bluejackets seized several small islands in Kiao-chau Bay, which the Germans were unable to defend except by long range fire from their shore batteries, and by mines with which the harbor had been thickly sown. Mine sweeping therefore occupied the first activities of the fleet. This operation was signalized by one of the many acts of patriotism and bravery that characterized the siege on both sides. One hundred Japanese women who made their living by diving for pearls in these waters offered to enter the water and release the mines from their moorings so that they would be carried away by the tides. Their courageous offer

was declined, not because the Japanese admiral believed it could not be carried out, but because the Japanese law expressly prohibited the employment of women in warlike operations. When one of the small boats that acted as mine sweepers was blown up during the dragging that followed the women renewed their offer, but again it was declined.

The first landing on the Shan-tung Peninsula was made September 2, 1914. Ten thousand troops were put ashore; but it was not until September 25, 1914, that the invaders made their first capture of a German outpost, Weihsien. The check on the Japanese advance, however, was due less to the defenders of Tsing-tau than to the torrential rains, which swelled the streams and for a time effectively barred further movements. The Japanese artillery was compelled to return to Lung-chow, their original base on the mainland.

The Japanese leaders proceeded with deliberation and caution. They had the enemy penned up with no hope of reenforcement, and nothing was to be gained by haste or the unnecessary waste of men and equipment. On September 19, 1914, to facilitate the movement of their troops behind the beleaguered city, they seized the railway connecting Tsing-tau with the Chinese province of Shantung, and China, prompted by Berlin, protested against the act as a violation of neutrality. This was the second Chinese protest, the first having been sent to Tokyo after the Japanese made their first landing on Chinese territory at Lung-chow. To the former objection Japan had no answer except to set forth that the landing was a military necessity and made with no intention of permanent occupancy. To the second protest, however, she replied without hesitation that possession of the railway line was justified since it was owned by Germans. The wide area covered by the Japanese investment campaign is shown by the fact that by September 13, 1914, they had established guards at the railway station of Kiao-chau—a town having the same name as the whole German concession—twenty-two miles distant from Tsing-tau.

While the Japanese infantry and engineers waited for the floods the naval airmen were not idle. The first damage inside



the city was inflicted by two seaplanes which dropped bombs upon the railway station and barracks. Although one of the planes was hit several times by the German guns, both made a safe return. This raid was the forerunner of a systematic air campaign, designed as much to strike terror and discouragement into the hearts of the garrison and the civil population as to gain any military end by the actual destruction of defense works. Bombs were dropped also upon ships in the harbor. Occasionally the Japanese flyers scattered circulars calling upon the defenders to surrender and pointing out the uselessness of further resistance.

The first serious losses on either side were naval. On August 28, 1914, two days after the first bombardment a typhoon swept the Japanese fleet, causing havoc among the little destroyers and sending one to the bottom. Five days later another destroyer ran aground in Kiao-chau Bay. A German merchant ship in the harbor was set afire by the Japanese aerial bombs and destroyed. The greatest naval losses suffered during the whole engagement were the destruction of the Austrian cruiser *Kaiserin Elizabeth* and of the Japanese cruiser *Takachiho*. The *Kaiserin Elizabeth* was sunk by the naval bombardment; but the loss of the *Takachiho* was due to the German torpedo boat *S-90*.

It was September 26, 1914, before the floods subsided sufficiently to permit the Japanese to resume their advance. On that day they drove the Germans from the high ground between the rivers Pai-sha and Li-tsun, and next day they pushed forward to a point seven miles northeast of Tsing-tau, between the Li-tsun and the Chang-tsun. The following morning found them established within five miles of the fortress. Their casualties were reported as three killed and twelve wounded.

These two days saw the heaviest fighting thus far during the siege. While the land forces were pushing up to the main German forts the fleet carried on a general bombardment, having by this time moved in close enough to make gun fire effective and having learned the range. The Japanese warships were assisted by the British battleship *Triumph*, which had joined them a short time before with the British destroyer *Usk*. These British

boats remained throughout the investment, the *Triumph* was a favorite mark for the German gunners, but escaped with comparatively slight damage.

By September 30, 1914, the Germans were driven in from their outer fortifications and Tsing-tau itself was completely surrounded. On that day the defenders made a desperate attempt to regain some of their lost positions, but they were repulsed, and the Japanese settled back for a few days to await the bringing up of their heavy siege guns.

It is said that the failure of this assault, in which the Germans apparently concentrated all their resources, convinced General Kamio that the capture of the city would not prove the long, arduous task that had been expected, and he abandoned forthwith his plans for a long, slow siege and made preparations to take the place by assault. At the same time the Japanese commander showed no disposition to sacrifice his men unnecessarily, and while waiting for their big guns the Japanese worked like beavers with pick and shovel protecting their positions and digging saps and zigzag trenches up to the very face of the German defenses. They labored under a storm of shells but so little exposed that losses under the bombardment were small compared with the casualties of the actual assault operations.

For eight days the Germans poured projectiles into the enemy's works; but for the most part their shooting was a waste of ammunition. Just why the defenders of Tsing-tau were so prodigal of ammunition at this time never has been satisfactorily explained. Military correspondents estimated that during one period of twenty-four hours the forts on the three hills containing the main defensive positions fired more than 2,000 shells without inflicting any loss whatever.

But by October 8, 1914, the German fire slackened perceptibly. They had found that they were wasting their resources and that several positions were almost out of ammunition. The warfare of that period is described in a letter written by an officer with the British expeditionary force:

"That night," he said, "we were working in trenches along a river bed at the bottom of the slope, where the others had been

wounded, and *sans doute* most darnation close to the enemy. A beginning had been made on this trench the night before, so there was a little cover. The two redoubts were about 800 yards on our right and left respectively, the enemy's trenches about 350 yards to our front.

"Well, for the first hour after getting down we were left severely alone. Then they started throwing star rockets and sort of Roman candle things which lit up the place like day, and at the same time they peppered us with Maxims, pompoms, and rifle fire from all three places. We had some men hit further back in the communication trench, but funnily enough none in the forward line. . . . We were entertained by a certain amount of shell fire during the rest of the night. Next night we were due to leave for the forward trenches at dusk to carry on, having had our usual entertainment in the afternoon from the Germans, when suddenly they began throwing shrapnel at our trench. For about half an hour it was all over us, and I'm blest if I know why nobody was hit. It was the overhead cover, I fancy, that saved us this time. We came out like a lot of rabbits when it was over and proceeded to get down below.

"The Japanese artillery was supporting us that night, as we were working on the enemy's side of the river, within 200 yards of their advance trenches. Never have I felt a more comforting sensation then when watching those Japanese shells bursting just over our heads, a little in advance, the shrapnel from them going slap into the Germans every time. I must say it was a magnificent sight when the Japanese guns were going, the German rockets, etc., and their machine guns and rifles joining in when they could get their heads up. One had to shout to make oneself heard, and those who saw it from the top of Heinrich Hill in rear said it was very fine."

During the early days of the siege life in the beleaguered city went on about as usual. A large part of the civil population had withdrawn while there was yet time, but enough shops remained open to supply the needs of those who remained. Cafés continued business and meals were served without interruption at the German Club throughout the siege, although toward the end the num-



ber of those who gathered at the club's tables dwindled to a few administrative officers and civilians.

In a proclamation the day before the expiration of the Japanese ultimatum, Governor Meyer-Waldeck had expressed the spirit of the little garrison in the following words:

"Never shall we surrender the smallest bit of ground over which the war flag is flying. From this place, which we with love and success have endeavored during the last seventeen years to shape into a little Germany across the seas, we shall not retreat. If the enemy wants Tsing-tau, he must come and take it."

Few, if any, military men in Tsing-tau doubted the outcome of the siege; but every resource was prepared for a desperate resistance. The city did not lack food; and after the surrender it was found that enough still remained to provision the garrison for more than three months longer. The supply of running water ceased about the middle of October. News from the outside world came in until November 5, and invariably it told of German successes.

"I remember one evening," said the Tsing-tau correspondent of the Associated Press, and the only foreign press representative in the city during the siege, "the roar of laughter that went up in the German Club when the news was read that England had asked Portugal for assistance. For two or three days it looked, according to the news, that the British Empire was going to pieces. We heard of revolutions in India, riots in Alexandria, mutiny and martial law in South Africa and even disaffection in Sarawak and North Borneo."

When it became clear that the end was drawing near preparations were made that as few war munitions as possible should fall into the hands of the enemy. The warships in the harbor that had escaped the bombardment were blown up. When the big guns in the forts had fired their last shots the gunners under orders destroyed them. In many cases this was done because without ammunition the guns were useless.

October 31, 1914, the anniversary of the emperor's birthday, was selected by the Japanese and English for their final bombardment. From 142 guns now occupying commanding positions came

a deluge of shells that continued for seven days. The gunners by this time had the exact ranges and wasted no ammunition. The staffs of the two expeditionary forces gathered on Prince Heinrich Hill to watch the final act of the passing of German rule in the Far East. The warships ranged in the harbor joined in, and after an hour or two it became evident that the German defenses would be swept away by mere weight of metal. Under cover of this terrific gunfire the Allies' troops drove their saps and trenches up the very edge of the defense works, where they waited orders to take the place by storm.

The Germans replied bravely. A great cloud of smoke and dust arose over the doomed city visible far out at sea. In the city the noncombatants took refuge in their cellars and helped care for the wounded. Almost every German position, except the bomb-proof casements where the guns stood, was hammered to pieces. The electric power station was destroyed, so that during the last few nights the city was in darkness.

The last handbills dropped into Tsing-tau by the Japanese aviators contained the following appeal: "To the honored officers and men in the fortress: It is against the will of God, as well as the principles of humanity, to destroy and render useless arms, ships of war, and merchantmen, and other works and constructions, not in obedience to the necessity of war, but merely out of spite, lest they fall into the hands of the enemy. Trusting, as we do, that, as you hold dear the honor of civilization, you will not be betrayed into such base conduct, we beg you, however, to announce to us your own view as mentioned above.

(Signed) "The Besieging Army."

It is needless to say that the enemy's plea was not heeded. By November 6, 1914, only spasmodic fire from widely scattered positions answered the Allies' bombardment. That night the Japanese and English charged across open ground and took the middle fort in the first line of defense with surprising ease, capturing 200 prisoners. The charge was led by General Yoshimi Yamada at the head of companies of infantry and engineers. At one point they surprised a squad of Germans in charge of a searchlight.

To have fired upon them would have betrayed the advance to the defenders of the adjacent fort; so, the story says, the Germans were quietly and quickly dispatched by the engineers with picks and shovels.

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## CHAPTER XLIV

### CAPTURE OF TSING-TAU

TSING-TAU fell early on the morning of the next day, November 7, 1914. Encouraged by the unexpected successes of the night, the Japanese commander gave the order for a final grand assault. Nobody was more surprised than the Japanese themselves. They had expected a last-ditch resistance and feared they would have to sacrifice a thousand men before gaining these positions commanding the city. But the Germans, their ammunition almost gone, stunned by the continuous rain of shells and broken by long fighting, had decided that further resistance was useless.

The Japanese infantry occupied the central positions on the main line of defense soon after midnight. Just before dawn they captured the north battery on Shaotan Hill, then the east battery of Tahtungehin and the Chungchiawa fort on the west. The heaviest loss suffered by any of the Japanese detachments in the final assault fell upon a company that was caught by machine-gun fire in an attack upon Redoubt No. 2. Out of 250 men only 87 escaped. The total Japanese casualties in the final assault were 450 killed and wounded. The British casualties were slight.

Daylight found the Japanese and British in possession of every position commanding the city and nearly 20,000 men were awaiting the signal to charge the last line of defenses when a white flag appeared on the Tsing-tau military observatory. Within the next hour flags of surrender were flying from all the other German forts. So unexpected was the sudden collapse of the defense that at six o'clock, when the Governor sent Major von Kayser, his adjutant, with a white flag to make terms, the signal of sur-



render was not observed and the Japanese, far from suspecting the German officer's purpose, opened fire, killing Von Kayser's trumpeter and shooting his horse under him.

The formal capitulation of Tsing-tau came at 7.50 o'clock on the evening of November 7, 1914, when both sides signed the Japanese terms. The Germans surrendered unconditionally, but were accorded the honors of war. On November 10, at 10 a. m., Governor Meyer-Waldeck formally transferred possession to General Kamio, and Germany's last foothold in Asia passed from her possession.

News of the fall of Tsing-tau, although not unexpected, caused great rejoicing throughout Japan and among her allies, and profoundly stirred the German world.

The German attitude was expressed by an editorial in the Berlin "Lokalanzeiger," which said: "Never shall we forget the bold deed of the yellow robbers, or of England that set them on to do it. We know that we cannot yet settle with Japan for years to come. Perhaps she will rejoice over her cowardly robbery. Here our mills can grind but slowly. Even if the years pass, however, we shall certainly not often speak of it, but as certainly always think of it. And if eventually the time of reckoning arrives, then as unanimously as what is now a cry of pain will a great shout of rejoicing ring through Germany, 'Woe to Nippon!'"

The Japanese and British forces made formal entry into the captured city on November 16. The Germans had done all in their power to destroy supplies, nevertheless the spoils of victory included 100 machine guns, 2,500 rifles, 30 field guns, a small amount of ammunition, about \$6,000 in cash, 15,000 tons of coal, 40 motor cars, and a large quantity of provisions. Prisoners taken numbered 4,043, including the governor general and 201 German officers and 3,841 noncommissioned officers and men.

The casualties on both sides, considering the length of the siege and the intensity of the gunfire in both directions, were remarkably small. The Japanese had 236 killed and 1,282 wounded, the British had 12 killed and 63 wounded, including two officers. The Germans estimated their losses in killed and wounded at about

1,000 men. To the Allies' losses must be added 10 killed and 56 wounded, all Japanese, by the explosion of German land mines several days after the surrender.

The Japanese Commander in Chief, General Kamio, was appointed governor of the captured territory, and the Japanese quickly removed the mines that remained on land and in the harbor, and cleared away the remains of the battered fortifications. The German prisoners were transported to concentration camps in Japan. The Japanese, who yield to no nation on earth in their respect for brave fighting men, treated the Germans with utmost consideration and permitted the officers to retain their swords. General Kamio and Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston, the British commander, returned to Tokyo on December 18, 1914, and received a demonstration of welcome that had not been equaled since the arrival of the victorious Japanese commanders in the war with Russia.

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## CHAPTER XLV

### OTHER OPERATIONS IN THE FAR EAST

ALTHOUGH the fall of Tsing-tau ended the military activity of Japan in the first year of the war, the capture of the German stronghold was not her only contribution to the anti-Teutonic cause. From the very outbreak of hostilities Russia looked to her former enemy in the Far East for arms and ammunition to equip her huge armies. Shipments from Japan over the Trans-Siberian Railroad began in August, 1914. No record of the value of these Japanese-made munitions is obtainable, but it has been said that the needs of the new Russian armies so far exceeded the capacity of Russian arms and munitions factories that without this Japanese aid Russia could not have continued to make war after the first few months. The armies of the czar were particularly fortunate in obtaining from the Japanese heavy guns to compete with the great cannon brought against them by Von Hindenburg. In this connection it was reported at one time

that the Russians had paid the Japanese for these guns by ceding the northern half of the island of Sakhalin in the Pacific.

The report was quickly denied by the foreign offices of both Russia and Japan, and deserves mention in this history only because it brought forth from Japan the following expression of her attitude toward the war: "Whatever assistance Japan may have given, or may propose to give, to Russia is an outcome of the cordial relations existing between Russia and Japan, and especially to the fact that both are fighting a common enemy. Assistance of this sort can never form the basis of political bargaining or territorial acquisition. Such bargaining would not be in conformity with the relations of special amity which have long subsisted between the two empires, and would be entirely foreign to the national spirit of both powers."

The flow of war munitions across Siberia was interrupted during the early part of 1915, when, for a time, it looked as if Japan might become involved in difficulties with China, but resumed again when the Chino-Japanese difficulties were settled.

Count Okuma, the Japanese premier, was quoted in the newspaper "Kokumin Shimbun" of Tokyo to the following effect: "Count Okuma emphasizes the impracticability and impossibility of dispatching troops to Europe, but points out that the great advance in the capacity of the Japanese to manufacture munitions will prove of great help to the Allies. The premier said Japan plans to send delegates to the peace conference, although it is not expected to extend the sphere of her influence to Europe. 'Japan wants Europe to recognize Japan's supremacy in the Orient,' he said."

The zeal with which Japan followed out this policy was proved by the fact that big guns were stripped from many of her coast fortifications on the northeastern coast and shipped to Vladivostok.

Japan began a clean sweep of German sea power in the Pacific as soon as she had definitely aligned herself with the Entente Allies. Germany's island possessions were occupied without bloodshed, for the German fleet was too much occupied elsewhere to guard the widely scattered colonies. Early in October a



Japanese fleet visited Jaluit, the seat of the German Imperial commissioner in the Marshall group, and the German officials, having no alternative, surrendered without opposition. Japanese marines destroyed "all establishments of a military nature" there and seized all munitions of war. The next day the Japanese took the island of Yap, which contained the local German headquarters for the Caroline group. Within the next fortnight the flag of the Rising Sun had displaced the Imperial Eagle at the German Government stations in the Marshall Islands, in the Marianne (Ladrone) Islands, and the East and West Caroline Archipelago.

In making these seizures Japan took pains to announce that the landings from the fleet were for military purposes and not for permanent occupation. This assurance was specially conveyed to the United States, which, as the owner of Guam and Wake, to the north and east, respectively, of the Marshall group, was naturally suspicious of the Japanese intentions. In fact, the danger of these operations lay not in possible armed resistance by the Germans, but in the possibility of political complications. As a breeding ground of international suspicion the Pacific Archipelago has been the Balkans of the Far East. Besides Germany and Japan, Great Britain, France, Holland, the United States, and Australia had vital interests there, and any one of these powers might have been offended by a single misstep in the Japanese method of procedure. Repeated assurances from Tokyo, however, that occupation was only temporary and for purely military purposes allayed, for the time being at least, international jealousy.

The Japanese Embassy at Washington pointed out that the occupation of these islands was only in line with Japan's previously announced intention to do what was necessary to protect her own shipping and that of her allies from German cruisers.

The status of these captured colonies, however, after they had passed from German to Japanese control differed from that of Tsing-tau. Japan promised that her occupation of the islands was only temporary and that their final disposition would be settled after the war. Before moving upon Tsing-tau she had declared that after the war this concession would be returned to

China. After the fall of Tsing-tau, when the question arose, the Japanese statesmen pointed out that this promise no longer bound them, since Germany had failed to accept the ultimatum. Occupied with graver issues, Japan's allies did not raise a question regarding the disposition of Tsing-tau; but there is little doubt that Japan, in the event of final victory for herself and her allies, will demand that the former German concession become her permanent possession.

Even after Tsing-tau had fallen, and the German possessions in the Pacific Archipelago were in their grasp, the Japanese kept their fleet on a war footing. German cruisers were still at large in the great expanse of the Pacific. The spectacular cruise of the *Emden* emphasized the harm that might be inflicted by a desperate band of German raiders upon merchant ships in the East. One of the least spectacular, but by no means least important, services rendered by the Japanese warships was in helping the cruisers of Great Britain and Australia escort the Australasian expedition that took part in the campaign at the Dardanelles.

## PART VI—THE WAR IN AFRICA

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### CHAPTER XLVI

#### CAMPAIGN IN TOGOLAND AND THE CAMEROONS

THE first shots of the Great War had hardly detonated across Europe when their echoes were heard in Africa. The war fever began to hover over Germany's colonial possessions in Africa—Togoland, the Cameroons, German Southwest Africa, and, greatest of all, German East Africa. Each of these colonies became in turn the scene of armed invasions and fierce conflicts, as important to the small forces involved as the great campaigns on the continent across the seas.

When Great Britain declared war on Germany on August 4, 1914, and the news flashed across the world to the official representatives of the warring nations in Africa, the British acting governor of the Gold Coast and the French governor of Dahomey planned a concerted campaign by land in cooperation with the warships to be found in African waters.

The first blow was struck on August 8, 1914, in Togoland, a country about the size of Ireland, lying between French Dahomey and the British Gold Coast. It is populated by a million Hausas and about 400 whites. At the beginning of the war the military force of Togoland could not have exceeded 250 whites and 3,000 natives. Hemmed in on three sides by French and British territory, with a coast line easily approached by warships, the colony was not in a position to offer much resistance if attacked.

On August 8, 1914, a British cruiser appeared before Lome, the capital of Togoland, and the town was surrendered without



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a shot being fired. But before the British force landed, the little German army of about 60 Europeans and 400 natives fell back to Atakpame, 100 miles in the interior.

While this was happening at Lome an expeditionary force composed of the Gold Coast Regiment, with British officers and commanded by Captain F. C. Bryant, R. A., crossed the frontier in motor cars on August 8, or 9, 1914, and a French force entered Togoland from the other side. A few days later the Allies had possession of all the southern part of Togoland, and advanced together toward Atakpame to capture an important German wireless station at Kamina in the same region.

The only real fighting in this campaign took place on August 25, 1914, when Captain Bryant and his forces had crossed the Monu River. The Allies drove the enemy from his intrenchments, seized the wireless station, and occupied Atakpame. Their losses were two officers and 21 men killed and about 50 wounded.

On August 26, 1914, the Germans surrendered unconditionally, and the Allies came into possession of three Maxim guns, 1,000 rifles and 320,000 rounds of ammunition. It was stated at the time that the Germans offered such a feeble resistance because many natives, on whom they had counted, refused to take up arms against the British.

Togoland having fallen to the Allies, it was arranged between the officials of Great Britain and France that the colony should be jointly governed, each to control that part of Togoland nearest her possessions. In a few months' time normal trade was resumed in the Allies' colony, and since private property had been respected during the invasion, there was nothing left to show that the country had recently been the scene of small but decisive conflicts, far-reaching in their effects.

The action in the African war drama now shifts to the Cameroons (German Kamerun Colony), which Germany took possession of in 1884. It has a seacoast of about 200 miles on the Bight of Biafra. To the northeast and south are the British Protectorate of Nigeria and French Equatorial Africa. The country is largely mountainous and is 290,000 square miles in extent. Be-

fore the war there were less than 2,000 whites among a population of 2,500,000 negroes, principally of the Bantu race.

The Cameroons, though surrounded by territory of the Allies, was a more difficult country to conquer than Togoland, owing to its natural advantages and the difficulties of communication over great distances. The first moves of the Allies met with disaster. It was in the African rainy season and misadventures multiplied as the invading troops marched through a wild and badly mapped country. It was decided between the Allies that two French columns should move from French Congo, while British columns entered at different points on the frontier of Nigeria.

On August 8, 1914, a detachment of mounted infantry of the West African Frontier Force left Kano and, marching 400 miles in seventeen days through West Africa, got in touch with the Germans at Tepe, a frontier station just inside the Cameroons. In the fierce engagement that followed the Germans were repulsed, losing five officers and suffering other casualties.

On August 29, 1914, the river station of Garua was attacked, and here one of the most disastrous battles of the campaign was fought. On August 31, 1914, Lieutenant Colonel Maclear, commanding the Royal Dublin Fusiliers and native troops, left their intrenchments 400 yards from the German forts and advanced to attack. The German gunners having perfect range, poured a murderous fire from machine guns on the British forces. The native troops wavered and fled, leaving British officers in the trenches, and these in turn were soon forced to fly to escape complete annihilation. Lieutenant Colonel Maclear was killed, and of the 31 other officers only 10 escaped, while 40 per cent of the native troops were lost. The remainder of the British force retreated into Nigeria in such an exhausted condition that had the Germans followed up their victory not a man would have escaped.

The second British expedition which entered the Cameroons from a more westerly point along the Nigerian frontier occupied, after slight resistance, the German station of Nsanakong a few miles from the border, where a week later the Germans attacked in force at two o'clock in the morning. The British resisted stubbornly, but, having exhausted their ammunition, the garrison

# WAR ENGINES

USED FOR

## ATTACK AND DEFENSE

SHELL • SIEGE GUN • ARMORED TRAIN • ARMORED CAR  
WRECKED FORT • SAFETY COSTUME • WIRELESS • TORPEDO



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In the passage connecting two lines of their trenches French soldiers have discovered an unexploded German shell covered with snow and are examining it with much interest





Copyright. American Press Association

These German soldiers are dragging a great siege gun into position  
for use in refortifying the city of Antwerp



Copyright, International News Service

Here are British marines serving the guns of an armored train used for the defense of important points in Belgium



Copyright, Underwood & Underwood

A Belgian officer in an armored car watching the effects of artillery fire during the bombardment and defense of Antwerp





Copyright, Paul Thompson

A concealed fort near Brussels destroyed by Belgian soldiers before they withdrew. Such defenses were powerless against 42-centimeter siege guns



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A water-tight costume, serviceable in leaving a submarine which is wrecked or which for any other reason fails to come to the surface. This design is used in the British navy



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A view inside an Austrian wireless station operating on the Austro-Italian front. It is installed on a movable car, and its position can be changed as desired





Copyright, Feature Photo Service

The explosion of a German torpedo against the side of a British vessel. The path of the torpedo through the sea is plainly visible

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GERMAN POSSESSIONS IN AFRICA

tried to cut their way out with the bayonet. The British lost three officers, while large numbers of native soldiers were killed or made prisoners. The remainder, escaping to the bush, after many hardships found their way back to Nigeria. Another British expedition from Calabar, near the coast, occupied Archibong, August 29, 1914, while about the same time a German force took possession of the Nigerian station of Okuri.

The British had failed by land; they were more successful on the sea, as will be seen in the chapter on Naval Operations. On September 4, 1914, an attempt was made by the Germans to wreck the British gunboat *Dwarf*, which with the cruiser *Cumberland* was watching German ships in the Cameroon estuary. The German merchantman *Nachtigal* tried later to ram the same gunboat and wrecked herself with a loss of 36 men. Further attempts to destroy the *Dwarf* also failed.

The British now taking the offensive cleared the channel for three miles, where the Germans had sown mines and sunk 10 or 12 steamboats to obstruct the waterway to Duala, the capital of the Cameroons. H.M.S. *Challenger* and five troopships joined the *Dwarf* and *Cumberland* on September 26, 1914, and, moving on Duala, bombarded the town.

On September 27, 1914, the Germans offered to surrender Duala unconditionally, and on September 28, 1914, Brigadier General C. M. Dobell came ashore and took it over. About the same time a battalion landing at Bonaberi, across the river from Duala, capitulated after some desultory fighting. The wireless station at Duala was found to have been wrecked, but the British took several hundred prisoners, captured 8 merchantmen with valuable cargoes and the German gunboat *Soden*, which was at once put into commission in the British navy. While the British were successful around Duala, a French force by sea from Libreville, French Congo, escorted by their warship *Surpris*, attacked *Ukoko* on Corisco Bay, south of the Cameroons, during which the armed vessels *Khios* and *Itolo* were sunk.

The Allies had captured the chief port and controlled the coast, but the most difficult work lay before them in the mountainous and almost roadless region still to be conquered. The retreating



Germans occupied a defensive position on a river at Japona, where on October 8, 1914, a French column came up with them, forced a bridge, and compelled them to continue their retreat.

On October 8, 1914, Colonel E. H. Gorges, commanding a British naval and military force and four field guns, sailed up the Wuri in launches and found the enemy intrenched near Jabassi. The British made a spirited attack, but were driven back by the accurate fire of the enemy. After a flank attack failed, the order was given to retreat, and the British returned to Duala.

The Allies reenforced, and with two 6-inch guns resumed the attack on October 14, 1914, when the German batteries were soon silenced. After a brisk engagement the infantry occupied Jabassi, taking ten European prisoners. Minor successes won by the Allies at this time were the defeat of the Germans at Susa, and the occupation of the region around Mora, near Lake Chad by a Nigerian Regiment which had entered the colony from the northeast.

Two columns of Anglo-French troops under Brigadier General Dobell, with Colonel Mayer commanding the French colonial infantry, followed the retreating Germans to Edea on the Sanaga River, some fifty miles from Duala. Part of the road led through a thick forest where snipers were concealed, who harassed the expedition at every step and were dislodged with great difficulty.

On October 26, 1914, Edea was taken without resistance, and the enemy retired to Yaunde, a station far in the interior. Mujuka, a station about fifty miles from Duala, was occupied by the British a few weeks later.

Early in November, 1914, General Dobell planned an attack on the German capital of Buea, and its seaport Victoria. The latter place was bombarded by the French cruiser *Bruix* and the yacht *Ivy*; marines were landed, and after a short and spirited fight it was taken, while the enemy, who had concentrated on the hills leading to Buea, were scattered by the Allies' forces advancing from different directions.

The Germans made a determined effort to regain Edea, but were forced to retire with a loss of 20 Europeans and 54 natives. Meanwhile, in the hinterland, the French General, Aymerich,

with a force of men and a steamer loaned by the authorities of the Belgian Congo drove the enemy from the Congo-Ubanghi region, which had been given to Germany in 1911. After two days of strenuous fighting the German posts of Numen and Nola were taken, and some officers, guns, and ammunition.

The greatest campaign in December, 1914, was the capture of the entire northern railway line, with rolling stock, locomotives, two aeroplanes, and about sixty white men. Mendawi, Baré, and Nkongsamba were other posts taken at this period.

At the close of the year the Cameroons were not conquered, but the Germans had been driven into the interior, could not secure supplies, and it was only a question of time when they must surrender or be annihilated. The allied forces were constantly harrying their enemy.

The Allies' next movement was an advance in three columns against Yaunde, where they fought two little battles January 27-28, 1915, and seized the post of Bersona. Near the coast some important operations were successful.

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## CHAPTER XLVII

### GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA—REBELLION IN UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

GERMAN Southwest Africa, to which we will now turn, was in a different situation at the outbreak of the war from that of the German colonies of the east and west. Over the frontier was a self-governing dominion, the Union of South Africa, with an independent parliament made up of a strange mixture of different parties. The irreconcilables in the Dutch population who had dreamed of a greater Afrikaner Republic, would they not take this opportunity to side with Germany who promised to further their ambitions? Great Britain expected some trouble from this element in the Union, and prepared for the worst, while Germany was equally active, and there was much intriguing to persuade

the Dutch to cast in their lot with them. In other parts of Africa, Germany had to fight her battles unaided, but here in the enemy's camp there was every hope of gaining powerful assistance. Until the situation in the Union became clear, it was Germany's part to defend her colony in Southwest Africa, hoping by a brave display of arms to win over the Dutch, who were bitter against England.

German Southwest Africa enjoys many natural advantages. Her capital is far in the interior. Between her railway on the south, which almost reaches the Cape frontier, and her border spreads out the desert of Kalahari and the arid, waterless plains of northwest Cape Colony. The branch railways are separated by about 200 miles from German territory, and on the northern line Kimberley was a little less than 400 miles distant. British forces entering the colony by land must encounter many difficulties, especially in the desert region, which the Germans left undefended because they believed it could not be crossed by troops.

Before the war, according to the official returns, the colony had a force of 3,500 men, mainly whites; but with reserves and volunteers from among the population of German blood it has been variously estimated that an army of from 6,000 to 10,000 men could be gathered together. The Germans were believed to be strong in artillery, and were known to have sixty-six batteries of Maxims. There was also a camel corps 500 strong.

After the declaration of war in August, 1914, Dr. Seitz, the German Governor, began to carry out his plan of defense. In the second week of August, 1914, the Germans abandoned Swakopmund and Lüderitz Bay, their principal stations on the coast, and after destroying the jetty and tugs in harbor, retired with their military stores to Windhoek, the inland capital. In the last weeks in August they made short dashes into British territory, intrenching themselves in some places, and occasionally engaged in a skirmish with farmers on the frontier.

Thus, when the Union Parliament met September 8, 1914, it was informed by General Botha, the Premier, that Germany had begun hostilities against the British colonies. On the following



day, as a challenge to the pro-German party, he moved a resolution to convey to King George an address, assuring him of the loyal support of the Union. Upon this General Hertzog moved an amendment to the effect that attacking German territory in South Africa was against the interests of the Union and the empire. But the victory was with General Botha's Government when the questions were voted on. Only 12 of the 104 votes cast were in favor of Hertzog's amendment.

It was evident that many burghers living in districts on the borders of German Southwest Africa shared Hertzog's opinion, and were opposed to taking offensive measures against the German colony as long as the Union was left in peace. From the time that Hertzog had been dropped from Botha's cabinet he had posed as a martyr. His adherents believed that he had been "sacrificed to please the English," and that Botha was merely a tool in the hands of the British Government.

The spirit of rebellion in the Union did not show itself openly for some time, but the leaders—Beyers, De Wet, Maritz, and Kemp—were busy conspiring and stirring up disaffection among the burghers who had never become reconciled to the Union.

De Wet, because of his world-wide fame during the Boer War, has been given undue prominence for the part he played in the rebellion. He was not the head and front of the movement, though his name was one to conjure with among the disaffected Boers, and he proved to be a valuable recruiting agent. His operations during the rebellion, as will be subsequently shown, were generally ineffective in the field, and terminated ingloriously, before he could work any great harm.

General Beyers, the most dangerous foe the Union had in the rebellion, was a direct contrast to the rude and unlettered De Wet. He was young and brave, and had shown himself one of the ablest soldiers the British had to fight against during the Boer War. He looked the dashing officer that he was—tall, straight, black bearded, and with his pleasant manners and easy speech he was just the man to inspire enthusiasm in others.

Colonel Maritz and Colonel Kemp, the other chief leaders in the

rebellion, had never been as prominent in South African affairs as Beyers and De Wet. Maritz had shown ability as a leader in the Boer War, had held various military positions since, and at the beginning of the European War was in command of the South African border between the Union and German Southwest Africa, to which he had been appointed by Beyers, who was commandant general of the citizen forces. General Smuts, the Minister of Defense, may have suspected some sinister motives in this appointment, for Maritz had many friends in the German colony, but for the present he had to keep his suspicions to himself and await some overt act of offense.

Colonel Kemp, the remaining chief leader, had never done anything to give him special prominence. He had proved himself an efficient soldier during the Boer War, and appears to have been in command of a training camp in the western Transvaal when the rebellion was started.

Under these four leaders, acting independently, or in conjunction with them, were subleaders, an indefinite number, members of the Government, and men connected with the church and army, whose part in the rebellion was to stir up the people.

An interesting character among the somewhat nebulous subleaders in the rebellion was Van Rensburg, sometimes called "Prophet" Lichtenberg, from the place where he lived. During the Boer War he had predicted a remarkable victory for the Boers, which had resulted in the capture of Lord Methuen, and ever since the burghers of the Union had held him in reverential awe. When the war with Germany broke out he made various prophecies. He discovered that the events foretold in the Book of Revelation would now take place. Germany, he said, had been divinely ordained to conquer the world and purify it. Any attempt to resist this divine ordinance would be punished by the righteous anger of an offended deity. Nor was the "prophet" forgetful of local politics, for he had another "vision" in which he predicted that Generals Delarey, Beyers, and De Wet were divinely appointed leaders, who would restore the old republic. These "prophecies" were spread broadcast throughout the Union, were eagerly believed by the superstitious burghers, and served

to hearten up the disaffected who had some grudge against the Government.

A great meeting of the burghers was summoned to meet August 15, 1914, at Treurfontein. This date had been fixed because Van Rensburg in a "vision" had seen "a dark cloud, with blood flowing from it, inscribed with number 15, and General Delarey, the uncrowned king of western Transvaal, returning home without his hat, followed by a carriage full of flowers." Eight hundred burghers attended the meeting, but Delarey, who spoke, had been warned by General Botha, and therefore spoke calmly, urging the burghers to remain cool and await events. Such was Delarey's influence over the assembly, who had come expecting to make a fiery speech, that a resolution expressing confidence in the Government was passed.

On September 15, 1914, General Christian Beyers resigned his position of commandant general of the defense force in a letter which was practically a declaration of war against the British Empire. It developed that for some weeks he had been organizing rebellion. He was secretly arranging a scheme of operations in which the German forces were to take part, while making plans for the Union Government. He hoped to win over General Delarey, leader of the Boers in the western Transvaal, but this officer was accidentally killed by the police near Johannesburg. The patrol out looking for the notorious Jackson gang of bandits, then in the neighborhood, had orders to examine any motor car and fire at once, if when summoned to stop their challenge was ignored. The car bearing Generals Beyers and Delarey had been twice challenged while passing through the town. The third time a policeman fired at the wheel to disable the car, and the bullet ricocheted and killed Delarey.

A thousand armed Boers at this time were encamped at Potchefstroom in Delarey's district. Colonel Kemp, who had sent in his resignation to the Union Government, and was working here for Delarey, had won over their officers, and on parade urged the men to refuse to volunteer for German Southwest Africa. He also collected in his tent such ammunition as he could lay his hands upon.



The death of General Delarey disconcerted General Beyers, and his fellow conspirators, and Colonel Kemp withdrew his resignation from the Union army. Over the grave of Delarey General Beyers, in the presence of General Botha, declared that he had no intention of advising or causing a rebellion, yet the following day, with General De Wet and others, he was urging the Boers who had come to the funeral of their dead leader to revolt against active service should the commandos be called out under the Defense Act.

Botha knew the men who were stirring up rebellion and acted quickly. He called for volunteers, announcing that he would lead in person the Union forces against the Germans, and the immediate response he received was gratifying. The conspirators remained quiet for some weeks, but General Beyers and De Wet were secretly at work against the Government of the Union.

On September 26, 1914, Colonel Grant and a small force of African Rifles and Transvaal Horse Artillery operating at Sandfontein near the German border were trapped by two German battalions while on their way to a water hole. From the heights the German guns swept the circular basin below where the Union force was gathered. The advantage was all in favor of the Germans. High explosive shells from ten guns wrought havoc among the South African soldiers, but not until their ammunition ran out and every man of their gun crews was either killed or wounded would the little band of Boers and Britons surrender. It developed later that Lieutenant Colonel S. G. Maritz, a Boer leader commanding Union forces in the Northwest territory, had turned traitor and arranged the disaster. It was through General Beyers that he had been appointed to an important command on the German border.

Maritz who was now ordered by General Smuts, Minister of Defense, to report to headquarters and give up his command, sent a defiant reply October 8, 1914. He stated that in addition to his own troops he had German guns and men, and had signed an agreement with the Governor of Southwest Africa ceding Walfish Bay (a British possession) and certain portions of Union territory in return for a guarantee of the independence

of the South African Republic. All his officers and men who were unwilling to join with him had been sent as prisoners into German territory.

General Botha replied to the rebel by proclaiming martial law throughout the Union. General Brits, with the imperial Light Horse, was sent to capture Maritz, and in an engagement October 15, 1914, at Ratedraai, near Upington, took seventy rebel prisoners.

On October 22, 1914, Maritz with 1,000 rebels and seventy German gunners, attacked at dawn the post of Keimos, where there were only 150 loyalists. The little garrison held out until reenforcements arrived and the battle then turned against Maritz, who offered to surrender for a free pardon. This being refused, the fight went on, and Maritz eventually fled wounded into German territory. Two days later a party of rebels with German gunners were defeated at Kakamas.

General Hertzog, who had represented the pro-German party in the Union Parliament, gathered a commando and broke out in revolt on October 21, 1914. He issued a manifesto complaining of English oppression, and announced that he would tolerate it no longer. Three members of the Union Parliament and a member of the Defense Council, Mr. Wessel-Wessels, came out in arms. In the western Transvaal and the northern Free State the rebel leaders had about 10,000 men in separate groups. Their plan was to join their commandos with a force under Maritz from German Southwest Africa.

The situation from a military point of view seemed to be serious for the Union, but Generals Botha and Smuts were active and resourceful and in a few weeks had 40,000 men in the field. The loyal Boers were in a difficult position, for now they were asked to fight against their own kith and kin for the British Empire. In battle the Dutch generals showed that they were anxious to spare their own kinsmen, and ordered their men to withhold firing to the last moment, hoping that the rebels would surrender. The rebels were not allowed time to join their forces, for General Botha gave them no rest night or day.

On October 27, 1914, General Beyers and his commando

operating near Rustenburg were driven in headlong flight all day long by General Botha and a force of loyalists. Two days later General Beyers was a fugitive. His scattered commandos were defeated by Colonel Alberts at Lichtenburg and again at Zuitpansdrift on November 5, 1914. Meanwhile, Colonel Kemp, who had been acting with General Beyers, now separated from his chief, and with a large force started for German Southwest Africa, pursued by Colonel Alberts. Beyers, trying to get in touch with De Wet, entered the Orange Free State, closely followed by a large loyalist force under Colonel Lemmer.

On November 7, 1914, Beyers's commando was attacked by Lemmer near the Vet River and though Beyers led in person, he was defeated, and, 364 of his men being captured and about 20 killed or wounded, the fugitive remnant returned to Hoopstad. De Wet, whom General Beyers had been prevented from joining by the activity of the loyalist forces, had gathered together in the northern districts of the Orange Free State a poorly organized body of soldiers, but sufficient in numbers to cause the South African Government some anxiety. Negotiations between the Free State leaders and De Wet postponed for a time any military action by the Government, but the old guerrilla captain was not to be pacified. There had been a rivalry between him and Botha in the Boer war, and he seemed anxious to measure strength now with a soldier whom he considered his inferior.

De Wet's name was a power in the land, especially among the "poor whites" and the squatter class, who without much intelligence or education had not prospered under new conditions in the Union. They were without hope for the future and felt that they were being crowded out by the more active spirits in the country. They saw in the rebellion a chance to improve their economic position. There was little to lose and much might be won. A new Afrikander Republic would bring back the old days for which they had never ceased to long for. It was from this class of malcontents that De Wet drew the bulk of his men. The rest were religious fanatics, disgruntled politicians, wastrels and adventurers.



We have said previously that De Wet's recruits were poorly organized. It was a weakness of this brilliant guerrilla fighter that he could not maintain discipline when handling a large body of men, and the sort of troops he was working with in the rebellion called for the sternest kind of authority to make them effective soldiers. He only enjoyed a month of freedom and covered considerable territory, but he accomplished very little from a military point of view. He could not follow the same tactics that he had employed in the Boer war with equal success now. At home on the back of a horse, it was impossible for him to slip through the enemy's lines as of old when there were motor cars to pursue. He began his campaign with an action at Winburg where he defeated a small loyalist commando under Cronje, and where one of his sons was killed.

A battle of considerable importance was fought on November 12, 1914, at Marquard to the east of Winburg. General Botha and his Transvaal commando by a forced night march had reached Winburg the day before and getting in touch with De Wet's forces encircled them on the east and northeast. Colonel Brandt at the same time led his commando from Winburg within easy reach of De Wet, while General Lukin and Colonel Brits moving forward from the west completed the hemming in of the enemy. General Botha's commando attacked De Wet's forces and defeated them with great loss. If General Lukin and Colonel Brits had not been delayed in taking up their positions all the rebels would have been captured. The victory was especially of far-reaching importance because it discouraged De Wet's hopes and strengthened the loyalist cause. All of De Wet's stores of food and ammunition were taken, and a hundred carts, wagons and motor cars, while the prisoners numbered about 250.

De Wet, with a Boer commando in pursuit, now fled up the Vet River, then turning south at Boshof, divided his decreasing force into two divisions. Leading one of these he turned again north, reaching the Vaal River with only 25 men remaining of the 2,000 he had fought with at Marquard.

Beaten back by a loyal outpost he succeeded in crossing the

Vaal on November 21, 1914, closely pursued by Commandant Dutoit and a motor car contingent from Witwatersrand. De Wet's followers had gradually deserted, and he had only four men with him when he succeeded in joining a small commando of fugitives gathered at Schweizer Renek. The heavy rainstorms at this time favored him as he started with this force to follow Colonel Kemp and join Maritz in German Southwest Africa, for the motor cars in pursuit could make small progress over the heavy roads. Crossing Bechuanaland on November 25, 1914, De Wet was pursued by another loyalist force under Colonel Brits who in two days captured half of the fugitives.

On December 1, 1914, at a farm at Waterburg, about a hundred miles from Mafeking, De Wet and his party of 52 men surrendered to Colonel Jordaan without firing a shot, and the one-time Commander in Chief of the Orange Free State forces was imprisoned at Johannesburg to await his trial for high treason.

In the Orange Free State, General Beyers and about seventy men harried by loyal commandos divided his party, and leading one group made a dash for the Vaal River pursued by Captain Uys and Cornet Deneker with a small force. Trapped at day-break on December 9, 1914, near the Vaal, Beyers and a few men tried to swim the river to the Transvaal under a fierce fire. Beyers was seen to fall from his horse, and was heard to cry for help, but was drowned before anyone could come to the rescue.

General Botha's operations in the northern district of the Orange Free State were made difficult because of the heavy fogs, but early in December, 1914, the rebels were in sore straits, 500 being captured while 200 surrendered to Commandant Kloppers a loyalist, who had been taken a prisoner and was afterwards released.

General Maritz, Colonel Kemp, and the "Prophet" Litchenburg had fled west, and after some fighting at Kurumun, and two minor successes, surprising two posts at Langklip and Onydas which they were forced to abandon on the arrival of reenforcements, they retired toward the German frontier where they were penned in by the Union forces.

On January 24, 1915, the rebels made their last sally, attacking Colonel Van der Venter at Upington. The rebel force, about 1,200 strong and led by Maritz and Kemp, was easily repulsed. On February 3, 1915, Maritz, having fled to German territory, Colonel Kemp and his commando of 43 officers and 486 men including the "Prophet" Lichtenburg surrendered.

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## CHAPTER XLVIII

### END OF THE REBELLION—INVASION OF GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA

WITHIN the first six months of the war the rebellion had been crushed. One reason for its speedy decline and fall was the general amnesty offered to all rebels who surrendered voluntarily by November 21, 1914. But to General Botha and his lieutenant, General Smuts, credit must be given for their masterly operations in the field, and the clear-headed way in which the campaign against the rebels was conducted. In less than two months General Botha had harried them from all points of the compass until they lost their nerve and became at last dispirited and weary. In numbers they were sufficient to prolong the conflict for a much longer period, but the quick moves made by Botha's men made it impossible for them to concentrate at any given point. Separated from each other in isolated bands it was impossible even with the best fighting to gain a notable victory. During the campaign General Botha had taken 7,000 prisoners, while the total casualty list of the Union army was only 334. In the hour of triumph he showed great magnanimity. The rank and file of the rebel army were not punished, but members of the defense force who had violated their military oath were placed on trial for their life.

Now that the rebellion at home had been disposed of, General Botha could turn his attention to his long-projected invasion of German Southwest Africa. As originally planned the expedition



was weak in numbers, inadequately trained, was without aircraft, and lacked sufficient artillery, but all these deficiencies were now made good.

On January 5, 1915, the burgher force reassembled, and began to encamp on Green Point Common on the way to German Southwest Africa. Thousands of Boers, freshly trained for war through their recent operations against the rebels, were with this army of invasion.

German Southwest Africa was in some respects one of the most valuable of Germany's colonial possessions in Africa. It contains 320,000 square miles, which is about the size of Germany and Italy together. It has a seacoast of 800 miles on the west, is bordered on the north by the Portuguese colony of Angola, and on the east by the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland. Its shortest frontier of all is the Cape of Good Hope on the south. The population numbers about 100,000 natives and 15,000 German settlers. There are two ports on the coast, Lüderitz Bay and Swakopmund. Near the latter is the little British enclave of Walfish Bay, used as a trading and whaling station. Diamond mines were discovered near Lüderitz Bay in 1906, and copper is also found in the country. There are some hundreds of miles of bleak and sandy desert which presented many difficulties to the Union forces invading the country.

The British Government attached great importance to the conquest of German Southwest Africa and offered a loan of £7,000,000 for the expenses of the campaign.

General Botha planned an enveloping movement against Windhoek, the capital, about 200 miles from the coast. He divided his forces into two armies, the northern under his command to use Swakopmund as a base and to follow the railway to Windhoek. The army of the south under General Smuts was divided into three separate columns. One under Sir Duncan Mackenzie was to move east along the railway from Lüderitz Bay. Another under Colonel Berrange was to invade the colony from the east, and a third column commanded by Colonel Van der Venter was to march north along the line running down Warmbad to Keetmanshoop. Botha's plans, if successful, would drive the German

forces away from modern communications into a waterless desert region, from which they could not easily escape.

The two German ports were occupied, and at the beginning of February, 1915, the four principal gates into the colony were in Union hands. The outcome of this campaign in the second six months of the war is narrated in Volume III of this history.

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## CHAPTER XLIX

### ATTACK ON GERMAN EAST AFRICA

LET us now survey the conditions in German East Africa, the greatest of the German colonies, during the first six months of the Great War. It is twice the size of European Germany, and has a population of 8,000,000, which includes about 5,000 whites. Having Britain for a neighbor on the north and part of the west borders, and with a coast of 620 miles, the colony was in a position to invite attack, and also to invade the enemy country of British East Africa. Had the Germans known of the military weakness of the British during the first weeks after war had been declared, they could have easily conquered their neighbor, whose defense force at the time has been estimated at less than 1,200. For some reason the Germans did not make the most of their opportunity, and during the early weeks were only making sporadic attacks of small importance on the south and west borders. On August 13, 1914, a British cruiser bombarded the German port and capital, Dar-es-Salaam. Landing parties destroyed the new wireless station, sank the floating dock and survey ship *Moewe*, and dismantled German ships in the harbor. On Lake Nyassa on the same day the German steamer *Von Wissman* was surprised by the British steamer *Gwendolin* which captured the captain and crew and made her useless.

On September 5, 1914, Brigadier General J. M. Stewart arrived at Nairobi with a battalion of Imperial Service troops, the Twenty-ninth Punjabis, one battery of Calcutta Volunteer Artil-

lery, a battery of Maxim guns, and one mountain battery. General Stewart assumed command of the British force at a critical moment, when the Germans had just commenced operations against the Uganda railway. In the third week of August they had seized the little frontier post of Taveta near their chief military post of Moschi, and on the coast south of Mombasa had captured Vanga.

The Uganda railway at Maungu was blown up early in September, 1914. The expedition that did this work had a curious, and, in the eyes of their enemies, an amusing experience. It seems that the excellent German maps, which served to guide them within twenty miles of their objective, stopped at that point, and they were forced to use English maps. These were incorrect, and consequently they missed the water holes, went eight miles out of their way, and were captured to the last man.

Fighting in Africa is quite a different thing from fighting on the continent of Europe where climatic conditions are seldom oppressive. In the inhospitable colony of German East Africa, the British soldiers endured much suffering. And where was the glory, a soldier complained, in being potted by an unknown man you could not see, near some place whose name you could not pronounce, and whom no one had ever heard of? And to be buried far from home and the land of your birth, this was a bitter thought indeed.

It speaks well for the *morale* of the soldier that he did not fail "to do his bit" while marching and fighting in this pestilential climate, where any exertion is followed by intolerable weakness.

A German force of 600 men on September 6, 1914, had marched down the Tsavo River, but their advance was delayed by Lieutenant Hardingham and a company of King's African Rifles, who worried them day and night, but were not strong enough to attack. These obstructive tactics gave time for reenforcements to arrive, consisting of several companies of the King's African Rifles and half a battalion of the Twenty-ninth Punjabis. Hardingham was now ready to strike at the enemy and an engagement was fought about five miles from the Tsavo railway bridge, which scattered the Germans in confusion. This success cleared



the way to establish advance posts at Mzima and Campiy Marubu, which places though repeatedly attacked by German forces, the British continued to hold.

On September 10, 1914, the Germans crossed the frontier on the north and occupied Kisi near the Victoria Nyanza. Surprised two days later by two companies of the King's Rifles, native police and several Maxims, they were driven out in disorder, and retired to the lake port of Karungu. The British steamer *Wini-fred* having sunk two German dhows on the lake, entered Karungu Bay to relieve the town. Driven off at first, she was joined by the British steamer *Kavirondo* and returned to threaten the port which the Germans hastily evacuated, and then retreated over the border.

Of the many attacks along the northern frontier in September, 1914, the most threatening was an advance along the coast toward Mombasa from Vanga. An attack by land and water had been projected, but the *Königsberg*, which supported the expedition, failed to shell the town for some reason and played no part in the subsequent engagement. The Germans who were 600 strong, with six machine guns, were nearly successful in their land attack, but were held up at Gasi for several days by Captain Wavell's Arab Company, and King's African Rifles from Jubaland, until reenforced by Indian troops on October 2, 1914. In the desperate fighting that followed, all the European officers were wounded, and the command of the King's African Rifles fell to a native color sergeant. It was owing to this man's bravery and skill, that the British were victorious, for he headed the charge which dispersed the enemy.

During the remainder of October, 1914, the British stood on the defensive, waiting for a big Indian force that was expected to arrive in November. The German attacks had slackened, but they already occupied territory at De Longido on the Romba River, and at Taveta and had an advance post between the Romba and the Tsavo.

On this campaign the Europeans suffered intolerably from heat and thirst, and military operations were difficult, owing to the nature of the country. There were no maps, or roads, and

owing to the presence of wild beasts picketing and scouting were attended by many dangers. A waterless desert covered with bush and thorny scrub stretches along the northern border, and where the pitiless sun makes a weakling of the strongest man. Fortunately for the British most of their officers had hunted big game in this difficult country, and were accustomed to the climate, while their bush-bred African levies suffered little or no inconvenience.

On November 2, 1914, a second Indian Expeditionary Force commanded by Major General Aitken and escorted by two gunboats arrived at the German port of Tanga and summoned it to surrender. The officer in charge asked for time to communicate with the governor who was away, and this was granted. The Germans took advantage of this delay to bring down every available soldier by the Moschi railway. As the evening advanced, General Aitken became impatient, and landing one and one-half battalions on the coast, advanced on the town. The Germans had prepared a strong defense and the British were forced to retreat to the shore and the cover of their gunboats.

Having landed the remainder of his force, General Aitken again advanced to attack the town on November 4, 1914. The result was disastrous. The Germans showed a perfect knowledge of bushfighting and its devious methods, and had prepared some painful surprises. Hives of bees were hidden along the roads which swarmed out and stung the invaders, when the lids were twitched off by concealed wires. Ropes hidden under the sand when stepped on displaced flags and gave the Germans the required range for their artillery. In spite of these ingenious devices to hold them back the British force reached the town.

The Kashmir Rifles and the North Lancashires forced an entrance on the right, while on the left the One Hundred and First Grenadiers attacked with the bayonet. But the odds against the British troops were too heavy. Met by a fierce enfilading fire from the housetops they were forced to retire and reembark. There were nearly 800 casualties, which included 141 British officers and men, making the Tanga disaster one of the costliest that had been fought up to this time on African soil.

An attack on Longido the fort in British territory held by the Germans, had been arranged to coincide with the movement against Tanga. The East African Mounted Rifles and an Indian contingent detailed for the work, were forced to fall back with heavy losses, and Captain Sandbach of the First Royal Dragoons was killed.

The British attack was not, however, an entire failure, for on November 17, 1914, the Germans quietly abandoned the fort and the British occupied it.

A German force invaded Uganda on November 20, 1914, and after several repulses forced the garrison to retire from Kyaka Fort, on the south bank of Kagera River. Many isolated engagements were fought along the border, but in January, 1915, the British suffered a second important defeat. The Germans had invaded British territory by way of the coast after their victory at Tanga, but were driven back. At the beginning of 1915 the British borders were clear, and the British occupied the post of Jassin, twenty miles inside German territory.

A German attack on January 12, 1915, was beaten off, but six days later the enemy returned 2,000 strong, with artillery and machine guns, and began a vigorous assault. The garrison fought with great spirit, but was forced to surrender when the ammunition gave out, and some 240 men became prisoners of war. A party of Kashmir Rifles succeeded in cutting their way through the enemy, and with the loss of half their number reached the British lines. The Germans lost in this action 57 whites killed and wounded, including 7 officers, while their native troops suffered heavily. The Germans could now rightly claim that they had freed their East African territory of the enemy and that they also held some posts inside British borders.



## PART VII—WAR IN THE AIR AND UNDER THE GROUND

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### CHAPTER L

#### EXPLOITS OF THE AIR FIGHTERS

THE eye of an army is in the air. Like Argus of old the aeroplane sees everything. Massed troop movements, scurrying cavalry, feint attacks in force, no longer deceive the opposing commander. They have gone before, along with much other panoply of war. Enemy movements of to-day are accurately known to friend and foe. Every hour aeronauts bring in reports of battery positions, ammunition columns, infantry marching from here to there, with a concentration in order at a point where the next day's communiqué probably will locate a stiff fight.

Without modern aircraft it is probable that the impasse on the western front never would have developed. One side or the other must have blundered and been overwhelmed at some point. Then the legions would have come pouring through and a decisive battle fought. This always has happened before. With a few variations it is the history of war. Former methods of information, cavalry patrols, spies, and so on, left much to guesswork. The general who could read his enemy's mind most accurately was the winner.

The aeroplane, supplemented by the airship, is the factor that has brought war to something like a business organization. Upon the army pilot's judgment, technical knowledge, courage and skill depends the safety of thousands. Every airman is a general in embryo, more entitled to that rank than many a commander of bygone days. To be a successful army aeronaut is to have a first-

rate mental equipment, a stout heart, and some very complicated knowledge of distances, geography, gunfire, and a thousand other things. The aerial branch of the different armies developed a fine type of man, and the heroes of the air stood foremost on the honor roll of the war.

Soon after the conflict started aerial raids and clashes between opposing machines began. The world was electrified by a report in August, 1914, that Roland Garros had rammed and destroyed a Zeppelin, losing his own life. It later developed that he was not killed, and Berlin denied the fact, but it stands on the record.

On August 20, 1914, a Zeppelin was brought down by French gunfire in a wood near Epinal. The wreckage was carried to Paris and displayed, bits of the framework bringing good prices as souvenirs, the money being devoted to the wounded. Ten days before the French capital had seen its first enemy birdman. Several bombs were dropped with small damage. As the German armies drove through Belgium and on to the Marne German air reconnaissances above the city became frequent. There was some dropping of bombs, although the unwelcome visitors occupied themselves principally with locating defensive positions.

A French airman shelled Metz on August 10, 1914, damaging an airship shed. This was the first Ally raid into Germany.

One or more Zeppelins flew over Antwerp, August 25, 1914, when it still was held by the Belgians, and released explosives which resulted in the death of twelve persons and the injury of many others. The Royal Palace, where King Albert, his Queen and children were housed, appeared to be the special objective of this raid, three or four bombs falling within the immediate neighborhood. The hospital of St. Elizabeth narrowly escaped. German confederates were believed to have signaled the Zeppelins where bombs should be directed. For the second time that night and again on September 1 other attacks were made, but without special incident. The initial visit was the first German raid of any consequence that brought about the killing of civilians and caused a great outcry from all the world.

Ostend was occupied by British marines on August 27, 1914, and a strong squadron of British flyers arrived the next day.

They immediately took up the burden of air patrol work on the extreme western end of the front and have borne it ever since.

The most serious loss in Paris during the first period of the conflict occurred September 1, 1914, when a Taube flew over the city shortly after six o'clock in the evening. It was observed above the Gare St. Lazare, where one bomb fell. Antiaircraft guns began firing at the raider, whose reply was to proceed to the Place de l'Opéra. A second missile was thrown there. French craft then drove off the marauder, but fifteen persons were said to have been killed by the first bomb. The next few days saw other aerial attacks, all details of which were suppressed. Some lives undoubtedly were lost. With the defeat of the invaders on the Marne bomb dropping in Paris was reduced. The greater distance of the new German lines and the increased watchfulness of the Paris air patrol made the work more difficult.

A German lieutenant and his observer were picked up off Borkum on September 3, 1914, by a British submarine, the motor of their seaplane having failed. Typical of the Allies' activity in the air was the blowing up of a German ammunition column at Doullens, nineteen miles from Amiens, September 16. This was accomplished by a British aeroplane, and was one of the earliest authenticated attacks of the kind. The Russians accounted for another Zeppelin in the early days of September, the big dirigible falling a victim to field gunfire during the Russian invasion of East Prussia. Aeroplanes played a large part in the maneuvers on the eastern front, but were little used for offensive purposes.

By this time airmen on both sides were becoming very expert in their duties. The number of flights increased, there were battles above the earth almost daily, and numerous French cities near the front were shelled by aircraft. This brought about a restriction of lighting, street lamps being cut to the minimum, illumination in houses checked, and powerful searchlights mounted at convenient points to scour the heavens for raiders. These precautions were taken throughout northern France, and England soon followed suit, London now being wrapped in a darkness that smacks of the Middle Ages.

German cities had a taste of the new warfare. Flight Lieu-



tenant C. H. Collet and five other airmen of the British service flew a distance of 200 miles to Dusseldorf on September 22, 1914, and dropped explosives upon an airship shed. Two of the squadron made their way to Cologne, but owing to the misty weather were unable to locate airship sheds or munition plants and refrained from injuring civilians.

Five machines under Squadron Commander D. A. Spencer Grey left Antwerp, October 8, 1914. Commander Grey directed his course to Cologne with two machines and circled above the city at a height of 600 feet, being subjected to a continuous fire. Severe damage was inflicted on the railway station and other military points.

Lieutenant Marix proceeded to Dusseldorf the same night and dropped bombs upon a Zeppelin shed. The structure caught fire and was destroyed with a Zeppelin inside, reports said. The three attacks, following in quick succession, caused something akin to consternation in cities along the Rhine, although not a single German noncombatant had been injured up to that time. General von Bissing, who then commanded the district, issued a proclamation calling on the people to be firm.

St. Omer, Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne were each raided several times during the mid-period of October, 1914. The main purpose of the Germans was to ascertain what reinforcements the British were transporting across the channel, the destruction of lives and property only incidental.

Notre Dame Cathedral, Paris, was struck by a bomb dropped from one of two Taubes that paid the city their respects on October 11. The missile failed to explode and only trivial damage resulted. This was on a Sunday afternoon, and inaugurated a series of Sunday raids that lasted six weeks.

Twenty bombs fell upon the city October 11, 1914, four persons being killed and thirty-four wounded. The raiders unloosed several bombs at Notre Dame, but the splendid edifice was not seriously injured, the northern tower merely having a small hole torn in the roof. Information as to the succeeding raids was kept secret. It is likely that upward of fifty victims died in the several visits of the German machines.

October 15, 1914, was marked by a conflict between four French machines and a squadron of German cavalry. Such a fight had never before taken place. The birdmen chased the cavalry squadron all day, letting go an occasional bomb that kept the troops moving. Finally they made a sudden swoop downward and released all of their remaining explosives, killing most of the Germans and their horses.

French machines brought down a Taube east of Amiens on October 24, 1914. The next day four bombs were thrown into Verdun, the great stronghold of northern France. There was no loss of life.

Kaiser Wilhelm narrowly escaped death when British aeroplanes shelled his headquarters at Thielt, November 1, 1914, which he had just left. Several members of the imperial suite were killed. This raid, it was said, followed specific orders by Sir John French, now viscount, who then was commander in chief of the British forces. The kaiser treated him harshly at maneuvers in Germany a few years before, when the general attended as a royal guest. He never forgave the offense, so the story runs.

French and British machines succeeded in blowing up Fort Englos at Lille, held by the Germans, on November 4, 1914, and followed up this stroke the next day by destroying Fort Carnot. Both stored great quantities of explosives and a number of German troops were killed. Previous attempts had been made to the same end, but without important results.

It was announced in Berlin on November 8, 1914, that three German airmen had met death in the pursuit of their duties, and six others injured since the war began. Allied figures placed the casualties at several times that number.

French Dragoons came upon a German aeroplane squadron being transported to the front by wagons on November 20, 1914, near Soissons. A fight ensued which cost the lives of nearly all the dragoons, but not until they had made kindling wood of a half dozen German planes. The exploit is unique in a war of odd conflicts.

The 21st of November, 1914, saw a raid by Squadron Com-

mander E. F. Briggs, Lieutenant J. T. Babington, and Lieutenant S. V. Sippe upon Friedrichshafen, on Lake Constance, where one of the principal Zeppelin works is located. The trio started from Belfort, a French fortress, 250 miles distant. Zeppelin sheds and a gas factory were shelled, all of which caught fire. At least one Zeppelin was said to have burned. The three machines were hit and Commander Briggs had to alight. He was threatened with bodily harm, although painfully injured. A German officer rescued him. France awarded the Legion of Honor to each of the three raiders.

Before hostilities began Mülhausen in Alsace sheltered a plant where the *Aviatik*, one of the best German machines, was built. French airmen made this plant the special mark of numerous sorties, and before the city was taken by French arms, only to be lost again, the factory was removed to Freiburg, in the Black Forest. Enemy airmen followed it up and Freiburg repeatedly has been shelled from the air. Two of these attacks were made in late November.

Throughout November, 1914, German forces in Flanders devoted especial attention to the British army service, repeatedly attacking transport columns, railway points and other rallying places for men and supplies. Hazelbrouck was subjected to an air raid on December 7, 1914, three children and the same number of adult civilians being killed. Visits of this kind were so frequent that little attention was paid to them except in cases where non-combatants met death.

December, 1914, however, was an unfortunate month for the air pilots. The attempt to keep up with the enemy occupied the available men on both sides, and the weather was unfavorable. Nothing of any consequence happened until Christmas Eve, when Dover was visited by raiders. Several buildings were damaged, but there were no casualties. The next day a Taube penetrated to Erith, on the Thames, which was the farthest point inland known to have been reached up to that time.

This same Christmas Day, 1914, brought forth a historic incident. For the first time warships and seaplanes engaged Zeppelins, aeroplanes, and land fortifications. Led by Squadron



Commander Oliver, seven seaplanes left England early in the morning and foregathered at a point near the island of Helgoland. Several cruisers and a squadron of destroyers served as a convoy. The airmen made directly for Cuxhaven, at the mouth of the River Elbe, seventy miles from Helgoland and but a few miles from the entrance to the Kiel Canal. They engaged enemy aircraft, dropped many bombs and spread consternation for three hours. Both shore works and the German fleet were subjected to aerial bombardment, with the attacking machines almost constantly under fire during the period of their visit. The British ships were attacked by two Zeppelins and a flock of aeroplanes, but the pilots showed caution, particularly the two Zeppelins, and would not come to close quarters. Submarines also tried to approach the cruisers but could not evade the destroyer flotilla. There was fighting on the sea, beneath the water and in the air, the first time a general engagement of this kind was ever attempted.

One Zeppelin was destroyed in its shed on this raid, according to reports emanating from Germany. What other damage may have been done is uncertain, but the primary object was to estimate the number and disposition of warships and shore batteries at Cuxhaven. In this the undertaking was notably successful, giving the British admiralty definite information of the forces at the point attacked.

Of the seven British seaplanes three returned safely to the cruisers, three others were hit and lost at sea, the pilots being picked up by destroyers. The seventh man, Flight Commander F. E. T. Heylett, was rescued and interned in Holland after a Dutch fisherman had saved his life. He fell into the water with his machine about eight miles from Helgoland and it was one of the surprising features of the raid that he escaped capture.

Meanwhile sporadic attempts were made to teach England that great lesson which Germany had promised without special success. Coast towns had been shelled by airships, but there was little to show for the Germans' efforts.

Yarmouth and several other Norfolk villages were the mark of Zeppelins on January 19, 1915, when two persons were killed

in Yarmouth and King's Lynn. A shoemaker and an aged woman were the victims in the first place, a soldier's widow and a boy of fourteen died at the second. A soldier and a few citizens were wounded at Yarmouth. These were the first victims of aerial warfare in England, and their death aroused the nation as probably nothing else had since the conflict started. It is certain that the raiders were Zeppelins, owing to the size and number of bombs dropped. In addition to the towns named, Cromer, Beeston, Sheeringham, Heacham, and Snettisham were shelled. The property damage was heavy.

Further Zeppelin raids came with the passing weeks, none of which assumed serious proportions until the return of summer.

Dunkirk, British headquarters in France, was shelled every day or two from the air during January, 1915. A few fatalities and considerable destruction resulted. The main object was to disorganize British arrangements, but increased watchfulness and a large number of machines soon gave Dunkirk better protection. Many duels have been fought above the city and aeroplanes lost on both sides.

Two members of the British aerial forces shelled the harbor at Zeebrugge, Belgium, converted into a submarine base after its capture by the Germans, and sunk one undersea boat on January 22, 1914. This again was a new achievement in war, which has been followed by a number of conflicts between aircraft and warships of various sorts. The Italians are believed to have sunk at least two Austrian torpedo boats in this manner, a French aeronaut made away with another off Ostend, and other similar clashes have taken place.

## CHAPTER LI

DEVELOPMENTS IN AIR FIGHTING  
MACHINES

AT the outset of the war the nations engaged knew a good deal about aerial science and were in various stages of preparedness. Germany had worked strenuously to develop the rigid airship, lavishing her efforts on the Zeppelin, but not forgetting the aeroplane. Austria possessed an indifferent equipment in both branches, Italy was somewhat better off, and Russia in a transition state where great steps forward had been made, but with an inadequate number of machines. Great Britain was in the same dilemma, but did have an excellent naval service, to which she had directed much attention.

France, after the Wright brothers showed that an aeroplane could fly, began the intensive development of aircraft. But the work was carried on in private channels rather than by the Government. The French air service was in many ways the best of all the air corps engaged, but probably not so well organized as the German. The record of France in aeronautics is a brilliant one, and to her is due many of the vital inventions that have made flights by aeroplane possible. Particularly in motor construction have the French excelled. Before hostilities began her aviators had been accustomed to set new world records almost at will, and no sooner had the war started than they rallied to the colors. Such men as Garros and Pégoud, the former captured, and the latter killed, became simple privates. Thus, in the beginning, France had the most daring and expert pilots, the Germans acted more as a unit, and the British had hit upon a middle course that was notably efficient. And the Russian airmen were soon to earn a reputation for daring that gives place to none. Austria had made a few spectacular raids on Venice, Ancona and other Italian cities, and the Italians had replied with consistent patrol and reconnaissance work. Austria has some splendid dirigibles, developed by herself, which



are exceedingly trustworthy, though only half the size of a Zeppelin.

A high officer of the United States army told a Congressional committee investigating military affairs that the French flying corps had more men attached to it than the entire armed force of the United States. This is indicative of the attention bestowed to aerial work and reveals the prodigious efforts made since the war began to meet new conditions. There are no reliable figures as to the number of machines and the men who were engaged in flying on either side. But there are many fairly accurate estimates, of which the following, both by experts, are useful. The figures are based on strength of the various corps at the beginning.

Country	Dirigibles	Aeroplanes
France.....	31	1,200
Great Britain...	15	500
Russia.....	16	800
Belgium.....	2	40
Serbia.....	0	40
Germany.....	35	600
Austria.....	10	350

Country	Dirigibles	Aeroplanes
Germany.....	22	320
Austria.....	7	100
France.....	16	834
Russia.....	10	164
Great Britain...	6	250
Belgium.....	2	40
Serbia.....	0	10

Somewhere between these two sets of figures probably lies the truth, with the odds favoring the larger estimate. The entrance of Italy brought the Allies about twenty-five additional dirigibles and from 200 to 300 aeroplanes. The preponderance always has been with the Allies, but Germany has to her credit the greater number of raids calculated to impress the public

mind—raids in which destruction was spread and the loss of life heavy.

Pégoud, Garros, Immelmann and Warneford, each name stands for brave deeds well done. The first two, both Frenchmen, were famous before the war started as daring pilots who courted destruction upon many occasions. Hostilities brought their fame to a climax. Immelmann, the German, has figured in the day's news for many months as the most daring of German pilots. His record of machines brought down is said to exceed a dozen. The name of Warneford ranks alone. While returning from an early morning flight over Belgium he sighted a Zeppelin homeward bound from a nocturnal trip to England's shore and gave battle. The Zeppelin tried to get away, but the young Canadian in the British service ascended above the dirigible, dropping bomb after bomb upon the gas bag, being under fire himself all the while. Apparently the Zeppelin could not be injured by his missiles. He had but one bomb left. This he flung downward in his last effort. Suddenly there was an explosion, a sheet of flame and rush of air that turned Warneford's machine completely over. He righted it and watched the Zeppelin fall to earth. The Victoria Cross and Legion of Honor were awarded him. A few days later he was killed on an aviation field near Paris when his machine failed.

To Americans the war in the new element was of supreme interest for many reasons, as many were engaged in it. The French flying corps included twelve or fifteen Americans. Some of the best known were William Thaw, a second lieutenant; Norman Prince and Elliott C. Cowdin, both corporals; J. W. Bach, Bert Hall, Frazier Curtis, D. W. Masson, and H. G. Gerin. Several of them were honored for gallant service.

The size and famed powers of the Zeppelin seize upon the imagination, and the Germans had thought that the huge craft would spread terror among their foes, particularly the civilian population. A campaign of suggestion carried on through the press of the world long before the war was diligently followed up after the start of hostilities. Marvelous accounts were given of Zeppelin fleets that could cruise for thousands of miles with a

formidable crew of men and enough explosives to wipe out whole cities. It was hinted that Germany had dozens of these airships.

During the last decade, and especially the last five years, the pet bogey of England has been an invasion by air. Newspapers gave frequent prominence to stories of strange midnight visitors who came in ghostly flying machines. First they were seen in Scotland along the coast, then throughout the British Isles. The nerves of the nation were pitched to believe almost anything that had to do with a host of Zeppelins or monster aeroplanes that would drop death from the sky and level England's might. Germany knew this and fostered the feeling. But once the war was on and the Zeppelins had come, were seen and heard, and their worst deeds viewed in the wreck of a few buildings with a few casualties, the British recovered their poise. The bogey had lost its power. There was more curiosity in London after six months of war over a Zeppelin visit than aught else, and it was this very curiosity that brought throngs of people into the streets when the raiders came, thereby increasing the number of persons killed and mangled.

This largely is true of Paris, the mark of the Zeppelin was left on a good many occasions during the first period of the war, but in later months the city was almost immune from attack. The fact is a tribute to the French flying corps, which found adequate means to check the Zeppelin. There never was the same dread of aerial attack in Paris as in London, due perhaps to the French temperament and the habit of living nearer to an ever-present danger.

The Zeppelin is an outgrowth of the balloon, a discovery of the brothers Montgolfier, who demonstrated at Avignon, France, in 1782, that a silk bag containing heated air would rise from the ground and support itself. Soon afterward gas was substituted for air, and by degrees the balloon evolved until it could be released from captivity and at least partly controlled. At the battle of Fleurus in 1794 the French used a balloon for observation, which marked its entry into the scheme of war. Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin is said to have procured the basic idea for his invention from an Austrian engineer named Schwarz,



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taking over certain patents held by the latter. But to him alone credit is due for developing the great airship that bears his name.

With a length of from 300 to more than 500 feet even the largest Zeppelins have a diameter slightly under fifty feet, which means least possible resistance to the wind when traveling against air currents. The most recently built Zeppelins have about 800,000 cubic feet gas capacity, with a car at either end beneath the hull. Four motors of from 180 to 200 horsepower and two sets of propellers create driving power. A system of rudders guide the big craft.

A Zeppelin frame is made of the finest aluminum, separated into from sixteen to twenty-four sections, each containing a gas bag. One or more of these may be damaged and the gas discharged without causing the airship to fall. Under the center of the frame and between the two cars is an armored cabin resembling a ship's cabin where the crew lives. This is provided with guns and all needed equipment. Above the gas bag is a platform bearing one or two machine guns, reached by a stairway passing between two of the compartments.

Wireless apparatus is another feature of the Zeppelin, which also is equipped with a device for dropping bombs. Estimates as to the Zeppelin's radius of action and carrying capacity vary. The best authenticated opinion places its maximum load at five tons, although other estimates increase the figures to eight tons. This includes the aggregate weight of the crew, fuel, water and supplies, which would enable the dirigible to transport something like one and a half tons of ammunition. It has the longest cruising power of any aircraft developed up to this time and holds the altitude record for dirigible balloons, having risen to more than 10,000 feet. It is known that the Zeppelin can travel 1,200 miles without replenishing its supplies, and some of the newer type are said to have a radius of from 2,000 to 3,000 miles. This is doubtful. Their highest speed is placed at fifty-two miles an hour, which may be increased to upward of a hundred miles an hour when flying with the wind. The usual crew is between twenty and thirty men.

The Zeppelin's disadvantages are numerous. Owing to the

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far superior speed of aeroplanes the monster airships are always in danger of successful attack from these puny antagonists. The whole principle of aerial warfare depends upon the height and rapidity with which a machine can mount into the air. Aeroplanes rise faster than a Zeppelin and have attained an altitude of 26,000 feet. They present an infinitesimal target as compared to the Zeppelin and maneuver more readily. Thus the German's principal achievement in aerial science is almost at the mercy of their enemies under ordinary conditions, although the Zeppelin mounts heavier guns and has the asset of a steadier position from which to fire.

Another distinction between the airship and the aeroplane is that the aeroplane must be constantly in motion, while the Zeppelin can remain stationary, or nearly so. But this is overcome through the aeroplane's ability to drive off and outmaneuver its larger adversary. Because of this the Zeppelin is employed only at night, save in rare instances. To sum up, it is in reality a clumsy affair, unmanageable with a gale blowing and has been shown to have but little use except for nighttime depredations. Many Zeppelins suffered severely in storms, and at least a half dozen have been lost since the war started as a result of the elements. Unless securely put away in their sheds they will break from moorings and float away should a stiff breeze come up while they are on the ground. Numerous accidents of this sort have happened, many men being hurt in striving to keep the big craft on earth. Each Zeppelin must have a retinue of attendants, for repair work is frequent and difficult. What their future may be is an unanswerable problem, but it is certain that they have failed to prove a scourge for Germany's opponents in anything like the degree expected. By its very unwieldiness the Zeppelin is its own worst enemy.

All aeroplanes are built on the same general principle. Driving force is procured by a gasoline motor that in some cases will generate 200 horsepower. The motor sets in motion one or more propellers, and the wings or planes serve to balance the machine, which is guided by a rudder at the rear end. Aeroplanes are of three kinds—monoplanes, biplanes, and hydroaeroplanes. The

first is distinguished by the fact that it has two planes, one on each side of the machine, with the propeller at the forward tip of the frame. Biplanes have two planes on each side, one above the other, and the propeller aft. The hydroaeroplane is substantially the same as the biplane, but is equipped with pontoons, and the body is built in the form of a boat, enabling it to either fly above or skim over the surface of the water. They are used almost exclusively by warships and have rendered valuable service. The British navy excels in this class of aircraft, having devoted special attention to aerial science in the naval arm. An aeroplane can be started with a 50-foot run, and will alight and come to a halt within a little more than that distance if necessity requires. On starting, the aviator endeavors to rise against the wind, and must always alight in the face of the current. Some of the smaller machines are constructed to carry only one man, but the majority accommodate two. From one to two hundred pounds of bombs constitute a full load, excluding the big battle planes, of which France has the larger number. These machines have room for several men, mount a gun forward and aft and will sustain a proportionately heavier load of ammunition.

Bombs are released from the bottom or side of the car by a trigger device. Accuracy only is possible when the machine descends to a height of 2,000 feet or less, preferably a few hundred feet. Being easily within range, at such times the airmen's work is extremely hazardous.

Even the slowest aeroplane can travel at a rate of forty-five miles an hour, and the newer models commonly make from 75 to 100 miles an hour. The fastest machines attain a speed of two miles a minute for short periods. No machine can fly slower than about thirty-five miles an hour and stay afloat. The cruising capacity of all types varies from 100 to 600 or 700 miles, longer flights being rare, although many planes travel 300 to 400 miles without alighting, sometimes in squadrons. The rate of progress determines to a large extent the time a machine can stay in the air, high speed burning up fuel so rapidly that flights are limited to a few hours.

The small machines of one-man capacity nearly always are



defenseless, only the most expert aviators being able to manipulate a gun and manage their craft. Pégoud was the first to accomplish this feat.

The constant effort of all the nations is to lighten the mechanical apparatus of flying craft and to promote speed and carrying capacity. Recently the Germans have been abandoning the Taube machine in favor of a biplane copied after the Henri Farman model, which is one of the distinctive French craft. It is more dependable and faster.

Many devices have been tried to lessen the noise of aeroplane propellers and conceal the machines from view while in the air. A favorite ruse, of course, is to hide amid the clouds and watch enemy positions. The Germans carried this idea a step further and invented a gas bomb which throws out a great pall of black smoke, furnishing airmen with a temporary cloak against unfriendly eyes. Another type of bomb gives out a misty volume of smoke exactly duplicating a cloud. Both airships and aeroplanes are supplied with these bombs.

To the Germans goes the credit for another clever ruse of war in the air. This is a car which suspends several hundred feet below the hull of a dirigible, and from which observers may reconnoiter while the airship is floating above a cloud. The car itself will be invisible except to the keenest eye, aided by an unusually powerful telescope.

The problem of invisibility is one to which the best scientific brains have been given endless thought. Several times the Germans have claimed a solution. It was announced that a combination of cellulose and acetic acid rendered a machine safe from the eye at 6,000 and nearly so at 3,000 feet. Whether this claim is well founded cannot be determined. The Germans also have built aeroplanes with wings made of synthetic resins, having the same end in view. Pronounced success has resulted, according to German circles.

Russia developed the largest type of aeroplane. It is known as the Sikorsky, has an armored body and room for from six to eight men. Two or three machine guns, and usually one field piece of about 3-inch bore, represent its armament. These ma-

chines are exceedingly powerful—just how powerful it is difficult to say, as the Russians have carefully guarded the secret of their construction, and there is no record of one having been captured. But they are known to have proved valuable auxiliaries of the army, and it is reported that Russia has embarked on a campaign of building, which contemplates numerous fleets of the Sikorsky machines. They are equipped with complete wireless outfit, being able to either send or receive messages, it is said. This is a great step forward, as no practical device for transmitting wireless signals from an aeroplane has yet been brought forward by either Russia's allies or opponents. Many machines carry equipment to receive messages, but must return to their lines with a report of enemy movements. What it would mean to instantly communicate important information from a position miles away is readily perceivable. As a substitute, the birdmen use showers of paper by day and parachutes with a red torch attached to indicate the foe's location at night. The method is a very good one, so far as it goes, but every belligerent eagerly awaits the time when aeroplanes may send wireless dispatches.

The best monoplanes are faster than the best biplanes. The latter are able to carry a gun at the forward end, and even with inferior speed sometimes have the monoplane at a disadvantage. With a whirling propeller always in motion, it has been deemed impossible to place a gun on a monoplane in such wise that its fire would be outside the propeller's radius when shooting straight ahead. In consequence guns were mounted at either the right or left side. When attacking or trying to drive off a foe it has been necessary to jockey for a position from which the observer could fire.

This handicap is said to be completely overcome in the Fokker, which has armored propeller blades, according to good information. The line of fire is directly through the propeller's zone of action, and such bullets as strike the blades are deflected. It is claimed that not more than five out of a hundred bullets strike the blades, and that it is impossible for the occupants of the car to be hit by a recoiling bullet.

The Fokker is equipped with a motor of from 110 to 120 horse-

power, and has a peculiar facility for performing spiral evolutions that bring it near an enemy plane while offering but a small target. Its tactics are different from the hitherto unvarying rule that aerial combats are won by the machine which gets above its enemy. Instead, the Fokker is reported to often seek the lower position, and, firing in a straight line, literally tear out the bottom of the other machine, much in the fashion that a shark would attack a small boat. The Fokker in reality is a shark of the air.

The conquest of the air has proceeded in such a way that the dreams of yesterday seem certain to be realized to-morrow. What the novelists conceived as a possibility has become a fact. We are face to face with a new mode of war that already has shown the futility of strong walls when the cities they protect are defenseless from above. Considering the youth of aircraft and the remarkable efficiency attained, it appears reasonable to believe that the future will see huge dreadnoughts of the air, even larger than Zeppelins, capable of flying for thousands of miles, and otherwise comparable to the biggest battleships of the sea. There are already aerial destroyers and machines built especially for pursuit. Perhaps we shall see battles in the new element on the same tactical plan as those of the sea. It is possible that a nation to control the world must not be the stronger upon the sea alone, but in the air as well. It may be that control of the sea would not counterbalance control of the air—that the air fleet could dictate to the rulers of the sea.

The aeroplane of the future, if it realize the hope of man's genius, will be silent and invisible, firing a noiseless and smokeless gun, cruising great distances—the true winged messenger of death.



## CHAPTER LII

## WAR UNDERGROUND—THE TRENCHES

THE Great War, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, inaugurated many new epochs. It was the beginning of a new era of invention—the development of warfare into a great science. It proved the value of engineering as a decisive factor in battles. More crucial battles were probably won by engineering skill than by the valor of the soldiery.

The most remarkable of these innovations was the great system of trenches which changed the whole method of warfare and completely upset the calculations of armies. It is necessary, to obtain a clear understanding of the European campaigns, to study very carefully this system of trench warfare.

Did the Germans foresee trench warfare and prepare for it in advance? Certain it is that they displayed great genius in this new science. It first appeared after their retreat from the Marne, following four days' fighting, September 6 to 9, 1914, when they reached the neighborhood of the Aisne, where the French found them securely dug in. Much mystery surrounds this stand of the Germans. Tales have been told of concrete gun emplacements built long before by German agents, and of defensive positions selected in advance by the General Staff, which were turned into a miles-long earthwork, anticipating a retreat from Paris.

The Germans faced about at a point north of Peronne, eastward to the St. Mihiel salient, between Verdun and Nancy, links in the barrier of border fortresses which had held up their efforts to advance in the first sweep of troops on to French territory. The wing of the army which did get through extended from the St. Mihiel position north and west to the vicinity of Peronne, and here it was that the French found them intrenched after the battle on the Marne. By degrees the sinuous line of ditches stretched to the Swiss border on the one side and, after a great flanking operation by all the armies engaged,

ended only when the sea was reached, to the Flanders coast. Lille fell, Ypres held, the trenches passed around. Like two Titans the opposing armies have wrangled along this embattled front, for many weary months have waited for a chance to deliver a telling blow. The Germans tried hardest at Ypres, around Rheims and in the Argonne; the French in Champagne and near Lens, with British aid at the second point. But every slight advance has had only one result: new ditches, more ditches. To the men in them it is a world of ditches and existence, the carving out and keeping open of a wound across the face of a continent.

During the campaign through Belgium neither side resorted to trenches other than the shallow rifle pits which had been handed down in the tactics of former wars. The Germans had no occasion to show their plan, if such they had, and the Belgians but little chance, even if they conceived the possibility of halting the invaders from a cleft in the face of the earth. It may then be fairly assumed that the trench sprang from necessity, that leaders on both sides, seeking for some protection from concentrated fire, turned to the earth and ordered the burrowing that has changed the whole complexion of war.

Approaching the battle line from a reserve post, the beginning of the trenches appeared as a ditch whose bottom sloped from the surface to a depth of from six to seven feet. Ordinarily there was room for two men to pass in this communicating trench, the sides gradually narrowing as the front lines drew nearer. The entrance was anywhere from two miles to a few hundred yards from the front, according to the nature of the country. In most places there were three lines of battle trenches, the second and third holding reserves, and the first, or fire trench, the men actually on duty. As a whole the trenches follow a tortuous, zigzag course, designed to prevent an enfilading fire if the enemy broke through at one or more points. Frequently a trench section was carried, while an intervening stretch held out until reserves came up and the whole was retaken. Communicating trenches sometimes crossed each other, or several converged at one spot. The system was comparable to the plan

of a city's streets, and the opposing commanders have detailed maps of both their own and the enemy's trenches. Plans of the latter were made by special officers who were skilled topographers using photographs and other records of observations taken from the vantage point of aeroplanes. Much time and infinite labor were expended in the work.

In front of the trench line stretched a little wall of earth. At some places, notably in Flanders, sandbags were used. Every few feet was an opening large enough to permit the entrance of a rifle barrel and for the man behind to sight the weapon. Look-outs with periscopes were on duty at regular intervals, the periscopes being one of the war's contributions to the paraphernalia of armies. This instrument consists of a mirror at the end of a tube, which reflects the scenes before it on a second mirror at the opposite end.

Trench walls ordinarily were unsupported, but in some instances it was necessary to use uprights and crosspieces, just as a mine shaft is constructed. In the beginning, life for the men on duty was extremely arduous, but improvement came with experience. Many of the German trenches were lined with concrete, keeping them practically free of water and the earth's moisture. All of the armies learned how to build comfortable dugouts in the trench walls, holding from two to a dozen men. Rude articles of furniture were introduced, with a bed, chairs, and other comforts in many instances. Deserted homes near the front had been shorn of their furnishings to make existence below the ground bearable.

Another variation of the trench was the bomb-proof or bomb pit, which was from ten to twenty feet deep, furnishing secure protection against the liveliest cannonade. When the French broke through in Champagne they found many such bomb pits filled with German soldiers who refused to surrender. Hand grenades were thrown in and their brave occupants blown to bits. One special danger of these pits was the likelihood of a shell's explosion blocking the entrance, bringing death by suffocation.

No sooner had the men become accustomed to trench life than



the fancy of their several races asserted itself. "This way to the Strand," "Piccadilly," "Bond Street," and other similar placards were posted in the British trenches, while particularly comfortable dugouts became the Ritz-Carlton, the Cecil, and so on. The French had their Palais, Faubourg, St. Germain, Champs-Élysée, and the Germans their Wilhelmstrasse. Thus do brave men make light of danger.

As a part of their Champagne offensive the French constructed a number of trenches capable of bringing up artillery and shells by transport. These trenches were in reality sunken roads, six to seven feet wide and proportionately deep. Over them were spread sheets of canvas, the upper surface painted to resemble the surrounding country as a means of deceiving German airmen. The ruse entailed prodigious effort and labor.

The second winter of the war saw vast improvement as regards sanitation and general healthfulness of the trenches. Instead of water knee-deep at many points, the trenches in the west practically were free of that troublesome element. The British and Belgians spent a good part of the first winter pumping water out of their subterranean homes. Frozen feet, neuralgia, and acute rheumatism were common.

What is true of the west largely was true of the east, but the analogy is not perfect. Russians, Austrians, and Germans fought over a vaster sweep of territory, more men have been engaged as a whole, the ebb and flow of battle has covered greater distances. As a result the belligerent forces have contented themselves with a ruder form of trench, made to answer impending attack, with the likelihood of desertion at short notice. Following the stiffening of the Russian resistance after Warsaw's fall and the advent of the second winter, both sides turned their attention to better trenches. The opposing lines in Courland, before Riga and Dvinsk, probably were as well dug in as the armies of the west. And they are almost as close together over a thousand-mile front—that is, from a dozen to several hundred yards. Farther south, toward the Carpathians, in Galicia, Bessarabia, etc., it appeared that the commanders were satisfied to keep an eye on enemy movements from a distance

of several miles. Trenches there were aplenty, but mobile forces rested on towns and villages as basic points and depended upon outposts for warning of an advance.

The Dardanelles campaign saw intensive development of trench warfare. There defender and invader faced each other over a no man's land only yards wide. With the exception of the Suvla Bay and Anzac positions, where the ground sloped gently to the hills above, the Turks had much the better of it. Always in possession of heights which commanded the tip of Gallipoli Peninsula, where Frenchman and Briton made such a bold but fruitless bid for the city of the sultans, they had their foes at an insuperable disadvantage. Being above, they were enabled to observe every move of the enemy and pin him down in such a narrow area that he finally gave up. Trench war on Gallipoli was more like the sieges of old, where foe met foe in hot conflict and died by the sword. Losses on both sides were large.

On other fronts, Mesopotamia, the Caucasus, in Africa, and other outposts, there was little trench fighting. The Italians have had their principal taste of it along the Isonzo, to cross which the Austrians took such heavy toll. Elsewhere the Italians battled almost entirely in mountainous country that precluded extensive trench systems.

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## CHAPTER LIII

### WEAPONS OF TRENCH WARFARE

**H**OWITZER fire is the chief menace of intrenched troops. These big-mouthed guns, throwing a heavy caliber shell which rises in a high trajectory before dropping to earth, are responsible for a large part of the casualties. By long practice gunners have achieved a weird precision in their deadly business, enabling them to drop howitzer shells with remarkable exactness. The most effective results are obtained by what is termed indirect

fire, guided from an aeroplane. The commander of a battery, protected by a hillock from the view of his opponents, will get the exact location of their trenches when his own airman drops a shower of fine paper above the spot. A minute or two later that particular trench section is subjected to severe shelling. Casualties are inevitable, and if one of the projectiles lands in a trench its defenders are wiped out to a man almost every time. The 9-inch howitzer shell weighs 290 pounds, and the 12-inch 1,000 pounds. These are seldom used except against great fortifications.

Another type of howitzer is the trench mortar. This is a diminutive cannon having a barrel from eighteen to thirty inches long, and usually is placed on the bottom of a trench, its nose pointing toward the enemy at an angle of from sixty to seventy-five degrees. These mortars are fired in much the same manner as ordinary big guns, with the exception that their shells are propelled by powder lighted from a fuse instead of the electric spark that has been adopted wherever possible, owing to the lessening of danger. The mortar shell is very effective. Fired at trenches but a few yards away, it usually reaches the mark. These shells follow the same spiral course as the big howitzer projectiles.

Trench war brought forth many new weapons and reclaimed still others from the past. In this latter class is the grenade, an effective means of attack through the Middle Ages, and even long before, being easily traceable to the custom of throwing Greek fire balls in classic times.

Hand grenades were used to some extent in the Russo-Japanese conflict, but it remained for the European War to see their general revival. Of the many kinds of grenades, both those fired by rifle and thrown by hand, the French bracelet grenade is typical. This is a small shell in reality, perfectly round and filled with bullets on the same principle as shrapnel. At the mouth or neck is a firing pin having a curved end. Into this the thrower inserts another hook on the end of a leather strap that passes around his wrist. He then tosses the bomb toward the enemy, automatically setting off the firing charge by a tug



on the pin. This fuse burns seven seconds. Grenade or bomb throwers become very expert, and all of the armies now have regular corps of grenadiers. About twenty men in each infantry company usually are detailed for this work.

The British employed an egg-shaped bomb containing bullets and charge of trinitro-toluol, one of the most powerful explosives. The thrower unfastens a catch at the instant of releasing the bomb, which in turn releases a trigger that sets off a quick match, burning seven seconds. The Germans and Russians—in fact, all of the belligerents—have bombs of the same general character. Practically all of them depend on the action of the thrower to fire a fuse that burns a few seconds.

In the early days of war beneath the ground the opposing armies were put to it for a method of reaching their foe, the penetration of shrapnel and rifle bullets being insufficient to pierce well-constructed trench barriers of sand in bags or dirt. The men soon hit upon the plan of grenades. They took beef tins and filled them with bullets and a powder charge, to which fuses were attached, and the grenade once more was in vogue. Prompt steps were taken by the army authorities, and the output of grenades now runs into millions.

Supplementing the work of soldiers armed with bombs are the various apparatus for throwing these instruments of death. In this class is the ancient catapult, used since the dawn of time to hurl destruction at a foe. It was once developed to a point where huge stones were thrown several hundred yards into walled cities and against weak spots in barriers. But the modern catapult is of small size, ordinarily nothing more than a resilient piece of wood from three to four feet long. One end being fastened to a heavy timber, the other is bent back as far as possible, and the bomb catapulted from a cup on the unfastened end. The French were partial to this type of bomb thrower, and also have used a contrivance made of metal along the same general lines.

In the British trenches one end of a heavy timber is placed at the bottom of a trench and the other at its top, facing the enemy. A thin strip of metal attached to the timber acts as a spring on which a grenade is placed, the unfastened end being

bent backward until it catches in the notch of an upright stick. Sudden release of this trigger propels the grenade.

The rifle is still another implement employed for bomb throwing. The Germans use this method a great deal, and the French and British to a lesser extent. It is fired by an ordinary rifle cartridge having a slightly smaller charge, and has a range of about four hundred yards.

There are many other sorts of bomb throwers, several of which work on the principle of a boy's sling. Accuracy varies a good deal, and the best results probably are achieved by grenadiers trained in the work. The quasi-mechanical devices naturally have greater range.

Grenades are much employed in a charge, where the thrower has an excellent chance to work havoc in an opposing trench. They also serve to help cut away barbed-wire entanglements before trench lines, although this is chiefly performed by artillery.

Shrapnel is another perpetual threat to the man in the trench. Bursting overhead, these shells throw out 300 bullets each in a fan shape, and when one such shell bursts in the neighborhood of a trench some one is almost certain to be hit. The bullets scatter over a radius of twenty-five yards, and may be fired accurately from a gun 6,000 yards away. To offset this danger the French adopted steel helmets instead of fatigue caps, and the saving in life is said to be considerable. A goodly percentage of shrapnel wounds in the trenches are injuries to the skull, and this new helmet cuts down the number of such wounds in an important way. Shrapnel for the most part bursts in the air but occasionally a lucky shot will place a shell directly in a trench. The result may be imagined. Both shrapnel and explosive shells, principally lyddite or some other high explosive, are useful in destroying barbed-wire entanglements, the principal defense of a trench from infantry charge.

A distinctly German weapon, but which was adopted by the British and to some extent the French, is the mine thrower. This projects an iron shell containing more than 100 pounds of explosive from 200 to 400 yards. The mine thrower in reality is another type of the trench mortar and a tremendously effective

one. The results of its fire are terrifying. Like the big German guns that leveled Antwerp's forts, Liege and many other strongholds, it throws a projectile much larger than had ever been used by any army, or was deemed possible at such a range and under such conditions. The effect of a hundred-pound shell falling into a trench from that of the enemy a few hundred yards off is enough to shake the steadiest nerves. So efficient was the weapon deemed that the British hastened to follow suit, and the French also in a more restricted measure.

In addition to all of these dangers the trench mine must not be forgotten. It is a particularly vicious way of killing a man, against which he has no protection once the charge is fired. Engineers on both sides were constantly engaged in driving saps or tunnels beneath the enemy's trench. They were anywhere from a few yards to several hundred feet in length and sloped downward beneath the trench to be blown up. Sometimes detachments, bent on carrying death to trench lines a short distance apart, met underground with only the flicker of a miner's torch to show their enemies. Then a fierce battle ensued, with picks, shovels and strong hands as weapons.

But even more terrible is the explosion of a mine. Every man within the mined area, which might be quite large, usually was killed. More than that, bodies are dismembered—shattered fragments of men, equipment and their trench furnishings mingle in a gruesome heap. Then on comes the enemy, bent upon winning a few feet of ground. If he gains lodgment in the shattered trench artillery opens upon him at once and the inevitable countercharge is not long developing. On many occasions men in the neighboring stretch of trenches forestall the charge of the enemy and meet him halfway. Either method is equally fruitful in casualties.

None of the implements of war, however, is comparable to the machine gun for effectiveness in trench fighting. It is the *ne plus ultra* of destructive machinery. One machine gun is equal to the fire of fifty infantrymen standing shoulder to shoulder. A crew of two men can often hold off a whole company by its deadly action. This the Germans first realized and the whole of their



western front bristles with these guns. Some reports have it that there is a machine gun to every sixth or seventh man, but this probably is exaggerated.

Before the outbreak of hostilities most of the belligerent armies carried six machine guns to a regiment. This number has been trebled at least, and in the front line trenches of the western theatre machine guns are to be met with at every turn of a trench. It is believed that the Germans had a larger number than the Allies.

These machine guns were always ready under all conditions to pour forth their hail of death. Many a charge has been checked at the outset by the concentrated fire of a few such guns. Troops pouring over a parapet who found themselves mowed down by machine-gun fire were more than apt to falter and return to cover. Once in motion the danger of a retreat was less.

Any hint of activity in an opposing trench was sufficient to bring a prompt fire from the machine guns across the way. At night, especially, are they turned loose in a hair-trigger sort of way that tells of constant watchfulness and jumpy nerves. A majority of charges were launched at night, wounded men were carried to the rear, relief came up for weary men on duty, ammunition was moved and all the thousand and one chores of trench life were done. To prevent the enemy from stealing the slightest advantage, opposing trench guardians set off star lights and other aerial illuminations in much the same manner as a Fourth of July celebration. At the beginning the Germans were better equipped in this respect than their foes, but with advancing months all of the armies received plentiful supplies of the kind.

Some of the most dangerous trench work fell to the men told off to repair wire entanglements, build new ones and, in many cases, new trenches. Compelled to work in front of their own lines, with the enemy in easy hearing distance, and with the night made brilliant by fitful illumination, it is a task to upset the most stolid. But this work proceeded every night along the whole front.

Other men also crept from the trenches at night and went

beyond the lines. Their business was to find out what was happening in their neighbor's trench. Great daring and much skill were shown by some of these prowlers, skill which would rival the craft of a plainsman or Indian. They often succeeded in approaching the wire entanglements of their opponents, and brought back bits of conversation that might enlighten a commander of some important project under way. The number of men equipped for this duty naturally was limited to those able to speak the tongue of whatever race opposed them.

Some sanguinary tales have been told of the East Indian cohorts in the British army who were said to delight in nighttime depredations. These men, brought up in jungle lore, accustomed to go through the world with the soft step and nonchalance that defies the Occidental, found it a delightful enterprise to slip through wire nettings and, with a long knife, descend upon the unlucky Germans whom they could reach. Such sallies were made by one, two, three or a dozen men in a group. Many of them never come back, but they spread terror among the troops facing them, which is a very excellent thing, says the textbook of war.

And the sniper was with the soldier always. Night and day he kept up an intermittent pot shooting that made every man within range feel he was the immediate target. Officers are the particular fancy of the sniper and a number of high commanders were killed or wounded by sharpshooters. A ruse of the Germans which cost the British many lives was to get a sniper through the lines wearing a British uniform. Then, after dark, he began his work. Stories of the death meted out to such men had a chilling effect on others, and the practice gradually subsided.

Rifle fire, of course, was a great factor either for assault or defense. And all of the armies had long-range rifles of deep penetration. The number of bullets discharged from machine guns and rifles in a critical moment is truly astounding. It is this concentrated fire that prevented a general engagement on the western front and success or defeat for one of the belligerents.

Another development of trench warfare is the buried gun turret. These are built on the plan of ship turrets, with one or two light field pieces inside. Machine guns supplant these in some instances. The top of the turret is about on a level with the trench barrier and is impervious to rifle bullets or shrapnel unless a shell should strike the turret or burst directly above it, when material damage might be inflicted.

Like the mine thrower the trench turret was brought forth by the Germans and was used by them almost exclusively. During the September offensive of the French, a number of such turrets were captured, with the gunners locked inside and chained to their pieces, according to reports. The fire from turrets could be kept up long after men protected only by trenches have been buried with earth or put out of action as a result of heavy artillery fire.

Near St. Quentin, south of Arras, was the famous Labyrinth of the Germans, familiar to the reader of communiqués. This Labyrinth was a perfect network of trenches, with guns at every turn, from the quick-firer to heavy field pieces. It comprised the ruins of two villages, barricaded and fortified to the utmost. A stream cut across the front of it and there was abundant timber. Never before in all likelihood was such a formidable fieldwork constructed. It was laid out with the idea that should the lines on either side be bent back the Labyrinth would hold—a thorn in the flesh of the foe. German commanders believed the position to be impregnable.

Several times the French tried to take the Labyrinth. Actions were started with two or three regiments, then a couple of divisions were thrown against it. Outer works were taken but the Labyrinth held. Finally, in the September rush it was swept clean of Germans. The French were amazed at the completeness of detail and ingenuity shown by the engineers who planned the famous Labyrinth. Its fall demonstrated again the old theory that any position can be taken by sufficient masses of troops. If commanders are willing to make the sacrifice any stronghold must succumb, say the authorities.

On the eastern front natural barriers were turned to excellent



advantage by both sides. When the Russians poured into East Prussia immediately after the start of hostilities they carried all before them until Von Hindenburg halted their advance at the Mazurian Lakes. These lakes formed a chain directly in the Russians' path. There was no way to go round. To continue they must go over and accept battle on ground of another's choosing. This they did and were badly handled, estimates of losses running up to a quarter of a million men in killed, wounded and captured. Trenches played a prominent part in the contest, General von Hindenburg having taken every possible precaution against defeat.

Throughout the several campaigns fieldworks have proved superior to strongholds of granite. Przemyśl was taken by the Russians with lighter artillery than that of the fortress. Doggedly the czar's forces pushed trenches forward rod by rod until the city capitulated. This occurred again at Warsaw, where the Germans shattered big forts with their powerful guns, but were held off until the Russians made an orderly retreat by the men in the trenches. Operations around Riga and Dvinsk also have proved that earth is a better defense against heavy gun fire than masonry. Southwest of Riga, the fine Baltic port of the Russians, lies a stretch of marsh country which the czar's strategists turned to good use. Trenches stopped the Teutons when nothing else had. By maneuvering they were forced to give battle with their flank resting on a marsh, then driven into it and overwhelmed. Seeing Riga slip between their fingers the German leaders dropped back until spring, foiled by trenches, marshes, and the men in the trenches.

The war saw a splendid development of the hospital branch. Wounded men are rushed from the front to base hospitals far distant, with the least possible rough handling, when their wounds permit. Especial pains were taken with regard to men hit in the trenches. No sooner did a man go down than either he or his comrades applied first-aid remedies contained in a package carried by every combatant. He was removed to a trench operating room if the case was urgent, or carried to an ambulance at the end of the communication trenches. Sometimes it was necessary to

wait for nightfall. It is on such occasions that suffering was greatest.

Once in the ambulance the wounded man was on the road to a clean bed, warmth, food, kind hands—all that renders life bearable. Men reached London within less than twenty-four hours after being shot or bayoneted.

There was a complicated system of moving ammunition, food and other supplies to the trenches. Nearly all of this work was done at night under tremendous difficulties. Not only were the transport columns under fire, but they had every conceivable disadvantage to grapple with in the way of bad roads, crowded conditions and the need of haste. Neither motor nor horse-drawn vehicles could approach nearer the front than the communication trenches. From there everything must be carried by hand.

To meet new conditions arising from trench warfare many changes were made in the routine of armies, in the apparel of troops and in the whole working of the men's lines. One of the best remembered complaints that came from the trenches, a humorous incident in a grim chapter, was the request of Highland troops for knitted bands to slip over their knees, such as are commonly worn on the wrist. Highland pride in bare legs was humbled by the mud and wet of Flanders, where rheumatism and other ills quickly developed.

"Fluffies" was a new and affectionate appellation bestowed on the British soldiers by reason of the sheepskin coats, with the fur worn outside, which became part of their equipment. Changes were made in the footwear of all the armies to meet trench conditions. The Germans were better fitted than their enemies in this respect, as in many others, at the start. Boots were part of their regular equipment, while both French and British troops wore shoes only. These were not of the heavy type, especially among the British, but later a shoe was decided upon by the two nations which furnished good protection against water and mud.

Added to the generous amount of heavy clothing furnished men in the field, many millions of dollars were expended by a charitable world in sending mufflers, socks, and other things to

the various armies. Taken as a whole the troops are made as comfortable as the stern enterprise of war will permit. And all of the belligerents showed magnificent spirit in the face of difficulties that were scarcely dreamed of. The first winter of the war saw several million men endure all the hardships of the cave-dweller's day with stoic resolution. The second winter was better—so far as that could be possible.

Front-line trenches usually were manned in six-hour shifts. Men coming on duty spent about six days in the third-line trenches, three in the second, and as many more on the firing line, alternating every few hours between the first and second trenches. This schedule is by no means exact, but furnishes a fair idea of trench routine. After their period of duty the men were relieved of service at the front for a period of one, two, three weeks. Retiring to some near-by village, they found rest and recreation from the strain of war. A portion of their time ordinarily was put in working on the roads and other camp duties, but with sufficient freedom to get a new grip on sorely tried nerves.

One of the most trying ordeals of the war's early days was the lack of facilities for bathing. Like everything else war must be learned and the troops now have many ways of procuring that refinement of man—a bath. Any kind of vat or tub is impressed into service, water being brought from streams. Old mills are in particular favor. At some places water wheels have been rigged up in the open, but this kind of bathing is for fine weather only, it is needless to say. Trench shower baths are obtained by standing under a cask filled with water. The release of a valve gives the bather a good sprinkling.

Life in the trenches furnished an endless panorama of man's adaptability to conditions, of his cheerfulness in the face of trial and the inherent excellence of his heart. Before the war we had been told many times that the race was deteriorating, that we had not the souls nor the wills of those who lived before us. Where, it was asked, were such soldiers as followed Napoleon, Caesar and other great captains, ancient and modern? The answer is before us.



It has been demonstrated that great fortifications, the development of which has occupied engineers for centuries, are not to be compared with earthworks and simple trenches for defensive purposes. It has been said frequently that Verdun, the stronghold of northern France, was saved from the heavy guns that leveled Maubeuge and other frontier fortresses, not by its size, its artillery or commanding position, but through the countless entanglements and trenches which halted the invader.

Military science in the future will attach small importance to big masonry works. It is probable that elaborate positions comprehending moats, wire entanglements, sunken roads, and buried gun turrets are to succeed the massive fortresses of the recent past and the present. It was shown at Vicksburg as long ago as the Civil War, that guns protected by sand banks, such as the bluffs on which that city stands, could defy artillery fire. The Federal fleet's shelling did little more than toss the sand about, and it was not until mines from the land side blew up the more important works that the city wavered in its brave defense.

Napoleon is said to have been the first great general to employ trenches extensively, although by no means in the same manner as at present. He thought rifle pits a very good thing for troops when besieging a fortress, and had his men dig trenches of a regulation depth on several occasions.

## PART VIII—POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE WARRING COUNTRIES

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### CHAPTER LIV

GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY,  
RUSSIA, AUSTRIA

WE turn now from the colossal campaigns and battle fields of the Great War to analyze swiftly the political and economic situation that the war created in each of the countries, the financial pressure, the social and business tension, and the general affairs "behind the scenes of government."

Let us first observe the conditions in England on the eve of her peril. When on July 31, 1914, Lombard Street saw the storm approaching it shut the doors of the Royal Stock Exchange and pulled down the blinds to save British credit. But on that day of panic there were at least 40,000,000 Englishmen who did not dream that the war was less than a week away and that it would involve the very life and destiny of the empire. Many of them said complacently: "If Great Britain must eventually fight, she has her coffers and her navy, and our people can continue to go about their business as usual."

The Stock Exchange had been closed on July 31, 1914, as much to save the British credit from the "raids" of foreigners as to prevent Britons themselves from bankrupting their great financial establishment. There is not in the whole history of international finance a more dramatic episode than what had been taking place in Lombard Street during the month of July, 1914. Certain foreign bankers and business men were definitely informed of the immediate imminence of war. On July 14, 1914, it was known to certain foreign bankers that Germany would

support Austria if war came as a result of the latter's trouble with Serbia. These bankers made use of their knowledge by unloading millions in pounds sterling in bonds and stocks on the Bank of England and other British banks in exchange for gold. From July 22 to 29 the reserve gold in the Bank of England fell from £40,164,000 to £38,131,000. On July 30, 1914, a further draft of £1,200,000 went abroad, and proportionate amounts were withdrawn from all the other leading British banks. During these same weeks foreign merchants bought unusually large bills of goods from British manufacturers on the usual sixty and ninety days' credit, and owed for them many millions of pounds.

On Monday, August 3, 1914, creditors were clamoring for gold for their paper, and there was not gold enough in all the United Kingdom to pay sixpence on the pound all around. But, fortunately, August 3 was a bank holiday, and a run on the banks was avoided. The House of Commons hastened to the rescue by passing an act called the Postponement of Payments, and this gave the Government the power to issue a royal proclamation postponing the payment of all bills for one month or until September 4, or later. The bank holiday was extended for three more days and the banks remained closed till Friday morning. The Government in the meantime began the issuing of legal tender notes for one pound and for ten shillings, which meant that all creditors would be compelled to accept these notes for all debts due them. The moratorium was extended to all debts except for rent for one month, and on Friday, when the banks opened, the panic had passed and business was resumed in the ordinary way. The Government had granted the payment of outstanding bills of £400,000,000 exchange, and the Stock Exchange had been saved from disappearing in wholesale bankruptcy.

When the Expeditionary Force, mobilized on August 5 to 8, 1914, began to land on the latter day on the shores of France, Lord Kitchener called on the British for 100,000 volunteers, and the House of Commons increased the army to 500,000 men and authorized two war credits, amounting to \$1,025,000,000. To the call for volunteers there was a spontaneous response, but it came largely from certain classes, such as the more skilled and



trained workers and the heads of families, men a hundredfold more valuable in the workshop and homes of England at this stage of the great crisis than in the trenches of France and Flanders.

But Great Britain entered the war with one signal advantage compared with all of her great struggles of the past. The principal leaders of both the great political parties were quick to see that the empire faced a struggle for its very life. Liberals like Asquith and Grey and Lloyd-George, and Conservatives like Bonar Law and Balfour, stood shoulder to shoulder. The colonies, likewise, quickly proved their loyalty.

On September 4, 1914, an important diplomatic event occurred in London. The Entente Allies—Great Britain, France, and Russia—signed an agreement that no one of them should negotiate a separate peace without the consent of all the others.

On November 17, 1914, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd-George, brought into the House his monster war budget. He told the Commons that he was forced to provide for a deficit on March 31, 1915, of £339,571,000, and he argued that a substantial part of this sum must be raised by taxation. He pointed to the precedent of Pitt and Gladstone in raising war funds. This war he said would cost Britain £450,000,000 (\$2,250,000,000) the first full year. If Great Britain rose to the heroic level of 1798 she would be raising a revenue of from £450,000,000 to £700,000,000, and no borrowing would be needed. It would be wisest to assume that the war would be long. It would be folly to borrow to meet interest on loans and loss of revenue. Four-fifths of the money raised would be spent in Great Britain, and during the war and after reconstruction there would practically be no competition in neutral markets except from America. For four or five years thereafter British industries would be artificially stimulated, but afterward customers' purchasing power would be crippled and much capital would have to be exhausted. During the inflation as much as possible should be raised by taxation. It had been decided to issue a loan of £350,000,000 at  $3\frac{1}{4}$  per cent.

On August 4, 1914, the French ministry appealed to Great Britain for her armed intervention in behalf of the future

equilibrium of Europe, and, as has been stated, Great Britain gave adhesion to that appeal by declaring war that same day on Germany. We have seen how on August 1, 1914, Italy had refused to join Austria and Germany in the war. Thus the Triple Alliance, which had existed for more than thirty-five years, fell like a house of cards, and from the Triple Entente, sprang to arms another triple alliance, that was a month later to bind itself hard and fast that no members of it should make peace without consent of its partners.

On August 1, 1914, the day on which Germany dispatched her declaration of war to Russia, France knew that she must enter the struggle, and the War Office gave an order to the Creusot factory for the construction of a number of howitzers. That order went out with the order to mobilize the French army.

On August 3, 1914, some changes were made in the French Cabinet. It was now one of the most radical governments that had ever ruled France. It had been constructed by leaving out the two ablest ministers in French public life, M. Théophile Delcassé, who in the Foreign Office had matched German diplomacy in Morocco, and M. Alexandre Millerand, a minister with an amazing amount of constructive energy. The majority of Frenchmen felt the Government could not go far in this war without M. Delcassé in the Foreign Office and M. Millerand at the helm of the War Office.

The mobilization of the army and its concentration at its allotted posts is described in Volume II. It now proceeded with the greatest energy and facility. The French railroads proved marvels of efficiency in moving the troops. The French war machine was running with ease and speed. On M. Viviani's Cabinet table on this same 4th of August, 1914, lay a dispatch that had been sent to the Cabinets of London and Petrograd by King Albert of the Belgians, calling upon the three Governments to cooperate in defending the neutrality of his kingdom. But the Government and the heads of the army had been woefully deceived in their judgment as to the strength of the fortresses of Liege and Namur. They were still very confident that these Belgian strongholds could hold out till the republic could

throw a powerful force into Alsace and Lorraine and draw off the Belgian invaders. This was the keynote of French hopes until August 17, 1914, when the Belgian Government became convinced that Liege could not much longer hold out, and on that day moved its archives from Brussels to Antwerp.

When on September 3, 1914, Von Kluck's artillery had come almost within range of the fortifications of the city, and some of his horsemen had penetrated within ten miles of the suburbs, the Government moved the capital to safety in Bordeaux. Even in the face of the Government's departure, with the sound of the invaders' guns in their ears, the people of Paris remained doggedly calm, and Joffre was still the country's hero. There is not in all French history another such example of complete unity and calmness under like circumstances, and Paris has felt the hands of the invader more often than any other city in Europe. Moreover, Paris was threatened at the critical stage with starvation, because of the breakdown of the railways. Every non-combatant had been sent out of the city.

But on September 4, 1914, the right wing of the German army turned and marched southeasterly, on September 7, 1914, Paris and France learned that their own army had turned to make a stand, and on September 13, 1914, General Joffre announced that the tide had turned and the German army was in full retreat. France was glad, but she did not show it in her old way. She was now too earnest and too determined to waste an ounce of her energy in demonstration.

On October 3, 1914, the minister of finance announced that advances made to the Government amounted to \$420,000,000. He also stated that business was beginning to show a slight improvement. Great improvement had been effected in the management of the railways. From October 1 expresses were resumed on all the lines. On October 7 an official French statement put the number of German soldiers on that date in France and Belgium at 1,640,000.

On December 8, 1914, the Government returned to Paris. On December 22 the Chambers met, and the unity that characterized the meeting on the outbreak of the war still endured in all its



strength. On this day General Joffre, who had practically become the dictator of the army, announced that twenty-four generals had been retired. The Chambers voted a war credit of \$1,100,000,000.

The year of 1914 closed with France proclaiming her faith in ultimate victory. The only notable moral and economic event that occurred in the republic during January was the Government's prohibiting the sale of absinthe. The bill was signed by President Poincaré on January 7, 1915.

The economic stability of Germany is one of the most remarkable features of the Great War. We have witnessed the spectacle of Emperor William suddenly returning to Berlin from a yachting cruise in the Baltic on July 26, 1914; we have heard his words of July 27, when Germany declined to accept the British proposal for a conference on the ground that it would practically amount to a court of arbitration, "that if Russia mobilized only in the south, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in the north, Germany would have to do so too." The emperor further stated that he was doing his best at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to agree. We have seen how, on July 31, 1914, Germany began mobilizing, when on the same day Russia issued orders to mobilize, and how on August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia, and the Great War became a fact. We have further observed how on August 2, 1914, German troops entered the Duchy of Luxemburg and demanded to know whether Belgium would permit the free passage of troops across Belgian territory; how Belgium refused permission and declared that she would defend her neutrality; and how Germany then informed Belgium that she would carry out by force her plans to approach the French frontier through Belgian territory, and German troops entered Belgium at Verviers.

The domestic political history of Germany was scarcely less vital to the crisis than her diplomatic history. On August 1, 2, and 3, 1914, the imperial chancellor was absorbed in delicate negotiations with the leaders of various Reichstag parties anticipatory of the famous war session of August 4, 1914, held under

the presidency of the emperor in his palace. It was of the utmost political importance for Germany's swift success in the war—and she then counted on no other—that a picture of unalloyed harmony should be presented to the world. The Socialist leaders demanded, in accordance with their party tenets, evidence that the hostilities for which the Government required £265,000,000 sterling of emergency war credits and £75,000,000 sterling of loans authorized, were of a “defensive” character.

Not only had Germany been made politically solid for the war, but she instantly began to demonstrate another phase of her capacity that was to startle the world. We have seen that Great Britain in the first stage of the war actually turned from the war itself to pick up Germany's lost foreign commerce. But this commerce was now taken from Germany as a great burden is taken from the back of a runner. It was a handicap to her in war, and for the time being she was well rid of it. In a flash, she reversed the machinery of her industrial, economic, and civic life, and hitched it up to her giant war machine.

The German Imperial Bank announced on August 10, 1914, that it held £65,000,000 in gold. With the outbreak of the war, gold had been called in as a prime defensive necessity of the realm. The newspapers organized gold collecting bureaus, and daily preached the necessity of paying gold into the bank. Before the war was a week old all gold disappeared. Notes for even as low as one mark and two marks were issued, and the man who brought to the bank a 10-mark piece in gold and took paper for it was called a true patriot.

Dr. Helfferich, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced on September 15, 1914, that a war loan of £200,000,000 at 5 per cent would be floated, the issue price being 97½. Great efforts were made to secure the success of this loan, and within a few days the total subscribed amounted to £223,000,000, but only £188,000,000 of this had been paid in at the end of November, 1914.

On October 13, 1914, the German Government after the fall of Antwerp gave assurances to Holland that it would respect the neutrality of the Scheldt River leading from Antwerp through Holland to the North Sea. During the siege of Antwerp there

was great uneasiness in Government circles at The Hague that Germany would seize the mouth of the Scheldt to use in bringing her submarines and other warships nearer to England on the ground of "military necessity," her excuse for invading Belgium.

On October 17, 1914, Germany estimated the number of prisoners she had taken in the two months of the war up to the first of October as 8,800 British, 31,000 Belgians, 94,100 Russians, and 123,000 French. Many of these prisoners had been put to work harvesting the German crops, but a few weeks later, through the medium of the American Ambassadors in London and Berlin, all British prisoners of war who were adjudged of no further use for military services were exchanged.

The Prussian Diet at the opening session on October 22, 1914, voted another credit of £75,000,000. This made £275,000,000 now appropriated to the needs of the war in its third month.

In both the German and Prussian Parliaments, December 2, 1914, all parties united in declaring that the war should be prosecuted to a successful end. In the German Parliament, the imperial chancellor, dressed in the gray service uniform of a general with a sword at his side, declared that the German nation was fighting "a defensive war for right and freedom," and that though the apparent responsibility of the war fell on Russia, the real responsibility fell on the British Government, as the latter would have made the war impossible, "if it had without ambiguity declared at Petrograd that Great Britain would not allow a continental war to develop from the Austro-Serbian conflict. Such a declaration would have obliged France to take energetic measures to restrain Russia from undertaking warlike operations, and the German action as mediator between Petrograd and Vienna would have been successful.

Turning now to Russia we find a remarkable situation. On August 1, 1914, when the tocsin sounded throughout the empire, the order went forth to close every vodka shop that had remained opened at railway stations and at hotels and restaurants, and to seal up all private brandy cellars. For many years the manufacture of vodka had been a Russian state monopoly, the revenue from this source alone amounting to \$500,000,000



annually, but in the previous April the czar had instructed the head of the Treasury to discontinue the manufacture of this Russian brandy, so that the Government might find a way to "tax the toil of the people instead of taxing their drunkenness." At the outbreak of war the minister of finance estimated that the people within that short time have increased their savings on an average of \$15,000,000 per month, as shown by the deposits in savings banks and other investments. He estimated that what the people would now save from temperance would pay Russia's bill in the war.

The closing of the vodka shop was to become an unusual factor, a military factor of great importance for Russia and her allies in the war. The minister of war estimated that because of prohibition the Russian army was mobilized and thrown on the Polish-German frontier three weeks earlier than it would have been possible with the vodka shops open.

The Jewish question now arose. The Russian Minister of War on September 5, 1914, issued an order permitting Jews to become officers in the Russian army and navy, and the announcement was well received in all quarters. Up to that time no Jew was ever allowed to become a military or naval officer, and the decision to admit Jews to such positions was said to be due to the gallantry which the Jews as common soldiers had displayed in the battles already fought. The imperial decree enabled the Russian commander in chief to confer commissions on several hundred Jews who gained exceptional distinction in the battles which preceded the capture of Lemberg. When this announcement was made it was also stated that the civil law restrictions on all members of the Hebrew race would be removed. The Jews would be admitted to the full rights of Russian citizens. Those Russian papers which had formerly been relentless advocates of antisemitism not only refrained from raising any objections, but expressed their approval of it in the warmest terms. The same feeling prevailed in those circles of Russian society in which it was formerly a breach of etiquette to mention the name of a Jew.

The war did not find Russia unprepared in regard to finance. The free balance in the state treasury amounted to more than \$250,000,000, while the gold reserve in the state bank was more than \$85,000,000. Economies in expenditure for the current year of 1914 had amounted to a saving of \$160,000,000, while the surplus for the first half of 1914 was \$38,000,000. In fact, so flourishing were the conditions that more than \$500,000,000 were at the disposal of the Government to carry on the war without it being necessary at the outset to impose additional taxation. But on September 8, 1914, the Government levied new taxes on the people, and on September 28 Petrograd bankers placed at the czar's disposal \$500,000,000 for financing the war and for the benefit of the families of soldiers. The next day the moratorium on all debts was extended another month.

On July 27, 1914, the Vienna and Budapest bourses, feeling the tremor of war in the atmosphere, closed their doors just as London, Paris, and Berlin were to do three days later. We have seen how on August 12, 1914, Austria declared war on Great Britain and withdrew her troops from the borders of France, whence she had sent them to provoke France to declare war on her in order to prove to Italy, one of her Triple Alliance partners, that France was the aggressor, and how France accommodated her by declaring war on her that same day.

But Austria was not neglecting to watch Italy, for on that same day—August 12, 1914—she sent one of her ablest diplomats, Baron Karl von Macchio, to Rome. One month and seven days later—September 19, 1914—Austria sent a force of 300,000 men to guard the frontiers between herself and Italy. In the first two weeks of August there had been a number of energetic nationalist demonstrations in Rome, Milan, and other Italian cities. Every ingenuity of statecraft, and even of menace, was employed to keep Italy neutral and passive while the Dual Monarchy hurled her mixed legions on Russia and little Serbia.

Austria's foreign trade had been nearly wiped out by the war. At the end of the fiscal year of 1914 there was reported on November 10 a deficit of \$168,000,000 in exports.





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